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preface
Canetti’s novel never fails to elicit rather strong opinions. Recently in the
New Yorker, David Denby declared it ‘‘a long, provocatively odd, and emo-
tionally demanding novel.’’ 1 Remarkable amidst the variety of these dis-
tinctly unambivalent reactions is the fact that readers have tended to see
Auto-da-Fé as a compellingly contemporary work, and in one notable case,
even pronounced it a ‘‘postwar novel.’’ 2 This is an understandable error.
Canetti did not really gain wide recognition until the early 1960s, when his
quixotic anthropological study Crowds and Power first appeared. Implicitly
addressing the Cold War stalemate, and hailed as ‘‘above ideology,’’ this
much-discussed book was bound to encourage readers to associate Canetti
in the first instancewith the burning issues of that bipolar world, rather than
with prewar modernist fiction. Yet placing Canetti the novelist alongside the
likes of such unmistakably postwar writers as Grass, Böll, and Christa Wolf
was probably more than an oversight. Those who read and reviewed the
novel at this time, including thosewho certainly knewof itsWeimar-era ori-
gins (such as Hans Magnus Enzensberger), were in fact quite prepared to
view it as a work chiefly about contemporary society. It may be that ‘‘social
relevance’’ was already becoming a dominant criterion of literary achieve-
ment, even before the student movement established it more firmly. And it
may also be that some critics simply mistook the date of republication—it
was reissued in the wake of Crowds and Power in order, in part, to capital-
ize on that book’s success—for the original date.Whatever the case, nobody
seemed to miss the modernist context of the early 1930s, when Canetti actu-
ally wrote what would be his only published novel.
There is more to this, of course, than merely a testimony to the novel’s
ageless appeal, though this would have pleased Canetti immensely since he
aspired to nothing more than to be a writer who transcended his own times.
This episode reflects an important fact about Auto-da-Fé: readers, even lit-
erary critics, are curiously disinclined to associate Canetti’s novel with the
classics of literary modernism. For this, as I endeavor to demonstrate, there
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is very good reason. Though surely part of the same anti-realist tradition
that embraces Joyce, Musil, and Rilke, Canetti is indeed strikingly different.
The novel’s wicked humor, its analytic posture, and above all its concern for
the diminishing public sphere set it far apart from what we would come to
know as ‘‘aesthetic,’’ or ‘‘high modernism.’’
In a graduate seminar on modernism, I recall asking about those es-
tranged and world-weary aesthetes, the typical protagonists of high mod-
ernism: How did they navigate their social lives? My question, which arose
out of my reading of Auto-da-Fé (a novel, incidentally, that was not on the
course syllabus), was met with polite disinterest. As I began to work my
way into the secondary literature, it occurred to me that critics often only
complicated the matter by attempting to apply a high modernist template
that just does not fit Auto-da-Fé. And, when the novel failed to measure up,
they credited themselves with having discovered an ‘‘error’’ in its concep-
tion. Fortunately, just around the time of these musings, a paradigm shift
occurred—in the case of German literature, one that is associated chiefly
with Peter Bürger, Russell Berman, and Andreas Huyssen—that enabled me
to approach the novel with an eye to its rich social and cultural context. This
approach has proven most fruitful above all in taking the novel on its own
terms, opening up a vista on a whole array of topics that up to now have
only been addressed, if at all, in piecemeal fashion.
While this more capacious view of modernism structures the bulk of this
study, allowing me to tap into Canetti’s unwavering interest in social ar-
rangements, it occurred to me that adhering to the traditional construction
of literary modernism may, in its own way, prove just as instructive. What
first helped me see the distinctive features of Auto-da-Fé, after all, was the
marked contrast with aesthetic modernism. Thus in the final chapter of this
study, I turn back the clock and place Canetti’s novel in the context of high
modernism. This exercise throws the novel into contrastive relief, revealing
more clearly than otherwise possible all the narrative features that comprise
what I have dubbed Canetti’s trademark ‘‘analytic modernism.’’
Readers familiar with Canetti’s engaging autobiography, the evocative
NorthAfrican travelmemoir, or his far-flung anthropological studyare typi-
cally struck by the breadth of the author’s interests, the variety of his ex-
perience, and the quality of his erudition. These same expectations are fully
met in Auto-da-Fé, yet up to this point there was no book available to guide
the reader through the rich and complex contexts and intertexts that make
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reading this challenging novel such a rewarding experience. Despite some
valuable monographs on particular aspects of the novel, as well as quite gen-
eral surveys of Canetti’s entire oeuvre, we have lacked a substantial study of
the full range of topics broached by the novel: the Freud satire, the ‘‘cultural’’
case for misogyny, the virulent racial anti-Semitism in its relationship to a
failed humanism, and a cluster of philosophical and pseudophilosophical
movements of the interwar period.
Though Canetti’s novel belonged to world literature long before it was
reclaimed by German readers in the early 1960s, scholarship has tended to
favor the German readership. I will attempt to serve two masters: both the
generalist who knows the novel as Auto-da-Fé in the ordinarily quite ex-
cellent Wedgwood translation, as well as the more specialized Germanist,
who will want to examine the original text in the context of my analysis.
In order to accomplish both tasks I have arrived at the following solution: I
have translated all quotations (or used available standard editions) from the
secondary literature, including Freud, Adorno, and Lukács. For the novel
itself, which is the principal object of my study, I have provided both the
English (which in not a few cases represents my revision of Wedgwood) and
Canetti’s German original.While this may seem pedantic and cumbersome,
it will, I think, prove worthwhile. For when it comes to humor and nuance,
of which Canetti is an acknowledged master, even a talented translation can
usually only capture one of an array of semantic options available in the
original. Most of my alternate renderings appear, perhaps unsurprisingly,
within the discussions of misogyny and anti-Semitism, topics which were
not aired so openly inWedgwood’s day.Taken together, there nowappears to
be enough evidence that this ‘‘personally supervised’’ translation, while still
of enormous value, cannot in fact have been line-edited by Canetti himself.
My interest in making this study of Auto-da-Fé available also to the non-
specialist and students of comparative literature hasmuch to dowith Canetti
himself. Roger Kimball captures perfectly the intrinsic dual thrust of this
enterprise when he describes Canetti’s works as ‘‘scrupulously avant-garde
yet ‘large’ enough in their ambition to command mainstream critical atten-
tion.’’ 3 One of the things that makes Canetti so continually attractive is that
he represents an ideal to which so many of us still, if only covertly, aspire—
namely, that of the nonspecialist polymath. There may be no more memo-
rable a skewering of academic overspecialization and pomposity in all of
world literature than that which we find in Auto-da-Fé. Yet this is clearly not
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to be read as an anti-intellectual stance. On the contrary, Canetti steadfastly
maintained that it is possible to be a serious intellectual generalist with-
out necessarily devolving into a dilettante. The effort, at least, is necessary,
Canetti felt, lest in our drive to master detail we lose sight of the larger so-
cial good. And those who are preoccupied with their own narrow specialty
become vulnerable, as the novel unforgettably suggests, to the power grabs
of the less scrupulous. Though Auto-da-Fé mercilessly critiques acquisitive
bourgeois notions of German ‘‘cultivation’’ (Bildung), Canetti himself re-
deems—and refashions—the concept in his own literary-intellectual career.
It is my hope, therefore, to enrich the reading experience of the more gen-
eral reader, even as I engage my colleagues in fairly specific debates about
the novel’s complex relationship to the interwar period of Austrian andGer-
man culture, traditional literary modernism, and Canetti’s own consider-
able body of social thought.
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Foreword to the 2020 edition
Is it fair to ask, almost twenty years after its initial publication, whether this 
book is rightly titled “the end of modernism”? Is it too grandiose to claim that 
Elias Canetti’s monumental interwar novel, Die Blendung (or Auto-da-Fé, as it 
would become known in the English speaking world), in any sense marked the 
end of modernism? The answer—a scholarly “yes and no”—sheds light both 
on Canetti as aesthetic innovator and social thinker and upon subsequent 
developments in literary and culture studies.
Auto-da-Fé is still rightly seen as a rejection of central tenets of what we once 
called aesthetic or high modernism. Arguably more than any of his literary 
peers, Canetti insists on the sheer durability and obstinance of our physical 
and social environments. This is not because he was invested in maintaining 
the status quo or in using literature to endorse traditionalist politics. Far from 
it. Canetti strongly opposed the Austro-fascism of interwar Austria, which he 
experienced firsthand as a young man, and he praised Karl Kraus’s heroism in 
publicly denouncing the Viennese police commissioner’s use of deadly force 
against unarmed civilian protesters at the famous 1927 demonstration in front 
of the Palace of Justice. And he would, of course, go on to pen an extended 
indictment against power itself, Masse und Macht (Crowds and Power)—his 
life’s work—and the most far-reaching cultural investigation of power prior to 
Foucault.
No, the remarkable solidity of the social sphere the reader experiences in 
Auto-da-Fé is more of a warning, possibly even a threat. Diagnosing social 
arrangements as constructed—a typical move in literary and cultural studies 
during the reign of critique as the master interpretive paradigm—was often 
accompanied by an earnest optimism for social renewal. The unstated 
corollary to this finding went something like this: anything that is revealed to 
be constructed could be readily deconstructed or even reconstructed. Canetti—
as if anticipating the critical debates of subsequent decades—answers with a 
cautious “not so fast.” Like Brecht, he was not particularly sanguine about social 
progress emerging merely from the awareness of social constructedness. He 
had witnessed the persistence of Habsburg traditionalism long after the actual 
demise of the empire; the continuation of anti-Semitism after Jews had fulfilled 
all the requirements of assimilation, including in some cases baptism; and the 
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perseverance of authoritarianism (not to mention the rise of fascism) during 
the putative democracy of the Austrian First Republic. There was plenty that 
he would have liked to see disappear, yet he was aware, perhaps particularly as 
a Jew, that wishing away the unwanted state of affairs was not only insufficient 
but also deeply problematic. A shrewd observer of entrenched power, he knew 
that social change was not a decisionist affair, and his modernist novel satirizes 
those who think it is.
The act of erasing intersubjective reality in Auto-da-Fé is therefore not 
high modernism’s welcome release from the shackles of history and society, 
nor is it primarily the artist’s soaring act of aesthetic reinvention. It is, more 
routinely, an ominous error: Peter Kien deploys scholarship (he is the world’s 
foremost sinologist, or so we are led to believe) to enclose himself in a tomb of 
knowledge. In one of the most famous passages of the novel—a devastatingly 
humorous parody of academia still topical today—Professor Kien “explains” 
how ignorance of the world is not only justified but indeed required by 
the rigors of academic specialization. Therese, the misogynistically drawn 
housekeeper, pursues a husband and fortune through flagrant acts of what we 
might call selective seeing, or the culpable overwriting of major elements of 
the Viennese public sphere, as readers are meant to notice. And Fischerle, the 
poor little hunchbacked Jew, concocts a fantasy of becoming a debonair, rich 
American, a dream of assimilation meant to transport him out of the criminal 
underworld he has been confined to all his life. But he is only rendered 
sufficiently “un-Jewish” in a violent attack that ends his life.
In other words, Auto-da-Fé does not despair of the social world’s reality 
or doubt its ontological status to the extent that many postwar scholars 
thought modernism should. The failure to fulfill this modernist criterion of 
epistemological uncertainty, it was argued (though sometimes only implicitly), 
rendered the respective work less sophisticated, less epistemologically radical, 
and moved it—ominously—in the direction of realism, with all of its allegedly 
unreflected assumptions about the real. Canetti’s major contribution was 
to show—from within the movement itself—that dangers lay in the other 
direction as well. Although he could not have anticipated the critical discourse 
that would define and valorize modernism decades after writing his novel, 
Auto-da-Fé serves as an uncanny anticipation of, and response to, these very 
debates. 
He was of course aware that his novel is dark (or “duster,” as he would later 
refer to it in his correspondence)—difficult, and not easily consumable. He 
would often warn those who came to him by way of other more accessible 
writings (such as the autobiography) that the novel, with its extremist figures 
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and challenging narrative technique (featuring serial interior monologue that 
frequently obfuscates the identity of the respective controlling consciousness), 
is simply not for everyone. It was not a book destined to become a bestseller, 
nor did it. He was also keenly aware of his place within literary modernism. 
James Joyce (whose grave at the Fluntern Cemetery in Zurich adjoins his 
own) was, Canetti observed, much more given to linguistic experimentation. 
In contrast, Canetti speaks of a need to respect the power and givenness of 
language; it proves sturdy enough, at any rate, to sponsor his own modernist 
satire in Auto-da-Fé. But this is by no means an unqualified endorsement. His 
profound skepticism focuses, rather, upon the use of language, particularly 
as an instrument of power and domination. The author of the modernist 
drama Hochzeit (in which intradiegetic confusion reigns supreme) was not 
naive about the propensity of language to fail. But neither was he absolutist 
about language’s inevitable failure. This would cause disciples of Derrida, and 
other poststructural theorists responsible for the canonical view of literary 
modernism at the time this study was first published, to wonder if Canetti 
really belonged to the club after all. Unwilling to segregate language as a thing 
unto itself, Canetti always treated it holistically, which is to say in the context 
of its speakers, auditors, and readers. It is no coincidence, then, that he renders 
readers of Auto-da-Fé complicit in his language games by compelling them 
to decode the often malicious voices lurking within ostensibly third-person 
narration.
If it can be said that Auto-da-Fé identifies and opposes certain antisocial 
elements within the high modernist paradigm (and performs similarly 
diagnostic work for a literary-theoretical paradigm that valorized radical 
epistemological skepticism over other kinds of literary knowing), it is of 
course not true that the novel ended modernism per se. How could it have? 
Modernism mutated on its own, to be sure, but critics are to blame as well. Like 
doctors who have overprescribed antibiotics, they have, in overextending the 
term reduced its conceptual efficacy. How can one today explain to students, 
or to colleagues outside of the field, what the word should mean under these 
conditions of almost limitless elasticity? It is a terminological embarrassment 
that I tried to cope with by creating sub-genres (such as, in the case of Auto-
da-Fé, analytic modernism). But I’m afraid that has not caught on—at least 
not yet. 
In the introduction to this book, I lean heavily on David Hollinger’s 
classic approach to the phenomenon. But I’m afraid that even his capacious 
dichotomy between the scientific, empirical knower and the aspirational, 
sometimes fantastic artificer no longer quite captures all that scholars now 
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seek to place within this overburdened rubric. Still, given the apparent cache 
of the term, and the felt need to apply it to works of high innovation and 
achievement, there may be some wisdom in the pragmatic solution, proposed 
by David Harvey (in The Conditions of Postmodernity), to view modernism and 
postmodernism together as one large (and heterogeneous) aesthetic response 
to modernity.
Canetti of course is no innocent of the predicament in which we find 
ourselves. Rather than having ended the movement (which was of course 
never really his intention), he managed to expand it, ingeniously using 
modernist tools to dissect modernism. He forced open the gates of the genre, 
introducing a kind of hybrid satire that depends upon language to communicate 
reliably even while the novel radically questions language’s communicative 
propensities. In Auto-da-Fé, it is after all one and the same narrative—a 
discourse that is repeatedly hijacked, sometimes covertly, by the novel’s 
sundry figures—that gives us both a real world denied or misrecognized by its 
characters and a world of illusion and fantasy. In combining the knower and 
the artificer functions within a single work, Canetti prepared us for a richer, 
more complex understanding of modernism. Not one that need spin out of 
control indiscriminately, losing all definitional contours, but rather one that 
accommodates both dependable judgment about intersubjective reality and 
highly perspectivized, subjective flights of fancy. In light of the contemporary 
assault on truth, and what James Kloppenberg has aptly called the pervasive 
culture of irony, Canetti’s is perhaps a particularly timely vision.
I dedicate this second edition of The End of Modernism to Alfred and 
Waltraut Doppler, who first introduced me to Canetti on a hike in the Green 
Mountains of Vermont when I was a student at Middlebury College. Their love 
of literature continues to sustain me. 
William Collins Donahue
July 2020
Nobody can write as wickedly as you.
(So bös wie Sie kann niemand schreiben.)
—Friedl Benedikt to Elias Canetti
Introduction
Modernism in a Different Key
Auto-da-Fé is a brutal book.
—Roger Kimball 1
After reading Auto-da-Fé Hermann Broch asked Canetti: ‘‘What are
you trying to say?’’ Before the visibly stunned Canetti could reply, Broch
continued, somewhat apologetically: ‘‘If you knew that, you wouldn’t have
written the novel. That was a bad question.’’ 2 Yet it is the question that
has occupied readers ever since the novel was first published in 1935. To
lay out my own answer, I have had to write this book; yet it can be stated
simply: Auto-da-Fé is profoundly concerned with the diminution of the so-
cial world.The ‘‘blinding’’ of the novel’s original German title,Die Blendung,
refers in the first place to the blocking out of social reality that manifests
itself personally, but is in each case emblematic of a larger cultural practice.
The novel evokes and hilariously debunks a whole series of cultural strate-
gies that ‘‘address’’ social crises largely by, as the Germans say, ‘‘thinking
them away’’ (wegdenken). These evasions take various forms, ranging from
a child’s magical thinking (‘‘if I don’t see you, you’re not there’’) to the more
subtle variety Canetti affiliates with escapist literature, popular philosophy,
and, not least of all, Sigmund Freud. It was Canetti’s deepest ambition to
become the kind of author whose work, which, though perhaps not fully
appreciated in its own day, would one day find lasting recognition. This as-
piration may well be met in Auto-da-Fé. For though it should in the first
instance be seen as responding to particular cultural crises of the Weimar
era, as I will show at some length in this study, it would be difficult to name
one object of the novel’s parody that is not in some manner with us still.
Whatmakes reading Canetti an exciting adventure is the fact that the per-
spectives he develops are never derivative and rarely expected, which per-
haps accounts for some of the curious interpretations I will address below.
Misogyny and racial anti-Semitism come under fire, therefore, not for the
2 : introduction
obvious reason that such practices are unjust. In fact, Canetti even exploits
these topics for humor—a fact that may explain why so many readers admit
only privately to laughing out loud while reading this novel. What proves
to be so laughable (though not ‘‘funny’’ in the sense of trivial entertain-
ment) is the intricate way in which misogyny is shown to be implicated in
the much-heralded ‘‘crisis of subjectivity.’’ Well before it was fashionable to
do so,Auto-da-Fé portrays this classic event in highmodernism—otherwise
known as the ‘‘fragmented subject’’—as a suspiciously gendered affair that
is not merely a personal, but a decidedly widespread cultural malaise. Like-
wise anti-Semitism: it does not require great hermeneutic skill to decipher
Fischerle (a major figure in Book 2 of the novel) as an icon of perverse anti-
Semitic stereotyping. Yet Canetti complicates this issue by relating the fate
of this hunchbacked Jewish pimp to the larger failure of humanism, indeed
of the entire enlightenment project of ‘‘culture’’ as it was resuscitated in a
particular way during the Weimar period.
At stake is not merely the efficacy of such peculiarly German enterprises
as Bildung and Kultur; there are, of course, more specific targets. While the
brothers Kien exhibit behavior that is perhaps most uncomfortably famil-
iar to academics of our own day, they happen to represent specific aspects
of two notableWeimar-era philosophical schools, neoempiricism and neo-
Kantianism. Peter Kien (referred to henceforth simply as ‘‘Kien’’) is the most
obvious culprit because he makes no secret of his cultural elitism. In his fa-
mous Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen
(Aesthetic Letters, 1795), perhaps the quintessential German document of
idealist aesthetics, Friedrich Schiller had espoused a model of culture that
would harmonize the requirements of the autonomous Kantian subject with
the demands of the sensual and contingent social world.ThoughKien claims
to be an ardent partisan of this lofty cultural heritage, his professed love of
Kant turns out to be little more than a specious justification for retreat and
isolation from a dauntingly modern world. Though the ‘‘ivory tower’’ syn-
drome is indeed a perennial, if not universal, phenomenon, we will see that
Kien’s ‘‘idealism’’ takes on a specifically Weimar form. As a noted philolo-
gist—indeed, theworld’s most famous such specimen—he invokes precisely
that discipline that was to play such a crucial role inWerner Jäger’s interwar
cultural renewal program known as the ‘‘ThirdHumanism.’’ Needless to say,
Kien’s practice of scholarship gives us little hope of cultural rejuvenation
from this quarter. Brother Georg is surely the more insidious of intellectual
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frauds, not in the least because he appears to be the sanest and most attrac-
tive of characters. He avidly seeks to portray himself as politically engaged
by promoting his ‘‘innovative’’ psychological methods as subversively anti-
bourgeois. But no less than his elder brother, Georg wraps himself in con-
temporary philosophical garb only to escape the very social world he claims
to advocate. With these two highly educated brothers, Canetti reminds us
how seductive fashionablemodes of thought can be, and how easily they can
be employed to mask hidden (as well as not so well concealed) agendas.
All of these constructions of culture are hilariously doomed: the pulp fic-
tion that fosters nostalgic retreat into a national history that never quite was
(an issue Canetti ingeniously intercuts by alluding to the then-bestselling
novelist Willibald Alexis), no less than the veneration of an imperial
‘‘Vienna’’ that has been reduced to a spectral and insubstantial presence. In
fact, the only truly durable municipal edifice in the whole novel turns out to
be the ‘‘Theresianum,’’ a building designed to evoke the economic disloca-
tions and cultural contradictions of the interwar years like no otherViennese
landmark possibly could.Auto-da-Fé leaves little doubt about what does not
work. Neither turning back the clock (as Kien and company would have it)
nor mindlessly chasing after the latest intellectual fad (as Georg does) will
suffice as a foundation for the cultural renaissance the novel suggests we need
so urgently.
Whence cometh our salvation? Once again, it is to Hermann Broch that
we turn for common sense. He observed, quite correctly I think, that the
novel ends in total destruction, harsh and merciless. Broch’s penchant for
answering his own questions is in evidence in the following query. Referring
to the novel’s rather bleak conclusion, he asks Canetti: ‘‘Doyouwant this col-
lapse? It is evident that you desire precisely the opposite. You would gladly
do your part to indicate a way out. But you don’t show us any.’’ 3 The novel
does not in fact contain the answer to the question of culture and society it so
complexly and relentlessly raises. Yet this point has eludedmany critics, par-
ticularly in the last thirty-five years. And for this Canetti himself must take
some of the responsibility. For that which has created so much confusion is
of course the author’s second major work, Crowds and Power (1960). Ever
since the publication of this quirky and voluminous anthropological study,
the novel has tended to be either rigorously segregated from it or relegated
to a secondary, illustrative status. The former approach has been advocated
by formalists such as David Darby, Robert Elbaz, and Leah Hadomi; but
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however much we stand to gain (and we undoubtedly gain the most from
Darby), this perspective tends to neglect the novel’s chief concern.
There has of course been no dearth of critics who read Auto-da-Fé in
light of Crowds and Power. But while the social dimension is thereby res-
cued, another distortion inevitably arises: the novel is consigned to the un-
likely role of anticipating the later social scientific theory. Critics of this
school routinely cite the novel to illustrate a point made more discursively
in Crowds and Power; and that point is often (and rather predictably) that
Georg, or at least his protean conception of crowds, bespeaks Canetti’s own
ideas on the primal nature of social groupings—one of the foundational
ideas ofCrowds and Power.But rarelydo these critics pause to notice that this
is an essentially circular endeavor that accomplishes little except, perhaps,
to attribute what I judge to be an unlikely degree of uniformity to Canetti’s
thought. Despite the fact that Georg’s credibility has more and more come
under fire in the last twenty years, this fundamental hermeneutic strategy
has proved astonishingly tenacious. Gerald Stieg exemplifies this approach
most recently in suggesting that the novel be read as a kind of encoded
‘‘fable’’ for the fundamental ideas of Crowds and Power.
My own approach is quite different. I believe we can have it both ways,
without splitting the difference. We can read Auto-da-Fé as the German
modernist novel with an inherently ‘‘social’’ agenda without reducing it to
the status of prooftext in the service of Crowds and Power. For one, Canetti
certainly did not know in 1930–31 what he would learn over the next thirty
years. To assume he did is, I think, the proposition requiring the greater leap
of faith. One could also point to the autobiography (still the most popu-
lar of all the author’s works, by the way) to support this view, though I am
conscious that this interpretive maneuver can easily function like the cita-
tion of scripture. Even as I write this line, I can imagine Canetti aficionados
ready to pounce with passages from the autobiography where we read that
the author’s interest in crowds dates to the same period in which the novel
was written; or eager to cite chapter and verse from the samework where we
learn that the 1927 riot and subsequent massacre at the Viennese Palace of
Justice were seminal historical events that inform both of these works. This
much may well be true; I see no reason, at any rate, to doubt Canetti’s word
on this. But what he is claiming, it should be noted, is not that Crowds and
Power provides the ‘‘theoretical key’’ to Auto-da-Fé (as Hans Magnus En-
zensberger claimed in his Der Spiegel review of 1963), but rather that these
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two works are inhabited by a common spirit of inquiry. This, at any rate, is
the formulation that best captures their actual relationship.
Since I am bucking a tradition that has dominated Canetti scholarship,4 it
seems worthwhile, even in this introduction, to say a few more words about
my conception of this relationship. Grasping the novel’s true relationship to
Crowds and Power is in fact prerequisite to comprehending Auto-da-Fé in its
own right and on its own terms. Without wishing to affiliate myself all too
closely with the pompous philologist Kien (who, let us recall, proposes in
all seriousness to write an authoritative and irrevocable exegesis of the New
Testament), I do hope with this book to lay to rest the single issue that has
most bedeviled Canetti scholarship.Auto-da-Fé nomore anticipatesCrowds
and Power than it does the Nazi period (another recurrent claim in the lit-
erature). Rather, it comprises a complex critique of obsolete, ineffectual, and
even reactionary ways of fending off modernity; it exposes a whole series of
cultural practices as essentially subjectivist, escapist, and therefore funda-
mentally antisocial; and it provides a stark perspective on modern culture
that unsparingly discloses all those things that mitigate against a tenable re-
newal of culture. But Auto-da-Fé does not yet provide the answer it seeks.
Martin Jay has repeatedly adduced Adorno’s residual Judaism as a signifi-
cant factor in the development of his famous negative dialectic. The biblical
injunction against divine imagesmay have played some crucial role, Jay sug-
gests, in Adorno’s adamant refusal to provide positive, affirmative precepts.5
A similar case could bemade for Canetti, at least up to the point when he de-
velops his notion of ‘‘Verwandlung.’’ For, like Adorno, he was an atheist Jew
who remained stubbornly interested in Judaism (and fascinated by religion
in general) throughout his life. But whether it was this factor alone, the dic-
tates and limitations of the fictional literary form, or the fact that he simply
did not yet know where his investigations would take him (or, more likely,
some dynamic combination thereof ), of one thing we can be sure: Auto-
da-Fé negates bogus notions of public culture without offering anything to
replace what Broch termed this ‘‘total destruction.’’
Enter Crowds and Power. Though the present study remains primarily
concerned with Auto-da-Fé, I argue, particularly in the final two chapters,
that the more accurate relationship between these two ‘‘life’s works’’ is dia-
logic: the novel poses the great question, towhich the anthropological study
wagers a tentative, but passionately argued, answer. In short, Crowds and
Power replaces the normative model of German Kultur, so richly pilloried in
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the novel, with an anthropological concept of culture. Such a move would
of course have appalled idealist cultural conservatives like Kien, who viewed
this approach (which was already widely discussed in theWeimar period) as
dangerously relativistic, or worse, mindlessly historicist. After all, they rea-
soned, what do the primitive cultures have to say to that flower of European
civilization, German Kultur? How could they serve as a font of cultural re-
newal? After the Second World War and the Holocaust, Canetti would face
less difficulty inmaking his case. In opposition to that heretoforemost influ-
ential thinker on crowds, Sigmund Freud, Canetti develops essentially two
ideas that serve as bookends toCrowds and Power: the primary quality of so-
cial groupings (not, as Freudwould have it, a secondary phenomenon essen-
tially at oddswith individual happiness); and amajor revision of theOedipus
complex that Canetti calls ‘‘Verwandlung’’ (transformation). Both of these
are fairly detailed concepts worthy of their own discussion, which I under-
take below. But the point for nowwould be to note that the novel has already
paved theway precisely for these conceptual innovations. In the penultimate
chapter, I seek to show how Freud (and popularized Freudianism) was al-
ready an important intertext for the novel. Canetti’s unremitting caricature
of Freudian notions, which unsurprisingly centers on the novel’s psychia-
trist Georg, raises topics undeniably similar to thosewewill encounter in the
later Canetti, namely issues of social organization and individual transfor-
mative potential, but in a strikingly different manner. As it turns out, Georg
is the promoter of notions that are not only debunked in the novel, but also
specifically superseded in the later anthropological work.
Though I work hard to overcome the fuzzy anachronistic thinking that
reads the latter work into the former, neither do I wish to suggest that the
works are radically different. The most obvious connection between the two
is Canetti’s enduring interest in power as an intersubjective, social practice,
as well as his acute concern for an imperiled social world. It is this pro-
nounced social orientation that marks Auto-da-Fé as distinctive, indeed as
an endpoint, in the German modernist tradition. It should be stressed that
this is not merely a chronological matter of Auto-da-Fé appearing at the
end of the great novelistic output of German modernism (roughly 1910–
30), though this fact cannot be entirely ignored since it provided Canetti the
temporal vantage point to look back on, and react to, earlier developments
in the German novel. Neither can we doubt that the young Canetti was any-
thing but acutely aware of such matters. Knowing full well where to turn
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in these matters, Canetti sent off the novel in manuscript form to Thomas
Mann. (Mann returned the bulky, unsolicited package without even having
broken the seal, though once Auto-da-Fé appeared in print, he praised it
profusely.)
One can undoubtedly give a political reading to Rilke’s Die Aufzeich-
nungen des Malte Laurids Brigge (Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, 1910),
and it is certainly true that a menacing Berlin plays a crucial role in Döblin’s
Berlin Alexanderplatz (1929), but it is in Auto-da-Fé that we first encounter
a fundamental challenge to that time-honored fixture of aesthetic modern-
ism, the fragmented subject, who often takes the form of a sympathetically
drawn, oversensitive aesthete misfit—one thinks, for example, of Rilke’s
Malte, Musil’s Törleß (Die Verwirrungen des Zöglings Törleß, 1906), or even
of Broch’s own Pasenow (Pasenow, oder Die Romantik 1888, 1930). In the last
chapter I argue that the novel’s defiance of what would become the regnant
paradigm of postwar modernism, most particularly in its rigorous exami-
nation of the social dimensions of fragmented subjectivity, explains in part
why it was later marginalized by academic critics. Yet before this model of
high modernism installed itself as normative under the aegis above all of
Adorno, critics had no difficulty in recognizing Auto-da-Fé as self-evidently
modernist. Indeed, it was one of the canards of the early criticism to affili-
ate Canetti’s experimental novel with that touchstone of modernism, Joyce’s
Ulysses. And this is a connection later journalist critics would continue to
make down to our own day.6Yet because it treats that sacred cowof aesthetic
modernism with critical reserve, scholarly critics would withhold their im-
primatur.
The second way in which Auto-da-Fé rings in an end to the high mod-
ernist tradition is via its deployment of a narrative structure that elicits and
enables analysis. The presence of an ‘‘epistemologically strong’’ narrative,
which I explicate also in the final chapter, would necessarily seem alien to
those raised on a diet of canonical aesthetic modernism. Yet this need not
signify a reactionary or regressive move, as some critics imply, especially if
one considers that the novel does not simply mock one perspective (Kien’s)
in order to install another (Georg’s). The critique is leveled evenhandedly
across the board, as I show at some length throughout this study. It is a
harsh and probing series of negations, not a ‘‘know it all’’ novel that con-
tains its own standard of good behavior—not, in other words, a case of fic-
tional ‘‘Besserwisserei.’’ The novel’s notable analytic propensity is an essen-
8 : introduction
tial characteristic that can, however, all too easily obscure the simultaneous
self-critique of reason enacted within the text. Indeed, if we are left with any
single impression, it is that epistemological hubris, both the reader’s and the
characters’, will inevitably be punished.
Nevertheless, we should not shyaway from the fact thatAuto-da-Fé repre-
sents a rupture in literary modernism, confronting the aesthetic (or ‘‘high’’)
canon with what I have dubbed a variant strain of ‘‘analytic modernism.’’
To find a suitable analogy—that is, a self-critical aesthetic program imbued
with a modicum of analytic confidence that is focused intensely on the so-
cial world—one would have to step outside the genre to include Brechtian
drama (and dramatic theory). But within the field of German prosemodern-
ism, Canetti’s Auto-da-Fé stands in this regard conspicuously alone. Which
evokes a second and important level of continuity in Canetti’s oeuvre: both
the early novelistic critique and the later anthropological rehabilitation of
‘‘culture’’ depend upon a fundamental allegiance to the enlightenment
values of inquiry. Canetti’s description of Crowds and Power in the 1965
interview with Adorno (which I discuss below) epitomizes this position per-
fectly: his project, he maintains, represents an ‘‘open system’’—but a sys-
tem nonetheless. The evils of Nazism and the Holocaust and the threat of
Cold War nuclear annihilation—the real motivating forces behind Crowds
and Power, by the way—demand a comprehensive revision of traditional-
ist European culture as well as a deep humility in the face of other, non-
European ‘‘primitive’’ cultures. Hackneyed idealist notions of high culture,
which imagine the German classics as an unproblematic wellspring of nor-
mative social values—a concept, by the way, very similar to that proffered
inWilliam Bennett’s bestselling Book of Virtues—will simply no longer do.
This dynamic combination of qualities we encounter in the novel—icono-
clastic cultural critique conjoined with a commitment to analytic discourse
—is in fact characteristic of the entire oeuvre. Canetti was to remain a skepti-
cal rationalist throughout his life. Like Brecht’s stance toward Stalin’s Soviet
Union—‘‘Critical, but for it’’ 7—Canetti affirmed rational critique as flawed
but necessary. With this in mind, we can understand why those literary-
critical paradigms predicated upon radical epistemological skepticism (I am
thinking above all of deconstructionism) are eo ipso bound to miss (or dis-
miss) Canetti’s distinctive contribution.
Did the young Canetti intend to put an end to aesthetic modernism?
Clearly, he made no secret either of his own rather immodest artistic ambi-
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tion to ‘‘make it new’’ (as Ezra Pound urged his generation), or of his dis-
dain for commercially successful contemporary writers like Stefan Zweig,
FranzWerfel, and Carl Zuckmayer. Yet it would bemistaken, I think, to con-
fine our discussion strictly to literature, or to think of these innovations in
primarily literary-aesthetic terms. Canetti critiques the sympathetic view of
the fragmented modernist subject and structures his novel analytically for
fundamentally political reasons. As an assimilated Sephardic Jew, born to a
Ladino-speaking family in the small town of Rustschuk on the outskirts of
the Austro-Hungarian empire, Canetti understood well that in reinventing
one’s self a whole lot more may be at stake than an aesthete’s interior life.
Canetti, I am suggesting, was biographically predisposed to understand the
modernist decentered self as a potential problem, not something to be cele-
brated uncritically. Accordingly, Auto-da-Fé sounds a warning: If a self is
reduced to a mere ‘‘bundle of sensations’’ (as Ernst Mach famously argued),
then might it not become vulnerable to another’s self-aggrandizement? If
the perceiving subject becomes paramount, might that not render the rest of
us more or less mutable objects of another’s perception and power? Maybe
these ‘‘fragmented subjects’’ were supposed to erode at precisely the same
rate, giving no one an advantage over another; but Auto-da-Fé suggests that
exactly this is not the case.
The significance of Jewish identity is of course not merely a matter of
biographical speculation, but central to the novel. The self that Siegfried
Fischerle desperately wants to shed is, not coincidentally, a stereotypically
‘‘Jewish’’ one. The fact that he cannot reinvent himself while the highly cul-
tured Georg can enact any number of metamorphoses amounts to a grave
indictment of a cultural program that only claimed to be universally ac-
cessible. As a politically astute Jew whose own assimilation to German cul-
ture was about to be revoked—Auto-da-Fé was published the same year the
Nuremberg Laws were issued—Canetti was very much aware both of the
politics of fragmented subjectivity and of the dangers of irrationalism.
TodescribeCanetti as essentially ‘‘political’’ requires an immediate caveat,
for his was an intellectual’s concern rather than an activist’s engagement.
This aspect of Canetti can best be gleaned (as can numerous others) from
the author’s encomiastic portrait of Dr. Isaiah Sonne (known perhaps to
some readers under the pseudonymAbraham benYitzchak) which he draws
in The Play of the Eyes: ‘‘Sonne had given up his worldly activities . . . But
he remained in the world, cleaved to its every appearance in his thoughts.
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He let his hands rest, yet he did not turn his back on the world; even in the
measured justice of his speech one could sense a passion for this world.’’ 8
Clearly this is the way Canetti would have us think of him: intellectually re-
moved, yet passionately committed. While he clearly hoped to intervene in
actual sociocultural debates by means of his writing, one senses in Canetti
a concomitant belief in the essential moral goodness of intellectual energy
expended on behalf of the world.
Auto-da-Fé partakes of the moral seriousness that characterizes all of
Canetti’s work, yet it does not lack for rich comedy. In fact, Canetti evinces
a great sense of humor about Auto-da-Fé as well as himself in one episode
from The Play of the Eyes, where he describes how the novel ultimately came
to be published. He had experienced not a little difficulty in finding a pub-
lisher, in great part, no doubt, due to the Nazi proscription of ‘‘degenerate’’
art (entartete Kunst), which by 1933 eliminated all the German publishers.
But part of the problem surely also had to do with the fact that the novel
makes substantial demands upon its readers. Finally, a wealthy newspaper
publisher, a certain Jean Hoepffner of Strasbourg, stepped forward with an
offer to put up the necessary subvention. Hoepffner’s rationale for backing
the book has nothing to do with the high-minded arguments I have been
explicating thus far. Quite the opposite: he thinks the novel will enhance the
status quo by making readers grateful that they do not actually inhabit a
world quite so bleak as that of Auto-da-Fé. After hearing Canetti’s résumé
of the novel, Hoepffner responds: ‘‘I will never read that. But such a book
should be available. That would have a good effect. Those who read it would
awake as if from a nightmare and be grateful that reality is other than this
dream.’’ 9 Canetti goes on to explain that since Hoepffner was repulsed by
the very description, and could not really support the novel for its actual
content, ‘‘he [Hoepffner] thought up a pedagogical intention for the exis-
tence of the novel: that of deterrence.’’ 10 In recounting this episode, Canetti
betrays not only a rare self-deprecating sense of humor, but indicates also
the Achilles heel of all political literature, namely reception. Even the most
committed piece of prose could be disarmed by a mind-set like Hoepffner’s
and coopted as socially affirmative art. Here Canetti admits that his own as-
pirations for the novel, which he hoped would provoke rather than pacify
his readers, are clearly beyond the novelist’s control.
More important, perhaps, than Canetti’s sense of humor about the novel
is the novel’s own humor, an aspect of the novel that was trumpeted by the
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early critics, particularly in the English press. If later German critics tended
to pass over this salient aspect of Auto-da-Fé, the British reviewer Walter
Allen did not hesitate to brand it ‘‘ferociously funny’’ and its author ‘‘a great
comic writer.’’ 11 It seems likely that the novel’s noted humor was at logger-
heads with the dominant existentialist readings of highmodernism, an issue
wewill revisit in the final chapter of this study. Rudolf Hartung, for example,
was apparently unable both to lament the novel’s depiction of ‘‘the irrevers-
ible loneliness of the individual in an atomized world’’ and see the humor.12
But Allen—along with many other readers—did. His judgment of the novel
as ‘‘a truly savage comedy’’ 13 at once points upwhat is unique about Canetti’s
brand of modernism, and suggests a literary heritage à la Heinrich Heine
and Friedrich Nietzsche, or, as Gerald Stieg has suggested for the Austrian
context, à la Raimund, Nestroy, and Karl Kraus.14 Reading the novel as a
‘‘great work of satire,’’ as Allen does,15 will require that we call into question
certain epistemological assumptions about literary modernism.
By the time Herbert Reichner published Auto-da-Fé in 1935, at the prod-
ding, apparently, of Stefan Zweig, the ideological climate had already be-
come hostile to an experimental novel. The Anschluß of 1938 ensured that
the novel’s designation as ‘‘degenerate’’ extended to Austria as well. After
the war, theVerlagWilli Weismann brought it out again, but this small pub-
lishing house suffered a great loss during the currency reform and soon
went bankrupt, leaving stacks of unsold stock inWeismann’s basement.16 By
the late forties Canetti’s novel enjoyed a ‘‘wide press response in a broad
spectrum of newspapers and periodicals’’ in England,17 thanks to theWedg-
wood translation, which Canetti supervised, and even garnered the coveted
Prix International for the best foreign novel in France. But in the German-
speaking countries it remained virtually unknown until its 1963 reappear-
ance, now in the Hanser Verlag.
Reading the novel after the SecondWorldWar prompted interpretations
both ahistorical and pseudohistorical. Reviewing the novel in 1947, Philip
Toynbee counsels us, in a tone a preacher might take to urge his congrega-
tion to apply a scriptural passage to their lives, to accept the depiction of
Peter Kien as an image of our darker selves. Canetti uses madness, Toyn-
bee admonishes, ‘‘to isolate and intensify the obsessive elements in all of
us. Hypocrite reader, he is forever insisting, this is you; yes, this disgust-
ing, insane creature who makes you draw up your skirts, is you yourself.’’ 18
In exhorting us to look into the distorting mirror of the literary grotesque,
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Toynbee has fastened upon one of the novel’s most memorable subjects, the
academic parody, the meaning and humor of which can be grasped with-
out making any special demands on the reader. The resilience of this take
on the novel can be seen in the remarks of Germany’s leading journalist-
literary critic. Speaking in 1985 about Canetti’s ‘‘Hauptwerk’’ (main work),
Marcel Reich-Ranicki summed up the novel in the following manner: ‘‘It is
a grand design concerning the tragedy of the intellectual in our century, a
parable of the highest ambition.’’ 19 Such a reading still has a good deal of
appeal, even if we do not particularly wish to see ourselves in the image of
the eccentric protagonist. The leftist social critic and poet HansMagnus En-
zensberger contributed to this universalizing, moralizing mode of criticism.
But, as might be expected, Enzensberger switches our attention from the
personal to the social: The novel’s depiction of insanity has, as Enzensberger
claimed in a Der Spiegel review of 1963, ‘‘everyman’s face, and the battles,
which are fought out in the slums and tenements, throw off giant historical
shadows. Canetti shows the ubiquity of paranoid structures.’’ 20
Side by side with the universalizing gestures of Toynbee and Enzens-
berger appears what I would call the pseudohistorical approach, taken by
those critics who see in the novel a prophecy of Nazism. Usually this takes
the form of viewing the final scene of the novel in which Kien enacts his self-
immolation as a foreshadowing of the Nazi book burning of May 10, 1933.21
While it is surely tenable to maintain that Canetti, who visited Berlin twice
in the years just before he wrote the novel, represents some protofascistic
tendencies, such as the intellectual’s inability—or refusal—to recognize the
brute and murderous force of a Benedikt Pfaff, any more direct an analogy
simply overreaches. We would do well in this regard to heed Canetti’s own
words. In one of the rare passages in the autobiography where we encounter
fairly specific references to political events, Canetti observes: ‘‘At the end of
January Hitler came to power. From this moment on everything that fol-
lowed this event seemed uncanny and foreboding. Everything affected me
personally . . . [but] nothing had been foreseen. Explanations and specula-
tion, even the boldest of prophesies, appeared like mere straw when mea-
sured against reality. What happened was in every detail unexpected and
new.’’ 22The interpretive strategy that views the novel as harbinger of Nazism
fails therefore to persuade not only because it asks us to see Canetti as a
fortune-teller (an assumption his autobiography clearly does not bear out),
but also because it promotes the view of Kien as sympathetic victim. But the
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destruction of Kien’s world is not so much lamented as celebrated in Auto-
da-Fé. The burning of Vienna’s ‘‘greatest private library’’ does represent a
cultural disaster of the highest order—and one keenly felt by Canetti him-
self—but nevertheless one of a wholly different order than that instigated
by the Nazis. In short, this pseudohistorical view of the novel as prophecy
of Nazism is one of those hermeneutic shortcuts that does justice neither to
history nor to the novel.
The End of Modernism: Elias Canetti’s Auto-da-Fé comes at a time when
neoconservative critic Harriet Murphy would have us believe that Canetti
actually advocates the ivory tower intellectual.23 Perhaps such confusion
arises, as I have intimated above, because Canetti espoused a more genteel
conception of intellectual engagement with the world than that which today
enjoys wide currency. He certainly represents a standard of erudition that
would be hard to maintain in the face of day-to-day political activism. It
should also be stated that his noted critique of power may actually have pre-
vented him from entering the rough and tumble of political agitation—may,
in other words, have proved somewhat self-defeating. While this observa-
tion opens the door to a more critical perspective on Canetti, one we very
much need, by theway, this should not bemistaken as Canetti’s sponsorship
of insular aestheticism.This bookwill, I hope, serve as a helpful corrective to
those revisionist scholars who, in my judgment, seek to remake the author
into one of his quite questionable characters.
Auto-da-Fé is a difficult and complex book in part because Canetti places
demands upon the reader commensurate with those he laid upon himself.
My own book seeks to place the reader in a position to grasp the multi-
layered parody of this ambitious work. Above all, this has meant explicat-
ing aspects of interwar European culture that may not be evident to con-
temporary readers, and then interpreting the novel against this backdrop. I
have selected six fields of inquiry (each of which corresponds to a respective
chapter) as most beneficial in this regard: (1) popular literature as an im-
plicit contrast to the novel’s own project; (2) misogyny and gender concepts,
particularly as they intersect with the contemporary ‘‘crisis of subjectivity’’;
(3) Weimar-era philosophical schools and fads as ‘‘dignified’’ intellectual
refuge from social concerns; (4) racial anti-Semitism as the barometer of
humanist culture; and (5) Freud, as well as popularized Freudianism, as the
novel’s great negative influence. The sixth and final chapter fulfills two func-
tions: it places Canetti’s novel in the context of traditional literary modern-
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ism and permits me the opportunity to reprise the fundamental arguments
of this study. As such, it serves in lieu of a more formal conclusion.
The title The End of Modernism risks conjuring the perhaps vintage Ca-
nettian attitude of grandiosity. (As Susan Sontag rightly reminds us, it was
Canetti’s unabashed aspiration to know everything, and Crowds and Power
does indeed appear to harbor a ‘‘summa anthropologica’’ kind of ambition.)
But this portion of the title will certainly mislead if taken to mean that Auto-
da-Fé somehow receives and completes or transmutes all the various literary
tributaries that lead into the muddy waters of what would become known
as ‘‘modernism.’’ Such would be an impossible claim in any event, since, as
I discuss below, the term ‘‘modernism’’ would remain in considerable flux
for decades after the novel’s completion. The ‘‘end’’ to which I lay claim on
Canetti’s behalf is considerably less comprehensive, but can only be stated
clearly once we extract ourselves from the conceptual morass that has de-
veloped around the term ‘‘modernism.’’ Auto-da-Fé is an end; but to what
precisely?
Fortunately, the intellectual historian David Hollinger has intervened to
restore some conceptual order, arguing that alongside the perhaps better
known literary figure of the ‘‘Artificer’’—he takes Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus
as his prime example—was always the more analytically inclined figure of
the ‘‘Knower.’’ Modernism always harbored dual desires, Hollinger explains,
both to create new meaning, in the smithy of one’s soul, if need be, and to
know a more or less objective order—or at least one that can be affirmed
intersubjectively.These two pursuits were not, in the first third of the twenti-
eth century, incompatible, and perhaps only now seem so, Hollinger shows,
in the wake of postmodernist caricature. Hollinger’s dichotomy is illumi-
nating in general and provides in particular a rather useful way of viewing
Canetti’s distinctive achievement. More than any of the other great German
prose modernists, Canetti sought to interrogate the assumptions of the arti-
ficer from the perspective of the knower—without, let it be noted, collapsing
either position entirely.While others may implicitly suggest the need for the
knower’s perspective—one thinks of Musil, Broch, and Thomas Mann, all
of whom offer powerful analyses of contemporaneous culture—none struc-
tures this into the very narrative to the degree of Auto-da-Fé. Canetti’s novel
distinctively ends the sole claim of the artificer—orof those artificer-smitten
critics—to represent literary modernism.
My focus on fragmented subjectivity (as the target of Canetti’s critique)
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and on the strong epistemic narrative structure (as the shibboleth of Ca-
netti’s ‘‘analytic prose’’) is meant therefore to highlight the ways in which
Auto-da-Fé occupies a unique border position—an endpoint, surely, though
not to a merely linear progression—and thus a fruitful perspective from
which to view larger developments in literature and the arts. Though hardly
capricious, my emphasis is necessarily selective and thus cannot do justice
to all that modernism has come to connote.24 By situating Canetti within a
wide swath of Weimar-era modernist discourse (in the first five chapters)
and into a discussion of certain salient aspects of postwar literary modern-
ism (in the final chapter), I have, I hope, laid the groundwork for a clearer
grasp of the place of Auto-da-Fé in twentieth-century German letters. But
this is by no means the final word. And, while attempting to clarify Canetti’s
distinctiveness, I do not wish in the process to have propagated errors in
the opposite direction. Though Broch and Kafka (for example) set them-
selves off from Canetti in ways I describe at some length below, we would be
foolish to overlook their enduring similarities—that which, after all, argues
for the comparison in the first place. Kafka’s flat characters—despite their
curious utility in Adorno’s conception of modernism—remain in fact struc-
turally similar to Canetti’s. And Broch’s noted lament about ‘‘partial value
systems’’—the critique of modernity that suffuses all three volumes of Die
Schlafwandler (The Sleepwalkers, 1930–32)—certainly finds its counterpart
in Canetti’s aversion to the sometimes irritatingly unforgettable ‘‘private be-
lief worlds’’ that characterize his novel. Pursuing these relationships in the
present study, however, presents a temptation I have had to resist; the scope
of my project has permitted only occasional asides and aperçus on authors
to whom one could justifiably dedicate whole chapters. Alas, this is a task I
must leave to others, or for another day. I hope with this book to have pro-
vided an analysis rich enough to provoke—and perhaps even to position—
such further investigations.
I have drawn on Canetti’s autobiography extensively in the preparation of
this book, and thus it may be worth reflecting, at least briefly, on some
methodological considerations. There is nothing of which Canetti scholar-
ship is in greater need than a truly critical biography—not a mere restate-
ment of the autobiography.When the estate papers aremade accessible, pre-
sumably in 2004 (according to newspaper accounts as well as the Hanser
publishing house), surely some of the widely accepted truisms about the
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Canetti oeuvre—including those that appear in the present study—will need
to be revised. To some extent, this is simply inevitable. But even now, it is
clear that a great deal of scholarship—and not only that which draws di-
rectly on the autobiography—consists merely in classifying Canetti’s fiction
with Canetti’s own theories of language and society. While some of this is
manifestly erroneous, as I argue below, the greater danger may be that it
is simply isolationist. Following the author’s own least helpful example—
Canetti famously fails to properly contextualize his social theory, or even
fully acknowledge his intellectual predecessors—this kind of scholarship
maintains a wall around the oeuvre. Ironically, this is a strategy that is dia-
metrically opposed to Canetti’smore laudable and often pathbreaking inter-
disciplinary interests.
I consider Canetti a privileged and inherently interesting, but not nor-
mative, interpreter of his own work, and wish therefore to take account of
his views whenever this seems relevant tomy argument. In no case, however,
have I based an argument exclusively, or even primarily, on such material.
I also deem it necessary to acknowledge here what most scholars know:
Canetti was very interested in shaping critical responses to his work, though
perhaps nomore so thanmany other authors. One should therefore take the
author’s assertions of influence and the like—perhaps especially when they
fit a critic’s argument all too well—with a grain or two of salt.
My own interpretative approach derives furthermore from what I judge
to be the quality and purpose of the novel’s array of intertexts. In order
to sketch in essential aspects of interwar culture I have not reinvented the
wheel, but drawn liberally on the intellectual histories of Judith Ryan and
Susan Marchand, the classic history of philosophy by Frederick Copleston,
as well as specialist studies by Peter Gay (on Freud), and others too. I have
endeavored, in other words, to bring the existing work of numerous schol-
ars of various fields into conversation with the novel, and meet the reader at
the level most commensurate with the intentions of Auto-da-Fé. What this
means, as I explain below in my discussion of philosophy, is that the novel
engages the educated reader and observer of wider cultural trends, but does
not seek to intervene in scholarly philosophical debates per se. Such an ap-
proach is frankly discouraged by the mode of the allusion to interwar trends
and figures: typically parodistic, this referential practice is simply not ame-
nable to what one might consider an ‘‘objective’’ or dispassionate scholarly
discussion. By drawing upon an array of authorities, I hope furthermore to
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evade the charge of capriciousness that has, not without reason, been leveled
against cultural studies.25 While I am keenly interested to note how Auto-
da-Fé engages the wider culture, and seek to permit the novel the freedom
to direct my attention, I turn to those more expert than I in the areas I have
identified above to demonstrate that the respective phenomenon under dis-
cussion is indeed a salient and significant cultural feature of the interwar
period independent of the novel.
Finally, a note of caution. Auto-da-Fé has been correctly characterized as
harboring a kind of ‘‘relentless analysis’’ (‘‘bohrende Analyse’’).26 In attempt-
ing to follow Canetti, I have probably made myself guilty of the same crime.
Again and again, the novel returns to its obsession with those question-
able, even reactionary, cultural practices that contribute to the dissolution
of the public sphere.Auto-da-Fé takes sometimes unexpected turns, engages
in controversial and perhaps even objectionable argument, but always re-
turns to this ‘‘social’’ agenda. I have undertaken to document and analyze
each such turn.While individual chapters treat roughlydiscrete topics, there
is inevitably some overlap. I have not, for example, been able to treat the
topic of misogyny without raising issues that are more properly the prov-
ince of subsequent chapters. Likewise, it has been necessary to treat the anti-
Semitism of Willibald Alexis’s text well before the major discussion of this
topic in chapter 4. Nevertheless, the argument is on the whole structured
so that readers can come and go as they wish; each chapter stands more or
less independently, with numerous signposts to other chapters, which can
be followed or ignored at the reader’s leisure.
1 The Novel(s) in the Novel
Modernism as Parody of Popular Realism
A Different Kind of Novel
In 1930 an ambitious young author set out to write a different kind of
book: a novel that would stand out against ‘‘the then regnant Viennese lit-
erature.’’ 1 That twenty-five-year-old firebrand had, as the seventy-year-old
Canetti recounts it, high aspirations, for this was to be ‘‘an austere book,’’
‘‘merciless,’’ and, above all, a considerable cut above everything ‘‘that could
be read as pleasant or pleasing.’’ 2 With a healthy sense indeed of his literary
importance, Canetti sought to distance his own work from the popular fic-
tion of the day: ‘‘That which was accorded the highest praise was of operatic
sentimentality, and among these were the most pitiful journalists and dilet-
tantes. I cannot say that any one of these meant a thing to me; their prose
filled me with disgust.’’ 3
His repulsion notwithstanding, Canetti seems to have been preoccupied
with the popular realist and neoromantic literature of his day well before
1975, when he first published the essay in which these remarks appear. For he
cites and thematizes popular novels throughout Auto-da-Fé, the novel that
was to rise far above this humble fare. What is more—and infinitely more
complex—he constructed his novel in a way that in some ways mimics the
very realist narration he deplores. The point of these strategies is to repel
what Canetti felt was the tendency of fiction to become an end in itself, and
thus an obstruction to social awareness. Far from a cynical acquiescence in
the unreadability of the modern world, Auto-da-Fé was to be a more truth-
ful—or, at least, a less dishonest—vehicle for representing the menacing
complexity of modernity.
When critics got around to analyzing the narrative structure of his novel,
they discovered what Canetti already knew, namely that as experimental as
Auto-da-Fé clearly is, it simultaneously evinces a traditional form. This led
Dieter Liewerscheidt to complain of ‘‘A Contradiction in the Narrative Con-
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ception of Elias Canetti’s Novel Auto-da-Fé.’’ 4 More recently, David Darby
divines a ‘‘rigidity of the narrative structure’’ lurking beneath the superficial
chaos of the characters’ rival belief worlds; and while the novel may seem
innovative to untrained eyes, yet ‘‘this exclusive rigidity suggests an essen-
tially traditional element in the narrative conception of the narrative struc-
ture of Auto-da-Fé.’’ 5 Both critics have correctly noted the novel’s affiliation
with the traditional, or what LennardDavis inResisting Novels calls the ‘‘clas-
sic novel.’’ What they miss, however, is the point that the relationship of
Auto-da-Fé to popular realism is not accidental or insidiously atavistic, but
quite conscious and parodistic.
Certainly none of this would have come as a surprise to Canetti him-
self, who repeatedly mentioned that his own novel was conceived as parodic
imitation of Balzac: he did not plan simply to rewrite the French master’s
‘‘human comedy,’’ but to devise a ‘‘mad’’ new version—a ‘‘Comédie Hu-
maine an Irren.’’ 6 Indeed, in the same breath that he makes his bold claim
for breaking new ground (‘‘One day the thought occurred to me that the
world could no longer be represented as in earlier novels’’), Canetti divulges
his predilection for firm narrative structure, perhaps thereby delineating his
own work from Rilke’s Malte, or, perhaps, from Döblin’s already successful
Berlin Alexanderplatz (1929), which had appeared just as Canetti wasmaking
notes for his own novel: ‘‘But that did not mean that one should create a
chaotic book, in which nothing was to be understood any longer; on the
contrary, one had to invent with the utmost discipline extreme individu-
als.’’ 7 Precisely because Canetti’s own ‘‘austere book’’ imitates the very litera-
ture it parodies, it will not suffice to describe his novel as merely latter-day,
and perhaps even inadvertently, realist. If Auto-da-Fé is somehow ‘‘essen-
tially traditional,’’ it is so only in the sense that parody must, of necessity,
incorporate that which it exposes to critique.
Willibald Alexis’s Die Hosen des Herrn von Bredow
Thenovel as literary genre first becomes an issue inAuto-da-FéwhenKien
meets Therese and decides she might just be educable: ‘‘Was it too late, he
thought, how old can she be? It is never too late to learn. But shewould have
to begin with simple novels.’’ 8 He selects a grease-stained copy of Willibald
Alexis’sDie Hosen des Herrn von Bredow (TheTrousers of Mr. Bredow, 1848),
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a dog-eared volume that shows the wear and tear of having been passed
around by numerous boyhood friends. A bundle of contradictions, Kien ab-
hors the selfsame book he has never been able to discard. Though he first
offers Therese the novel because he suspects that ‘‘she longs for culture,’’ 9 he
loses no time in placing novels beyond the pale of true German ‘‘Geist’’:
A novel was the only thing worth considering for her. But no mind ever
grew fat on a diet of novels. The pleasure which they occasionally offer is
far too heavily paid for: they undermine the finest characters. They teach
us to think ourselves into other men’s places. Thus we acquire a taste for
change.The personality becomes dissolved in pleasing figments of imagi-
nation. The reader learns to understand every point of view. Willingly
he yields himself to the pursuit of other people’s goals and loses sight of
his own. Novels are so many wedges which the novelist, an actor with his
pen, inserts into the closed personality of the reader. The better he calcu-
lates the size of the wedge and the strength of the resistance, so much the
more completely does he crack open the personality of his victim. Novels
should be prohibited by the State.10
Kien’s diatribe calls to mind serious questions about the status and value
of novels (echoing a contemporaneous debate on the cultural role of ver-
nacular national literatures at universities),11 but this humorously paranoid
tirade—especially as it culminates in a Platonic demand for state censorship
of art—obviously cannot be taken as the novel’s final word on the issue. Yet
improbable as it may seen, Kien’s warped fear of popular novels actually ex-
presses the two points that will structure our own discussion of Alexis. In
viewing novels as a kind of sexual seduction that leaves us dispersed and
spent, a notionwewill encounter againwithKien’s brotherGeorg, the fearful
professor correctly affiliates this kind of literature with escapism and pas-
sivity. More specifically, Kien’s fear of sacrificing his own agency, even disin-
tegrating his very self, by immersing himself in multiple pleasurable acts of
readerly identification provides an important point of contrast, albeit comi-
cally exaggerated, against which Auto-da-Fé defines itself. Yet at this point,
we must still greet these themes—Kien’s fear of being bodily penetrated by
novels, his horror at permitting the disintegration of his carefully cultivated
Charakter by means of sympathetic overidentification with fictional charac-
ters, and his concomitant assumption that novels are just the right fare for
women—with the deep suspicion they so richly deserve.
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We encounter this same ‘‘sexual’’ orientation toward novels once again
in Therese’s reaction to Kien’s gift. Misled by what she takes to be a sug-
gestive title, ‘‘The Trousers of Mr. Bredow,’’ she takes the book for a porno-
graphic potboiler: ‘‘She opened the book and read aloud, ‘The Trousers’—
she interrupted herself but did not blush. Her face bedewed with a light
sweat.’’ 12 Here Canetti slyly alludes to a very similar reception of this same
novel in what is perhaps the most beloved instance of German realism,
Theodor Fontane’s Effi Briest (1895). Fontane’s Roswitha, a simple domes-
tic not unlike Therese, has been asked to borrow a whole list of books from
the local library in order to carry Effi through her feigned illness designed
to lengthen her stay in Berlin. But Roswitha balks at the last item on the
list, which is of course Alexis’s Die Hosen des Herrn von Bredow. ‘‘Roswitha
read to the bottom of the list,’’ the narrator informs us, ‘‘and in the next
room cut off the last line; she was ashamed—both for herself and for her
mistress—to hand over the list in its original form.’’ 13 LikeTherese, the semi-
literate servant Roswitha assumes the novel is lascivious in nature and there-
fore disreputable. But unlike Roswitha, Therese eagerly lunges for the book;
she does not blush, Canetti’s narrator pointedly says, but only works up a
little anticipatory sweat.With this one allusion, Canetti pithily indicates the
problematic appeal of Alexis and his ilk. As Effi’s request to Roswitha indi-
cates, Alexis is sought out as a means to kill time, as a pleasant distraction
from current problems; indeed Effi implores Roswitha to select ‘‘really old
books,’’ confusing perhaps the sixteenth-century setting of Hosen with its
mid-nineteenth-century date of conception and publication.14 And, as we
have seen in both Roswitha and Therese, Alexis arouses a kind of misplaced
sexual appeal, which we will explore further below.
While it is true that the core of Canetti’s Alexis reception is already ad-
umbrated in these first, brief reactions of Kien and Therese, these passages
serve only to foreshadow an intertextual reference of tremendous signifi-
cance throughout the novel. The Alexis intertext—which is cited no less
than eight times 15—clearly presents an illustration of the kind of novelAuto-
da-Féwasmeant to overcome: an example of culturally affirmative historical
realism that offers solace to readers rather than a challenge to engage with
contemporary cultural debates.The second—and related—point of contrast
will be the narrative superciliousness of Die Hosen, a conceit that conceals,
rather than problematizes, the use of invidious stereotypes. This ‘‘authori-
tative’’ endorsement of Germanic cultural unity proved highly seductive,
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Canetti suggests, to an identity-deprived Weimar readership.16 But we are
far ahead of our story.
It may well be that for the post–World War II generation of readers
neither the nameWilhelmHäring (1798–1871) nor his better known pseudo-
nymWillibald Alexis rings a bell. Indeed by 1950 the Alexis scholar L. H. C.
Thomas proclaimed that the bulk of the author’s work, including his most
popular novelDie Hosen des Herrn von Bredow, had ‘‘passed into oblivion.’’ 17
Alexis, who began his literary career in 1822 with a translation of SirWalter
Scott and later wrote a series of eight historical ‘‘patriotic novels’’ (vaterlän-
dische Romane), never escaped the latter’s shadow; indeed he had become
widely celebrated as ‘‘the GermanWalter Scott.’’ 18 After Fontane and Frey-
tag, whose envy of Alexis’s continuing popularity may have had something
to do with the latter’s eclipse, Alexis was the most popular realist author of
the nineteenth century. Although his work was not always enthusiastically
received by nineteenth-century critics, his ‘‘masterpiece’’ novel (Thomas)
achieved instant and sustained success: ‘‘According to book lists, no fewer
than sixty editions and reprints of Die Hosen des Herrn von Bredow have
appeared since the date of first publication.’’ 19
When Canetti sat down to write Auto-da-Fé he could count on the fact
that Die Hosen was still widely known.20 The novel was published and re-
printed throughout the twenties, reaching a high point in 1924 and 1925
with five separate editions appearing each year.21 These editions seem to
have targeted youthful and patriotic readers, for their publishers bore names
such as the Deutsche Jugendklub-Bücherei (GermanYouth Club Library) and
the Deutsche Dichter-Gedächtnis-Stiftung (German Poets Memorial Foun-
dation; Dresden, 1927) and they were included in series such as Lebens-
bücher der Jugend (Lifebooks of the Young; Westermann, 1923–25), Bücher
der Deutschen (Books of the Germans; Stiepel, 1922) andDie bunten Romane
der Weltliteratur (Colorful Novels of World Literature; Verlag der Schiller-
buchhandlung, 1925). In the previous decade the novel had been annotated
for use in history courses and was joined in 1921 by another school edi-
tion from the presses of Velhagen and Klasing. In 1928 Die Hosen joined the
ranks of Reclams Universal-Bibliothek, a well-known and respected series of
inexpensive paperbacks designed to bring culture to the masses.22 Though
Fontane may ultimately have been correct when he prophesied in 1873 that
Alexis would only be remembered by local fan clubs (‘‘die kleinenW. Alexis-
gemeinden’’), he completely missed themark when it came to the enormous
Figure 1. Title page from a turn-of-the-century edition of Willibald Alexis’s
Die Hosen des Herrn von Bredow. Harvard University Libraries.
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popularity of Die Hosen in the first half of this century.23 What did those
contemporaries of the twenty-five-year-oldCanetti know, thatwe, in all like-
lihood, no longer do?
The story, which was once as familiar to Germans as Mark Twain’s Tom
Sawyer still is to Americans, is quickly told. While Götz von Bredow, a
frontier nobleman of the early sixteenth century, is sleeping off a drinking
bout held in celebration of the conclusion of a provincial diet (Landtag),
his wife Brigitte sneaks off his famous trousers to give them a long over-
due washing. Her moral dilemma, which she earnestly discusses with the
Dechant (a clergyman), arises from the conflict between her duty as Haus-
frau to uphold an exemplary standard of cleanliness and her obligation as
Frau not to deceive her husband, who could never bear to be parted from
his lucky trousers. Thus, contrary to the prurient expectations aroused in
bothRoswitha andTherese, this woman’s interest in removing her husband’s
pants is totally lacking in erotic motivation; it is, rather, purely a ‘‘German’’
dilemma between two kinds of duty. Brigitte errs on the side of cleanliness
and submits her husband’s legendary elk skin pants (Elenshosen) to the an-
nual outdoor fall laundry. A wandering peddler, or Krämer, arrives on the
scene and arouses the attention of the laundry detail, which is starved for
news and held in awe by his magnificent wares.
Some of the Krämer’s goods turn out to be fraudulent, a plot segment
that exhibits a longstanding anti-Semitic trope about the deceitful Jew, as we
will have further occasion to notice below. The ensuing displeasure sets the
plot, at long last, in motion. Late that night in the Bredow castle Hohenziaß
an unexpected guest arrives: it is Lindenberg, trusted advisor to the Elector
Joachim I in Berlin, and a distant relation of the Bredows. Having lost in a
crap game all the money entrusted to him by the prince for distribution to
the poor, Lindenberg begins to cast about for ways to replenish his purse
and avoid humiliation at court.
He mounts a diatribe—beginning with the young Elector and culmi-
nating with that upstart ‘‘bourgeois rabble’’ (Bürgerpack)—against all the
social and political forces that threaten the traditional privileges of the
landed aristocracy. This drunken harangue is clearly prompted by Linden-
berg’s gambling losses and is suspiciously framed by mention of the rich
peddler Klaus Hedderich, who, it is said, could well afford to relieve the
nobleman of his financial embarrassment. Lindenberg hatches a plan to ini-
tiate the adopted noble sons Hans-Jochem and Hans-Jürgen into the an-
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cient—and now forbidden—Faustrecht of the aristocracy. Though Linden-
berg claims that the reassertion of this now obsolete aristocratic practice of
appropriating property at will is meant to redress the contemporary bour-
geois affront to the Junker nobility, hewill conveniently line his own pockets
while taking this ‘‘principled’’ stand. That night they set out to ambush the
peddler Hedderich, ostensibly to teach him a lesson for selling false wares,
but actually to relieve him of his considerable wealth.
The brothersHans (Hans-JochemandHans-Jürgen) are figures borrowed
from the folk tale. All too predictably, one is good looking, well liked, and
destined for knighthood and theworld, whereas the other is distinctly plain,
painfully shy, and marked for the monastery. Equally foreseeable is the
eventual reversal: the handsome Hans-Jochem is crippled in the raid on
Hedderich and is carted off to the cloister. Hans-Jürgen rises to the occasion,
recovers von Bredow’s pants (which the peddler had stolen), and becomes,
by virtue of his unflinching honesty, the trustworthy advisor to the Elector,
replacing the treacherous Lindenberg. Eva, once the object of Hans-Jochem’s
vain desire, becomes his brother’s bride. With this marriage, Hans-Jürgen’s
ascent from neglected, orphaned son to privileged royal advisor is complete.
It is a typical rags-to-riches fairy tale.
The story moves within carefully plotted moral coordinates: Hans-
Jochem, the narrator instructs us, was given to ‘‘vanity and pride’’;24 and the
favored treatment he received from his adoptive family had suspiciously to
do with a certain ‘‘substantial inheritance,’’ 25 which his brother lacked. His
maiming injury was, therefore, foreordained by a narrative logic that pun-
ishes evil and rewards good. The treasonous Lindenberg pays for his dis-
loyalty with his life, and even the ultimately good Elector-prince must pay
for his youthful naiveté and gullibility. Though every figure must at some
point withstand the scrutiny of the moralizing narrator, none acquits herself
quite so well as the good wife Brigitte. After the know-it-all narrator, she is
the moral standard bearer of the novel: A woman who knows her place, she
can switch effortlessly from the role of ‘‘absolute ruler’’ (‘‘unumschränkte
Herrin’’) in household matters to the most subservient of women vis-à-vis
men.26 Indicating their essential consonance, the narrator says of Brigitte:
‘‘The housewife considered all manner of hard work a celebration, and we
think so too.’’ 27 It comes as no surprise, then, that Brigitte is the real hero
of the novel: due to her ingenuity (and the practice she gained during the
recent autumnal outdoor laundry), she is again able to deprive her husband
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of his heirloom pants, and thereby ensure his failure to take part in the re-
bellion against the Elector. Hans-Jürgen can decisively prove von Bredow’s
innocence because, thanks to Brigitte, he is able show that throughout the in-
surrection he had been in possession of ‘‘Die Hosen des Herrn von Bredow.’’
Those early readers of Auto-da-Fé who were still familiar with Alexis’s
novel, perhaps from their childhood reading, perhaps even from their school
curriculum, would probably first have been struck by the humorous incon-
gruity. Beyond the fact that Therese is virtually illiterate, it is clear that Kien,
who read and reread Die Hosen as a child, mistakenly thinks of Therese
as a harmless Brigitte figure. Like his cultural cousin Professor Rath (or, as
his unappreciative students called him, Professor Unrath), Kien conceives
of women in a painfully naïve manner that is thoroughly informed by the
idealizing literature of a bygone era.28 This comes as no surprise, for, as
we shall see, Kien’s conceptions of the material, sensual world—of which
women are simply the chief exponents—are predetermined by the ‘‘higher’’
truths of books. Kien no more comprehends Therese as an erotic partner
than Emanuel Rath does Lola-Lola’s manifest sexuality (sleeping with Lola-
Lola meant just that: sleeping). On the contrary, Kien anticipates in the first
instance a model housekeeper, or Wirtschafterin (an expectation Therese
initially fulfills in her solicitous treatment of Die Hosen), and a Brigitte-
like woman, who knows her place. As we shall see in the following chapter,
Therese grotesquely clashes with the gender expectations of both Kien and
contemporaneous culture.29
The key aspect of Die Hosen, however, and one that would have been
remembered long after plot twists and turns were forgotten, is that it is a
historical novel at a double remove from the post–World War I period in
which Canetti parodically cites it. Though it may seem hard to believe in the
wake of the debate on history and fiction initiated byHaydenWhite, histori-
cal fiction was (and perhaps still is in some quarters) taken very seriously
as history.30 For Adolf von Grolmann, for example, Alexis’s historical fiction
represents an ‘‘internal contradiction’’ that nevertheless demands adulation
when it is carried off well.31 Despite the inevitable pitfalls endemic to the
mix of history and fiction,Die Hosen, of all Alexis’s ‘‘vaterländische Romane’’
(the subtitle of a whole series of his books) receives the highest marks for
its faithfulness to history. Thomas even goes so far as to credit Alexis as a
forerunner of the eminent positivist historian Leopold von Ranke.32 What-
ever we might today make of this novel’s relationship to the early sixteenth
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century, the fact remains that German pedagogues and publishers of the
Weimar period deemed it appropriate for the classroom.
This association of Alexis with the grand tradition of Rankian positiv-
ism may, however, distract from the more questionable ends to which such
literature was routinely put, namely, as culturally affirmative purveyor of
national(ist) tradition. Lynne Tatlock suggests that Alexis’s historical novels
were always simultaneously a means of coping with contemporaneous real-
ity: it is a mistake, she says, ‘‘to see the historical novel and the novel of con-
temporary life as two distinct genres.’’ 33 At the turn of the century, Thomas
suggests, Alexis’s ‘‘works may have been officially encouraged for political
reasons. In theyears following the unification ofGermanyan effortwasmade
to build up a German tradition, something which older nations had created
for themselves through the centuries. The importance of Prussia, now the
center of the new state, required emphasis, andAlexis’s novels were based on
what little historical tradition Prussia had to offer.’’ 34 The ideological value
of the vaterländische Romane in shoring up the Prussian state seems clear
enough; patriotism was at any rate the Alexian attribute emphasized both
by Freytag and Fontane. The appeal of Die Hosen and similar historical fic-
tion during the Weimar period cannot have been very different. At a time
when national identity and political traditions were either lacking or hotly
contested, novels in the mode of Alexis, which celebrate German histori-
cal traditions that perhaps never were, must have provided an anchor in an
ideological maelstrom. In this regard, we would do well to recall that ‘‘the
modernist and new objectivist aesthetics that emerged in Germany in the
1920s’’ were by no means typical of the time. In fact, as Wolfgang Natter
points out in his study Literature at War, 1914–1940, traditionalist, patriotic,
and nationalist literature was deeply entrenched and, indeed, promoted by
virtually all the German cultural institutions in any way connected with lit-
erature.35 For Canetti, at any rate, the recourse to historical fiction as an
ameliorative for the identity crises of the interwar period represented one of
those reactionary responses to modernity the greater novel parodies.
Canetti captures this flight into history above all bymeans of his protago-
nist, whose own practice of reading the world replicates that of the classic
Alexian historical novel. Before Therese becomes his chief nemesis, Kien’s
confrontation with brutal reality takes the form of his relationship to Bene-
dikt Pfaff, the retired police officer turned doorman. Though Kien would
like to think of the monthly payments to this ogre as a generous gratuity,
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they amount in fact to the kind of bribe mafia toughs extort in return for
‘‘protection.’’ Kien’s method of coping with this menacing brute is to his-
toricize him in a manner that both alludes to and reiterates the historical
appeal of Alexis’s novel. The period to which Kien assigns Pfaff, the early
sixteenth century, underscores the connection to Die Hosen des Herrn von
Bredow. Rumaging through a pile of books, Kien alights upon an academic
strategy that will disarm this menacing beast:
In the catalogue of the fallen books, there figured as No. 39 a stout antique
volume onArms and Tactics of the Landsknechts. Scarcely had it curvetted
off the ladder, with fearful crash, than the trumpeting caretakers were
transformed into landsknechts. A vast inspiration surged up in Kien. The
caretaker was a landsknecht, what else? The fist had no more terrors for
him. Before him sat a familiar historical figure. He knewwhat it would do
and what it would not do . . . Unhappy, late-born creature, who had come
into the world a landsknecht in the twentieth century . . . shut out from
the epoch for which it had been created, stranded in another to which it
would always remain a stranger! In the innocuous remoteness of the six-
teenth century the caretaker dwindled to nothing, let him brag as he would!
To master a fellow-creature, it suffices to find his place in history.36
It is of course not the sixteenth century per se that elicits such a sense of
calm in the professor, but its safe remove from the rough and tumble of the
interwar present. Recall that this was a time, as Thomas Mann records in
his diaries, when military issue machine guns from the First World War fell
into the hands of rival cliques, creating havoc in the once serene streets of
Munich. Kien maintains this historicizing illusion about Pfaff throughout
the bulk of the novel until his true brutality is no longer avoidable. When
the brutish Hausbesorger apprehends Kien at the Theresianum (the state-
run auction house cum pawn shop), Kien begrudgingly admits, in a pun
that is characteristic of the novel’s wit, ‘‘Die Vergangenheit ist vorbei ’’ 37 (The
past is over)—meaning that the ruse of employing history as prophylactic
against a disconcerting present had now decisively failed. With Kien’s en-
thusiasm for the ‘‘harmless distance’’ of the past, Canetti puts his finger both
on a contemporary trend of the interwar period and on a bankrupt strategy
of historical realism that is best summed up as escapism.38 Kien develops
this talent into a virtual cult of the past—at the expense, of course, of any
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engagement with his own contemporary polity.39 Ironically, Kien, who set
himself so far above Alexis’s historical fiction, lives by the very same escapist
principles.
Kien’s brother Georg presents a strikingly similar view of belletristic
novels: for him they represent an insular phase to be overcome, something
he believes he has left behind in order to turn to theworld of thementally ill.
Georg, too, associates novels with sex and women. But whereas Peter dreads
novels as ‘‘wedges’’ (Keile) that would penetrate and dissolve the armor of
his panzerlike Charakter, leaving him spent and distracted, Georg fondly
remembers them as pleasurable occasions of sexuality: ‘‘Reading was fon-
dling, was another form of love, was for ladies and ladies’ doctors, to whose
profession a delicate understanding of lecture intime properly belonged.’’ 40
Such pleasures are, of course, private; in fact, Georg relates the joys of
‘‘schöngeistige Lektüre’’ (polite, usually belletristic literature) directly to its
ability to smooth over the social divisions of the real world by reiterating
empty but elegantly formulated sentences about ‘‘intimacy.’’ 41 In the follow-
ing passage, we observe how Georg explicitly links novelistic escapism to
mindless sex. Moreover, it appears that French novels served for him as a
kind of instructional manual for seducing the clients of his gynecological
practice, while providing the simultaneous pleasure of distracting him from
the tragic and disruptive events of his own society:
The best novels were those in which the people spoke in the most cul-
tured way . . . The task of such a writer was to reduce the angular, pain-
ful, biting multifariousness of life as it was all around one, to the smooth
surface of a sheet of paper, on which it could pleasantly and swiftly be
read off . . . The more often was the same track traversed, the subtler was
the pleasure derived from the journey . . . Georges Kien had started as a
gynaecologist. His youth and good looks brought patients in crowds. At
that period, which did not last long, he gave himself up to French novels;
they played a considerable part in assuring his success . . . Surrounded
and spoilt by innumerable women, all ready to serve him, he lived like
Prince Gautama before he became Buddha. No anxious father and prince
had cut him off from the miseries of the world, but he saw old age, death
and beggars in such an abundance that he no longer noticed them. Yet
he was indeed cut off, by the books he read, the sentences he spoke, the
women who were ranged round him in a greedy close-built wall.42
30 : modernism as parody of popular realism
‘‘Sealed off ’’ (abgeschlossen), protected by an ‘‘unbroken wall’’ (geschlossene
Mauer): There is probably no clearer expression of literature’s problematic
potential—here linked explicitly to male heterosexual gratification—to be-
come an insular form of escapism. Georg’s conception of novel reading as
a sort of eroticized anaesthesia certainly takes the critique of Alexis’s com-
forting historicism a step further. Yet, given the fact that Georg himself turns
out to be a thoroughly questionable character, can we confidently say that
this is the overall position of Auto-da-Fé?
Given the demonstrable social concerns of Canetti’s novel, which are de-
tailed further in subsequent chapters of this study, as well as the consistently
skeptical attitude toward insular behavior we encounter in the novel, we can
assume that Georg’s rejection of belletristic novels as pleasurable diversions
falls in line—though perhaps not quite in the way he intended—with the
novel’s larger position. But the question about Georg’s reliability is never-
theless well placed, because it will lead us to a more precise distinction. The
simple pleasure derived from identifying with a beautiful and trustworthy
character, which is a standard feature of popular prose, becomes more com-
plicated in Auto-da-Fé. It is not that Canetti sets out to deprive us of these
gratifications utterly; rather he shows, above all in Georg, that identification
is both a necessary and highly problematic process. The question of Georg’s
credibility regarding his views on novels, then, is itself part of a larger nar-
rative strategy that is designed to entice the reader to identify with him.We
are intended, in other words, to approve of Georg, at least provisionally;
and thus it comes as little surprise that he here seems so right about novels.
Ultimately, the point is neither to establish the brothers Kien as trustworthy
nor as reliably and consistently untrustworthy; like all modernists, Canetti
foregrounds the reader’s role in making and revising such judgments. But
he does so in ways that have not yet been fully appreciated. To elucidate this
point will require us, temporarily at least, to leave our Trousers behind—but
not without a promise to return.
Ascriptive Narration
Georg’s musings on novel reading as an essentially antisocial mode of
autoerotic gratification comes very close to the view proffered by the critic
Lennard J. Davis, who, in Resisting Novels warns against novelistic seduc-
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tions. He reminds us that ‘‘novels are not life . . . and [that] their function
is to help humans adapt to the fragmentation and isolation of the modern
world.’’ 43 For Davis, as for Canetti, this function is highly suspect, because
social fragmentation is typically overcome in novel reading not through en-
gagement, but bymeans of pure avoidance. Thus the classic novel—the real-
ist novel of the nineteenth century, which is the focus of Davis’s study—
offers a number of dubious defenses against modernity which, in turn, merit
our vigilant supervision.
Central among these defenses is the process of identification.44Davis’s re-
marks on this mechanism will help us understand what Canetti is up to with
the asymmetrical figure of Georg:
Now the issue of physical beauty becomes more understandable. Since
the physical beauty of most protagonists is not accidental but taken as a
functioning requirement of the classic novel, I would suggest its function
is that it encourages the element of desire to enter the reading process.
In making a character attractive, the author can draw the reader towards
that set of signs much as advertisers can draw consumers toward a prod-
uct by associating it with a physically attractive model. In effect, it is not
so much that we identify with a character, but that we desire that charac-
ter in some nonspecific but erotic way. In this sense, part of novel reading
is the process of falling in love with characters or making friends with
signs.45
With this in mind, the structural spoof on realist identification that at-
tends the introduction of Georg Kien comesmore clearly into view. Georg is
not only the most likable character in a novel peopled with despicable and
disgusting louts, he is also the most differentiated of the otherwise flat char-
acters. Dagmar Barnouwobserves correctly that ‘‘he is the most ambivalent,
the most psychologically realistic figure of the novel.’’ 46 Yet, above all, he
is—or appears at first blush—‘‘beautiful and kind.’’ 47 ‘‘He was tall, strong,
fiery and sure of himself; in his features there was something of that gentle-
ness which women need before they can feel at homewith aman. Thosewho
saw him compared him to Michelangelo’s Adam.’’ 48 Only later will it occur
to the reader that this glowing description, not unlike those laudatory pro-
gram notes about actors and singers, has been authored by none other than
the honoree himself.
Canetti’s point in introducing the good, and good-looking, doctor four-
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fifths through Auto-da-Fé, is central to the novel’s project of reflecting on—
and distancing itself from—popular contemporary realism. Up until this
point in the novel, Canetti has deprived us of any identification possibilities
by serving up misers, cheats, and self-deluded megalomaniacs.With Georg
we get for the first time someone like us, which is to say someone like our
idealized selves, a person we can trust. More than that, as Davis would re-
mind us, we receive with Georg the ideological comfort that comes from
the belief in unitary characters, and from the conviction that individuals
can effect social change—recall that Georg is a world-renowned psychiatrist,
whose revolutionary methods of treatment are the envy of the profession
and the promise of the future.49
Early critics of the novel took the bait, as I believe first time readers still
do: Ernst Waldinger’s review of 1936 asserts, for example, that Georg ‘‘sym-
bolically represents—as we can easily guess—the writer himself with his in-
terpretations and solutions.’’ 50 Similarly, Walter Allen, in a review of 1947,
writes of Georg as ‘‘the one sane character in the book . . . an eminent psy-
chiatrist . . . who alone is aware of objective reality.’’ 51 The novel does not
ultimately support such an identification, as Barnouw has quite persuasively
shown, but it does tease us. After all, as we shall see in the following chapter,
Georg, who considers himself such a distinguished ‘‘connoisseur of men’’
(Menschenkenner), completely bungles his brother’s cure.52
Why the tease?What Canetti has enacted at the structural level by having
us lunge toward Georg to satisfy our craving for identification is a replay of
an epistemological object lesson—this time between reader and text—that
has already been played out a number of times at the level of story and that
is part and parcel of realist fiction like Die Hosen. The pitfall, as we see again
and again, is that identification, as a process for determining what is true,
real, and valuable is an extremely problematic process. Whereas Alexis—as
we shall soon see—proffers identification in a naive and unreflective man-
ner, Canetti makes it the object of merciless parody.
In the following scene, Fischerle, the hunchback dwarf Kien meets when
he is evicted from his library-apartment, attempts to ingratiate himself
by showing exaggerated concern for the professor’s unwieldy ‘‘mental li-
brary’’ (Kopfbibliothek). Before permitting this little man (Männchen) to
take on this awesome responsibility, Kien inquires, as a standard precaution,
whether this incorrigible thief has ever stolen. Kien receives the assurance
he needs when he discovers that he and Fischerle share a lack of athletic
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prowess—that is, just at that moment when he establishes an identificatory
bond:
‘‘You are no doubt a fast runner?’’ Fischerle saw through the trap and an-
swered: ‘‘What would be the point of lying? When you take a step, I take
half a one. At school I was always the worst runner.’’ He thought up the
name of a school lest Kien should ask him: in fact he had never been to
one. But Kien was wrestling with weightier problems [namely the mem-
oryof his own physical shortcomings]. Hewas about tomake the greatest
gesture of trust of his entire life. ‘‘I believe you!’’ he said simply. Fischerle
was jubilant.53
Later, in the course of Fischerle’s scheme devised to fleece him, Kien
chooses to believe a far-fetched tale concocted by the Fischerin (Fischerle’s
would-be lover) simply ‘‘because her indignation pleased him.’’ 54 The novel
is full of such scenes in which a misplaced identification of one figure with
another results in hilarious misconstructions. Critics miss the point, there-
fore, when they stress exclusively the reader’s epistemological superiority
over the fictional world of Auto-da-Fé, forgetting that we, too, fall for Georg
in amanner that has been rehearsed at the figural level throughout the novel.
Moreover, there is a certain warmth to this inclusive gesture that critics
often overlook. While I stress the fact that Canetti subjects his readers to
the very identification trap in which he enmeshes his repellent figures, there
is perhaps a positive side to this technique: our condescension toward the
novel’s figures is pierced by the realization that we, too, are implicated in
the very same hermeneutic process. As if to make the point that we are all
subject to the Janus-faced potential endemic to identification, which holds
out both the prospect of insight as well as the danger of vain distortion,
Canetti comments in his autobiography on a rumor, passed along by an
otherwise thoroughly untrustworthy gossip (‘‘Schwätzer’’), about his dear
friend Dr. Sonne. ‘‘I accepted [the hearsay] without further investigation,’’
he confides, ‘‘it simply pleased me so much, that I granted it credulity.’’ 55 Of
course, this rumor (which, incidentally, claimed that Sonne was a great phi-
lanthropist who attempted to keep his generosity anonymous) could prove
false; Canetti is obviously no less vulnerable to error than anyone else. Con-
sidering the issue of identification from this retrospective view, the novel’s
position comes more clearly into view. The perceptual error Canetti seems
so concerned with in the novel is perhaps not the essential epistemologi-
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cal dilemma, the ‘‘erkenntnistheoretische’’ problem attending any such act of
judgment, but the fact that the typical case of figural identification implies a
willful reduction of the other to the very limited parameters of the projecting
self. Canetti’s own identification with Sonne fails to arouse our condemna-
tion not because it is any less fraught with possible error, but because this
process directs Canetti outward and positively, far beyond his own abilities
and interests. It is frankly true that the matter of identification is treated in
Auto-da-Fé in primarily negative terms: here it is principally a danger that
the novel will not let us forget. But this proves to be a central concept in
Canetti’s thinking that evolved significantly throughout this life. Auto-da-
Fé frames the question, but it is not the last word on the hermeneutics of
identification. Here as elsewhere, we are undoubtedly richer for considering
the full scope of Canetti’s thought; but it would be mistaken to assert crass
equations. In opposition to Freud, as I endeavor to show in the penultimate
chapter of this study, Canetti later developed a positive concept of trans-
formative identification that he would famously dub ‘‘Verwandlung’’—liter-
ally, ‘‘metamorphosis.’’ As in other key areas, the novel’s insistent negations
would lead ultimately to more positive, though still cautious, affirmations.
But once again, we are far ahead of our story.
When Davis writes of ‘‘novelistic identification,’’ he is explicitly expand-
ing the term to include both character and narrator, for the latter is also
a source of seduction as well as an object of identification.56 Indeed, Davis
goes so far as to collapse the two when, for example, he maintains that ‘‘the
character with whom readers most seek to connect is the narrator.’’ 57 If we
turn our attention now to that portion of Die Hosen which, we are told,
Therese so meticulously reads and rereads, we are immediately confronted
with an instructive contrast. Davis’s observations on classic narration pre-
pare us perfectly for the Alexian narrator: ‘‘The presence of the narrator is
comforting and mature, and authorizes the restoration of order, commu-
nity and communication by his or her very presence. This authority is made
even more dramatic in the nineteenth century by the fiction that almost all
narrators are male.’’ 58 True to form, Alexis’s patriarchal narrator opens with
an expansive aerial shot of Brigitte’s Herbstwäsche (autumn laundry), asks
himself rhetorically what those specks of white could be, suggests a whole
series of incorrect answers as he slowly moves us closer to the scene, and
finally brings the great laundry enterprise into sharp focus. The narrator’s
mastery of space repeats itself when he momentarily occupies the perspec-
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tive of theman in themoon.59WhenBrigitte later ventures out onto the roof,
but is too preoccupied with her husband’s pants to take in the breathtaking
scenery, the narrator steps in to tell us what she doesn’t see.60
His magisterial spatial purview is matched by his temporal perspective:
conscious of the intervening centuries, and constantly mediating between
the past and the present, the narrator introduces a long descriptive passage
with these words: ‘‘At that time the region was completely different than it is
today.’’ 61 Most importantly, the narrator provides the moral fulcrum, step-
ping back occasionally even from his beloved Brigitte to remind us: ‘‘But
the best woman remains a woman,’’ 62 suggesting that even someone as sen-
sible and practical as Brigitte cannot be assumed to transcend the inherent
weaknesses of her gender.
Alexis’s narrator, in other words, perfectly demonstrates Davis’s soothing
male authority figure, who provides seemingly reliable ethical and episte-
mological orientation to the reader. For Davis, this aspect of epistemological
authority is the sine qua non of the classic narrator and explains our most
fundamental attraction to this voice in the text: ‘‘As characters, then, narra-
tors may not have physical beauty, but they are required to ‘know theworld.’
The central myth here, as with the myth of beauty, is that if one is able to
write a novel—to manipulate words into things—then one must be able to
understand things and thoughts better than most other people.’’ 63 All of
which only serves to magnify the contrast between the narrator of Auto-da-
Fé and the narrator of Die Hosen. For though Canetti’s narrator takes on the
appearance of seductive omniscience, we soon come to see that he is driven
and riven by incompatible figural interests.
The earliest and most apparent illustration of this can be seen in a key
scene near the beginning of Book 1 of Auto-da-Fé. This situation, paradig-
matic for the novel’s narrative strategy—and therefore a point of reference
later in this study—amply demonstrates the initial collusion of the narra-
tor with the protagonist Peter Kien. For all we know, the professor is an
innocent bystander witnessing the following exchange on aViennese street:
‘‘Suddenly he heard someone shouting loudly at someone else: ‘Can you tell
me where Mut Street is?’ There was no reply. Kien was surprised: so there
were other silent people besides himself to be found in the busy streets. With-
out looking up he listened for more. How would the questioner behave in
the face of this silence? . . . Still he said nothing. Kien applauded him . . .
Still the second man said nothing . . . The incident was taking place on his
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right hand. The first man was yelling: ‘You’ve no manners!’ The secondman
was still silent. Then Kien felt a nasty jolt. The other man, the silent one,
the man with character, who controlled his tongue even in anger, was Kien
himself.’’ 64
This passage provides an early lesson on how to read the novel. Here (as
elsewhere) the reader is duped, albeit temporarily, by a narrator who is re-
peatedly commandeered by his characters. Though we ultimately learn of
the identity of Kien and ‘‘the second man,’’ we will never again be able to
read so trustingly. Like all beginner’s lessons, this one is fairly elementary;
later on wewill not be told so directly that the narrator has conspired with—
or been inhabited by—one of the characters. In fact, we are as readers en-
couraged to adopt the very cynical attitude that pervades the story itself.
Far from the cosmic vantage point offered by the Alexian narrator, Canetti’s
narrator fails in his essential task ‘‘to know the world,’’ a point I will return
to in chapter 3. Rather than lulled into epistemic security, we are in fact
called upon continually to engage in an active and not always very satisfying
hermeneutic revisionism.
Having carefully sifted the claims and counterclaims of various critics re-
garding the narrative status of diverse passages of the novel, David Darby
observes: ‘‘The conclusion one reaches from conducting such a survey of
opinions regarding the extent of the different types of focalization is that the
limits are extremely difficult to define . . . The effect of this almost ubiquitous
ambiguity, along with the tendency of the narrator to slip between focaliz-
ers, undermines the authenticity of the information discoursed throughout
the novel.’’ 65 For Darby, the novel’s crucial conflict is essentially internecine,
namely that between the characters and the narrator. Following Dolezel’s
narratological lead, Darby postulates a battle between the characters, each
intent upon installing his or her own private ‘‘figural belief world’’ as norma-
tive reality, and the narrator, who ultimately possesses the ‘‘authentication
authority’’ of the greater novel. He declares the narrator the victor in this
struggle, and thus solves what for him is the novel’s great riddle—namely
how relative clarity proceeds from such ambiguity.
Darby’s close reading enriches our understanding of the dynamic nature
of narration that characterizes Auto-da-Fé, but it does not solve the riddle
entirely. For the intelligibility of these ‘‘inauthentic’’ rival belief worlds rests
ultimately on their exclusion of any wider (and therefore more complex)
vision of social reality. It is fundamentally the highly reductive and gro-
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tesquely stylized character of these mutually exclusive worlds that makes
them in the end detectable and amenable to debunking. The panoptic view
we gain on the characters’ doomed solipsistic escapades proceeds less from a
particularly knowledgeable or authoritative narrator, than from the charac-
ters’ own highly problematic retreat from the intersubjective, social realm.
Narration in Auto-da-Fé, far from offering comforting structure, sets in
motion a process of interrogation and ascription. When confronted with
one of those moments of indeterminacy, the reader is put in the uncom-
fortable position of actively employing a set of conveniently discrete stereo-
types—convenient, that is, from the point of view of the hermeneutic task.
Crassly put, once inducted to the hermeneutics of suspicion and confronted
with the set of stereotyped characters at our disposal, we must continually
ask ourselves questions like these: Does this unit of narration sound like the
lecherous Wirtschafterin? Is this scrap of speech attributable to the money-
grubbing Jew, the pompous professor, or the bestial Hausbesorger? Though
we may in some cases decode the ostensibly third person narration differ-
ently (i.e., attribute it to another figural voice), we all draw on the stereo-
types introduced by the novel to make sense of the voices which variously
inhabit the narrator. The novel’s success at combining pervasive narrative
ambiguity with plot-level clarity, is therefore ultimately to be found not in
narratological models, but in the culture which purveys the reductive and
pernicious clichés on which Canetti so richly draws in the first place.
Auto-da-Fé provides its own antimodel in the form of the book given to
Therese, which sets in motion the disastrous marriage, and thus the entire
plot. Canetti’s parody of narrative ‘‘Blendung’’ should therefore be under-
stood against the blindness of the allegedly omniscient Alexian narrator, the
most glaring example of which is his obliviousness to, which really amounts
to his endorsement of, anti-Semitism.Despite his impressive geographic and
temporal command, this narrator, who is otherwise full of truisms, judg-
ments, and platitudes, fails to open his mouth on this (quite literally) central
issue in the novel.
Book 1 of Die Hosen sets up a symbolic chain of signifiers, which em-
ploys the cliché of the deceitful Jew: the narrator explicitly associates the
peddler with the devil and depicts him as conspicuously moneygrubbing.66
Later, when Lindenberg inquires about the availability of a Jew to solve his
financial worries, his hosts immediately suggest the hawker Hedderich.67 In
the meantime, the clergyman and Peter Melchior (of the Bredow clan) have
38 : modernism as parody of popular realism
a conversation that recapitulates the moral about the Jewish monger: the
Dechant insists that it is acceptable to cheat the devil (read: the Jewish ped-
dler), because he cheats us. Melchior concedes the latter statement, but in-
sists that ‘‘One shouldn’t even cheat the devil’’ 68—thereby upholding the
analogy between Jew and devil even while making a moral point. In each
of these cases, it should be noted, the novel’s morality extends only to the
injustice of revenge; the cliché itself, the ‘‘guilty Jew,’’ is never questioned.
Lindenberg later tells a parallel story about the tailor Wiedeband; but, for
obvious reasons, Lindenberg—who is about to attack Hedderich—fully en-
dorses the execution of this deceitful and prideful tailor.69
Now all of this may seem overly subtle for a popular novel; and indeed it
would be, were it not for the overt pronouncements made at the opening of
Book 2. Speaking of von Bredow’s arrest for having ambushed Hedderich,
the Elector’s bodyguard and the courtier Otterstädt exchange the following
words: ‘‘Old man Krippenreiter has had such misfortune that he’s ambush-
ing a Jew who is travelling with his wares to Berlin.’’ ‘‘A Jew.’’ ‘‘Or something
like that.’’ 70 The confusion (or better, equation) of the deceitful, venal ped-
dler with ‘‘the Jew’’ continues as the matter is discussed, and is picked up by
Lindenberg as an obvious identification when he responds to the Elector’s
query: ‘‘Your Highness is referring to yesterday’s attack on the Jew, about
which I’ve heard.’’ 71
Up to this point one might still entertain the possibility that the politi-
cally progressive Alexis, whowas loosely associated with the Junges Deutsch-
land (YoungGermany) group,may be thematizing rather than underwriting
anti-Semitism.72 Yet this assumption is misplaced: as Hal Draper has docu-
mented,many, indeed amajority, of Germany’s liberals of this era were open
anti-Semites.73 The possibility of a critical perspective on anti-Semitism is
definitively foreclosed when the idealistic young Elector (whose right-hand
man the novel’s young hero becomes) announces: ‘‘I hate the Jews, Linden-
berg, and plan to tighten the reign on these unbelieving usurers, when their
time comes. For they are and remain betrayers of the blood of our Lord and
Savior. Yet, even if it were Simon the thief or Judas Iscariot, who took the
thirty silver pieces, no one would have the right, and no one should even
dare, to lay a hand upon him where I have reserved jurisdiction to myself.’’ 74
The Elector would like to come across as noble: despite his pronounced reli-
gious anti-Semitism (which was widely held to be a defensible position up
to, and in some cases even after, the Holocaust),75 he energetically insists on
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banning rogue anti-Semitic vigilantes. But as his first sentence reveals, his
hatred toward Jews is asmuch economic as religious, and he is really only re-
serving the right of such violent punishment to himself. Like Brigitte, whose
only objection to beating that ‘‘knave of a peddler’’ 76 is that it will result in
driving up the price of the goods of those peddlers who survive, the Elec-
tor’s pronouncement has nothing to do with what he deems to be the essen-
tially guilty and duplicitous Jew. Although Alexis does afford Joachim some
depth by depicting weaknesses as well as strengths, the Elector remains an
essentially positive figure.77 His naivete regarding the Junkers’ insurrection
and his draconian punishment of Lindenberg—not, at any rate, his blatant
anti-Semitism—constitute the sins for which he pays with loneliness.78
Conversely, neither does the eventual rehabilitation of Lindenberg affect
the bigoted representation of the Jew.79That the novel’s two great adversaries
can so readily agree on this single issue, does, however, undercut any linger-
ing supposition thatAlexis’s portrayal of anti-Semitismmay somehowyet be
critical. The clinching argument for Die Hosen is the narrator’s complicity.
Again in Book 2 he engages in diabolical description of the peddler, encour-
aging the semiotic link, already common at the time, connecting peddler,
devil, tailor, and Jew.80 Even more damning for this otherwise loquacious
narrator is his sudden silence on blatant anti-Semitism. Recall that this is
the same narrator, who, on other occasions, has not hesitated to supply us
with such pearls of wisdom as: ‘‘The mind of man is changeable,’’ to spell
out the already evident cautionary tale inherent in Hans-Jochem’s vanity,
to jest about von Bredow’s modest mental ability, or to preach his gospel
of simple living.81 Ironically, Hedderich’s actual religious status remains in
doubt to the end. Yet, given the ideological cast of the novel, the message
is clearly not the relatively enlightened view that Christians, too, can be as
rapacious as any others, but rather that one can justifiably be mistaken for
a Jew if one behaves like the venal and dishonest Hedderich.
Of course Canetti, too, incorporates anti-Semitism in his novel, as we
shall observe in some detail in chapter 4. But whereas Alexis goes to great
lengths to naturalize bigotry, the racial and gender stereotypes of Auto-da-
Fé virtually jump off the page. The reader of Die Hosen, as we have seen,
is meant to identify with the racist narrator; the reader of Auto-da-Fé is
painfully confronted with grotesque caricatures that cry out to be under-
stood against the culture that fostered and propagated them. The Alexian
text, I am arguing, serves up bigotry (and other comforting truisms) in
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the comfort of a hermetically packaged historical narrative that served in
the interwar period to insulate readers from a disconcerting political and
social reality. In contrast, Canetti’s is virtually a know-nothing narrator,
more placeholder than identifiable persona. Though there exists an undeni-
able narrative voice—as when Fischerle’s murder and Kien’s suicide are re-
counted—it is simply not the voice of pacifying authority. And if the narra-
tor ultimately wins that ‘‘narrative battle’’ against the novel’s characters, it
is a Pyrrhic victory in which he remains their sometime hostage.
Perhaps the best evidence that narration in Auto-da-Fé is more a vexing
question than a quenching font of epistemological authority comes from re-
ception data. To use Davis’s term, one can confidently state that this is not
a novel that needs resisting—it seems to have provoked that response all
on its own. Far from Georg’s conception of reading as mindless sex, readers
of Auto-da-Fé have often enough reported their displeasure: one thinks im-
mediately of Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s famous description of the novel
as ‘‘a literary monster’’ (ein literarisches Monstrum), or of Marcel Reich-
Ranicki’s peremptory pronouncement that it is ‘‘ungenießbar’’—unpalat-
able, not merely unenjoyable.
A good deal of this difficulty can be traced to the narrative strategy that
fails to provide a ready-made perspective from which to view the insidious
stereotypes that inhabit the novel. Reading, and rereading, is so annoying
because just when we hope to pin some execrable assertion on the narra-
tor, we discover that hiding in an apparently objective narrative voice is a
focalized mind-set after all—or at least the distinct possibility of one.What
frustrates the reader is not the process of ascription itself—the attribution of
some apparently gnomic statement to a particular figure—but the fact that
it forces us, at least provisionally, to adopt as a necessary hermeneutic de-
vice the very stereotypes we would otherwise eschew. We must continually
rehearse and deploy anti-Jewish, misogynistic, and other clichéd and base
conceptions just to read the novel. Perhaps in so doing, we are unpleasantly
reminded of the fact that, as Sander Gilman argues, we routinely employ
such stereotypes in our everyday thinking.82
The novel is rife with pertinent examples.83 But since a close reading of
a more than five-hundred-page novel on this question is neither possible
nor desirable (and because further illustrations will be given in subsequent
chapters), one example, from a passage already quoted, will serve to dem-
onstrate this phenomenon. In the discussion of Georg, above, we read what
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appears to be an obvious bit of narrator-based description: ‘‘In his features
there was something of that gentleness which women need before they can
feel at home with a man.’’ 84 Once we discover Georg’s incredible ego, his
benevolent-sounding but unmistakable misogyny, and the ability he shares
with his fellow characters to infiltrate the narrative voice, we will want to
ascribe this portion of the description (and perhaps even more) to the self-
aggrandizing consciousness of Georg himself. In this way, we are constantly
challenged to ascribe what first appears to be authorial narration to one of
the fictional characters who essentially has taken on the mantle of narra-
tor. This ceaseless dynamic between the initial impression of ‘‘zero focaliza-
tion’’ and the eventual determination of ‘‘internal focalization’’ comprises
not merely a formal refinement regarding the representation of conscious-
ness in literature,85 but an important social admonition: Those authorities,
like the Alexian narrator, who lay claim to magisterial cultural perspectives
need to be examined critically for the special and partial interests that may
be lurking beneath their ‘‘omniscience.’’ There will inevitably be some dis-
agreement in this mammoth text about precisely who is speaking where.
What we are no longer permitted to do, however, is to ascribe unproblem-
atically such foundational utterances to a trustworthy, neutral, and stable
narrative voice. Adducing the narrator as the basis for a definitive interpre-
tation of Auto-da-Fé—still a fairly common occurrence in the secondary lit-
erature—is therefore something readers should greet with suspicion. For in
Auto-da-Fé we know only who these characters claim to be—not who they
essentially are.
As a translator of three Upton Sinclair novels for the leftistMalikVerlag, a
task he later described as a mere sustenance job (‘‘eine Brotarbeit’’), Canetti
became an expert on popular, socially engaged realism in the interwar pe-
riod. In citing and parodying the beloved Alexis in Auto-da-Fé, Canetti
offers not a broadside on literary realism per se—for he continued to revere
Balzac andZola as exemplary practitioners of the genre 86—but amuchmore
specific critique of historicizing escapist tendencies and seductive narrative
structures that conspire to make literature the very anesthetizing, insular
activity Georg held it to be.
If truth be told, Canetti was not particularly interested in literary classi-
fications, even if he was acutely aware of literary and cultural developments
in general. Like his modernist contemporaries, he was interested in repre-
senting the modern world, the ‘‘new reality’’ (neue Wirklichkeit) of the post–
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World War I era, which he felt demanded new modes of expression. In re-
flecting on the genesis of his novel, Canetti writes: ‘‘I toldmyself that I would
build spotlights with which I could illuminate the world from outside.’’ 87
This remains a valuablewayof viewingAuto-da-Fé—as outside our everyday
world, yet designed to illuminate it. Considering the various novels cited in
Auto-da-Fé yields productive insights that clarify Canetti’s own project. Yet
this discussion also poses the danger of skewing the novel. For if Auto-da-Fé
were to be read merely as a participant in a literary debate, this would only
serve to reinforce the very insular escapism the novel seeks to challenge and
overcome.
2 ‘‘The truth is you’re a woman.
You live for sensations.’’
Misogyny as Cultural Critique
When Canetti finds in Broch the necessary attributes of a great writer—he is
original; he sums up his age; he opposes his age—he is delineating the
standards to which he has pledged himself.
—Susan Sontag 1
You’re always polite, you woman, you’re like Eve . . . Take a rest from all this
femininity! Maybe you’ll become human again.
—Peter Kien to his brother Georg 2
False Starts: Toward a New Critical Paradigm
Recently, critics have begun to worry about misogyny in Auto-da-Fé.
Rather than view it as part of the overall parodic structure of the novel, how-
ever, they tend to submit their findings urgently, like investigative reporters
who have just discovered corruption in city hall. Richard H. Lawson alerts
us, for example, to ‘‘Canetti’s considerable misogyny,’’ 3 and regrets that the
novel contains ‘‘a series of misogynistic aphorisms that perhaps passed as
amusing in the 1930s; for example: ‘Women are illiterates, unendurable and
stupid, a perpetual disturbance.’ ’’ 4 If Lawson seems willing to let us off with
a general sort of warning, Jenna Ferrara is less forgiving. She indicts the nar-
rator for ‘‘submerging’’ women’s voices, and Canetti himself for encoding in
this fiction his own deep-seated hatred of women.5Ultimately, she contends,
the novel recommends Anna—the sexually abused daughter of the building
superintendent—as an exemplum of female subservience. Most recently—
and most spectacularly—Kristie Foell has suggested that ‘‘the unfortunate
message’’ of at least one scene of the novel ‘‘is that women want to be raped
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and [that they] make accusations of rape out of a sense of sexual frustration.
Therese’s confused desires play into the myth that women deservewhat they
get, whether rape, poverty, or murder’’;6 similar pronouncements can be
found throughout her recent monograph. If such critics have espoused dis-
putable claims, they nevertheless deserve a good deal of credit for drawing
our attention to a crucial and thus far rather neglected aspect of the novel.7
When confronted with this kind of ideological criticism—a sort of head-
hunting expedition for pernicious stereotypes—one is necessarily reminded
of Shoshana Felman’s pathbreaking corrective to psychoanalytic criticism,
in which she reminded fellow critics (whowere then churning out fairly pre-
dictable Freudian interpretations) that sex is not the answer, but the ongoing
question.8 Perhaps the same should be said of ideological criticism at this
juncture: locating insidious stereotyping is not itself the end of the pursuit.
What is needed, rather, is careful analysis of the largermatrix of ideas and lit-
erary strategies within which these stereotypes appear. Only then could we
askwhether (and how) the reader is encouraged to accept, reject, or question
the prejudice in question.
Yet such attention to the larger constellation of literary strategies is pre-
cisely what one misses. Overlooking what is perhaps the hallmark of this
modernist novel, the ironically porous narrator, these critics have instead
posited the traditional narrator of literary realism in order to anchor their
respective argument about the ‘‘novel’smisogyny.’’ 9WhileCanetti’s narrator
employs the formal prerogatives of the traditional storyteller (third person,
the tense of narration, gnomic utterances), the novel itself pulls the rug of
reliability out from beneath him, discrediting his putative authority and in-
dependence.Throughout the novel the narrator embodiesmore the desire to
speak universally, objectively, or in the voice of nineteenth-century Wissen-
schaft than any unquestioned ability to do so. Canetti’s mercurial narrator is
repeatedly infiltrated by the novel’s cast of characters, and the reader quickly
learns to suspect that the claims issued by the narrator typically emerge from
quite vested interests. At best, the narrator of Auto-da-Fé is reliably unreli-
able, and thus a foundation incapable of supporting suchweighty allegations
of misogyny.10
It remains a riddle how a reader could be interpolated or sutured into (to
borrow terms from structuralism) this allegedly nefarious text.The failure to
demonstrate this proposition is crucial; for the broad experience of readers
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indicates a continual ‘‘falling out’’ of the story rather than the experience of
being comfortably buckled in.While Reich-Ranicki’s pronouncement of the
novel as ‘‘indigestible’’ may ultimately seem unfair, he is certainly correct
that the reader is in no way seduced into a state of unreflective stupor. In
fact, the novel’s remarkable humor depends to a great extent on the reader’s
epistemic sovereignty over the distorted and limited worlds each character
takes to be utterly real, natural, and universally valid. Perhaps these latter-
day muckrakers should give some credit to the novel itself, for it is a text
that foregrounds and questions those misogynistic stereotypes, rather than
one that insidiously deploys them as natural.
Before proceeding directly to this argument, however, let us briefly re-
visit the question: Why the hesitancy to grant this parodic possibility in the
first place? Part of the accusatory posture taken by the critics mentioned
above may be attributable to two additional and related—though up to this
point inexplicit—factors of feminist criticism of the novel. First is the fail-
ure to deploy with historic specificity the term misogyny, despite the fact
that the meaning of the word has evolved significantly from the beginning
of the century to the present day. One need not assume, for example, that
Canetti evolved into a model feminist as the term came to be defined from
the 1970s onward, in order to grasp his critique of misogyny as it was pressed
into service during the early decades of this century to solve the celebrated
‘‘crisis of the self.’’ The second factor that may have inhibited critics from
seeing the novel’s misogyny as part and parcel of the text’s overall parodic
structure is the premise of the Anglo-American approach to feminist liter-
ary criticism, which characterizes all the aforesaid studies. Such critics are
forever trying to redeem the novel’s women, particularly Therese. With re-
gard to Auto-da-Fé this is frankly a doomed enterprise. Any attempt to re-
cover Therese’s supposed interiority is bound to be stymied by the hard fact
that none of the characters is psychologically realistic. Stressing the novel’s
overt artifice in this regard, Canetti once said to Hermann Broch: ‘‘These
are figures, not real people.’’ 11 Moreover, the novel cannot be made over to
be fundamentally about women: in point of fact, it is a rich parody of men’s
(particularly Peter and Georg Kien’s) distorted views of women and ‘‘the
feminine,’’ and thus can never satisfy critics searching for a story centered
on—or offering equal time to—female subjects. That would simply be a dif-
ferent novel.
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Three Obsolete Women
If misogyny in Auto-da-Fé is neither some distasteful by-product of an
otherwise great novel, nor merely the pernicious ideological vestige of a
chauvinist author, one needs to confront the question with a new para-
digm. Rather than the purveyor of retrograde thinking, Auto-da-Fé is in
fact remarkably progressive. Not only because the self-conscious and per-
vasive deployment of misogyny takes critical aim at the contemporaneous
clichés of gender—notably, as Pöder has shown, by citing and inverting
OttoWeininger’s widely read Geschlecht und Charakter (Sex and Character,
1903)—but also in its encoding of what is generally taken to be a fairly re-
cent refinement in thinking on gender: the distinction between the social
construction of gender roles and the biologically given status of sex. This
disjunction of sex and gender is broadly evident in Therese’s insistence on
her conjugal rights as well as her adamant refusal to accept Kien’s attempt
to restrict her role to that of mother-librarian. The gender/sex distinction is
perhaps nowhere clearer than in Kien’s absurd (yet telling) pronouncement
that his brother Georg is, essentially, a woman.
This rupture, however much it may contribute to the dislodging of tra-
ditional gender strictures, should be seen primarily in light of the novel’s
staging of the epistemological dilemma implied in the peculiarly male crisis
of the self.Themisogynyworthyof investigation consists therefore not in the
fairly obvious derision of female figures, but in the novel’s gendered struc-
turing of the epistemological exchange, inwhich ‘‘woman’’ or the ‘‘feminine’’
figures throughout as the thing to be known. For the philologist Peter Kien
she is both the inscrutable text (waiting to be authoritatively decoded) and
China; for the psychiatrist Georg she is the quintessence of insanity, pas-
sively and appreciatively awaiting his marvelous treatments. She is, respec-
tively, mother and demimonde. But what she may never be, of course, is a
cognitively coequal partner capable of her own crisis of subjectivity.
Looking at the novel’s misogyny in this way helps us to see the represen-
tation of woman not only as a synchronic, generalized critique of woefully
sexist images, but also as a quite time-specific product of the historically
conditioned crisis of subjectivity. Well before Hermann Bahr pronounced
the self unsalvageable (‘‘Das unrettbare Ich,’’ 1904), Austrian intellectuals
had been debating the implications of what Judith Ryan has dubbed ‘‘The
Vanishing Subject.’’ It was precisely this specter of an attenuated ‘‘empiri-
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cal’’ self, Steven Beller argues, that inspiredOttoWeininger’s infamous opus;
and though the contemporary debate on the self was perhapsmost explicitly
conducted in academic circles, it also had unmistakable political ramifica-
tions in the form of collectivist and irrationalist movements of the early part
of this century.12 Yet the more precise impulse behind Auto-da-Fé, which
was begun in 1930, was not so much this ongoing anxiety about the self, but
those questionable attempts (above all Weininger’s) proposed to solve that
crisis. The late modernist novel Auto-da-Fé can therefore be viewed most
productively as an epiphenomenon ofmodernity, or as a kind ofmodernism
once removed.Canetti’s specific contribution, aswe shall see in greaterdetail
below, is not only to drawour attention to the gendered status of the subject,
but more specifically to indict the canonical high German (and European)
construction of culture for enshriningmisogyny as both normal and norma-
tive. The only characters given enough psychological depth to sustain any
kind of crisis of identity are, of course, Georg and Kien. And both attempt
to use ‘‘woman’’ to manage their difficulties: to shore up a dissolving self (as
in the case of Kien), or to trade in an obsolete self (Georg). ‘‘Woman’’ in the
novel, let us be clear about this from the beginning, is largely the projec-
tion of desperate men. That these brothers can conduct their exploits under
the dignified cover of high culture, however, broadens the novel’s critique
considerably.
First, it may be helpful to followout the line of questioning implicit in the
‘‘image of woman’’ approach to feminist inquiry in order fully to appreciate
the novel’s critique of misogyny as a crutch to male identity. Where do the
perverse images of woman originate? Certainly Kien is a quite fertile source
for this kind of invective: indeed he literally reconstructs Therese as whore,
reasoning that he had not fully understood her ‘‘true’’ profession until he
recognizes her again in the person of the ‘‘Pensionistin’’ (Fischerle’s prosti-
tute, whose dependable patron has earned her this title), for Kien ‘‘a second
Therese.’’ 13 Fischerle, Pfaff, and even the purportedly good brother Georg
all contribute their own inventive brand of misogyny. Although a consider-
able quantity of woman hatred emanates from the male characters, it would
be quitemistaken to overlook the fact that the novel’s women are rather sim-
plistic types well before the novel’s men get their hands (or, in the case of
Kien, their minds) on them. It is also true that the narrator is no affirmative
action employer: Therese does not command nearly as many pages as Kien,
nor is her verbal repertory any match for the master philologist. The same
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could be said for Anna, the Fischerin, and the other female figures. Like the
men, the women are comic types; unlike the men they are distinctly more
limited in every imaginableway. Having noted the dual source of the novel’s
images of woman does not, however, reinstate the charge of narratorial or
authorial misogyny. Those female images, as yet unmarked by the efforts of
male figures to appropriate and refunction them, represent the cultural cli-
chés of the day: woman as mother, housekeeper, whore, damsel in distress
(Anna), martyr (the Fischerin). All, ranging from the combative and self-
assertive Therese to the self-abasing Fischerin, serve to fulfill male fantasies,
male careers, and male pleasures.
Let us first cast a glance at the novel’s auxiliary female figures, Anna
and the Fischerin. Both are holdover types from nineteenth-century cul-
ture, easily recognizable from popular literature and opera of the period.
Canetti’s deployment of these figures proceeds in the spirit of ‘‘hyperbolic
parody,’’ a term developed by Elisabeth Bronfen to describe the strategy of,
for example, Margaret Atwood.14 This approach—particularly well exempli-
fied by Canetti’s novel—attempts to overcome stereotypes not by avoiding
them, but by giving them free berth to self-destruct. Obviously this method,
which Bronfen calls ‘‘complicity as critique,’’ 15 does not produce many good
women in the sense of models for extraliterary women. Canetti’s portrayal
of the absurdity of the female type is an assault on the cultural institutions
that continue to purvey gendered straitjackets in the form of outmoded,
sentimental female figures. In the figures of the Fischerin and Anna in par-
ticular, Canetti draws out the appeal and defining characteristic of the female
martyr/victim: her utter expendability for male purposes.
The Fischerin, by all accounts a minor figure, suggests a tragic modifica-
tion of the Papagena figure fromMozart’s Die Zauberflöte (TheMagic Flute,
1791). In that famous opera, Papagena is the luscious prize for Papageno,
the buffoon counterpart to the protagonist Tamino.While an acknowledged
musicalmasterpiece,Die Zauberflöte as libretto operates on a comically sim-
plistic gendered binary opposition between the evil—and ultimately van-
quished—Queen of the Night and the patriarchal seat of all wisdom and
light, Sarastro. Papageno proves himself worthy of his look-alike bride by
enduring certain abstentions (albeit with considerable shortcomings) en-
forced by the sacred priesthood. Essential for the intertextual allusion, how-
ever, is the memorable and entertaining childishness of Papageno. Unlike
his counterpart Tamino, Papageno never quite matures. His life proceeds
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in an idyllic forest, and his work is nothing but play: he catches beautiful
birds for the queen-mother and receives in return his daily bread and wine.
If it is ‘‘delicious’’ (köstlich), as it always is when he behaves, he is content.
In the make-believe world of perpetual childhood, Papageno has but one
wish: a bride just like himself. The comic and fecund pairing of Papageno
with Papagena parallels the opera’s more serious coupling of Tamino with
Pamina. True to Northrup Frye’s conception of comedy, the opera ends in a
doublemarriage. This much at least Canetti could have expected of his read-
ership. The citation of Papagena in the figure of the Fischerin is not hard to
recognize: the female hunchbacked dwarf with a ‘‘Jewish’’ long nose is simul-
taneously an evocation of the Papagena disguised as hideous crone (i.e., be-
fore hermetamorphosis into the bucolic blond beauty), and Fischerle’s exact
physical counterpart. The modification, however, is double: not only does
Canetti’s hag remain a hag, but more important there is the alteration im-
plicit in Fischerle’s antagonistic relationship to the Fischerin. In Mozart’s
opera, Papageno gets his girl for obeying, more or less, the advice of the old
woman (and, by extension, the guidelines of the priestly sect). He was, in
other words, rewarded for being a good boy. Canetti draws out this aspect
by making Fischerle perhaps even more a child than Papageno. Fischerle
has no use for his look-alike would-be lover for two reasons: First, and fore-
most, he is attached to the Pensionistin (the ‘‘Capitalist’’ in the Wedgwood
translation) as a boy to a mother. ‘‘For she loved him,’’ he claims (infiltrat-
ing the narrator’s voice), ‘‘he was her child.’’ 16 At the pivotal moment when
Fischerle might conceivably launch his voyage to America he is compelled
to return to say goodbye to ‘‘mother,’’ to spend one more comforting hour
in the cradle under her bed. ‘‘He’d have liked to creep under the bed once
more in farewell; that was the cradle of his future career . . . he’d found in it
a peace unknown in any café.’’ 17 It is from this protected site that Fischerle
habitually experiences the Freudian primal scene (‘‘Urszene’’) between his
maternal Pensionistin and one or another of her paying customers.
The Fischerin’s rejection is foreordained bya second, related factor. Fisch-
erle represents a very self-consciously drawn caricature of the self-hating
Jew. As such, Fischerle cannot possibly accept his veritable mirror image as
spouse or lover. (His actual mirror image, one may recall, is only good for
producing eminent, but beatable and despicably ‘‘Jewish,’’ chess opponents.)
His fantasy woman, with the emphasis on fantasy, is a rich, tall, American
blond whose chief drawing card is her ability to finance Fischerle’s own as-
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similation and acceptance in gentile society. Fischerle’smake-believe bride is
thus an ‘‘Aryan’’ beauty intowhich this misshapen and all ‘‘too Jewish’’ look-
ing crone cannot possiblymetamorphose. No chance in this fantasy—which
resonates, as we shall see below in chapter 4, with the rising tide of racial
anti-Semitism—for the hunchbacked, filthy, Jewish newspaper peddler.
In playing on the Fischerin/Papagena connection, Canetti draws out the
essential component of male projection in creating a female counterpart.
The principle of complementarity that underlies binary gender classifica-
tions in Western thought (and explicitly evident in Weininger’s categories)
is here pilloried as a merely apparent complementarity that is essentially a
one-sided projection. Canetti cites and inverts the tradition of the ‘‘match
made in heaven’’—theymeet in the pub ‘‘The Stars of Heaven’’ (Zum idealen
Himmel )—bydrawing the Fischerin as the object of abusive rejection, rather
than as the comic resolution of plot. The Fischerin emerges as an outmoded
female type who no longer serves to resolve the dramatic conflict, and thus
elicits the humor of incongruity for those familiar with her cultural precur-
sor(s). This is just one of Canetti’s many ‘‘ernste Scherze’’ (serious jokes) told
over the heads of his own characters.
It is characteristic and telling that in order to elucidate the role of the
Fischerin one must tell the story of Fischerle: that, in a nutshell, is the point.
Canetti is drawing our attention to female figures who are little more (in the
case of the Fischerin, nothing more) than the reflection of male characters,
mere adjuncts to male development plots. The Fischerin is significant not
only in what she invokes and fails to fulfill, but also in her additional role
as martyr. For she stands by her man until death does them part, a sacrifice
not remotely hinted at in the role of Papagena. This tragic turn results pre-
cisely from the identical outward appearance of Fischerle and the Fischerin.
The event follows upon the encounter between Kien and the book-pawning
team of Pfaff and Therese. Kien apprehends Therese, Pfaff restrains Kien,
and the police are called in straight away. The crowd outside draws its own
ever-changing conclusions, deciding ultimately that the dirty little manwith
the ‘‘Jew nose’’ ( Judennase) is the guilty culprit deserving of vigilante-style
justice. They proceed to beat him quite severely; he is saved only when the
Fischerin shows up and is mistaken for Fischerle. She is murdered in his
stead.
Critics accustomed toviewing the novel through the optics ofCrowds and
Power tend to see in this scene a criticism of crowd behavior, of the ‘‘Masse’’
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Figure 2. Fischerle’s rejection of his look-alike Jewish paramour in favor of a tall,
blue-eyed blond is echoed in the anti-Semitic caricature of the day, as in this circa-
1935 cartoon from Kurt Plischke’s Der Jude als Rassenschänder. United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum Photo Archives.
whose thirst for excitement and revenge is blind. True enough. But the cri-
tique is more complex: the death of the Fischerin is the death of the type,
a revelation of the essential nonliving status of woman as a male look-alike
projection. In fashioning the Fischerin, Canetti seeks to retire an obsolete
cultural representation of woman, as well as explore its motivations. Yet this
understanding of the Fischerin as a female character type clearly does not
exhaust hermeaning in the novel. In fact, focusing exclusivelyon the topic of
misogyny can easily distract from the concrete anti-Jewish fervor, which so
clearly contributes to her murder. Moreover, Fischerle’s rejection of this vir-
tual mirror image because of her inescapably ‘‘Jewish’’ physical markers in
favor of an imagined Aryan beauty suggests the pertinence of the Fischerin
to our discussion of racial anti-Semitism below in chapter 4.
None of the novel’s figures evokes empathetic identification, with the
temporary exception of Georg, as we have noted. But if the Fischerin elicits
any reaction from the reader, it is probably foremost the feeling that she is
pathetic. This much at least she has in common with the figure of Anna, the
unfortunate daughter of the brutal Hausbesorger Benedikt Pfaff. To under-
Figure 3. Fischerle’s fantasy of American success includes a fancy chauffeured
car, as in this 1935 cartoon, titled ‘‘The Martyr Abroad,’’ from the magazine
Brennessel. These onlookers, however, are not the adoring crowds of Fischerle’s
vain imagination, but resentful observers who immediately identify the prosperous
man as a Jew (as Fischerle suspected would happen even in America), and suggest
(in the German caption) that Jews who emigrate with such wealth could not have
faced much hardship in Germany in the first place. Bildarchiv Preußischer Kultur-
besitz; photo courtesy United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Photo Archives.
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stand how in the figure of Anna Canetti is drawing on a mainstream of Ger-
man literary tradition, it will be necessary first to review the folktale milieu
that is clearly the inspiration for this daughter in distress.We turn, of course,
to the Brothers Grimm, those intrepid folktale collectors and wordsmiths of
the nineteenth century whose philological fervor was deeply rooted in the
German nationalism of the day. As in the case of the Fischerin/Papagena,
the citation is mixed but unmistakable.
Anna is a folktale figure who cannot become a fairy tale heroine: she is
stuck in that realistic first part of the fairy tale marked by naturalistic expo-
sition. In this case it is an account of brutal victimization at the hands of her
own father. But her story fails to abide by that ‘‘fundamental law [of fairy
tales] requiring the reversal of all conditions prevailing in its introductory
paragraphs.’’ 18 Anna does indeed dream of a rescuing hero in the form of
the local grocery boy, but the fictional world of Auto-da-Fé simply fails to
respond to her romantic desires and fantasies of revenge: the grocery clerk
botches the burglary and fails to deliver Pfaff ’s head on a platter. The ‘‘fairy
tale’s movement from victimization to retaliation’’ 19 therefore takes place
only in the imagination of the beaten and beleaguered daughter.
Instead of rescue she suffers numerous beatings, rape, and pregnancy.
Finally she is left by her father to die. Anna is, in a sense, themodern incarna-
tion of ‘‘Allerleirauh’’ (Thousandfurs), but without any of the supernatural
assistance accorded that heroine. Again, the reference is all but subtle. In the
Grimms’ tale, ‘‘the father of young Thousandfurs (Allerleirauh) . . . prom-
ises his wife on her deathbed that he will remarry only if he finds a woman
whose beauty equals that of his quickly fading spouse. When the king’s en-
voys return from a worldwide search for a second wife to announce that
they have failed in their mission, the king’s eye lights on his daughter, and
he is overcome by passion for her.’’ 20 Benedikt Pfaff of Auto-da-Fé is not so
scrupulous: ‘‘Soon after this change his wife died, of overstrain . . . On the
day after the funeral his honeymoon began. More undisturbed than before,
he treated his daughter as he pleased.’’ 21
In The Hard Facts of the Grimms’ Fairy Tales, Maria Tatar explains the
suppressed centrality of the incest theme in this genre: it is the obverse of the
more frequently noted ‘‘jealous evil stepmother’’ motif. Since the relation-
ship of the two tale types may not be widely understood, it is worth quoting
her elucidation at length: ‘‘In tales depicting erotic persecution of a daughter
by her father . . . mothers and stepdaughters tend to vanish from the central
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arena of action.Yet the father’s desire for his daughter in the second tale type
furnishes a powerful motive for a stepmother’s jealous rages and unnatural
deeds in the first tale type. The two plots thereby conveniently dovetail to
produce an intrigue that corresponds almost perfectly to the Oedipal fanta-
sies of female children. In this way fairy tales are able to stage the Oedipal
drama even as they disguise it by eliminating one of its two essential compo-
nents.’’ 22 Whereas a tale such as ‘‘Allerleirauh’’ might permit us to speculate
whether we are reading about a daughter’s ‘‘fantasy of an amorous father’’
as opposed to an actual ‘‘father’s perverse erotic attachment,’’ 23Canetti’s re-
inscription of this fairy tale figure allows no doubt as to the origin of the
desire and violence. The benefits to the child, which, as Bruno Bettelheim
famously expounded them, result frompsychologicallyworking through the
oedipal drama, are of absolutely no value if the fantasies and desires are all
the father’s. Anna’s drama is relegated to the feckless fantasy of a nonexistent
male savior. Pfaff ’s is the real drama, and in this Anna has amere supporting
role.
As in the case of the Fischerin/Papagena, the cultural allusion becomes
in the hands of Canetti a rather more complex alloy. If the male projection
involved in the construction of the Fischerin was primarily visual, here it
takes the form of a cruel verbal game. Annamust reinforce Pfaff ’s self-image
as ‘‘the good father’’ (der gute Vater)—in a chapter of the same name which
Canetti remembers having performed at frequent public readings—by com-
pleting his sentences. It is a debased version of that type of polite Viennese
conversation espoused by Altenwyl (of Hofmannsthal’s Der Schwierige),
the purpose of which is ‘‘to provide your partner the key conversational
prompt’’ (dem andern das Stichwort [zu] bringen):
‘‘She gets her keep from . . .’’ ‘‘. . . her good father.’’
‘‘Other men do not want . . .’’ ‘‘. . . to have her.’’ . . .
‘‘Now her father’s going to . . .’’ ‘‘. . . arrest her.’’
‘‘On father’s knee sits . . .’’ ‘‘. . . his obedient daughter.’’
‘‘Her father knows why he . . .’’ ‘‘. . . thrashes her.’’
‘‘My daughter isn’t ever . . .’’ ‘‘. . . hurt.’’
‘‘She’s got to learn what she . . .’’ ‘‘. . . owes to her father.’’ 24
This exercise is a form of verbal and semiotic extortion and serves to under-
score Anna’s enforced role as reflector or function (in the mathematical
sense) of her father’s ego. Like the fairy tales that harbor father-daughter
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incest in their subtext (or in alternate versions),25 Anna herself is enlisted to
cover over the father’s violence and remake him in the image of ‘‘the kind
father.’’
If Canetti’s point with respect to the Fischerin is to desentimentalize for-
ever the submissive, self-sacrificing representation of woman, with regard to
Anna it is to demonstrate the absurdity of the notion that a woman’s power
and freedom is rooted primarily in imagination and fantasy. In both cases
he draws our attention to clichéd cultural representations of women that
served—until, perhaps, their refunctioning inAuto-da-Fé—to disguise their
source inmale interests. Yet here, too, Canetti’s critique is multivalent. Anna
belongs therefore not only to the discussion of female types and stereotypes,
but also plays a central role in the novel’s rejection of Freudian notions that
interiorize real, intersubjective violence—as I argue below in greater detail
in chapter 5.
As in the cases of the Fischerin and Anna, let us consider Therese first
as she is ‘‘given’’ to us by the narrator, apart from the misogynistic asper-
sions generously heaped upon her by Kien and Pfaff. For she is a type before
she enters the plot—indeed she remains virtually unchanged throughout.
She is a lower class, fairly obese, and imposing woman, who has spent her
entire career as a domestic servant. She is in addition a social climber for
whom marriage is the means of entering the respectable middle class; and,
of course, she is a woman with an unabashed and largely unsatiated sexual
appetite. She is drawn, on the surface at least, as the diametrical opposite of
Kien. In her materiality, fleshliness, greed, and thick affiliation with com-
merce and money she represents the antithesis to her husband’s putative
intellect, ‘‘Geist,’’ and overall aloofness to things of this world. Not surpris-
ingly, this opposition is advanced ironically, consisting largely of Kien’s own
manifest self-delusions.
Therese makes her debut as a fifty-six-year-old Wirtschafterin, a maid
who cooks and cleans for the forty-year-old scholar. She makes her greatest
impression, however, in providing fastidious care for Kien’s books. It is this
which earns her the short-lived epithet, ‘‘a sublime spirit’’ (eine großartige
Seele).26 Indeed, ‘‘her touching solicitude for The Trousers of Herr von Bre-
dow’’ 27moves Kien to proposemarriage: ‘‘With some ceremony she selected
a suitable piece of paper and wrapped it around the book like a shawl round
a baby . . . He had underestimated her. She knew how to handle a book
better than he did.’’ 28 The comparison of book to baby is apt: for this is pre-
56 : misogyny as cultural critique
cisely the function Kien envisions for her—mother to his library. But if he
marries to gain a maternal figure to nurture his charges, he is very quickly
disabused of this notion. On his wedding night Kien finds to his dismay that
lurking within the apparently loyal, motherly domestic is a ‘‘monstrous’’
sexual appetite. Up to this point Therese may be said to incorporate a good
many contemporary cultural clichés regarding women as, for example, cata-
logued byWeininger. Yet to those familiar with the German literary canon,
Therese evokes a more specific literary predecessor: she is the reincarnation
and revision of Lene from Gerhart Hauptmann’s widely read Bahnwärter
Thiel (Stationmaster Thiel, 1888).29
Eric Downing has suggested that in reading the literature of the German
nineteenth century we look to the female figures for the encapsulation of the
respective aesthetic program.30 With regard to Hauptmann, it is clear that
Lene is advanced as the bearer of that ‘‘really real’’ realism, namely Natural-
ism. She provides a stark contrast not only to the ethereal first wife, Minna,
but also to the more sensitive and spiritual Thiel himself. True, the station-
master is no intellect; yet he is the village pedagogue and cultivates an in-
wardness totally alien to Lene. The dichotomy is therefore essentially the
same as in Auto-da-Fé. Until the brutal final scenes of Hauptmann’s novella,
at which point Thiel is in any case coded as insane (and thus not his former
self ),Thiel represents the higher, spiritual values of the Romantic past, while
his robust and corpulent wife stands for the brutal violence of modern life. It
is surely no coincidence that Tobias’s death is due as much to the negligence
of Lene as to that harbinger of technical modernity, the locomotive.
It is of course also no coincidence that Thiel (like Kien) marries in order
to get a good mother and receives something quite undesirable into the
bargain: ‘‘Without realizing it, he had, however, accepted three things in
his wife: a harsh, tyrannical temper, truculence, and a brutal temperament.
After six months it was common knowledgewho ruled the roost. One pitied
the stationmaster.’’ 31 The sympathies of the villagers for Thiel, as opposed
to Lene, whom they brand a whore (‘‘das Mensch’’) and an animal (‘‘So ein
Tier’’), correspond to those of the implied reader. Thiel is the beloved com-
panion of the village children, their informal teacher and friend, while Lene
is the greedywifewho cannot sleep for her excitement about the potato patch
to be planted on the railroad right of way. In contrast to Thiel’s gentle in-
struction—given, not coincidentally, in a rich bucolic setting meant to con-
trast with the new industrial landscape—Lene’s pedagogy consists of cruel
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corporeal punishment, the traces of which Thiel observes in the red mark-
ings on the face of his son Tobias. Lene, too, is the seat of sexuality, and as
such she paralyzes poor Thiel. This sexual dependency seems to explain his
visceral attachment to her even after he has witnessed her physical abuse of
Tobias. All in all, one can safely argue that the novella advances Lene, the
monstrouswife and representative of a ‘‘naturalistic’’ and brutal reality, quite
without irony. But this only works as long as the other term in the gender
binary—namely Thiel—is drawn with relative sympathy.
Canetti’s citation of Lene in the figure of Therese draws out the phony
premise in such gender dichotomies. By making Kien (and others) equally
monstrous, he lays bare the absurdity of heaping the evils (or ‘‘realities’’) of
the age at the feet of woman. Rereading Lene in light of Therese allows us to
see how the former is set up to take the fall: like the Fischerin andAnna, Lene
is doomed from the start. In her very construction—that is, as she enters the
narrative—we find a crass distribution of character traits designed to put a
female face on the stark realities of the day.
In Auto-da-Fé such a possibility is precluded from the start. Kien is no
sympathetic or innocent figure, such asThiel has often been construed to be.
Therese’s sexuality is even more pronounced than Lene’s, but the simplistic
model of sexual stimulus (=woman)/response (=man) is inAuto-da-Fé dra-
matically altered by an array of sexual proclivities and perversions: Pfaff ’s
brutal incest, Kien’s frigidity, Georg’s flagrant seduction of his patients, and
so on. The citation of Lene in the figure of Therese serves to recall and ex-
plode a simplistic gendered economy of vices and virtues, though it is surely
also true that this rejection of the Thiel/Lene model arises from the larger
cast of characters, which will be explored in greater detail below. It is notable
that a number of critics have only realized half of the intertextual potential:
Therese’s entrance has sometimes unproblematically been hailed as the in-
trusion of the ‘‘world’’ into the realmof Kien’s rarefied intellect.32Yet nothing
could be more appalling to the arch anti-realist Canetti than the prospect of
any one figure—male or female—representing adequately so much reality.
In arguing that Canetti is citing Hauptmann’s Lene in the figure of The-
rese, I am suggesting a rather specific allusion. CanTherese, then, still be said
to represent a type? In so far as Lene herself is drawn as a nonindividual type,
the answer is an emphatic yes. It is not merely that Lene is given no psycho-
logical depth and considerably less attention than Thiel, which qualifies her
for the status of the typical rather than the individual. It is also the narra-
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tor’s use of the ancient arachnid trope to designate her femininity. In fact,
one of the principal images which for the reader aligns the ominous train
with the brutal wife is that of the ensnaring, predatory spider. Lene’s pro-
nounced physicality and sexuality spreads a ‘‘web of iron’’ over the trapped
husband: ‘‘Her full, half-naked breasts heaved with excitement and threat-
ened to burst her brassiere, and her gathered skirt made her broad hips
appear even broader. This woman appeared to emanate a power—uncon-
querable, inescapable—to which Thiel felt unequal. Light as a fine spider’s
web and yet firm as a net of iron, it surrounded him, binding, overwhelm-
ing, debilitating.’’ 33 The ensuing description of telegraph wires and poles as
‘‘the web of a gigantic spider’’ 34 that runs along the train tracks only under-
scores the text’s juxtaposition of Lene and the train as ambivalent forces of
modern life, both intimately involved in the demise of Tobias.
By partaking in the traditional allegorization of woman as spider (and
the implied corollary of man as trapped victim in her web), the narrator
of Hauptmann’s novella places Lene in a venerated tradition of misogynis-
tic representation in German literature. The most obvious predecessor in
the German canon would of course be Gotthelf ’s Die schwarze Spinne (The
Black Spider, 1842), a story Canetti read as a youth and recounts in some
detail in his autobiography.35 Though there are surely notable differences in
the realizations of the arachnid trope—Hauptmann makes Lene more the
Naturalists’ stimulus of instinct than the Gotthelfian seducer tomoral evil—
all representations of this type suggest a crudely dichotomized distribution
of character traits invariably unfavorable to the woman.36
Like Lene, Therese is constructed as an unlikely, obese femme fatale.
Therese’s physicality, for example her ‘‘gorgeous hips’’ (prachtvolle Hüften)
noted by the furniture salesman Herr Grob, along with the voluminous blue
skirt, receive repeated attention. Furthermore, her wedding night expecta-
tions, the relentless pursuit of Herr Grob, as well as her apparently willing
acquiescence in Pfaff ’s advances, all attest to an unabashed sexual appetite.
But the type stops here, at least as far as the narrator is concerned. Kien,
as we have already seen, is in no way portrayed as the passive victim of the
woman’s web of intrigue. True, Therese is called a spider (as well as Medusa
and a good many other things), but this is all Kien’s doing: ‘‘In the spider,
the most cruel and ugly of all creatures, I see an embodiment of woman.
Her web shimmers in the sunlight, poisonous and blue.’’ 37Whether we look,
then, at the specific gender economy of Hauptmann’s novella or consider
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Lene as a representative of a broader type, it seems rather clear that Canetti’s
interest in the allusion is to subvert the traditional binary gender classifi-
cation. For whereas it was the omniscient narrator of Hauptmann’s novella
who advanced the arachnid link between Lene and the killer train, it is the
very questionable Kien in Auto-da-Fé who pathetically employs his rhetori-
cal skills to paint himself as the true victim of the ‘‘monstrous’’ housekeeper.
Therese distinguishes herself from the Fischerin and Anna in her ability
to manipulate images and intervene on her own behalf. She rejects Kien’s
intended role for her as the eternal mother, she makes a pass at Herr Grob,
and shemeets her match in Pfaff. It is not that she is better or worse than her
more simply drawn sister types, but that, beyond the already circumscribed
role given at the level of narrator, she is able to contest further reductions in
her role that are assigned (or denied) her at the level of character. This act
of contestation (modest though it is, since it still operates well within the
mother/whore dichotomy) introduces to the novel themore nuanced notion
of gender as an imputed, but by no means natural role. Therese’s achieve-
ment, if we can call it that, is to place the gender stereotype into question by
reversing the expectations Kien harbored for her. Kien, too, seems to realize
that ‘‘the feminine’’ need not refer to women per se. In a manner consonant
with the parodistic cast of the novel as a whole, Kien untethers the concept
of gender from its biological moorings. How else could he discover that his
brother, deep down, is really a woman? The representation of the feminine—
whether or not female figures are at issue—comprises an important strand
of narrative in Auto-da-Fé.
Before turning to the novel’s treatment of this more elusive topic, let us
take stock of the ground covered so far. In the Fischerin we saw how the
notion of woman as preordained prize or crown for the male protagonist’s
successful completion of a test of maturity (the Papagena function) is self-
consciously inverted in Fischerle’s rejection of his female counterpart pre-
cisely because she is made to appear as his unacceptably Jewish double. In
the figure of Anna we witnessed the shortcomings of romanticized illusions
and passive fantasies in the face of actual abuse: no prince comes to the res-
cue of this incestuous ruler’s daughter. Finally, in Therese we are invited by
allusion to the Lene-Thiel model to rethink the gendered binary distribu-
tion of vices, and to question the validity of explaining the brutal side of
modernity as, essentially, female monstrosity. Which is another way of say-
ing that Kien’s diagnosis of his own sense of exile in the modern world—
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a predicament faced by so many other intellectuals of the Weimar era—is
frankly untenable. Canetti suggests that none of these outworn literary topoi
is adequate to capture the complexity of post–World War I society.
The Brothers Kien Discover ‘‘the Feminine’’
The male characters’ own misogyny is detectable almost without analy-
sis; the only hesitation one might provisionally have would be the attribu-
tion of any particular misogynistic observation to an unambiguous source,
as we noted above in surveying the novel’s peculiar narrative situation. This
obvious form ofmisogynistic representation and behavior—be it Kien’s ‘‘in-
spired’’ pseudophilosophical grounding of misogyny, Pfaff as incestuous
father and wife-beater, Fischerle as pimp, or even Georg’s more insidious
abuses—need not detain us here. For, to borrow Justice Potter Stewart’s dic-
tum on pornography, we know it when we see it.38What is perhaps less clear
is that notions of the feminine constructed and employed by each of these
figures are by no means limited to biological women. Such representations
range from China, to the novel’s quixotic ‘‘gorilla man,’’ indeed, as we have
seen, to the male protagonist(s) themselves. To understand the function of
the feminine on this level—and to appreciate Canetti’s critical engagement
with contemporaneous intellectual debates—it will be necessary to digress
a bit and sketch in the ‘‘crisis of subjectivity’’ in fin-de-siècle Austria.
In ‘‘The New Psychologies,’’ the first chapter of The Vanishing Subject,
Judith Ryan outlines themajor figures in the pre- and non-Freudian psycho-
logical movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:
Franz Brentano, Ernst Mach,William James.39 The crisis of subjectivity that
followed from the new ‘‘neoempiricist’’ views of the self—for example, from
Mach’s conception of the self as ‘‘a bundle of sensations’’—proved discon-
certing, to say the least. Ryan explains: ‘‘As empiricist thought began increas-
ingly to filter into the consciousness of the educated public, panic began to
spread. If there was no such thing as the self, the basis for decisions and ac-
tions seemed to have been removed. If there was no real distinction between
subject and object, the familiar structures of language seemed to have been
eroded. Many contemporaries felt virtually paralyzed, unable either to act
or to speak.’’ 40 Ryan’s survey of psychologies covers the period from 1870 to
1930 (though for the literature under consideration she extends this period
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to 1940); thus Canetti clearly comes in at the tail end of this movement.
In his Vienna and the Jews, 1867–1938, Steven Beller concurs in the urgency
of this Weimar-era debate, pointing out that this question occupied lead-
ing Jewish intellectuals such as Freud, Schnitzler, Broch, and others, who
addressed this disconcerting rift between the ‘‘empirical’’ (Machian) disuni-
fied self and the ‘‘ethical’’ self presupposed by liberal political culture in a
variety of crucial ways.41 Canetti’s contribution to this debate is manifold,
but first and foremost was his realization that the crisis was not of subjec-
tivity per se, but ofmale subjectivity.Auto-da-Fé, I will argue, thematizes the
suspect conjunction of rabid misogyny with attempts to shore up the dis-
solving self.42When one thinks of these two problems—the ‘‘vanishing self ’’
along with misogyny—in the early twentieth century with special attention
to the Austrian context, it becomes clear that Canetti was not, by far, the first
to treat these two issues in tandem. His predecessor was of course the widely
read Otto Weininger, whose immensely popular Geschlecht und Character
was already beyond its thirtieth printing by the time Canetti sat down to
write his novel.43 Intellectually and culturally, this is undoubtedly the novel’s
great intertext, onewith which Canetti and his friends werewell acquainted.
‘‘WhatWeininger is essentially doing,’’ Beller explains, ‘‘is using sexual types
to describe psychological states, a procedure that was deeply embedded
in Western culture . . . [and] part of a tradition that reached its apogee
in Jungian psychology.’’ 44 Weininger’s legendary misogyny—‘‘his obsessive
identification of all that he fears with the feminine’’ 45—is integral to his at-
tempt to salvage the self (as the genius, value legislating ‘‘Man’’) and ban-
ish those traits associated with its dissolution to the category ‘‘Woman.’’ 46
Whereas Weininger sought to salvage the ‘‘liberal’’ self—a self defined by
reason and ethical thinking—by recourse to misogyny (as well, of course, as
anti-Semitism), Canetti’s project is to expose this putative solution as highly
problematic.
Viewing the feminine in this larger sense helps us to see the male char-
acters—especially Kien and Georg—as having more in common than has
usually been seen. Kien has been treated as the ascetic academic, who stands
in contrast to his lecherous and hedonistic brother, Georg. Certainly the
novel itself invites such a polarization on one level: Kien is represented as
the self hermetically (that is to say academically) sealed off from the threat-
ening stimuli of the outside world. Georg, in contrast, is the winsome man
of the world, whowillingly engages, even incorporates, the most aberrant of
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human behavior in his work with the insane. This opposition, however, is
undercut in a number of ways, but most obviously by the manner in which
both make use of the feminine. Simply put: both brothers represent the self
in crisis; only the method of self-rescue is superficially different. For Kien
it is a radical elimination of the feminine, for Georg it is the radical incor-
poration of the very same—a strategy he thinks will work like a preventive
inoculation against disease.
Kien’s academic pursuits are not incidentally misogynistic, they are in-
trinsically so. Canetti’s decision to make Kien a master philologist in the
nineteenth century tradition frames the issue in terms of interpretation.
Kien himself sees thematterof interpreting texts in a fairly simplistic, though
no less self-contradictory, manner: all semiotic power emanates from the
master interpreter who fixes for all time a heretofore incomplete or corrupt
text. Let us not forget that this is the man who plans a final, and, needless
to say, irrefutable, exegesis of the New Testament, in which he proposes to
demonstrate that Jesus was at heart a bibliophile like Kien himself: ‘‘Since
the philologist in him still lived, he decided to devote himself, when peaceful
times should again bless the land, to a fundamentally new textual exami-
nation of the gospels . . . He felt himself equipped with enough knowledge
to guide Christianity back to its true sources, and though he was not to be
the first to pour the true words of the Savior out to humanity, . . . he might
indeed hope, with sufficient inner conviction, that the interpretations he set
down would be final.’’ 47 Kien’s interpretive audacity stands in stark inverse
proportion to the credibility he arouses in the reader: because his claims to
authority often refer to well known extrafictional texts (such as in this case
the Bible) of which the reader has independent knowledge, Kien’s preten-
sion to definitive accuracy is immediately recognized as mere bombast. Yet
as long as Kien’s powers of interpretation are trained exclusively upon ab-
struse Oriental texts, and as long as no one can challenge his claim to the
title of the ‘‘world’s foremost sinologist,’’ he meets with little opposition.
Like the ‘‘Philosophie der Blindheit’’ (philosophy of blindness) he concocts
when confronted with Therese’s intransigent bedroom set, Kien’s intellec-
tual conceptions are eclectic, inconsistent, and fundamentally self-serving.
Though Kien’s relationships with mere mortals are at best secondary to his
intellectual pursuits, he clearly tries to employ the same process in read-
ing people: a unilateral, authoritarian projection of himself onto the other.
Though small-minded projection is widespread in the novel, one can safely
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argue that for Kien woman is—or should be—the philologist’s text par ex-
cellence. The equation in fact reads both ways: it is both a matter of the
feminization of the text and a textualization of woman.
If Kien is on the one hand full of overweening confidence in his inter-
pretive aptitude (‘‘Whatever he sets his hand to succeeds, submits to his
proofs’’),48 he is also plagued by lingering doubt. In fact, his overly con-
fident assertions of demonstrable univocal textual meaning—as opposed
to Saussurian multivalence—reveal an untenable epistemological despera-
tion.Unconvincingly, but no less hilariously, Kien pronounces: ‘‘Knowledge
has freed us from superstitions and beliefs. Knowledge makes use always
of the same names, preferably Graeco-Latin, and indicates by these names
actual things. Misunderstandings are impossible.’’ 49 In addition to the hu-
mor this remark arouses amidst the plethora of patent misunderstandings,
it bespeaks a pervasive epistemological anxiety.
Earlier yet Kien reveals a hairline crack in his self-image as master
meaning-maker when, following the great dispute with Therese concern-
ing the will, he finds himself stymied and capable only of incomprehensible
drivel: ‘‘Time and again he had to force himself to reach for the Japanese
manuscripts on his desk.When he got so far, he would touch them, and im-
mediately, as if repelled, draw his hand back again. What is the meaning of
them? . . . On the half-written sheet before him he had drawn, quite contrary
to his habit, characters which had nomeaning whatever.’’ 50 It is of course no
coincidence that woman—here in the figure of the novel’s principal woman,
Therese—represents the challenge to fixable, stable meaning, even while she
represents the fantasy text that elicits the very prowess boasted by the phi-
lologist. Indeed these are two sides of the same coin. The exact same oppo-
sitional relationship—though here the tables are turned—is evident in the
situation below where Kien is enjoying a temporary victory over Therese:
‘‘It was enough for him that shewas silent. Poised between China and Japan,
he paused to assure himself that this was the outcome of his clever diplo-
macy . . . In these days he was fertile in happy conjectures. An unspeakably
corrupt text he had rehabilitated within three hours. The right characters
simply streamed from his pen . . . Word by word, older litanies came back to
him and he forgot hers.’’ 51 Therese is ‘‘an affront to scholarship,’’ therefore,
not merely in the mundane sense of pestering the great scholar engaged in
his lofty ‘‘mission of enlightenment’’ (aufklärende Mission) 52with petty ma-
terial requests, though this is the way Kien perceives it much of the time. In
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her nagging inscrutability, she represents, more importantly, the dark side
of Wissenschaft, and as such she is a constant threat to Kien’s very raison
d’être.
Kien has been attempting, with ever dwindling success, to read Therese
since the beginning of the novel. Just before proposing marriage, Kien,
thinking he is about to marry a maternal librarian, reflects: ‘‘She is the
heaven-sent instrument for preserving my library . . . Had I constructed a
human being according to my own designs, the result could not have been
more apt for the purpose.’’ 53 What he fails to see, however, is that he has all
along been attempting to construct her according to his own design. Both
the desire to render Therese a patently decipherable text and the inability
to do so are evident in the scene where Kien lies in bed recovering from the
sound beating Therese has just given him: ‘‘At that time she repeated herself
over and over again; he learnt her words by heart and was thus, in the truest
sense, her master . . . but Therese suddenly began to talk again. What she
said was incomprehensible, and therefore held despotic sway over him. It
could not be learnt by heart, andwho could guess what would come next?’’ 54
None of this dissuades Kien from his effort to textualize Therese: in fact
his efforts to write her off, or out of the scene, form the central event of
the novel. In what is deservedly the most celebrated chapter of the novel,
‘‘Private Property’’ (Privateigentum), Kien mounts his lengthy ‘‘Defense of
Learning,’’ in which he hopes to prove ‘‘that Therese’s death was essential ’’—
‘‘daß Therese zugrunde gehen mußte.’’ 55His self-defense is selfless and noble,
for his is really a ‘‘Verteidigung für die Wissenschaft’’—that is, for science
and truth against this female adversary. Therese, of course, is far from dead,
and is all the while standing behind her would-be murderer. Although we
will want, below, to consider precisely how and why scholarship itself de-
manded her death, what concerns us here is Kien’s characteristic conception
of Therese—for him, now, a mere mirage—as a corrupt text awaiting his
interpretive genius. The equation of woman with text, and the view of both
as eminently conquerable, is evident throughout Kien’s thinking, but per-
haps nowhere so obvious as in the following: ‘‘Hewould examine thismirage
until he had convinced himself of what it really was. He had followed trails
no less dangerous, imperfect texts, missing lines. He could not recall ever
having failed. No problem he had undertaken had ever been left unsolved.
Even this murder he must needs regard as a task accomplished. It took more
than a hallucination to shatter Kien.’’ 56
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Kien’s failure to bring Therese under semiotic control is deeply impli-
cated in his final suicide. Very near to his demise, Kien extols the virtues of
books over people: ‘‘Books are dumb, they speak yet they are dumb, that
is the wonder.’’ 57 Therese proves less tractable than Oriental manuscripts:
she talks back, thwarting the unilateral direction of meaning-making envi-
sioned by Kien. The obstacle to the master-slave (philologist-text) model,
which Therese poses in her unpredictable, incomprehensible, and therefore
uncontrollable prattle is in fact very much like the rebellion of the books
in the final conflagration scene. Those formerly docile, decodable ciphers
mount a semiotic insurrection.
Here Kien’s world turns upside down. The passive recipient of meaning,
the text, takes on a life of its own, wreaking vengeance on the once tyranni-
cal and now quite mad master reader: ‘‘A letter detaches itself from the first
line and hits him a blow on the ear. Letters are lead. It hurts. Strike him!
Strike him! Another. And another. A footnote kicks him. More and more.
He totters. Lines andwhole pages come clattering on to him.They shake and
beat him, they worry him, they toss him about among themselves. Blood
. . . Help! Help! Georg!’’ 58 Kien is ultimately undermined by the feminine,
beaten now not by Therese but by the binary rigidity of an epistemological
system that seeks to sort out the knower and the known along predictable
gender lines, a system that in the case of Peter Kien self-destructs. A great
library burns and it is a grand farewell not to a collection of irreplaceably
rare books, but to a system of thought pregnant with its own destruction.
Focusing on the person of Kien—who is intentionally drawn rather
sparsely—can distract us from the novel’s more profound critique of con-
temporary culture. In her most recent study, Lustmord: Sexual Murder in
Weimar Germany, Maria Tatar remarks, ‘‘The profusion of images of Eve,
Circe, Medusa, Judith, and Salome in art and literature around 1900 gives
vivid testimony to an unprecedented dread of female sexuality and its homi-
cidal power.’’ 59 This concatenation brings to mind Kien’s own subsequent
dredging of the mythological, literary, and philosophical canon meant to
make his final case against Woman.
Kien’s great speech at the police station, the novel’s most hilarious scene,
is of course delivered for a crime he never committed, but ardently wishes he
had: themurder of Therese. He clearly presents it as amurder; but is it in any
sense Lustmord? There can be no doubt that the aggression between Therese
and Kien dates from the unconsummated wedding night, when Kien, in re-
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sponse to his bride’s sexual overtures, locks himself in the bathroom and
sobs uncontrollably. Certainly Kien’s physical trouncing at the hands of this
‘‘phallic mother’’ (as Foell dubs her) comes as a direct response to his failure
to follow up on the sexual advances Therese perceived him to have initiated.
If the sexual source of this murderous aggression is not yet sufficiently evi-
dent, Canetti provides a gloss in the form of the protagonist’s flashback. Just
as Kien’s wedding night anxieties come to a head, our world famous sinolo-
gist recalls in vivid detail a childhood visit to the beach during which his
curiosity about the soft, slimy inside of a mussel drives him to utter distrac-
tion.His frenzied destruction of the sea shell (‘‘die Muschel ’’)—whenhe can-
not properly pry it open, he simply smashes it to smithereens—is as much
an act of Lustmord as Döblin’s ‘‘Murder of a Buttercup’’ (Die Ermordung
einer Butterblume, 1913) which Canetti may in fact have had in mind.60 At
any rate, the incident gains significance in the novel in so far as it is elevated
to a chapter title in Book 1. Canetti is clearly capitalizing upon popularized
Freudian ideas in this passage; but as we shall see below in chapter 6, this
tongue-in-cheek borrowing does not imply an endorsement of Freud.
Kien’s strikingly learned justification of this imagined murder provides
an ironic case studyof the phenomenonTatar finds so striking inWeimar-era
culture: not so much the historical cases of Lustmord themselves (numer-
ous enough, to be sure), but the wider, post–World War I cultural tendency
to reduce complex sociohistorical causality to archaic misogynistic myth.
In Auto-da-Fé we catch Kien in the act: the rumors of Therese’s death have
been not only greatly exaggerated, but fabricated before our very eyes. Kien’s
feeble attempts to coopt victim status, simultaneously to suppress the female
victim, and to obscure the fact of his own agency—all traits Tatar identi-
fies as seminal aspects of the Lustmord phenomenon 61—are the target of
the novel’s critical humor. Clearly we are not in danger of falling under the
ideological sway of a man who claims, almost in the same breath, (1) to have
murdered Therese in self-defense, (2) that Therese actually killed herself in
a grotesque act of autocannibalism, and (3) that it was finally scholarship
itself which required her death—all, of course, while Therese is physically
pushing herself on her confessed murderer.
If Kien’s frustrated Lustmord is rooted in a crisis of male subjectivity,
which, according to Tatar, intensified dramatically in the post–World War I
era,62 he finds plenty of cultural fodder for his hatred in the books he reads
and collects. In the end of his great defense, Kien credits his library with
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Therese’s murder. Similarly, Pfaff seeks to dismiss Kien’s ranter by explain-
ing to the detectives that ‘‘things like that are in books.’’ 63 And both are, in
a sense, quite right.
As if to bear out the veracity of Pfaff ’s claim, Kien mounts in the novel’s
penultimate chapter, not coincidentally entitled ‘‘WarywiseOdysseus’’ (List-
enreicher Odysseus), a veritable tour de force, ostensibly for the benefit of
his brother Georg, proving the rich cultural pedigree of misogyny. Begin-
ning with Confucius, Buddha, and Homer, Kien wends his way through the
great books taking (andmistaking)misogynywherever he can find it. At one
point during this woman-hating harangue, the overconfident psychiatrist
thinks he has found the key to Kien’s disquisition: ‘‘Georg here saw him-
self as an important part of the mechanism which another person had set in
motion for the maintenance of his threatened self-respect.’’ 64 While Georg
correctly perceives Kien’s ‘‘threatened sense of self ’’ as a key precondition for
this cultured exhibition of misogyny, this is probably no longer the insight
we need.What strikes the reader at this point is not Kien’s quirky perversion
of texts, but the large-scale cultural availability ofmisogynist narratives.Un-
like modernist novels such as Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz, which employ
misogynistmyth to exculpate the Lustmörder (sexualmurderers),65 Auto-da-
Fé foregrounds the cultural excess of such myth and showcases the protago-
nist’s efforts at self-exoneration in the pathetic and desperate figure of Peter
Kien, that impotent would-be Lustmörder. ‘‘What kind of man would not
have murdered such a woman?’’ he asks, rhetorically.66 As Kien brings his
cultured tirade to a close, Georg observes correctly, in a statement that ex-
ceeds his own comprehension, that ‘‘the [cultural] material was more ample
than his hatred.’’ 67
Madness, as Foucault has taught us, may be more a suspect catchall desig-
nation that expands and contracts to meet the interests of those in power
than some eternal, objectively determined classification. Defining madness
can be deployed polemically to marginalize those who would threaten the
semiotic and social order. This is precisely the way in which the narrator
casts Kien’s diagnosis of Therese’s madness: ‘‘He felt at his best when he
could relegate her to the one category where there was room for everything
which he was unable, for all his education and understanding, to explain.
Of lunatics he had a crude and simple idea; he defined them as those who
do the most contradictory things yet have the same word for all. Accord-
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ing to this definition Therese was—in contradiction to himself—decidedly
mad.’’ 68The conjunction ofwomen andmadness has, of course, its ownwell-
worn tradition in European literature, as Gilbert and Gubar have long since
shown.69 This novel’s specific feminization of mental illness is carefully laid
out, particularly with regard to the gynecologist-psychiatrist Georg Kien.
An important thread running throughout this narrativization of madness
is the markedly ‘‘feminine’’ threat to stable semiotics, that is, the menace
posed by ‘‘those who do the most contradictory things yet have the same
word for all.’’
In his rigid insistence on ‘‘the accepted terminology’’ of ‘‘official psychia-
try’’ and in his conviction that the insane are only good insofar as they can
be used to corroborate the existing scientific system, Georg’s predecessor at
the Paris insane asylum comes very close to Kien himself: ‘‘He took it for his
real work in life, to use the vast material at his disposal to support the ac-
cepted terminology . . . He clung to the infallibility of the system and hated
doubters. Human beings, especially nerve cases and criminals, were noth-
ing to him . . . They provided experiences which authorities could use to
build up the science. He himself was an authority.’’ 70 This egotistical direc-
tor elaborates a definition of madness as ludicrous as Kien’s philosophy of
blindness. Like Kien’s own rather suspect pseudophilosophy, the predeces-
sor’s psychiatric principles are unmistakably rooted in a conflict with ‘‘real’’
women: ‘‘Madness, he said with great emphasis, and looked at his wife with
penetrating and accusing gaze (she blushed), madness is the disease which
attacks those very people who think only of themselves. Mental disease is
the punishment of egoism . . . He had nothing else to say to his wife. She was
thirty years younger than he and cast a glow over the evening of his life. His
first wife had run away before he could shut her up—as he had donewith the
second—in his own institute; she was an incurable egoist. His third, against
whom he had nothing save his own jealousy, loved Georg Kien.’’ 71 Just as
the quack philologist locates the disruption of meaning in woman, so too
this self-important psychiatrist finds madness to consist of excessive female
egoism, for which his ex-wives provide the prime examples.
Although Georg would have us believe he is the great alternative to his
predecessor’s rigidity and arrogance, we come to understand (as we real-
ize the extent to which Georg has commandeered the narrator’s voice) how
fundamentally similar they really are. Not unlike his predecessor (and not
unlike his elder brother) Georg sees himself as a savior figure; that his meth-
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ods differ is not really the point. He casts himself (bymeans of the infiltrated
narrator’s voice) first as an inverted Moses figure, then as Yahweh himself:
‘‘He did them [the insane] the service, and led them back into Egypt. The
ways he had found to do so were no less wonderful than those of the Lord
when he set free his people.’’ 72 Reminiscent of Kien’s cooptation of the nar-
rator to express his worldwide eminence among sinologists and philologists
is Georg’s claim to his own fame, deceptively ensconced in authorial narra-
tion: ‘‘His colleagues admired and envied him . . . They hastened to break off
little fragments of his fame, by proclaiming indebtedness to him and apply-
ing his methods to the most different cases. He was bound to get the Nobel
Prize.’’ 73
Georg’s immense ego and putative fame rest no less than his brother’s
on the exploitation of the feminine. But whereas Kien felt compelled to ex-
clude it in order to protect the purity of his precepts and the integrity of
his much vaunted Charakter, Georg’s manipulation takes the form of radi-
cal cooptation. This was true from his earliest days as a gynecologist when
he exploited his good looks to attract female patients. In his ‘‘own’’ words,
he was ‘‘surrounded and spoilt by innumerable women, all ready to serve
him; he lived like Prince Gautama before he became Buddha.’’ 74 What shall
concern us presently is precisely this conversion experience in which he ap-
parently learns to forego the pleasures of real women, only to take on the
mantle of malleable femininity.
Though he claims to have parted ways with women at age twenty-eight,
we should not understand this as total abstention.75 It is true, however, that
Georg’s infatuation with the so-called gorilla man (the insane brother of
the rich banker) coincides precisely with his attempt to fend off voluptuous
female sexuality in the person of the banker’s wife. This erotically neglected
spouse lures Georg to the upper chambers of her mansion in order to seduce
him by means of a sexually suggestive painting, which, in deference to ap-
pearances, had been relegated to the gorilla man’s garret quarters. But this
strategy fails: the extensive overtures of ‘‘Madame’’—the banker’s wife—
prove fruitless against the charm of the gorilla man: the man who has, in
Georg’s eyes, successfully appropriated the feminine while remaining male.
For Georg it is love at first sight: ‘‘If only the gorilla would speak again! Be-
fore this single wish all his thoughts of time-wasting, duties, women, success
had vanished, as if from the day of his birth he had only been seeking for
that man, or that gorilla, who possessed his own language.’’ 76
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In a study of quite different texts (namely, horror films), Carol Clover
has shown that the typical story of male development, deeply entrenched in
the Western tradition, is marked by an appropriation of culturally defined
feminine traits.77 Thus, whereas a woman exhibiting male attributes would
more likely be seen as aberrant (and thus incite horror), it is entirely pos-
sible for amale hero—while retaining a fundamentallymasculine identity—
to exhibit development in his character by becoming somewhat feminized.
The developmental arc of one male character (in Auto-da-Fé: Georg) can be
made to lookmore reasonable, Clover demonstrates, by contrasting it with a
more radically gender-mixed character (here, the gorilla man). In portray-
ing Georg’s great conversion, this pivotal growth experience made possible
by the incorporation of the feminine, Canetti is lampooning this very tradi-
tion. But to understand this parody better, we must first ask what precisely
this gorilla man represents.
Part of the humor, of course, is the apparent incongruity of images. We
are invited to see this bestial man evincing a considerable sexual appetite
(recall his ever-present ‘‘scantily dressed’’ Parisian ‘‘secretary’’ on call to tend
to his every whim) as somehow essentially feminine. But in his primitive-
ness, animality, and predilection for hedonistic pleasures, he is a quite pre-
cise realization of Weininger’s fears regarding the ‘‘surrender of the ‘mas-
culine’ bastions of logic and ethics to the ‘feminine’ realm of feelings and
sexual desire, which he sawoccurring all aroundhim in turn-of-the-century,
‘modernist’ Europe.’’ 78 Indeed, one could not ask for a clearer illustration
of a forfeiture of logic and intersubjective rationality than the gorilla man’s
solipsistic ‘‘system’’ of language.
Georg falls not for the sexualized, macho ape-man, but for his allegedly
revolutionary and whimsical system of language, in which the signifiers no
longermatch upwith the signifieds. In fact, the gorilla man’s linguistic inno-
vations, viewed in their entirety, can accurately be seen as a caricature of
Saussurian insights on the relationship of langue to parole. Since the experi-
ence of the gorilla man is what causes Georg not only to reconsider his pre-
vious promiscuity, but also to privilege madness over sanity, it will be worth
examining the gorilla man’s enterprise in some detail. This is the linguistic
marvel that so captivates Georg, not to mention many critics of the novel:
Each syllable which he uttered corresponded to a special gesture. The
words for objects seemed to change. He meant the picture a hundred
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times and called it each time something different; the names seemed to
depend on the gesture with which he demonstrated them . . . Objects . . .
had no special names. They were called according to the mood in which
they floated. Their faces altered for the gorilla, who lived a wild, tense,
stormy life. His life communicated itself to them, they had an active part
in it. He had peopled two rooms with a whole world. He created what
he wanted, and after the six days of creation, on the seventh took up his
abode therein. Instead of resting, he gave his creation speech.79
The free-floating signifiers notwithstanding, the gorilla man is essentially
a Peter Kien in a monkey suit. The gorilla’s language production, a grand
spoof on the neoempiricist theories of the day (as wewill see in greater detail
below in chapter 3), has two essential qualities: (1) it is apparently capri-
cious, fluid, and spontaneous, but (2) anchored in the consciousness of the
(ever-changing) gorilla man himself. The gorilla’s speech is indeed an act of
free creation over which he himself exercises sole domain. The fluidity and
lack of clear definition between self and other that characterizes this lan-
guage is in fact a parodistic evocation of Weininger’s infamous shibboleth
of ‘‘Weiblichkeit,’’ or femininity, namely the so-called ‘‘Henide.’’ 80 It may be
a tautology to unveil the gorilla man’s language system as pure nonsense;
yet insofar as Georg himself—who has been seen by a number of critics as
the novel’s only sane character, even as the voice of Canetti himself—makes
so much of it, we, too, need to be very clear about it.
For Georg this is a crucial experience: he publishes a formal ‘‘thesis on
the speech of this madman’’ 81 and alters the entire course of his life from
this point on. Georg’s enthusiasm for the gorilla man’s language is funda-
mentally analogous to the peculiar brand of empathetic psychiatry he prac-
tices: he treats his patients by taking on their manias, by playing a role in
their psychodrama, by becoming a pure function of their needs. He plays
the Fischerin to their Fischerle, the Anna to their Pfaff, and, quite literally,
the ‘‘Jeanne’’ to their Jean.82 In short, in both the narrower andmetaphorical
senses, he plays the role of woman. Yet just as the gorilla’s language capri-
ciously shifts in meaning according to his mood or passion but never spins
out of his control, so, too, is Georg covertly always in charge. He plays, but
never really becomes, the ‘‘Weib’’ Peter accuses him of having become.83 The
malleable mask he dons merely serves to camouflage a rather unified, ego-
dominated, ‘‘male’’ self.
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His therapy amounts to playacting, as his elder brother repeatedly
charges. ‘‘Kings he addressed reverently as YourMajesty . . . He became their
sole confidant . . . He advised them . . . as though their wishes were his own,
cautiously keeping their aims and their beliefs before his eyes . . . never au-
thoritative in his dealings with men . . . Was he not after all their chief min-
ister, their prophet or their apostle, occasionally even their chamberlain?’’ 84
Careful to appear submissive and humble to men, and to fulfill their delu-
sional wishes, Georg clearly occupies a feminine role in the treatment of
his patients. In one of the novel’s most memorable images Georg envisions
himself as ‘‘a walking wax tablet’’ (eine spazierende Wachstafel ),85 which ex-
presses precisely his self-conception as passive receptacle rather than domi-
neering determiner of meaning. On the surface this would indeed seem to
be quite the opposite of his elder brother’s self-image; indeed, it tellingly
coincides with the philologist’s conception of the ideal, masterable, text.
Georg’s principal undoing in the reader’s eyes is his bungling of the treat-
ment of his own brother. Like the renowned philologist who fails accu-
rately to read Therese, the famous psychiatrist unravels before our eyes as
he makes one idiotic diagnosis after another. Despite (or perhaps because
of ) his vaunted ability to assume the manias of others, he cannot really see
much beyond himself. When he arrives on the scene and hears Therese’s
tale about Kien having murdered a previous wife, he refers the crisis back to
himself. In the blink of an eye, he shifts our focus from the ailing brother to
the specter of a disgraced, internationally renowned therapist:
Georg the brother of a sexual murderer [eines Lustmörders]. Headlines in
all the papers . . . His retirement from the direction of the institute. In-
discretion. Divorce. His assistants to succeed him. The patients . . . They
love him, they need him, he cannot leave them. Resignation is impos-
sible. Peter’s affairs must be seen to . . . He was all for Chinese characters,
Georg for human beings. Peter must be put in a home . . . It is evident that
he is not responsible for his actions. Under no circumstances will Georg
retire from the direction of the institute.86
In passages such as these it becomes clear that Georg’s careful learning of
the language of the insane is not essentially different from Kien’s motive in
memorizing Therese’s every utterance. The effect of emphasizing that ‘‘He
was all for Chinese characters, Georg for human beings’’ simply encourages
us in our reading of these two phenomena, Oriental texts and the insane, as
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parallel instances of the feminine, though of course Georg means to suggest
themuch greater importance of his endeavor. Yet it is clear enough that both
brothers seek control and confirmation of theirownpreeminence and genius
by exploiting the interpretive potential of their speciously feminized objects
of inquiry. This essential identity of the two brothers is evident once more in
Georg’s ‘‘yearning for a place where he too was no less absolute master than
his brother in the library.’’ 87 To sustain this illusion of absolute sovereignty
both employ the very clichéd, contemporary conceptions of the feminine
that achieved such widespread notoriety during the interwar period. Peter
Kien, in a vain effort to shore up an obsolete, positivistic epistemology, tries
desperately to textualize his woman, to make her the unmistakable object
in the subject-object binary, and thereby to assuage his own anxieties via
‘‘culture.’’ When she fails to comply, when the threat of incomprehensibility
persists, his system collapses and he goes mad. Georg attempts to coopt the
feminine as a type ofmadness andmalleability that claims to subvert an ossi-
fied, conservative political culture. His endeavor, no less than his brother’s,
is principally one of interpretation and meaning-making. But the subver-
sive, countercultural, and antibourgeois stance that Georg’s conversion ex-
perience initially seems to signify is ultimately exposed for its rootedness
in a profound egocentrism. Like Kien’s, Georg’s use of the feminine proves
to be a profoundly unsuccessful way of defining himself. In the end Kien
immolates himself and Georg departs, ignorant of his own disgrace.
This analysis raises new questions about canonical readings of Auto-da-
Fé. Until the seventies it was not uncommon to find Georg interpreted as
the novel’s only identification figure, even as the author’s raisonneur, an
idea Foell resurrects in her recent study of 1994. One of the principal rea-
sons for siding with Georg is of course his relative congeniality toward the
greedy, self-centered, and brutal cast of characters. More important to in-
terpreters such asWalter H. Sokel, however, was the alleged correspondence
between Georg’s reflections on crowds and Canetti’s own theory on this
topic as elaborated at great length in Crowds and Power.88 Though more re-
cent evaluations of Georg have taken him down a peg, uncovering him for
the charlatan he is,89 none has penetrated to the principal point of identity
between the brothers Kien: the exploitation of the feminine to resolve amale
ego crisis.
The reading I have developed here might also dampen the kind of en-
thusiasm, which, for example, Russell Berman expresses in The Rise of the
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Modern German Novel (1986), where he adduces Auto-da-Fé as an instance
of ‘‘charismatic modernism.’’ 90 This interpretation hinges on a rather san-
guine reading of Georg, who is portrayed as the key exponent of the novel’s
‘‘utopian character.’’ Berman’s perspective onGeorg and the novel as awhole
seems to be rooted in a strain of literary theory that sees—if only im-
plicitly—a source of social liberation in both the linguistic theories of Ferdi-
nand de Saussure and Freud as he was read in the late sixties, and beyond.
The liberation of the signifier from the signified as well as a belief in the
emancipatory potential of unrepressed libidinal energies have indeed served
to inspire the literary theory of leftist critics as diverse as Foucault, Cixous,
Barthes, and somemembers of the Frankfurt School. Saussurian linguistics,
it would seem, has helped deconstruct the naturalness not only of language,
but that of larger social and gender arrangements as well.
This linguistic/psychoanalytic infusion into criticism, notwithstanding
the many lasting contributions it has made and continues to inspire, may
be precisely what has blinded us for so many years to Canetti’s parody
in the figure of Georg. Neither Georg’s enthusiasm for a language that is
nothing more than a child’s, nor his espousal of fighting insanity with in-
sanity, can really be taken seriously today. His authoritarian occupation of
‘‘feminine’’ madness is hardly a harbinger of the new charismatic commu-
nity—unless we really want to emulate the gorilla man’s semioticwhimsy, to
which, let us not forget, his sex-slave secretary must subordinate her every
desire. Indeed, without the overwhelming context of emancipatory literary
and cultural theory that values the marginal, oppositional forces thought
to stand ‘‘outside the law’’ (and which Berman felt were present in Georg),
it is quite difficult to imagine how one could have been so enthralled with
Georg. Canetti’s parody of Georg’s appropriation of the feminine (first in
the seduction of his gynecological patients, then in his adoption of the lan-
guage of the insane) also gives us reason to reevaluate Georg’s ruminations
on the crowd. Sokel may be quite right to emphasize some thematic par-
allels with Crowds and Power, but with one important caveat: for the eth-
nologist/sociologist Canetti, ‘‘die Masse’’ (meaning ‘‘mass’’ or ‘‘crowd’’) is
a fundamental category of social analysis applicable to all human beings.
For Georg, it is clearly—and therefore speciously—feminized.91 The best
evidence of this may be Georg’s conviction that his own course of self-
feminization has inured him to the dangers of an unannounced eruption of
the feminine: ‘‘Countless people go mad because the mass in them is par-
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ticularly strongly developed and can get no satisfaction . . . Once he had
lived for his private tastes, his ambition and women; now his one desire was
perpetually to lose himself. In this activity he came nearer to the thoughts
and wishes of the mass, than did those other isolated individuals around
whom he lived.’’ 92 Georg never gives up either his own rather firmly devel-
oped sense of individuation nor his lascivious appetites. His newfound love
of the crowd is just another instance of erotically charged playacting. Below
in chapter 5, within a discussion of the novel’s response to the contemporary
Freudmania, wewill observe how Georg’s muddled ideas about societal on-
togeny form a pointed and humorous target of satire. More immediately, we
will see how both Georg and Kien wrap themselves in the respectable garb
of Weimar-era philosophy, a process that in the end only demeans the larger
cultural project to which both pay such effusive lip service.
3 Self-Indulgent Philosophies
of the Weimar Period
The Use and Abuse of Neoempiricism
and Neo-Kantianism
By the time he wrote Auto-da-Fé, Canetti had arrived at a devastating insight:
not only is all speech self-serving but all listening is self-serving. We remake
the world in our minds as a phantasmagoria of our desires.
—David Denby 1
With the noted exceptions of the revered Dr. Sonne and a few other
elect, Canetti recalls the bulk of the Viennese intellectuals he encountered
during the interwar period as problematically self-absorbed: ‘‘One has to
imagine this city and this coffeehouse ethos, this flood of self-reference, self-
assertion, confession and self-aggrandizing. Everyone spilled over with sym-
pathy for himself and for his own significance. Everyone grumbled, every-
one chimed in and trumpeted. Yet all remained huddled together in small
groups, even publicly, because they needed and suffered each other for their
[self-important] speeches.’’ 2 Particularly this final sentence, which portrays
these gatherings not as bearing intrinsic communal value, but useful instead
only insofar as they prop up the solipsistic individual, resonates profoundly
and hilariously inAuto-da-Fé. It is precisely this ‘‘selfishness’’ (Eigenutz), the
polar opposite of everything Sonne (and, by extension, Canetti) stands for,
that Canetti saw as the expression of a dangerous and widespread lack of
concern for society. Canetti singles out Eastern philosophy—or, to be more
precise, a particularmode of reception of Eastern thought—as the culprit for
this asocial behavior on the part of somany intellectuals of this era. ‘‘Eastern
wisdom,’’ he contends, provided a popular and respectable way of abandon-
ing social responsibility: ‘‘In renouncing sympathy for the world of one’s
immediate environs, one also surrendered responsibility for it.’’ 3
But in Auto-da-Fé it is not really Eastern philosophy—despite our pro-
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tagonist’s prominence as a world-renowned sinologist 4—that serves as in-
tellectual cover for a retreat from social concerns, but rather two specific
philosophicalmovements that flourished in the interwar period: neoempiri-
cism, which in the novel is associated principally with Georg; and a loosely
practiced neoidealism, which of course centers on Kien himself. These two
highly educated brothers both wrap themselves in popular (and popular-
ized) philosophy in order to authorize their spurious withdrawal from an
increasingly bewildering social reality. Contrary to what Lukács would later
claim about modernism—that it abuses the dignity of philosophy to en-
dorse its own subjectivist ideology—Auto-da-Fé pointedly questions the use
of philosophy employed to legitimize the denigration of social awareness.
Moreover, Kien and Georg represent two sides of the same philosophical
coin. Both the radicalization of the Idealist subject (as caricatured in Kien)
as well as the empiricist premise of inductive epistemology (as practiced
by Georg) tend to grant priority to the thinking/percipient subject at the
expense of those objects of thought and sensation. In the end, these ‘‘self-
legislating’’ subjects greatly exceed Kant’s prescription for autonomy; they
proceed unhindered in their abusive and solipsistic behavior by virtually
any kind of checks and balances and, worse yet, do so as adherents of high-
minded philosophical schools.
Before pursuing this line of thought, a word on method. Previous critical
discussion of philosophy in Auto-da-Fé has focused on classical empiricism,
taking its cue from the protagonist himself, who, in a moment of philo-
sophical confusion, quotes the famous eighteenth century British empiricist
Bishop Berkeley.5 While Darby’s discussion of Kien’s misappropriation of
Berkeley remains instructive, it may also be misleading insofar as it takes the
novel for an academic philosophical tractate. There are two problems with
this assumption. First, Canetti repeatedly discounted this intention, protest-
ing that he was not in the first place a philosopher. Though he exhibits an
impressive but general familiarity with theWestern philosophical tradition,
one that could be assumed in an educated person of his day, he nevertheless
yielded on particular points to the philosophically more expert Hermann
Broch, who, according to Canetti, gave himself over to philosophy as will-
ingly as others yielded to nocturnal pleasures.6One can furthermore deduce
from Canetti’s total oeuvre that Canetti was indeed well acquainted with
those areas of philosophy that impinged upon the social concerns dearest
to him, that is, issues related to crowds and power. Of course we should not
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now err in the opposite extreme by assuming that the numerous philosophi-
cal references in Auto-da-Fé are superfluous or mere background music, as
they surely are, for example, in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s novel Shosha. On the
contrary, they continue to be quitemeaningful, as we shall see below, though
not as interventions in professional academic philosophy, but rather insofar
as they illuminate the individual’s relationship to society and culture as a
whole. Second, the fact that neoempiricism and neo-Kantianismmake their
appearance by way of caricature suggests that we will be better served by
seeking their meaning broadly, that is, in the manner in which they serve
to characterize the respective figure, rather than as an independently valid
assessment of the respective philosophical movement. Finally, in this re-
gard we should note that Canetti simply did not know directly the work of
Franz Brentano, a major figure in neoempiricism, at the time he wrote the
novel.7 The novel cannot therefore be read as an academic, source-based en-
gagement with this—or, indeed, any particular—philosophical school. In
elaborately reconstructing a philosophical system of, say, Bishop Berkeley
in order to elucidate a quip that Kien tosses off opportunistically, one clearly
risks hermeneutic overkill. Or worse, it can lead us away from the novel’s
principal concerns, and, however inadvertently, present a kind of evasion of
the novel’s central critique. Instead, I will proceed on the assumption that
Canetti imbibed neoempiricism as something that was, as he himself puts it
in a piece of correspondence, simply ‘‘in the air.’’ 8
Empiricism and Neoempiricism
Judith Ryan has shown that, with psychology just beginning to emerge
fromphilosophy as a discipline in its own right, ‘‘empiricist psychology’’ was
the great and as yet neglected impetus for modernist writers up to 1940.9
Let us begin by asking how Canetti’s novel of 1930–31 fits into this matrix of
ideas.
Ryan sets out to distinguish between the ‘‘experimental psychologists’’
and the ‘‘empiricists’’ of the latter half of the nineteenth century.10 The
former, represented by WilhelmWundt, inquired into human sensation by
means of experimentation and overlappedwith the interests of physics; such
inquiries ‘‘led to new investigations into the various forms of illusion perpe-
trated by the senses.’’ 11 By contrast, the empiricists (and in particular Bren-
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tano) prized introspection over experimentation. It is this second group,
‘‘the philosopher-psychologists, the empiricists,’’ that Ryan credits with ‘‘the
greatest impact on writers and artists at the turn of the century.’’ 12 Here
is Ryan’s précis of the ideas that were to prove so influential on modernist
poets: ‘‘What did it mean to be an empiricist in the late nineteenth century?
Primarily, it meant that the only admissible evidence for the existence of
something was that of our senses; the only reality was that of our conscious-
ness. The empiricists attacked metaphysics as postulating a reality ‘behind’
or ‘beyond’ that of the senses. Similarly, they rejected the dualism of subject
and object. For them, there was no separate ‘object-world’: everything that
was, subsisted in consciousness itself.’’ 13
The towering figures in this group were, as we have already noted, the
Austrians Franz Brentano and Ernst Mach, as well as the AmericanWilliam
James. Although there are important differences among these thinkers,14
the denominator common to all is a diluted, less substantial self. Brentano
championed a more systematized view of the poetic theory of correspon-
dences, in which neither the subject nor the object exists absolutely and
independently, but only in mutual interdependence. This relationship he
called ‘‘intentional.’’ Mach’s famous definition of the percipient subject as
a ‘‘mass of sensations, loosely bundled together’’ goes a good deal further
in unraveling the traditional conception of the self. And though William
James tempered the effect of such radical ideas by means of his philosophy
of pragmatism, he nevertheless shared such fundamental concepts as the in-
tentionality of perception. ‘‘His answer to those who saw empiricism as a
life-inhibiting philosophywas to propose a strategyof accepting any notions
that actually helped us in our practical lives, even though they might not
accord with the more sophisticated philosophical views we also held.’’ 15
Ryan’s most important contribution, for our purposes, concerns the
pervasiveness of empiricist thinking. She shows, for example, how Bren-
tano’s teaching seeped into the Austrian Gymnasien (university preparatory
schools) by way of his numerous students who later took teaching positions
there. In general, it seems well established that empiricist thinkers such as
Mach, Brentano, and James did indeed set the intellectual agenda on this
issue at least through the early decades of the twentieth century—that is,
if we are careful to include not only their disciples, but their opponents as
well. While it is true that Canetti later claimed to have had only an ‘‘insuf-
ficient conception’’ of Brentano’s ‘‘widespread influence’’ (die Vielfalt seiner
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Austrahlung) on contemporary thinkers,16 he acknowledges that the Vien-
nese air was still thick with free-floating neoempiricist notions during the
interwar period.
Though Ryan presents a quite differentiated spectrum of literary re-
sponses to the problem of ‘‘the vanishing subject’’—some authors enact the
trauma, others parody it, still others oppose it—her survey of contemporary
philosophy and psychology pays scant attention to that prominent intellec-
tual movement that effectively (though indirectly) opposed empiricist psy-
chology, namely neo-Kantianism—amovement that is importantly relevant
toAuto-da-Fé.Nowhere are these schoolsmore clearly opposed than in their
conception of subjectivity. While the neoempiricists trumpeted the erosion
of the boundary between self andworld, the neo-Kantians sought to reestab-
lish the line of demarcation separating the Verstandeswelt (world of intel-
lect) from the Sinneswelt (world of sensory experience), a division that was
held to be prerequisite to the expression of Kantian autonomy of the indi-
vidual. An additional amendment to Ryan’s account seems in order when
appraising the work of Canetti, namely a greater emphasis on the experi-
mental psychologists within the neoempiricist movement as opposed to the
introspective philosopher-psychologists.We ought to remember in this con-
nection that Canetti spent five years studying chemistry and allied sciences
just prior to writing Auto-da-Fé. Though he could not flee quickly enough
from the laboratory, this experience appears to have left its imprint on the
novel. Indeed we shall see below that a striking analogy exists between the
approach taken by experimental psychologists such asWilhelmWundt and
the form of the novel as designed by Dr. rer. nat. Elias Canetti.
The novel’s attitude toward empiricist accounts of subjectivity is, as we
shall see, richly parodic. Kien is at best a fair-weather empiricist, Georg a far-
cical caricature of the empirical self. Canetti’s main concern is to show that
the empiricist conception of the self may be fine for world-weary aesthetes
and lonely lyric poets, but is overtaxed in confronting the demands of inter-
subjectivity, that is to say in imagining humans as essentially social beings.
In drawing out the implications of empiricist thinking, often by means of
merciless hyperbole, the novel suggests that this manner of thinking under-
mines the sociopolitical realm. In terms of individual psychology,moreover,
it implies a kind of self-evisceration, even a Selbstmord: for only a self can
get rid of a self.
Peter Kien is neither the isolated individual in the vertiginous metropolis
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fumbling to make sense of self and world (e.g., Rilke’s Malte), nor the artist
as a young man (Musil’s Törleß), nor the hapless young hero forced to live
out the clichés of a previous generation (Broch’s Pasenow). Writing in the
wake of rising social unrest—whose violence, as we have noted, Canetti wit-
nessed personally—and in the wake of his own experience of the isolating
nature of an overspecialized academia, Canetti is preoccupied with the dis-
solution not of the self per se, but of the connection between the individual
and society. Or, to put it another way, he problematizes a conception of the
self, which from the outset is unsuited to interpersonal and social engage-
ment.17His response to thematrix of empiricist psychology is not, therefore,
a sympathetic literary reenactment of the vanishing subject, but a critique
of inauthentic strategies of self-assertion, a parody of illegitimate efforts to
overcome the subject-object dichotomy and, ultimately, a rejection of em-
piricist psychology as solipsistic.
Empiricist as well as experimental psychology were, as we noted, very
much concerned with the matter of perception. But whereas empiricists
such as Brentano (much like his eighteenth-century empiricist predeces-
sor Berkeley) stressed the interdependence of existence and perception, the
experimental researchers such as Wundt emphasized the distinctions be-
tween the individual’s perceptions and a scientifically observable reality.
Both theories have a certain validity: the former stresses the symbiotic rela-
tionship, the constitutive power of perception (and thus the inextricability
of reality and perception), while the latter stresses the distorting potential
inherent in perception.
At first glance, Therese’s creative reworking of the sign at the furniture
shop seems to give us a scene from classical comedy, of which Gottsched
himself—were it not for the farce—might heartily approve: ‘‘She came to a
halt in front of his shop. The letters in the shop front came close to her eyes.
First she read Gross & Mother, then Brute & Wife. She liked that. She even
wasted some of her busy time just looking at it . . . The letters danced for
joy, and when they had finished dancing she read suddenly, Gross & Wife.
That didn’t suit her at all.’’ 18 The scene is a spoof on Brentano’s ‘‘inner per-
ception,’’ which grants a reality to consciousness, whether or not the items
of consciousness correspond to an external reality. Having just witnessed
Therese’s elaborate reverie of bedding the handsome ‘‘Mr. Brute’’ (Wedg-
wood’s rendering of ‘‘Herr Grob’’), one does not hesitate in convicting her
of allowing her runaway fantasy to rewrite reality in a manner commensu-
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rate first with her own erotic desire and then with her greatest fear—namely
that he is already married.
How is this different fromGottsched’s dictum that in comedy the point is
to mock (‘‘auslachen’’) aberrant characters, that is, to laugh them back into
a morally acceptable place? The question is pertinent in light of Canetti’s
use of comic types: Therese might, for example, be labeled according to her
ruling passion(s): she is a lecherous version of the miser (‘‘die Geizige’’). But
while this type of generic, moralizing reading of Auto-da-Fé is not invalid,
neither should it eclipse Canetti’s stinging, hilarious, and far more general
critique of empiricist thinking. For it is not up to Therese alone to remedy
this failing; the neoempiricist atmosphere lies heavy over the entire cast of
characters. As a broader, cultural phenomenon, it is not amenable to indi-
vidual remedy. Ultimately, this latter critique is of greater moral—rather
than moralizing—import.
Though Brentano’s theory was not in itself subjectivist, it had this effect
nevertheless. Brentano, we recall, held that ‘‘we can consider the object
precisely as intended and as inexistent, without raising questions about its
extramental nature and status.’’ 19 Brentano’s avoidance of ontological ques-
tions and extramental reality gave priority, if only by default and even-
tual misapplication, to the subjective perceptions of individuals. What the
neoempiricists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century lacked,
and what their eighteenth-century forebears (such as Berkeley) supplied,
was a guarantee against such relativism. Berkeley anchored his system, as
Darby amply documents, in God.20 The neoempiricists, as Ryan points out,
were pointedly antimetaphysical, and thus this option was lost to them.
Yet, as Copleston observes, the reigning and still topical problem in West-
ern philosophy is, as Kant well understood, the conformity between mental
concepts and extramental objects.21 The neoempiricist attempt to sidestep
this puzzle in eliminating the subject-object dichotomy by granting reality
only to consciousness is, as Canetti’s novel wickedly illustrates, not without
problems.
In what is perhaps the most memorable of Therese’s misprisions, Canetti
provides an ironic twist to Brentano’s ‘‘intended’’ but ‘‘inexistent’’ objects.
This occurs during Therese’s visit to what we know as the Cathedral of St.
Stephen; the scene marks an interlude in her dogged attempt to wrench a
testament from Kien, who, in turn, believes she is referring to a great sum
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she stands to inherit independently. Just after learning of Kien’s meager net
worth, Therese takes her problem to prayer:
She sought out the largest church in the town, the cathedral . . . There
hung a picture of the Last Supper, painted in expensive oil colours . . . The
money-bag looked as though you could touch it, thirty beautiful pieces
of silver inside . . . Judas held it tight. Hewouldn’t let go, hewas so greedy.
He grudged every penny. Just like her old man . . . Her old man is thin,
Judas is fat and has a red beard. In the middle of it all sits the superior
youngman. Such a beautiful face, all pale, and eyes just as they should be.
He knows everything . . . Her husband’s a dirty miser. To do such a thing
for twenty schillings . . . She is the white dove. She is flying just above
his head. She shines white, because of her innocence. The painter would
have it that way . . . She is the white dove. Let Judas try any of his tricks.
He won’t catch hold of her. She will fly wherever she wants. She will fly to
the superior young man, she knows what’s beautiful. Judas can say what
he likes. He can go and hang himself . . . The money belongs to her . . .
Soon the soldiers will come . . . She will step forward and say: ‘‘This isn’t
our Lord. This is Mr. Brute, a simple salesman in the shop of Gross and
Mother. Youmustn’t lay a finger on him. I’m his wife. . .’’ Judas can go and
hang himself. She is the white dove.22
Therese’s rewriting of this cardinal scene should not be read merely in a
manner that would characterize her: as a virtual stock character, she is al-
ready quite amply developed. The satire aims instead at empiricism, for
which every mental image is ‘‘actual,’’ even if it is not otherwise ‘‘real.’’ It is
perhaps pedantic to spell out Therese’s misreading. Yet we should be clear
that it involves not merely an identification of her beloved Herr Grob with
Jesus, but ultimately an utter substitution of the latter for the former.
Canetti specifically parodies the process of mental correction (the way
the mind corrects for perceptual illusions was a central concern of the ex-
perimental psychologists) in having Therese first see Judas as the physical
opposite of Kien (i.e., corpulent and red-bearded), and then somehow his
very likeness. Notice also how she first savors the thirty shillings in the purse
insofar as she envisions having the money herself. But once she projects
Kien onto the Judas figure, who, as everyone knows, actually receives the
moneybag, the sum suddenly drops to twenty. This is no accident, since im-
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mediately after naming this new, lower figure, Therese angrily recalls her
obdurate allegation that Kien had attempted to cheat her out of her right-
ful inheritance by correcting the arithmetic in his bankbook—another sum
that, she believes, sank before her ‘‘very eyes.’’ Though she is compelled for
other reasons to remake Kien into Judas, she is not about to grant him the
full thirty shillings. The third instance of ‘‘mental correction’’ from the pas-
sage cited above has to dowith Herr Grob: because he is at first the beautiful
love object, Therese eagerly assigns him the role of Jesus. Shortly thereafter,
however, under the pressure of the Passion narrative itself, she is constrained
to distinguish her beloved Herr Grob from Jesus—who, of course, is about
to be crucified—so that she can script a happy ending to her own erotic
fantasy.
The point of such scenes is not, in the first place, to scold the two-
dimensional figure back to moral perfection, but wittily to indicate what is
lost in the empiricist conception of the self: namely a firm sense of the other,
and of the larger social world. Though Canetti is certainly not concerned
to restore Christianity as a dominant cultural narrative, he demonstrates by
means of exaggeration the threat inherent in empiricist thinking: in this case,
the loss of common cultural goods, of images that (for better and worse)
can bind a community together. Writing at the end of a long period dur-
ing which the subjective side of experience had, in the German canon at
least, been highly valorized, Canetti raises in Auto-da-Fé an objection, not
against that vaunted German Innerlichkeit (inwardness) and authentic sub-
jective states per se, but against the implicit claim that nothing else matters
quite so much. Therese’s heretical, personalized version of the Last Supper
is easily unmasked and corrected (now, by the reader) because she and the
object of her devotion are extremely well-known quantities. She, a highly
stylized type; the Last Supper, a tableau from the Christianmasterplot. Only
such extremes can produce a parody of empiricism that does not itself risk
becoming a celebration of the empiricist self. Canetti’s recourse to a rela-
tively stable cultural signifier should not be seen as nostalgia for a type of lit-
erature (or worldview) where everything has its unquestioned, preordained
place. Nor does it reflect an inherent preference for two-dimensional figures
as opposed to full-blooded Menschen. Canetti’s self-conscious use of these
extremes is dictated rather by his task, which here is to illuminate the poten-
tial risk in uncritically embracing the faddish neoempiricism of the day. This
critique of what we might call ‘‘mental privatization,’’ which takes aim at
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the progressive erasure of the public domain as an independent ontological
entity, is particularly evident in the novel’s spectral and fleeting evocation
of Vienna.23
Therese’s burlesque reading of the Last Supper painting satirizes the em-
piricist effort to collapse the subject-object dichotomy. In contrast toMalte’s
celebrated, imaginary reconstitution of the semi-demolished house, a pro-
cess we are meant to affirm, Therese’s undeniably imaginative reading of the
painting is rendered decisively inauthentic. Her visit to the cathedral sug-
gests that the empiricist conflation of mental conception and extramental
object, the reduction of reality to consciousness, is flawed because it over-
looks the potential inequality of the two terms. Anticipating one of his own
great themes in Crowds and Power (as well as the work of Foucault), Canetti
points out that what one sees (as well as what one fails to see) is already en-
meshed in power. Or, to put it otherwise: power—and therefore the abuse
of power as well—begins at the point of (mis)perception.
Nowhere is this more obvious than in the case of Kien. We have seen
already how Kien’s empiricist pronouncements, in particular his epistemo-
logical skepticism expressed above all in the ‘‘esse percepi’’ outburst, are
rooted in his skirmish withTherese. It is beside the point, however, whether,
or to what extent, Kien is a sincere empiricist. More importantly, he—like
Therese—is an occasion for playing out some of the more questionable im-
plications of empiricist conceptions.
One cannot approach Kien without encountering the classic empiricist
agenda. He is, as we observe throughout the novel, obsessively concerned
with the strength of his eyes and with overcoming the subject-object bifur-
cation. Furthermore, he maintains a doggedly antimetaphysical stance and
explicitly subordinates existence to consciousness. Yet though all the issues
line up, Kien is nevertheless the novel’s least likely empiricist. Deeply fearful
of any except the most solitary experience, Kien cuts himself off from the
empiricist font of meaning. His eyes actually reverse the order of Democ-
ritus’s atomism: his optical apparatus seems to assign rather than receive
the data of experience. And, though the empiricists included introspection
(in addition to sense perception) as a source of meaning, this hardly makes
Kien an exemplary empiricist. If we associate a diffuse ego with empiricism,
a sense of self and other as embedded in an indivisible flux, then it becomes
clear that Kien is at best amisfit, autocratic empiricist.When we read, for ex-
ample, that ‘‘he reserved consciousness for real thoughts; they depend upon
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it; without consciousness, thoughts are unthinkable,’’ 24 it becomes clear that
the empiricist program is lurking there, even if at times it appears more to
threaten than to characterize the protagonist. Indeed, Kien could only repre-
sent an authentic empiricist by giving up the critique of empiricism which
he embodies.
One could visit a multitude of scenes where perception is fundamentally
at issue, as near the end of the novel where Kien declares the meal Therese
serves him an illusion. Having the meal thrown at him does little to con-
vince him of its material reality; neither does his act of self-mutilation (he
cuts off a finger) prove persuasive. But all such scenes, and in particular
this act of self-impairment, harken back to Kien’s paradigmatic denial of
Therese. Indeed, the act of digital self-dismemberment recalls Kien’s act of
self-blinding, and the attendant ‘‘Philosophie der Blindheit ’’ discussed above.
It echoes (and inverts) the famous mutilations of Abelard and Origen, who
only escaped the snares of (female) material reality—and were thus free to
continue their meditative lifestyle—by means of castration. And it accen-
tuates the proximity of empiricism to escapism, a nexus we will notice in
connection with Georg, below.
Kien’s prototypical problem is his failure to apprehend figures who en-
joy as much fictional reality as he does himself, and, more importantly, his
attempt to employ the dignity of philosophy and scholarship to underwrite
these failings. When Kien applies his philological prowess to obscure ori-
ental texts, most of us can only guess at the distortion. But when he trains
his powers on the tabula rasa for which he takes Therese, we catch him red-
handed; for her fictional existence, no less than his own, has already been
inscribed by the narrator and no effort of the world-renowned philologist
can erase her with impunity. In other words—to reconnect briefly to an
aforementioned debate—if there really is a struggle between Kien and the
narrator for what Lubomir Dolezel calls the ‘‘authentication authority’’ in
this narrative, its resolutionmust be sought not only in narratology, but also
in the novel’s broader critique of popularized neoempiricism.
Once again, the problem is not so much an individual moral failing as
a shortcoming endemic to empiricism, which since its eighteenth-century
incarnations has been notoriously ill equipped to affirm the existence of
other coequal subjects. Though Berkeley never doubted what he referred
to as the ‘‘spiritual’’ reality of percipient subjects, his difficulty of affirming
fellow humans can, perhaps, be grasped from the provocative claim in the
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Principles ‘‘that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than
the existence of men; because the effects of Nature are infinitely more nu-
merous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents.’’ 25 When
the neoempiricists of the nineteenth century jettisoned theism and meta-
physics, this prop to ‘‘finite spiritual substances,’’ incredible even to some
of Berkeley’s contemporaries, was lost as well. Which may explain in part
why Brentano, immediately after his neoempiricist phase, became aCatholic
priest.
There is an additional, though closely related, intrinsic weakness to the
basic conception of all varieties of empiricism, including the neoempiricist
incarnation, whichmakes the apprehension of fellow individuals depend on
an a posteriori assembly of sense data. To this way of thinking, fellow human
beings are secondary phenomena,mere inductions from sensoryexperience.
Copleston’s critique of Berkeley on this fundamental point applies mutatis
mutandi to the later forms as well:
[Berkeley] does not tell us how we can be certain that the ideas which we
take to be signs of the presence of finite spiritual substances [i.e., people]
really are what we think they are. Perhaps, however, he would reply that
. . . from ideas or observable effects which are analogous to those which
we are conscious of producing, we infer the existence of other selves; and
this is sufficient evidence. But if anyone is dissatisfied with such an answer
and wishes to know what justification there is, on Berkeley’s premises,
for making this inference, he will not receive much help from Berkeley’s
writings.26
The conception that other selves need to be built up from ‘‘effects which are
analogous to thosewhichwe are conscious of producing’’ poses the dangerof
seeing others as mere projections, a notion that the novel extensively paro-
dies. When the neoempiricists blurred the contours of the self, moreover,
they concomitantly blurred the perceptibility of other selves as independent
entities.While Mach’s ‘‘idea of a fluid, unbounded self essentially composed
of sense impressions, a self that was not distinct from its surroundings’’ 27
may in some sense be seen to overcome or master a painful dichotomy be-
tween subject and object—a kind of liberation, as it were—it simultaneously
erodes the essential distinction between subject and subject. Shorn of its
eighteenth-century metaphysical underpinnings, neoempiricism can ulti-
mately only speak of the other as object of one’s own consciousness, or, to
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use more contemporary terminology, as a mental construct, rather than co-
equal subject. From the neoempiricist point of view, the percipient subject
is structurally favored over the perceived subject.
And this is precisely the critique we see played out again and again in
Auto-da-Fé. The combined evidence of all his senses fails to convince Kien
of his wife’s existence:
He had seized Therese; not tentatively, but with all his strength he
clutched at her skirt, he pushed her from him, he drew her to him, he
enclosed her in his long, lean arms. She let him have his way . . . Before
they are hanged, murderers are allowed one last meal . . . He turned her
round once on her axis and forewent the embrace . . . He glared at her
from an inch off. He stroked her dress with all ten fingers. He put out
his tongue and snuffled with his nose. Tears came into his eyes with the
effort. ‘‘I suffer from this hallucination!’’ he admitted, gasping.28
The overwhelming sensory data notwithstanding, Kien stands by his previ-
ous conclusion: ‘‘I live for truth. I know this truth is a lie.’’ 29 Canetti goes
to great lengths to include all five senses here. Prior to the so-called experi-
ment narrated above, Kien had already perceived a Therese-like voice: ‘‘At
present she is silent, but earlier she had the voice of the murdered woman
too.’’ 30 In fact, it is this singularly disturbing voice that leads Kien to dis-
prove her existence in the first place. His learned argument in favor of a
spectral Therese (‘‘Schein-Therese’’) therefore presents an embattled empiri-
cist agenda; for the professor, as we shall see presently, is really intent upon
asserting his own pseudo-Kantian autonomy and defeating the heteronomy
implied in his sensory experience of Therese. Ironically, empiricism is here
vindicated; Therese really does exist. Yet it has introduced and authorized
a subjectivism that, the novel implies, can be turned against itself. More-
over, as we shall soon see in greater detail, it invites a neoidealist backlash,
as already adumbrated in the passage cited above.
The misrecognition of Therese is paradigmatic of figural misapprehen-
sion throughout the novel. Kien misperceives Pfaff ’s essentially violent na-
ture (at least until Kien becomes his prisoner) by historicizing him as a
sixteenth-century ‘‘Landsknecht,’’ as we noted above. Georg similarly mis-
reads the brutish caretaker by aestheticizing him into a state of mythologi-
cal impotence: ‘‘All the murders, all the anxieties, all the malevolence in the
world had vanished: The caretaker pleased him. His head reminded him
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of the rising sun of early that morning. He was crude, but refreshing, an
untamed, stout fellow such as one rarely sees now in the cities and homes
of civilization. The stairs groaned. Instead of carrying it, this Atlas smote
the wretched earth.’’ 31 The construction of an acceptable caretaker proceeds
along the same lines as Therese’s reinscription of the Last Supper: bits and
pieces of the original are incorporated into an image determined predomi-
nantly by the needs of the percipient subject, and therefore result in pure
distortion. Georg’s prettifying misprision of the caretaker in fact strays far
more from thewife-beating, child-molesting brutewe know thandoesKien’s
putative hallucination, the Schein-Therese, from the real Therese.32
The inability to see people, or to see them for who they really are, re-
peats itself in virtually every figural constellation: Fischerle takes Kien for
a Jew, and assumes that practically everyone else is the swindler he (that is,
Fischerle) in fact is. The parody reaches its height in Fischerle’s construction
of a chess opponent who is literally his own mirror image. Pfaff renames his
daughter ‘‘Poli,’’ a shortened form for the ‘‘Polizist’’ (policeman) he once
was, forcing her to wear his pants and play the role of the criminal he in fact
is.When the daughter finally rebels, Pfaff denies her existence, claiming she
is an impostor: ‘‘She was no daughter of his! . . . By mistake he referred once
to a certain Polly. But his muscles made up for that mistake immediately.
The name of the female he was disciplining was Anna. She claimed to be
identical with a daughter of his. He did not believe her. Her hair came out
in handfuls and when she defended herself two of her fingers got broken.’’ 33
The ‘‘blinding’’ of the novel’s title, then, can be read as an indictment of the
empiricist blind spot for fellow human beings. Though Brentano stressed
the unity of consciousness, and Mach envisioned a sort of sensory monism,
the egalitarian, leveling tendency of this thinking does not account for the
de facto experience of separate, antithetical agents. It may be fine to speak,
as William James did, of a super-consciousness in which we all somehow
participate; but such a heady view fails to accommodate the experience of
clashing, rival subjects.
In peopling his novel with Hobbesian louts, Canetti is saying neither that
the world is really so utterly brutish (as Peter Russell famously claimed),34
nor that perceptual error is so rampant or so typically detectable. He is in-
stead drawing attention to a widespread manner of thinking about the self
and other that is essentially apolitical, perhaps even antipolitical. The em-
piricist failure to affirm the other a priori, as it were, paves the way toward
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a mental expansion of the self at the expense of the other. In the novel we
see this in the mental cocoons, ‘‘the rival belief worlds,’’ as Darby deftly dubs
them, that each character weaves around him/herself—individual refuges
in which fellow subjects are merely so muchmaterial to be affirmed, denied,
or reworked according to the respective reigning monomania.
The result of such thinking, when taken to the extreme, is the eclipse of
the social world. In a massive novel of roughly five hundred pages, set in
a metropolis we might as well call Vienna, there is surprisingly little atten-
tion to community, city, commerce, and so on. The great contrast would of
course be Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz, in which the capital city is itself a
rival subject, as Marilyn Silbey Fries has argued. But Auto-da-Fé is a novel
in which the narration is largely determined by the characters. The nar-
rator moves the characters on and off stage, supplies the characters with
enough rope to hang themselves in self-contradictory babble, and splices in
a number of key cultural intertexts. But he does not provide a sustained,
independent vista. The characters, unable to see each other, cannot begin
to construct a social world. This accounts for the simple fact—to give just
one example—that on Therese’s way home from the furniture store the city
suddenly fades to black, and we get none of the municipal ambiance that
Fontane would surely have provided. Instead, we are restricted to Therese’s
consciousness, constrained to observe her as she reworks her humiliation
into dubious acclaim. Retaining her inward focus, she expends every ounce
of mental energy in an effort to place abusive mockery in a more favorable
light, which becomes apparent to the reader when she stretches the auditory
data beyond belief in concluding that the assembled customers ‘‘laughed at
her out of respect’’ (lachten vor Stolz). Preoccupied with such ‘‘introspec-
tion,’’ Therese perceives not a representative slice of city life and local color,
but a highly selective assortment of scenes (such as her fascination with the
marching band leader) which in the end serves primarily to reiterate her
own venal proclivities and desire for erotic fulfillment.
This warrants bearing in mind in light of Canetti’s repeated comment
that his novel was inspired by Balzac’s Comédie humaine. The first question
onemight raise, especially when one thinks of the best-known of that series,
Père Goriot (1834), is, Where is Canetti’s Paris? In Balzac’s novels one en-
counters similar base passions, but one also experiences a vibrant metropo-
lis and a palpable society, however much this society may be excoriated for
its injustice, greed, and vain pursuits. The municipal and social lacunae in
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Auto-da-Fé follow in good empiricist fashion from the consciousness of the
subjects. As Kien put it, when he found it convenient to strike an empiricist
pose: ‘‘Esse percipi, to be is to be perceived.What I do not perceive, does not
exist.’’ 35
Though empiricism never claimed to supply an adequate political theory,
any theory that seeks to define the subject must ultimately be held account-
able for the implications of that theory on the polis. Auto-da-Fé spins out
those consequences mercilessly. After all, a vanishing subject does not ac-
cord well with the notion of civic responsibility; a Machian dissolute self
merely dissolves the question of ethics, both personal and social. If an em-
piricist sympathizer were to object, claiming that the author tramples upon
the nuances of empiricism in straining the theory beyond the intent of its
original philosopher advocates, one could only agree. Auto-da-Fé does in-
deed present a caricature of empiricism, with all the reductionism and dis-
tortion that term implies. Yet this observation only serves to clarify, rather
than nullify, the novel’s distinctive intervention. Auto-da-Fé is concerned
with the questionable social uses of the neoempiricism that was bandied
about Viennese salons and coffee houses during the interwar period, not
with an esoteric professional debate among philosophers.
Canetti’s creation of headstrong fictional figures should not bemisunder-
stood as a nostalgia for an outmodedwill-dominated psychology.His figural
constellations do however bear a pertinent and still relevant warning: ego
strength does not simply disappear in the face of empiricist notions of the
self. Here we must take stock of the fact that empiricism never established
itself as a widely accepted theory, to the extent, for example, of Darwin’s
theory of evolution. That the debate was widespread, I do not dispute. But
what began as a theory of the self, rooted both in experimental psychology
and philosophical reflection, quickly became something else in addition:
something we might call a mood, a set of conceptions that one adopted.We
need, in short, to account for empiricism’s Janus face: it was both a scientific
theory (i.e., something discovered) and a mood (i.e., something donned).
It is necessary to grasp this dual aspect in order to appreciate Canetti’s final
critique contained in the figure of Georg.
If one has been up to this point hesitant to accept empiricism as a vital
intertext to the novel, Georg should remove all doubt. Unlike the other fig-
ures, Georg is characterized specifically to allegorize (and caricature) the
empiricist self. In explicit opposition to his well-armored brother, Georg
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is drawn as the great recipient of sensual reality. Both as gynecologist-
womanizer and as psychiatrist, he is portrayed as essentially drawn to, if not
dependent upon, the voluptuousness of material reality. Explicit references
to empiricist concerns are replete. After studying the gorilla man, we learn
that this man of science, who, by the way, metamorphoses from ‘‘Georges’’
in France into the Germanic ‘‘Georg’’ as he passes the border into Austria,
‘‘was learned enough to publish a thesis on the speech of this madman. A
new light was thrown on the psychology of sounds,’’ 36 a publication that
evokes a typical neoempiricist research project. More specifically, Georg’s
elaborate praise of the insane for firmly holding to the actuality of their hal-
lucinations is a satirical reference to a subcategory of Brentano’s celebrated
theory of intentionality, namely ‘‘inner perception,’’ a point we see reflected
in the following lecture Georg delivers to his fawning assistants:
‘‘You see, gentlemen,’’ he would say to them when they were alone to-
gether, ‘‘what miserable single-track creatures, what pitiful and inarticu-
late bourgeois we are, compared with the genius of this paranoiac. We
possess, but he is possessed; we take our experiences at second hand, he
makes his own. He moves in total solitude, like the earth itself, through
his own space . . . He believes in the images his senses conjure up for him.
We mistrust our own healthy senses . . . But look at him! He is Allah,
prophet, and Moslem in one. Is a miracle any the less a miracle because
we have labeled it Paranoia chronica? We sit on our thick-headed sanity
like a vulture on a pile of gold. Understanding, as we understand it, is
misunderstanding. If there is a life purely of the mind, it is this madman
who is leading it!’’ 37
Georg’s endorsement of such inner perception is at once a playful per-
version and a critical citation of Brentano’s ideas; for although Brentano ac-
knowledged hallucination and idiosyncraticmental images, his theoryof the
‘‘unity of consciousness’’ failed adequately to distinguish between delusion
and reality. What strikes us immediately about this passage is that Georg
diagnoses the empiricist self as essentially insane and for this very reason
capable of offering a credible critique of bourgeois society. Georg, of course,
thinks he is tendering a precious paradox to his worshipful listeners. But
the novel suggests the contrary. Given the withering critique of neoempiri-
cism we have already encountered, we are instead inclined to inquire into
the sanity of attributing political subversiveness to an already weak, mar-
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ginalized, and largely institutionalized group of people. Questions of power,
particularly as they are secreted by erudite-sounding philosophy and psy-
chology, are never far away in this novel.
We realize before long that Georg is in effect praising himself, or the self
he had become since his conversion experience with the gorilla man. His
entiremethod, such as it is, lies in the putative permeability of his conscious-
ness, his ability to enter into—and take on—the selves of others. In this he is
the very image of the Machian self, a self that merely serves as the locus for
the constant reconfiguration of sense impressions: ‘‘When he was tired and
wanted a rest from the high tension with which his distracted friends filled
him, he would submerge himself in the soul of one of his assistants. Every-
thing that Georg did, he did in the character of someone else.’’ 38 Recall that
Georg dates the shedding of hismundane, bourgeois self to that fatefulmeet-
ing with the gorilla man, who is the great inspiration for his revolutionary
psychological treatments. Yet, as we noted in some detail above in chapter 2,
if the celebrated gorilla language represents a collapse of subject-object re-
lations, if it suggests a much more elastic relationship between signifier and
signified than Peter Kien could ever abide, it does so at the expense of every-
thing and everybody but the authorof thismake-believe universe, the gorilla
man himself. Canetti’s criticism of empiricist thinking as embodied inGeorg
is, then, both old and new: he continues to raise questions about reality re-
duced to consciousness and he challenges the assumption that empiricism is
innocent of power relations. New with Georg, however, is a critique of what
we above called empiricism-as-mood. It is not Georg’s disingenuous shed-
ding of traditional subjectivity alone, or even primarily, which is at issue.
Though it is true that the brothers Kien both suffer from savior complexes,
and that only Peter is a self-acknowledged elitist, there is a deeper question
at stake. The empiricist satire associated with Georg aims in the first place
at the possibility of such a conversion to empiricism.
Once again, the issue antedates the empiricism of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, but continues into our own day as well. The
problem can be stated thus: the phenomenal treatment of the human being,
which neoempiricism espoused, fails to account for the individual’s experi-
ence of being separate from, and yet acting on, theworld. Copleston explains
how this dual aspect of experience, of being both separate from and part
of the world, has structured much of the Western philosophical tradition.
Since this point is foundational not only for the present argument, but also
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for our later discussion of modernism (chapter 6), it will be worth quoting
here in full:
Considered as spirit, as standing out from the world, he [i.e., the human
being] is able, and indeed impelled, to raise metaphysical problems, to
seek unity behind or underlying the subject-object situation. Considered
as a being involved in the world, he is naturally inclined to regard these
problems as empty and profitless. In the development of philosophical
thought these divergent attitudes or tendencies recur, assuming different
historical, and historically explicable, forms . . . Inasmuch as man can
objectify himself and treat himself as an object of scientific investigation,
he is inclined to regard talk about his standing out from the world or as
having a spiritual aspect as so much nonsense. Yet the mere fact that it
is he who objectifies himself shows, as Fichte well saw, that he cannot be
completely objectified, and that a phenomenalistic reduction of the self
is uncritical and naïve.39
This last sentence bears particular relevance for our understanding of
Georg. The very conception of the empiricist (or here, phenomenalistic) self
implies, as Copleston illustrates, the potential existence of the idealist self
that would thereby be negated. In other words, this represents an aporia in
the philosophical discussion of subjectivity in which each option implies the
possibility of the other. Neither the spiritual nor the phenomenalistic view
of the self can be adopted to the exclusion of the other without oversimplify-
ing an issue that has perplexed theWestern philosophical tradition down to
our own day, and which, according to Foucault, constitutes the central co-
nundrum of the modern episteme.40 Neither will Auto-da-Fé let us rest easy
in uncritically adopting what was then the intellectual fashion of the day and
still circulates in various guises. Canetti suggests in the figure of Georg, with-
out in any way proposing a simplistic return to idealist metaphysics, that it
may take a self to lose a self.
Though Kien spouts key empiricist terms, and Therese exhibits—in an
admittedly hyperbolic fashion—the perceptual concerns of empiricism,
Georg is the only figurewho self-consciously adopts an empiricist self. Ironi-
cally, he is impelled to such a makeover for the same reason his brother is
moved to quote the famous esse percipi: troublesomewomen.His fascination
with the gorilla man comes at a time when he professes to be bored with his
career as gynecologist and with his licentious lifestyle, both of which tend
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for him to merge into a single undertaking. His fling with empiricism, then,
is deeply imbricated with an attempted escapism. Yet, as we saw in the pre-
vious chapter, Georg’s conversion is a case of ‘‘back to the future.’’ As psy-
chiatrist he is no less careerist, and to the extent he has sworn off women—
and that is indeed debatable 41—he has replaced that sensual gratification by
continually slipping into the psyches of his maniacal patients.
When considering the target of Canetti’s parody embodied in Georg, we
would do well, finally, to recall the marriage of empiricist thinking to fin-
de-siècle aestheticism, as Ryan has encouraged us to do. Georg’s unique art
of healing is derived from the nonreferential, nonutilitarian language of the
gorilla man. This faux primitive man, though maintained by a rich and cor-
rupt banker, is held up as the consummate critique of bourgeois venality,
moral hypocrisy, and narrow-mindedness. His own free use of sounds with
no regard to the mundane requirements of communication is opposed to
a bourgeois commodification of language. Relegated to the attic because of
his family’s embarrassment, the so-called gorilla brother is a scathing par-
ody of the garret artist ostensibly at odds with and misunderstood—yet all
the while supported—by the middle-class world.
Georg carries his message forward, founding by means of his revolution-
ary psychiatricmethods a select group inwhichmembership implies neither
collegiality nor equality, but depends on the good graces and condescension
of its leader. Dedicated to a small cadre of those privileged with the gift of
insanity, Georg takes it as his mission to preserve them from the degrada-
tions of the dull-minded bourgeoisie. Outside the confines of his asylum and
in the real world—for example, at the abode of his beleaguered brother—
Georg is utterly helpless. Given all these parallels between Georg and the
most famous aesthete of the day, one is tempted to conclude that the Georg
Canetti has in mind is perhaps Stefan George (1868–1933).
Georg certainly demonstrates that empiricism’s vanishing subject is not
exclusively a scientifically found object, and is by no means a neutral stance
free of ideology. With Georg, Canetti raises once again the question of em-
piricism’s collaboration in escapism, apoliticism, and in effete bourgeois
protest, as well as the more fundamental question involved in the uncritical
espousal of the phenomenal self. If the empiricist self is traditionally asso-
ciated in high modernism with privileged states of consciousness (such as
the quasi-mystical union of self and other), it can just as well, as we see in
Georg, be affiliated with a kind of false consciousness.That ‘‘wax tablet’’ may
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not be so malleable and accommodating as one would like to think; in fact,
it may have a mind of its own.
The novel’s answer, therefore, to the question posed by William James
in an essay of 1905—‘‘Is Radical Empiricism Solipsistic?’’—is an emphatic
‘‘yes.’’ But we should be careful in stating this to emphasize the term ‘‘radi-
cal.’’ For in raising communal, ethical, and political issues Canetti confronts
the empiricist evanescent self with questions it is ill suited to answer. It would
be premature, however, to conclude that with Auto-da-Fé Canetti rejects
en masse the great modernist novels that either feature a lone, or virtually
solitary, protagonist, or focus primarily on the rich consciousness of one
figure among many others. We are concerned, rather, in Auto-da-Fé with
a substantially different set of problems that nevertheless impinges on aes-
thetic modernism. One could perhaps more correctly say that Auto-da-Fé
picks upwhere a novel like Berlin Alexanderplatz leaves off: Döblin portrays
Franz Biberkopf brilliantly as passive player, as the capital city’s truly hapless
spazierende Wachstafel, if you will. But that novel provokes a critical clamor
just at that point when we are asked to envision Franz as a credible political
agent. This mystically reconstituted self is, apparently, to be redeemed in
the politics of socialism, though some critics havewondered if the drums we
hearat the endof the novel are calling Franz to dance to the step of a quite dif-
ferent—perhaps even fascist—drummer. How suited is this fragmented and
buffeted protagonist—however reconstituted he may be—to the demands
of politics and public culture? This question, as Auto-da-Fé makes clear, is
very well placed.
Below we will explore how neo-Kantianism, which grew up side by side
with (and in partial opposition to) neoempiricism, is present in the novel
in a way that both underscores the critique elaborated above and suggests
ways of rethinking some of the central problems associated with empiricism:
namely, the isolation of the individual and the eclipse of the sociopolitical
world.
Neoidealism
kien: the man who would be kant
In the essay ‘‘The First Book, Auto-da-Fé,’’ Canetti recounts the curious
fact that his protagonist once bore the name ‘‘Kant.’’ 42What is so astonishing
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in this account, in which Canetti conceals as much as he tells, is the fact that
this appellation was no mere momentary fling. The novel was completed,
circulated in typescript form, and read publicly on numerous occasions with
the name Kant still in place. Even the novel’s original title, foretelling the
protagonist’s doom, suggested the well-known forebear: Kant fängt Feuer
(Kant Catches Fire). Since the author dropped this hint in 1975 there has
been no lack of speculation on the protagonist’s supposed affinities with his
philosopher ancestor; nor has there been a paucity of inventive, if rather un-
convincing, conjecture on the transformation of that name into ‘‘Kien.’’ 43 In
this regard, I would not overlook the obvious, even ifmundane, convenience
of replacing the original name with one of the exact same length in an al-
ready prepared typescript. Understanding the sense in which Kant remains
integral to the novel will require a brief digression; but since Kien’s nominal
precursor has so often provided the occasion in the secondary literature for
raising the novel’s philosophical issues, it seems appropriate to discuss the
question here.
Those critics who maintain that the similarity between Kien and Im-
manuel Kant is rather slight, limited to a few biographical details, are essen-
tially right. But this determination does not in itself solve the problem. For
what is the point of those parallels that do exist: the early-rising, prolific
bachelor intellectual given to strict routine, the persnickety punctuality, the
daily walk one could set one’s watch by? Why did Canetti expunge merely
the name, but not the substance of the comparison?
To assume both that there are indeed some residual similarities between
the character Kien and the philosopher Kant and that it was a good idea
for the author to change the name, apparently on Hermann Broch’s insis-
tence,44 would suggest either that Canetti was a little lazy, perhaps less than
thorough in making the correction, or that the characterization should be
understood as a sort of capricious, postmodern citation that doesn’t quite
add up to anything. Yet if we distinguish between author and character, we
may find a third,more compelling, solution, which requires us neither to im-
pugn the author’s craft nor suggest an anachronistic and rather far-fetched
periodization.
Tellingly, the similarities that do obtain between Kien and Kant are of
Kien’s own making: just as he tosses off a Berkeleian quote when in need
of a philosophical justification for the tactics he employs in his feud with
Therese, so too does he elsewhere fancy himself as following in the footsteps
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of Germany’s most celebrated intellectual. We have already seen that, al-
though consistency and accuracy are not attributes of Kien, self-importance
and philosophical opportunism certainly are. To see Kien as a self-styled
Kant figure squares well withwhat we otherwise knowabout the protagonist.
Indeed one could posit further similarities, which, we can assume, would
only please the arrogant Privatgelehrte Kien. Kien’s pride in the inscruta-
bility of his work does indeed ring a certain intertextual bell: for, ‘‘as Hegel
remarks, it is only when we come to Kant that we find philosophy becoming
so technical and abstruse that it could no longer be considered to belong to
the general education of a cultured man.’’ 45 Furthermore, when Kant was
forty years old—precisely the age of the protagonist—he refused several
university posts that were offered to him, just as Kien claims to have done:
‘‘Whenever any chair of oriental philology fell vacant, it was offered first to
him. Polite but contemptuously, he invariably declined.’’ 46 Instead of taking
positions incommensurate with his research interests, Kant worked both as
a Privatdozent and as a librarian.47
If we consider each of these points of similarity, it becomes clear that Kien
is only Kant in his uncorroborated but grandiose claims to academic status
and in his inconsequential daily habits. To leave these similarities in place in
the face of the obvious differences between the historical and fictional fig-
ures characterizes the protagonist’s inflated self-imagewhile simultaneously
giving the reader some comic distance between the real Kien and the Kien
who would be Kant.48
Of course characters do not name themselves; authors do. It is tempting
to think that Canetti, who allows his figures to occupy the narrator to an
extraordinary degree, simply allowed his protagonist, for a while, to inhabit
his own consciousness. But to permit Kien to remain Kant would indeed
have been a great mistake because it would validate the actual conflation of
the protagonist with the great philosopher. Leaving Kien as Kant would, in
other words, have suggested that the author shares in his character’s delu-
sions of grandeur. Such, apparently, was Broch’s concern. He was extraor-
dinarily irritated by the original title and name of the title figure, Canetti
recalls, ‘‘as if I meant thereby to imply that the philosopher Kant was a cold,
insensitive creature now condemned in this book to catch fire.’’ 49 Canetti
certainly meant for his protagonist to think of himself in such complimen-
tary terms, but did not intend to endorse them. He grasped this distinction
just in time.
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kien as a parody of neoidealism
This point must be made delicately, because while Auto-da-Fé parodies
certain reactionary implications of interwar neoidealism, it also shares some
of the fundamental concerns of this movement’s most distinguished phi-
losophers, namely the neo-Kantians, whodominated philosophical and aca-
demic discussions of the day.50 Like Canetti, the neo-Kantians (to the ex-
tent one can make any such generalization about this loosely knit group)
were profoundly concerned about the atomization of culture, and earnestly
sought to legitimate the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) as an antidote
to this process of cultural disintegration.51
As both a Ph.D. chemist appalled at the narrow-mindedness of scien-
tific specialization and a creative author asking the big cultural questions,
Canetti, too, was concerned to bridge the widening gap between the pres-
tigious natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and the increasingly belea-
guered humanities. If there is any one theme that unified the neo-Kantians,
it was surely their effort to overcome both the crude materialism of the sci-
entific positivists, while simultaneously opposing the metaphysical extrav-
agances that had marked German idealist philosophy from Fichte to Hegel
—all with a view to establishing a new cultural unity. It was the last grand at-
tempt of Western philosophy to establish a unified Weltanschauung before
the rise of radical pluralism, or what we now call the postmodern condition.
If Canetti and the neo-Kantians shared the same point of departure,
however, they soon parted ways. In Auto-da-Fé, and particularly in Peter
Kien, Canetti chose to parody not the neo-Kantians themselves, but certain
reactionary tendencies for which neo-Kantianism provided a respectable,
philosophical cover. Thus I do not contend that the novel targets the sophis-
ticated (if problematic) systems of Cohen, Windelband, Cassirer et al., but
themore simpleminded recipients (such as Kien) who saw in this movement
an opportunity to retreat from the disconcerting materialism and politi-
cal turmoil of Weimar-era culture into the rarefied realm of German ideal-
ism. Though Kien is enough of an intellectual opportunist to make occa-
sional use of the surfeit of neoempiricist thinking that swirls about him, he is
muchmore prevalently an ardent idealist, albeit according to his own lights.
Though one could justifiably take issue with his use of idealist philosophy,
this is the vocabulary with which he is most comfortable.
While he cloaks himself in idealist phrases, Kien employs these more as
a shield against an unwanted reality than as a designation for something
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he seems to understand or value in its own right. For Kien the realm of
true being is neither the Platonic form nor the inscrutable Kantian Ding an
sich, but simply learned books.The printed word—not any Berkeleian ‘‘sub-
strate’’—represents the primary ground of reality; our sensory world is only
secondarily real, a wan shadow thrown off from the realm of great books.
A few examples of Kien’s ‘‘idealism’’ are memorable for their humor. While
taking an uncharacteristically relaxed walk one day, Kien hears the cooing of
pigeons, whose real existence he can only recognize and confirm thanks to
his special access to the printed word: ‘‘ ‘Quite so!’ he said softly, and nodded
as he always didwhen he found reality bearing out the printed original.’’ 52The
birdsong is only true because the sensory data ratifies the prior and higher
truth emanating from the printed page, which thus functions as a kind of
Platonic form. In a similar fashion, Kien recognizes the roses presented to
him by Fischerle only because he had first encountered them in that realm
which is the source of all truth and reality, his library: ‘‘He took the roses
from Fischerle’s hand, remembered their sweet smell which he knew from
Persian love poetry, and raised them to his eyes; it was true, they did smell.
This soothed him completely.’’ 53
Clearly, for him the neoidealist sanctum sanctorum is the library itself.
The flight from the anxieties of contemporary culture is abundantly evident
in Kien’s effusive enthusiasm for his well-fortified library:
Through the lofty skylights poured illumination and inspiration . . .
Through the glass above him he could see the condition of the heavens,
more tranquil, more attenuated than the reality. A soft blue: the sun
shines, but not on me. A grey no less soft: it will rain, but not on me.
A gentle murmur announced the falling drops. He was aware of them at
a distance, they did not touch him. He knew only: the sun shines, the
clouds gather, the rain falls. It was as if he had barricaded himself against
the world: against all material relations, against all terrestrial needs, had
built himself an hermitage, a vast hermitage, so vast that it would hold
those few things on this earth which are more than this earth itself, more
than the dust to which our life at last returns.54
As numerous commentators have noted, Kien literally blocks out reality
with books: save the skylight overhead, he has all the windows cemented
up in order to make room for more bookshelves. Whenever he leaves the
library-fortress, Kien takes a little protection with him: every morning be-
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fore his signature walk (to bookstores, by the way) he carefully selects the
right volumes, which he then carries as close to his body as possible, a kind
of biblio-prophylaxis ‘‘against all material relations.’’ Once Therese deprives
him of access to his beloved books, Kien agilely develops themobile ‘‘mental
library’’ (Kopfbibliothek).
Though a caricature to be sure, Kien repeatedly identifies himself as an
idealist. He is given, for example, to praising the timeless and durable nature
of his ownCharakter,which he opposes to a variety of protean beings such as
actors, themasses, women, and so forth. Here is an early illustration: ‘‘Punc-
tually at eight his work began, his service for truth . . . You draw closer to
truth by shutting yourself off frommankind. Daily life was a superficial clat-
ter of lies . . . Who among all these bad actors, who made up the mob, had
a face to arrest his attention. They changed their faces with every moment;
. . . His ambition was to persist stubbornly in the same manner of existence.
Not for a mere month, not for a year, but for the whole of his life, he would
be true to himself.’’ 55 This elitist, self-congratulatory encomium culminates
in a declaration of Schillerian idealism. Echoing the famous idealist motto
‘‘Es ist der Geist, der sich den Körper baut’’ (It is Spirit which builds itself
a body), Kien affirms: ‘‘Character, if you had a character, determined your
outward appearance’’ and then proceeds to describe himself as appropriately
‘‘narrow, stern and bony.’’ 56
Later in the novel Kien emerges as an explicit defender of German ideal-
ism. A poor student arrives at the Theresianum with the intention of pawn-
ing an eight-volume set of Schiller’s works. Kien intercepts him with this
question:
‘‘What do you want?’’
‘‘I . . . er, I wanted the book section.’’
‘‘I am the book section.’’ . . .
‘‘What do you intend to do upstairs?’’ asked Kien threateningly.
‘‘Oh . . . er . . . only Schiller.’’ 57
Kien pays an excessive price for a worthless, used edition, which he then re-
turns to the student with this admonition: ‘‘ ‘Never repeat this action, my
friend! Believeme, noman is worth asmuch as his books!’ . . . ‘Why Schiller?
You should read the original. You should read Immanuel Kant! ’ ’’ 58 Once
again, we observe the confusion of the central term ‘‘value’’ (Wert), whose
economic and normative-cultural meanings are continually at loggerheads.
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Kant will surely return the besieged Kien to a more secure world of tradi-
tional values, but Kien thinks he can help bring this about only by paying
ransom—he uses precisely these terms—to the very market forces that have
undermined traditional culture.
Kien reveals a similar affinity for his erstwhile philosopher namesake
when, at the apex of his misogynistic diatribe, he arrives at what for him
is the root of the problem, the creation of woman. ‘‘It irritates him the
more that he can only believe in the Categorical Imperative and not in
God. Otherwise he could transfer the blame to Him.’’ 59 Yet in each case
where Kien evinces an idealist (or pseudoidealist) inclination, the deeper
motive for his philosophical loyalties peeks through: fear of masses, modern
society, and women—all of which for him are metonymically related. This
suspect form of idealist enthusiasm—neoidealism as escapism—emerges
clearly fromwhat at first seems a paean to Enlightenment supranationalism:
Every human being needs a home, not a home of the kind understood by
crude jingoistic patriots, not a religion either, a mere insipid foretaste of
a heavenly abode; no, a real home, in which ground, work, friends, recre-
ation, and the spiritual realm of ideas [geistiger Fassungsraum] come
together into an orderly whole, into—so to speak—a personal cosmos.
The best definition of a home is a library. It is wisest to keep women out
of the home. Should the decision however be made to take in a woman,
it is essential to assimilate her first fully into the home, as he had done.60
Kien, who clearly focalizes this narrative segment, begins by celebrating
that classic Enlightenment realm open to all men willing to shed their par-
ticularist national or religious affiliations.Without transition, however, this
enlightenment reverie spills over into explicit misogyny. The ‘‘heteronomy’’
that forKantmeant the reception of laws froman external source (andwhich
thus abrogates the idealist autonomous subject) becomes in Kien’s eyes a
prospect preeminently associated with women. As we saw in chapter 2, it
is above all Therese who stands in for the dreaded ‘‘Sinneswelt’’ (the world
of senses and materiality) that threatens to overpower Kien’s ‘‘Verstandes-
welt’’ (world of the intellect). Though employing quite assailable definitions
of these concepts, Kien obdurately clings to the Kantian distinction between
the intelligibleworld and theworld of the senses as if to a lifeboat. It is in this
sense that Kant represents a home, or ‘‘Heimat,’’ to Kien. ‘‘Zurück zu Kant’’
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(Back to Kant) was the motto of the neo-Kantians of the interwar period;
one can almost hear it here in Kien’s philosophically inflected longing for
a secure conceptual home. The abrupt transformation of this fantasized
library, this ‘‘geistiger Fassungsraum,’’ from universal intellectual gathering
place into a blatant refuge from modernity, a ‘‘personal cosmos,’’ signifies
the critique Auto-da-Fé offered to the wider cultural debate of the Weimar
era. Kien’s desperate expression of ‘‘Kantian’’ autonomy proves no less dan-
gerous, it should be noted, than the empiricist pose struck by his brother.
Before this inflated ‘‘idealist’’ self, the quotidian world threatens to dissolve
just as assuredly as it does under Georg’s neoempiricist dispensation.
While the novel’s parody of neoidealism is practically insulated from the
more serious work of the professional philosophers (by dint of Kien’s sloppy
and opportunistic thinking), it simultaneously targets an inherent weakness
of the neo-Kantian program, namely its own insular proclivities. As much
as it may have hoped to provide the epistemological basis for a new cul-
tural consciousness, it remained ghettoized in university philosophydepart-
ments. On the other hand, to the extent that it held an appeal for a wider
audience in the interwar period, it proved eminently cooptable by conser-
vatives who wished to turn back the clock. If Kien can be seen as one of
Fritz K. Ringer’s ‘‘mandarin intellectuals,’’ as I think he should be, then this
problematic professor may represent one instance of that backward look-
ing Bildungsbürgertum,which witnessed the eclipse of its own relevance and
yearned for the return of the more secure days of yore.61 To ears such as
these, and according to Ringer they were many and influential in the inter-
war period, the entreaty to return to Kant provided a welcome rallying call
that often had little to do with formal philosophy.
In this context it would be apt to underscore Kien’s obsession with the
past, a proclivity we have already had occasion to notice. Here, in his hymn
to the past (Vergangenheit), the professor’s problematic adherence to ideal-
ist philosophy comes into full view. Just before he is ousted from his beloved
Bibliothek, we read:
The present is alone responsible for all pain. He longed for the future,
because then there would be more past in the world. The past is kind, it
does no one any harm. For twenty years now he had moved in it freely,
he was happy.Who is happy in the present? If we had no senses, then we
might find the present endurable . . . He bowed before the supremacy of
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the past . . . A time will come when men will beat their senses into recol-
lections, and all time into the past. A time will come when a single past
will embrace all men, when there will be nothing except the past, when
everyone will have one faith—the past.62
The conjunction of love of the past (or what Ringer in his study calls
‘‘past mindedness’’) with a distinct predilection for neoidealist slogans (no
matter how misunderstood) should give us some pause, for this had a real-
world counterpart in contemporaneous academic circles in thewake of neo-
Kantianism.ThoughKienwill presently profess supreme faith in theKantian
categorical imperative—to the exclusion of the biblical diety—he is at this
point still willing to pay tribute to God as guarantor of the past: ‘‘God is
the past. He believes in God.’’ 63 This of course indicates where this pseudo-
philosopher’s real concerns lie, even as it points to another entrenched phe-
nomenon in German culture, namely the infusion of post-Kantian idealism
with a misplaced religious aura.64
Now historians of philosophy might well view Kien as a straw man, per-
haps little more than a one-sided polemic, and they would be partly right.
For Canetti has singled out only those two aspects of contemporary neo-
idealist thinking which he held to be most suspect: (1) the tendency toward
self-insulation and historicizing retreat, which tempted less discriminating
devotees to bracket out rather than embrace the modern world; and (2) the
inherent propensity of all idealist philosophy to subordinate the ‘‘world’’
to abstract and potentially self-serving formulations. With Kien we are re-
minded that philosophy—even idealist philosophy—is never wholly above
the world, and certainly never innocent of power.
Yet just as we noted above (in chapter 2) that Kien and Georg are ulti-
mately not that dissimilar, so, too, would it now be mistaken to exaggerate
the differences between neoempiricism and neo-Kantianism. Both repre-
sent latter-day forms of the great Copernican revolution in Western phi-
losophy, which began to understand perception as constituent of reality,
though obviously in quite different ways. Both are forms of philosophical
modernism, and as such challenge simplistic notions of objective reality that
were fueled by the dominant natural sciences of the mid-nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.65 Both neoempiricism and neo-Kantianism, the
lattermore systematically to be sure, sought to combat whatOllig terms ‘‘the
objectivism of popular materialist philosophy’’ of this period,66 the same
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unproblematic assertion of objectivity, it should be noted, that is so much
with us still today. Thus it should not be surprising at all that Kien, groping
for a learned way to oppose the materialism of mass culture, should light
upon a Berkelian quip, even though he otherwise clothes himself in ideal-
ist apparel. In fact, the incident that inspires Kien’s philosophy of blindness,
the incursion of Therese’s furniture into his library, is accompanied by a
lengthy reflection on the onerous ‘‘excess of sensory stimuli’’ (Sinnesexzesse)
inflicted upon him by modern nuclear science. On top of everything else,
he now is intruded upon by ‘‘fools who fiddle with electricity and compli-
cated atoms,’’ and has to worry about electrons racing around his formerly
peaceful pages.67 The coupling of unwanted furniture with the then-latest
discoveries in physics under the rubric ‘‘sensory overload’’ is a reminder that
Kien, transparent as his motives may ultimately be, cannot simply be dis-
missed. Like it or not, he is but an avatar of broader cultural phenomena, a
fact nowhere more evident than in his flawed attempts to salve his discom-
fort in the modern world with the consolation of traditionalist philosophy.
While these two specific philosophical schools have faded from the intellec-
tual scene, the potential for abusing intellectual pursuits as flight from social
responsibility is clearly very much with us still.
Kien’s prescription of old-fashioned, philologically based Bildung to a
modern world that seems to be spinning out of control in fact places him
in a specific group of idealist respondents to the interwar crisis of culture.
Though Kien would be appalled to be associated with a movement deeply
concerned with the reformation of secondary school curricula, his strident
espousal of philology as a cultural cure-all situates him precisely there. The
identification of this group, once a preeminent cultural force headed by
Werner Jäger, will be the initial task of the following chapter, which has as
its larger concern the elucidation of the novel’s representation of racial anti-
Semitism.
4 The Hunchback of ‘‘Heaven’’
Anti-Semitism and the Failure of Humanism
It was of course the Prater, which gave rise as well to that monstrous figure
Siegfried Fischerle from Auto-da-Fé . . . yes, that horribly doomed attempt at
assimilation under extreme conditions.
—Gerald Stieg 1
Bildung, Assimilation, and the ‘‘Crisis of Values’’
Canetti’s Jewish figures are frankly hideous: filthy, rank, hunchbacked,
underclass dwarfs intent upon cheating a blue blood gentile out of a family
inheritance. Auto-da-Fé’s principal Jew is of course Siegfried Fischerle, the
pimp from a lowbrowViennese pub called The Stars of Heaven (Zum idealen
Himmel ), who strikes up a conversation with Peter Kien in the hope of
drumming up business for his prostitute wife, die Pensionistin. Needless to
say, Fischerle fails in his effort to entice Kien, who after all could not bring
himself to sleep with Therese on their wedding night. In a manner perfected
by Canetti (both in the novel and the contemporaneous drama Hochzeit),
Kien and Fischerle converse at length without ever really understanding
who the other is. Failing to grasp the true occupation of either Fischerle or
his wife, Kien concludes that the persecuted little man desperately aspires
to the attainment of that highest of German cultural goods, Bildung, only
to be thwarted at every turn by his fleshly and greedy wife. In diagnosing
Fischerle’s ills as a lack of proper cultivation, Kien touches upon one of the
most salient cultural debates of the interwar period. If Fischerle proves im-
pervious to Kien’s Bildung-remedy, it is because, as the very embodiment
of virtually every contemporary anti-Semitic stereotype, he is by definition
forbidden that universal avenue of human ascent held out by this Enlight-
enment ideal.
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In no time at all, Fischerle metamorphoses in themind of the protagonist
into a junior Kien, and the Pensionistin into anotherTherese.This disfigured
little man becomes the professor’s protégé on terms that are thus by now
quite familiar. Accordingly, as the suffering husband of this duo, Fischerle is
assigned the role of the Faustian spirit hindered in his lofty pursuits by his
venal and concupiscent ‘‘wife’’:
He [Kien] knew nothing of the rituals of the place, but one thing he rec-
ognized clearly—this stainless spirit in a wretched body had struggled for
twenty years to lift itself out of the mire of its surroundings . . . Therese
[die Pensionistin], no less determined, dragged him for ever back into the
slime . . . He has clutched at one tiny corner of the world of the spirit and
clings to it like a drowning man. Chess is his library . . . Kien pictured
to himself the battle this down-trodden man fought for his own flat. He
takes a book home to read it secretly, she tears it in pieces and scatters it
to the winds. She forces him to let her use his home for her unspeakable
purposes. Possibly she pays a servant, a spy, to keep the house clear of
books when she is out. Books are forbidden, her own way of life is per-
mitted . . . She flings open the door and with her clumsy foot kicks over
the chessboard. Mr. Fischerle weeps like a little child. He had just reached
the most interesting part of his book. He picks up the letters scattered
all over the floor and turns his face away so she shall not rejoice over his
tears. He is a little hero. He has character.2
Kien’s efforts at recreating Fischerle in his own self-image are transparent.
As in the case of Therese—who reworks the mocking laughter of the furni-
ture store employees into dubious praise—we are witness here to an imper-
fect projection still in process. Determined to see Fischerle as a pure spirit
and seeker of truth (that is, as a neoplatonist academic like himself ), Kien
superimposes the image of a book on the chessboard so that when ‘‘Therese’’
brutishly overturns it, Fischerle scrambles to collect ‘‘scattered letters’’ (die
herumliegenden Buchstaben) as he would so many chess pieces. It would be
a great mistake to dismiss this passage as merely the distorting projection
of one figure upon another, though of course this is once again the case. In
misreading Fischerle as hungry for humanistic Bildung, Kien engages a spe-
cific controversy about humanism’s prospects as a source for German nor-
mative values after the great defeat in World World I. Fischerle, as we shall
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see, incarnates the failure of this humanism to translate its values into social
policy.
As background to this calamity, I will paint in a few broad strokes a com-
plex story that has been told much more extensively elsewhere.3 Though the
German ‘‘crisis of values’’—the deep sense of cultural anxiety occasioned
by the rift between the natural and social sciences on the one hand and the
humanities (‘‘Humanenwissenschaften’’) on the other—dates back to the last
decades of the nineteenth century, it occupied the post–WorldWar I imagi-
nation with particular intensity.4 Following Winckelmann in the Enlight-
enment, German intellectuals had widely turned to Greece as the font of
normative cultural values.Towhat extent could this Schillerianmodel of aes-
thetic education continue to function as a cultural stabilizer in postwar Ger-
many? Was it possible to turn to classical philology for the cultural moor-
ings that were so necessary in these turbulent times? Commenting on the
situation in post-1918 Germany, intellectual historian Suzanne Marchand
observes:
Never before had the gap between scholarly research and the cultivation
of the individual seemed sowide; never before had the Humboldtian aim
of reconciling the interests of both within the German system of higher
education seemed so implausible . . . During and particularly after the
war, this critique of scholarship for its own sake found a large and increas-
ingly diverse circle of advocates . . . Critics charged the scholarly com-
munity of the 1920s with abdicating its role in establishing social values
and building character. The scapegoating of ‘‘specialists’’ for the ‘‘soul-
lessness’’ of modern German culture went hand in hand with the con-
viction that ‘‘pure intellectualism’’ would destroy social unity—as well as
the integrity of the human character.5
During the interwar period, there were a number of attempts to address this
crisis, ranging from the amorphous vitalist movement advocating ‘‘Lebens-
philosophie’’ (life philosophy) to the more sophisticated efforts of philoso-
phers aimed at reinstating Kantian philosophy as an anchor for cultural co-
hesion and meaning.
Alluding toGoethe’s Faust, and no doubt wishing to see himself as a Faus-
tian spirit striving for truth amid Weimar decadence, Kien dubs Fischerle
his ‘‘Famulus.’’ 6 In order to grasp the meaning of this would-be spiritual
(‘‘geistig’’) apprenticeship, wemust first understandmore clearly what Kien,
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as a self-styled idealist academic in the throes of the interwar crisis of values,
stands for. As we noted in the previous chapter, brother Georg is the novel’s
preeminent carrier of neoempiricist sentiments, Kien his idealist counter-
part. But just as we differentiated above between actual empiricist philoso-
phers and psychologists (such as William James and Franz Brentano) and
their more questionable epigones, so, too, ought we to differentiate here.
Kien’s appropriation of idealist notions is, as we have noted above, a desper-
ate attempt to hold on to something solid at a time of monumental social,
political, and intellectual upheaval.
The academic groupwith which Kien might more precisely be identified,
however, is suggested by his specialty as master philologist. For it was clas-
sical philology, according to Marchand, that came under fire in the inter-
war period for what reformers decried as its elitism and irrelevance to the
modern world. Marchand observes:
‘‘Philology’’ had become ametaphor for the numbing drudgery, authori-
tarian discipline, pedantic obscurantism, while classical language train-
ing remained, for the bulk of the professoriate, the sine qua non of both
Bildung and humanistic Wissenschaft. This combination of declining so-
cial status and the increasing sense that the Gymnasium alone held back
a culture-destroying flood of superficiality, decadence, and utilitarian-
ism prepared the backdrop for a kind of classicist morality play, in which
philologists were sacrificed on the altar of modern materialism.7
It is easy to imagine Kien in this latter role of sacrificial lamb, particularly
since he so willingly portrays himself and his scholarship as valiantly and
inveterately opposed to mass commercial society. This is, after all, how he
ends up standing guard before the Theresianum in an attempt to intercept
anyone attempting to pawn books. Before one too precipitously exempts
Kien from this context because of his primary interest in sinology, it should
be noted that Kien is also a classical and biblical philologist, as his grandi-
ose plan to write the final exegesis of the New Testament illustrates. Indeed
Kien’s specialty as an Orientalist may above all signify the very ‘‘pedantic
obscurantism’’ Marchand notes above.
Today it may seem curious indeed to suggest that one would turn to the
humanities for a consensus on cultural and social values.We are in our own
time—and perhaps particularly in France and the United States—more ac-
customed to viewing these disciplines as a theater of contention rather than
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a wellspring of cohesive and binding norms. Yet in what is perhaps the last
great attempt at a German cultural synthesis, the so-called ‘‘Third Human-
ism’’ of the interwar period,Werner Jäger attempted precisely this: to anchor
postwar politics (broadly conceived) in what he held to be the secure foun-
dations of classical philology. The goal, asMarchand explains, was to ‘‘rejoin
Wissenschaft to Bildung, historical research to the generation of values, and
modern ‘rootless’ Germans to the serene andmorally superior Greeks; a new
German Golden Age, a Third Humanism, might commence in the shadow
of military defeat and political chaos.’’ 8 While Kien’s practice of desiccating
scholarship represents exactly that which Jäger wanted to overcome, Kien
also registers those very scientific challenges with which Jäger’s ambitious
program was ill equipped to contend. Kien’s consciousness of the ‘‘millions
of atoms’’ racing around in what in the good old days appeared to be a quite
stable piece of text signifies, as we noted above, a scientific modernity of
which the protagonist is only dimly aware. Pausing long enough only to ex-
press his anxieties, the old-fashioned philologist reminds the reader how
utterly incongruous modern science had become for the traditional scholar.
Refracted throughKien’s partial understanding and palpable trepidation are
some of the most revolutionary breakthroughs of the early twentieth cen-
tury science: the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, and the Heisen-
berg uncertainty principle. In this context, Kien’s embrace of a pseudo neo-
Kantianism—to the extent even that hemimics the daily habits of Immanuel
Kant—and his unconvincing espousal of neoidealist principles clearly signi-
fies a questionable retreat, rather than a new cultural synthesis. Ultimately,
Jäger’s vaunted Third Humanism, which set out to salvage Kien’s discipline
and place it at the center of the new German republic as the ‘‘provider of
cultural norms,’’ foundered on its inability to contest vulgar, exclusionary
definitions of Germanness;9 failed, in other words, in roughly the same way
Kien would.
It is against this background that Kien’s offer to elevate the handicapped
Jew via high culture needs to be seen. If Fischerle’s wife transmogrifies in
Kien’s jaundiced eyes into ‘‘a second Therese,’’ it is nevertheless true that
Fischerle himself becomes for the reader a kind of second Therese insofar as
he is destined to fulfill the role Kien had once assigned to his bride: junior
librarian. For Therese, too, Kien had once held out the hope that, illiterate
as she was, the sheer proximity to such a magnificent library and, of course,
to himself, might raise her to a higher level of humanity. Yet because she is
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a woman, Kien is never so sanguine about Therese’s prospects for Bildung
as he is about Fischerle’s.
From the very beginning, Kien worries about his ability to keep up his
end of the Bildung-bargain: ‘‘He feared coming into collision with the little
fellow’s thirst for education. He might reproach him, with apparent justi-
fication, for letting his books lie fallow. How was he to defend himself ?’’ 10
Shortly thereafter, the narrator—infiltrated again by Kien—worries that
‘‘through daily contact with so vast a quantity of learning the little man’s
hunger for it would grow greater and greater; suddenly he would be caught
secreting a book and trying to read it . . . He would have to be prepared
for it orally.’’ 11These practical matters of proper pedagogy notwithstanding,
Kien never doubts the equation of Bildung with humanity: ‘‘If it were pos-
sible to infuse these [like-minded creatures] with a little education, a little
humanity, this would certainly be an achievement.’’ 12Of course this bias cuts
both ways: those with little or no learning (such as Therese) are by the same
standard judged to be subhuman.
When Fischerle feigns deep concern for his employer’s Kopfbibliothek—
the phantom counterpart to the library Kien was forced by Therese to va-
cate—the self-styled ‘‘Privatgelehrter’’ (a term meaning ‘‘private intellec-
tual’’ without an official academic post, but ironically emblematic of the
protagonist’s noted asocial ‘‘inwardness’’) can only assume that the dwarf ’s
education is proceeding just as he had expected. In fact, he seems to ac-
quire cultivation virtually by osmosis: ‘‘Under the pressure of the books,
which he did not even read, the dwarf was changing before his very eyes.
Kien’s old theory was receiving notable confirmation.’’ 13 Of course, noth-
ing could be further from the truth. The entire novel is structured by the
comic principle of incongruity, and this is no exception: Fischerle is merely
playing along with Kien in order more systematically to rob him of the bal-
ance of his inheritance. Yet the fact that Fischerle fails to take seriously his
own Bildung does not at all detract from the fact that Kien’s repeated and
lofty claims regarding the transformatory power of learning—hypocritical
though they may well be—define the sociocultural agenda for the reader.
Though he lacks the self-awareness and sophistication of Schnitzler’s Pro-
fessor Bernhardi (1912), Fischerle nevertheless serves to draw our attention
to the conflict between the rising tide of racist nationalism on the one hand,
and the cosmopolitan core of Kantian humanism that was being revived
in various hues in order to shore up German identity after the First World
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War, on the other. Comically unaware of this larger cultural nexus, Fischerle
nevertheless poses the serious question about Jewish assimilation by means
of German Kultur.
In the interwar period Jewish assimilation as well as the increasing oppo-
sition to it were burning issues. In 1922 Karl Kraus reissued his 1913 essay ‘‘Er
ist doch e Jud,’’ in which the master satirist reiterated his faith in assimila-
tion through Bildung. ‘‘He tried to deal with the claim that he was Jewish,’’
writes Steven Beller in Vienna and the Jews, 1867–1938, ‘‘by demonstrating
that he possessed none of the supposedly Jewish qualities. Theworld ofGeist
in which he lived, he continued, had no room for race or racial characteris-
tics. He did not even know what Jewish characteristics were. Nevertheless,
he demonstrated to his own satisfaction that he had none . . . In other words
Kraus was saying that the Jews who lived in the world of Geist could avoid
the problem of ‘jüdische Eigenschaften’ . . . by not having any, for they were
irrelevant in that world.’’ 14 But Kraus’s claim, especially by 1922, was more
a desperate argument for the way he wished things were than a reflection
of contemporaneous reality. Kraus’s ‘‘continuation and radicalization of the
Enlightenment ideal of pure humanity,’’ 15 no less than Kien’s own phony es-
pousal of these ideals, point to a liberal tradition already long under siege
by, for example, the open anti-Semitism of the Austrian Christian Socialists
led by the notoriously anti-Semitic mayor of Vienna, Karl Lueger.
What people like Kraus, Theodor Gomperz, and Hermann Cohen (the
latter in his role as one of the founders of the neo-Kantian school) were
hoping to articulate in the post–World War I era was thus not merely a gen-
eral response to the larger crisis of values, but, more particularly, a response
to the challenge to their identity as German Jews.16 Their tenacious loyalty
to the German philosophical tradition since Kant can in large part be ex-
plained, Beller argues, ‘‘because the tenets of German idealism contained the
one vital prerequisite to assimilationist theory, the autonomy of the will.’’ 17
Indeed, for humanists of the Aufklärung, Jews offered a test case of the effi-
cacy of Bildung: ‘‘The sheer radical nature of the transformation needed to
create a human being from an oriental such as the Jew would be proof of
education’s power in creating a purer human, the ‘new types of humanity’
which would form the rational society of the future.’’ 18
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Fischerle as Mascot for Racial Anti-Semitism
This ‘‘society of the future,’’ however, bore little resemblance either to
the Weimar Republic or the First Austrian Republic. Indeed the rise of
racial anti-Semitism, which had its roots in the later nineteenth century but
achieved particular virulence in the post–World War I period, contested
precisely that ‘‘one vital prerequisite to assimilationist theory, the autono-
mous will’’ of each human being. InAuto-da-Fé the diminished opportunity
for assimilation is represented less in the plot—it is certainly not a matter of
a Jew’s thwarted attempt to join German culture—but in the very charac-
terization of the novel’s principal Jew, Siegfried Fischerle. Without a doubt
Fischerle worries about being recognized and treated as a Jew, and he is in
fact snubbed by a waiter in The Stars of Heaven because of his Jewishness.
Yet, as in the case of Therese, it is vital to note that Fischerle enters the nar-
ration—that is, even before he becomes the object of prejudice and abuse at
the level of plot—as a veritable stockpile of contemporaneous anti-Semitic
stereotypes. Chief among these, as we shall see, are the physical attributes
that mark him as a Jew. This is how we first encounter him:
Suddenlya vast hump appeared close to himand asked, could he sit there?
Kien looked down fixedly.Wherewas themouth out of which speech had
issued? And already the owner of the hump, a dwarf, hopped up on to a
chair . . . The tip of his strongly hooked nose lay in the depth of his chin.
His mouth was as small as himself—only it wasn’t to be found. No fore-
head, no ears, no neck, no buttocks—the man consisted of a hump, an
immense nose and two black, calm, sad eyes . . . Suddenly [Kien] heard
a hoarse voice underneath the table: ‘‘How’s business?’’ 19
Needless to say, this description comprises a veritable catalogue of contem-
porary anti-Jewish clichés, the best known being the large-nosed Jew, which
is reiterated tirelessly throughout Book 2 of the novel. This coarse and stri-
dent use of stereotypical characteristics seems to have cowed some critics,
who appear more disposed to view Fischerle as just one more in a series of a
self-absorbed characters unable to communicate meaningfully with his fel-
low human beings. Yet it would be a mistake to muffle the novel’s critique
by generalizing Fischerle in this manner.
In her 1991 study Die Figurenkonstellation in Elias Canettis Auto-da-Fé,
Jutta Paal has suggested that Fischerle’s Jewish identity need not detain us
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at all: ‘‘Except for the ‘consumptive waiter’ no one at the Stars of Heaven
is bothered by his heritage. Therefore it would be mistaken to attribute too
much meaning to the religious persuasion of this figure.’’ 20 Yet the manner
in which Paal refers to Fischerle’s Jewishness is flawed from the very out-
set. For the kind of racial anti-Semitism this figure is made to represent has
little to do with the euphemizing term ‘‘heritage’’ (Herkunft) and nothing
to do with religion. Ironically, if Paal really means ‘‘religious confession’’
(Religionszugehörigkeit), her assertion would be correct; for Fischerle has no
connection whatsoever to Judaism as religious faith. Instead, this phrase—
and similar ones appear elsewhere in the criticism—functions merely as an
evasive surrogate for the very Jewish identity that has become so problem-
atic. Indeed, this eagerness to dismiss the issue overlooks Kien’s own ini-
tial aversion to Fischerle’s Jewishness. Shortly after the introductory pas-
sage on Fischerle, we read that Kien ‘‘considered the all-pervading nose of
the manikin, it inspired him with mistrust.’’ 21 A little later Fischerle inten-
tionally drops the word ‘‘Jewish’’ while attempting to defraud Kien of some
funds: ‘‘Fischerle made a minute pause in order to observe the effect of the
word ‘Jewish’ on his companion. You never can tell. The world is crawling
with anti-semites. A Jew always has to be on guard against deadly enemies.
Hump-backed dwarfs and others, who have nevertheless managed to rise
to the rank of pimp, cannot be too careful. The swallowing did not escape
him. He interpreted it as embarrassment, and from that moment decided
that Kien must be a Jew, which he certainly was not.’’ 22 Here Fischerle regis-
ters a street-smart awareness of pervasive anti-Semitism, even if this ‘‘sharp
observer’’ (scharfer Beobachter) completely misconstrues Kien’s body lan-
guage at the same time. As we already know, Kien is able to put aside the
repugnance he feels in the companyof Fischerle and see his own ‘‘pure spirit’’
reflected—albeit somewhatmore dimly—in the disfigured dwarf. But if Paal
is right in that the central figures do not themselves actively cast anti-Semitic
aspersions upon Fischerle, this apparently does little to allay the Jew’s own
acute awareness of widespread anti-Semitism. It occurs to him, for example,
that it would be particularly inadvisable to draw attention to himself in a
church: ‘‘He forgot he was in church. He was usually respectful and cautious
in churches, for by his nose he was very obviously marked.’’ 23 A little later
Fischerle whisks Kien off a busy Viennese street into a church, and a similar
fear recurs: ‘‘Fischerle was caught off his guard; in a church he felt uncer-
tain of himself. He almost pushed Kien out again into the square . . . Let the
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church collapse, hewas not going to run into the arms of the police! Fischerle
knew terrible stories of Jews buried in the wreckage of falling churches be-
cause they had no business to be there. His wife the Capitalist had told them
to him because shewas devout andwanted to convert him to her faith.’’ 24Yet
it is not only this type of superstitious anti-Semitism registered by Fischerle
himself, but also the patronizing philosemitism of the proprietress of ‘‘The
Baboon’’ (Zum Pavian), which keeps our focus on the character’s ‘‘Jewish-
ness’’ throughout.
The question that has been assiduously swept under the rug in the dis-
cussion of Auto-da-Fé is,Whose anti-Semitism is it? Just as wewere required
to confront the misogyny evident in the narrative construction of Therese,
so, too, must we ask about the anti-Semitism inherent in Fischerle’s very
characterization. Recall that his very first words are ‘‘How’s business?’’ (Wie
gehn die Geschäfte?). Though he is far from singular in his avarice, he is
the preeminent entrepreneur in the novel, and, of course, a swindler par
excellence, not to mention a systematic exploiter of the gentile workers in
the ‘‘Firma S. Fischer.’’ It seems only natural to him to refer to investment
funds as ‘‘Jewish capital’’ (das jüdische Kapital ), which he does repeatedly.25
Furthermore, though no one character is particularly attractive in this novel,
Fischerle alone (with the necessary exception of his look-alike accomplice,
die Fischerin) is consistently described as an animal, outfitted with simian
arms (‘‘lang wie die eines Gibbon’’) and a croaking voice (‘‘er krächzte’’), who
sniffs out (‘‘wittert’’) both money and danger and, like some trained circus
animal, even gathers up cash with his tongue.26
The matter is perhaps complicated by the fact that the novel’s greatest
anti-Semite is Fischerle himself. He sees Jews as essentially criminal, and
when Kien tries to fire him, he retorts: ‘‘Grateful, aren’t you! You Jewish
swine! . . . You can’t expect better from a Jew swine!’’ 27 Still under the im-
pression that Kien is himself a Jew, Fischerle reiterates the epithets he has
presumably heard in abundance directed at himself. Above all, Fischerle is
forever dressing down imaginary chess opponents who are none other than
projections of his own ‘‘Jewish’’ self. After one such match—Fischerle is lit-
erally addressing his mirror image—he dispatches his opponent with these
words: ‘‘At home in Europe we call this galloping chess! Go begging with
that nose!’’ 28
Are we entitled to dismiss all this by claiming, however incredibly, that

















































anti-semitism and the failure of humanism : 117
though equally insufficient, way of accounting for this discourse is to suggest
that it is merely an expression of Canetti’s own Jewish self-loathing.30 These
opposing explanations share a common strategy of subsuming the anti-
Semitic discourse under debatable questions of biography, and thus distract
us fromFischerle’s iconic role as the grotesque amalgamof almost every con-
temporaneous anti-Semitic stereotype.31 Looking back to the first half of the
century, it is not hard at all to find anti-Jewish caricatures strikingly similar
to Fischerle himself. Figure 4, for example, gives us ‘‘Der kleine Cohn’’ (Little
Cohn), a Jewish dwarf whose physical deformity disqualifies him frommili-
tary service. Sander Gilman observes that the ‘‘ill-formed ‘little Mr. Kohn’
[was] the eponymous Jew in German caricatures of the period,’’ a kind of
anti-Semitic mascot of Wilhelmine culture.32
The alleged Jewish physique exhibited in Little Mr. Cohn/Fischerle is not
at all new in the long history of anti-Semitism; but racial—or better, corpo-
real—anti-Semitism was on the rise in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury and gains infamous prominence in Germany and Austria during the
interwar period,33 a development clearly in evidence in the famous cari-
catures of the period. Though not every Jew is necessarily represented as
quite so small as Der kleine Cohn, most are indeed stunted, bowed over, and
egregiously malformed.34 Furthermore, a preponderance of contemporary
anti-Semitic caricature shows Jews to have notoriously bad posture, a trait
that in Fischerle receives its hyperbolic expression in the form of the great
hunchback.35 Using the language of philology, which as we noted was at this
time charged in a particular way with propagating the very Enlightenment
values that should have liberated Fischerle from his entrapment in anti-
Semitic stereotypes, Kien rationalizes Fischerle’s imprisonment in a cursed
genealogy. Referring here to the Capitalist’s persecution of poor Fischerle,
Kien notes that ‘‘her destructive activity . . . was directed at the man oppo-
site, whom nature by means of a dismal etymology had, at any rate already
made a cripple.’’ 36 Just prior to this episode, Kien tellingly remarks, in re-
sponse to Fischerle’s curious explication of the term ‘‘Stipendium’’ as ‘‘Jew-
ish capital’’:37 ‘‘By their etymology shall ye know them.’’ 38 It is worth noting
that Kien has in fact reversed the enlightenment formula for assimilation:
whereas once particularity was to be absorbed in universal human potential,
here the philologist employs the tools of his trade to explain away the Jew’s
physical abnormality. He speaks like a Jew, Kien reasons, so it makes sense
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that he looks like the quintessential Jew; nature, sanctified by the nomen-
clature of high cultural Bildung, has made him thus. Clearly, the suggestion
that etymology, that central trope of philology, could be used to rationalize
and naturalize Fischerle’s fate as a Jewish cripple is deeply ironic in light of
the central cultural mission attributed to philology during the Weimar era.
Hunched over, often bow-legged, frequently short, and almost univer-
sally supplied with a grotesque, oversize nose—these characteristics corre-
spond to a tee with those assigned to Fischerle, and largely make up the
physical charmhe holds for themadamof The Baboon, thewhorehouse cum
cafe where Fischerle procures his bogus passport: ‘‘The landlady embraced
Fischerle’s hump. She overwhelmed him with words of affection; she’d been
longing to see him, longing for his queer little nose, his crooked little legs,
she’d longed for his darling, darling chessboard.’’ 39
Neither the visual nor the narrative clichés are by anymeans coincidental;
on the contrary, they reflect the specific doctrines of an increasingly wide-
spread racial anti-Semitism. Gilman reports that physical degeneration was
a scientifically accepted fact of Jewish life at this time; the only debated ques-
tion was whether such deformity was attributable to genetics or to a bane-
ful environment, such as the Jewish ghetto.40 Within the fictional world of
Auto-da-Fé it is therefore not surprising that the brawny Benedikt Pfaff rhe-
torically suggests that he is ‘‘becoming a Jew’’ just as he begins to fear that
he is being perceived as a physical weakling.41 For, as Gilman notes, German
medical handbooks from the first half of this century are rife with assertions
about the innate feebleness of the Jewish body.42
Siegfried
Canetti’s critique in Auto-da-Fé of corporeal anti-Semitism takes what is
at this point in this study a familiar form: hyperbole. As in the case of tradi-
tional misogynistic stereotypes, Canetti records putatively Jewish physical
attributes and explodes them by means of grotesque exaggeration: the poor
posture becomes an outrageously prominent hunchback, the large nose be-
comes ‘‘this total nose’’ (diese ausschließliche Nase). But that is not all. Built
into Fischerle’s characterization is another aspect of contemporaneous Jew-
ish life, a trace of assimilationist striving of which Fischerle himself is hardly
conscious: his name.
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Before proceeding it may be helpful to recall that in Auto-da-Fé the char-
acters do not develop in any Aristotelian sense: their possibilities—like
those of musical instruments—are pregiven, and the plot is therefore a mere
playing out of predictable (and often quite meager) potentialities.43 This is
worth keeping in mind when reflecting on the significance of Fischerle’s
first name: Siegfried. For this is not to be seen as revelatory of Fischerle’s
inner striving—Canetti’s figures donot at any rate have anydiscernible inner
life 44—but as a signifier of a social and cultural event that stands in parodic
contrast to the actual career of Fischerle: namely, successful Jewish assimi-
lation to German culture.
If Canetti meant merely to repeat the negative stereotypes, he might have
given Fischerle one of the more common epithets from the abundant stock
of anti-Semitic nomenclature: Israel, Jacob, or Itzig.45 But instead he chose
‘‘Siegfried,’’ the quintessentially Germanic name from that quintessentially
Germanic epic, Das Nibelungenlied. What today may seem a quaint sub-
tlety (or, indeed, a mere detail) was in fact a matter of no small import at
the beginning of the century.46 During the Wilhelmine period, Ruth Gay
reports, ‘‘Siegfried became one of the most popular names among Jewish
boys,’’ a fact she explains as a direct expression of Jewish veneration of Ger-
man culture: ‘‘To the German Jews Bildung represented a new kind of intel-
lectual and emotional home after the physical confines of the ghetto and the
closed scholarly world of Jewish learning.’’ 47 Which illuminates, perhaps,
why the infamous protagonist of Oskar Panizza’s Operated Jew (1893), Itzig
Faitel Stern, crowns his grotesque series of efforts to remake himself into
an ‘‘Aryan’’ look-alike with the new name ‘‘Siegfried Freudenstern.’’ 48 Both
as a magnet for virtually every anti-Semitic stereotype and in his determi-
nation to recreate himself physically, this Itzig/Siegfried is richly reminis-
cent of Canetti’s later Fischerle—a connection encouraged insofar as Panizza
was championed in theWeimar period by both Kurt Tucholsky and Walter
Benjamin.49
Yet if the Jewish predilection for the Germanic name Siegfried once sig-
nified a confidence in German culture as a home for Jews—an assertion
Panizza puts in question already at the turn of the century—this clearly no
longer applies to Fischerle, who can envision a future for himself only by
means of escape, not assimilation. Though he does not aspire to authentic
Bildung, Fischerle’s name (as well, of course, as his association with Kien)
invites us to remember a not-too-distant time when allegiance to German
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culture provided an entré, a venue for shedding the particularist garb of
Judaism. In a masterful stroke of naming, Canetti has captured the contra-
dictions of post–World War I German culture: ‘‘Siegfried,’’ the signifier of
successful assimilation, coupled with ‘‘Fischerle,’’ a designation of indelible
ethnicity that simply could not be escaped.50
If Jews at this time were increasingly defined in terms of genetic and
physical features, so, too, were Germans. The slouching, limping figure of
‘‘Israel’’ was, in the popular imagination, contrasted with the idealized ‘‘Ger-
man’’ body of Siegfried. ‘‘Blond Siegfried types,’’ for example, became the
physical—if secret—ideal of the Jewish foreign ministerWalther Rathenau,
even while he accepted ‘‘many features of the anti-Semites’ caricature of the
Jew.’’ 51 Indeed, in the Wilhelmine and Weimar periods there would have
been an inescapable association with Richard Wagner’s immensely popular
Siegfried, whose title figure did much to propagate the image of the nordic
man as the quintessential German.52
Ernst Hanisch, who has investigated ‘‘The Political Influence and Appro-
priation of Wagner,’’ points out that during the First World War ‘‘Siegfried
came to be identified with the essence of Germanness, the world war was
seen as theGötterdämmerung of theWest.’’ 53Hanisch goes on to explain that
during the FirstWorldWar, ‘‘inevitably, the famous sentence fromWagner’s
German Art and German Politics is invoked, to the effect that to be Ger-
man means to do something for its own sake, a sentiment that had acquired
an almost sacrosanct status in nationalist circles. Siegfried, symbol of vic-
tory (Sieg) and peace (Fried), appears as the poetic exemplification of this
thought, whereas Mime, the symbol of all that is un-German, of the enemy
powers, is motivated only by considerations of egoistic utility and self inter-
est.’’ 54 Shortly after the outbreak of the First World War, Wagner’s son-in-
law Houston Stewart Chamberlain identified Wilhelm II as the age’s new
Siegfried, authorized to uproot all that is ‘‘un-German’’ and lead the battle
against ‘‘the corroding poison of Judaism.’’ ‘‘Opposed to this diabolical race’’
Chamberlain wrote to the Kaiser, ‘‘stands Germany as divine champion:
Siegfried versus the worm.’’ 55 Given the widespread cultural resonances of
Wagner’s opera in this period, it may be instructive to view the novel in this
light.56
Fischerle’s physical description in itself suggests the connection, for while
he may be named for the handsome and powerful hero (of both the Ger-
manic saga and theWagner operas), he is clearly drawn more to the specifi-
Figure 5. This rough draft for an anti-Semitic cartoon by Josef Plank counterposes
a judge from Kien’s social class with a stooped-over, malodorous Jew who could
have been drawn from the pages of Auto-da-Fé. Similarly repulsed by Fischerle’s
filth and deformity, Kien nevertheless senses in this misshapen dwarf the hunger
for transformative Kultur. Library of Congress; photo courtesy United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum Photo Archives.
Figure 6. ‘‘Diese ausschließliche Nase’’ (This total nose). Two of Fischerle’s cardinal
attributes are reflected in this cartoon from the anti-Semitic Viennese magazine
Kikeriki. These ‘‘Jewish’’ drones are marked most obviously by a grotesquely
oversized nose, but are characterized no less by their parasitic practice (as the
German caption instructs) of exploiting the worker bees—echoing Fischerle’s abuse
of his gentile employees in the ‘‘Firma S. Fischer.’’ United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum Photo Archives.
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Figure 7. This page from the 1936 anti-Semitic children’s book Trau keinem Fuchs
auf grüner Heid, und keinem Jud bei seinem Eid provides a stark visual contrast
between idealized ‘‘Aryan’’ masculinity and the putatively physically degenerate
Jew. The accompanying poems teach schoolchildren the following lessons: ‘‘The
German is a proud man, who can work and fight. Because he is so handsome and
full of courage, the Jew bears him an ancient grudge. This is the Jew, one sees that
immediately—the biggest scoundrel in all the land. He thinks he is the handsomest
of all, and all the while is so ugly.’’ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Photo Archives.
cations of the hideous dwarf Mime. Early on, the youngWagnerian Siegfried
informs his surrogate father that he finds him physically repulsive:
I am repelled
by the sight of you;
I see that you’re evil
in all that you do.
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I watch you stand,
shuffle and nod,
shrinking and slinking,
with your eyelids blinking—
by your nodding neck
I’d like to catch you,
and end your shrinking,
and stop your blinking!
So deeply, Mime, I loathe you. . .
Everything to me
is dearer than you: birds in the branches
and fish in the brook—
all are dearer to me,
far more than you.57
Physical polarity, expressed in terms of ‘‘racial’’ physical attributes that con-
temporaneously defined Germans and Jews, is the crux of Siegfried’s break
with Mime. The telltale signs are familiar to us from Canetti’s description
of Fischerle: an awkward, almost animal gait combined with a grasping,
probing visage.When the young hero recognizes the incongruity of his own
‘‘Aryan’’ beauty with the unpleasant appearance of his putative father, he be-
gins to question his true parentage. He learns the truth while gazing at his
own splendidly Germanic image reflected in the waters of a pond:
And there in the stream
I saw my face—
it wasn’t like yours,
not in the least,
no more than a toad
resembles a fish.
No fish had a toad for a father! 58
Mime, clearly the toad (Kröte) in this dichotomy, is forced to admit that he
is no blood relation: ‘‘You’re no kin to me.’’ 59 Under great duress, he vouch-
safes the story of his charge’s naming, suggesting a nominalist causality (or
proleptic etymology) that issues forth in physical beauty:
The wish of your mother—
that’s what she told me:
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as ‘Siegfried’ you would grow
strong and fair.60
Moreover, Mime’s reputation—particularly inWagnerian circles—as es-
sentially greedy,materialistic, treacherous, and therefore ‘‘un-German’’ only
strengthens the connection between himandFischerle. LikeMime, Fischerle
attempts to deceive and rob his master while he sleeps, but unlike his Wag-
nerian double, Fischerle contemplates murder only to dismiss it as an im-
possibility for a Jew. MarcWeiner goes further to argue that Wagner differ-
entiates Siegfried from Mime—both tenors—by assigning them distinctive
voices that connote, respectively, a healthy, manly Germanness and a de-
graded, effeminate Jewishness: ‘‘[Mime’s] elevated tessitura, contrasted with
the lower vocal writing for Siegfried, gives him away to Wagner’s contem-
porary audience schooled in a culture that understood the Jewish voice to
be high, nasal, and different.’’ 61 PerhapsMime (or, for that matter, Alberich)
is not essentially an anti-Semitic figure in the sense that later audiences
in different cultural settings would easily recognize. Yet, given the broader
semiotic economy of the Weimar period, he is eminently amenable to this
interpretation, and in fact functions in this manner as an intertext to Auto-
da-Fé.62 The decisive factor in establishing this intertextual relationshipmay
be the fate Mime and Fischerle share: both die by the sword because of their
irrepressible venality: ‘‘If I fail to kill you,’’ Mime asks Siegfried, ‘‘how can I
be sure of my treasure?’’ 63 But Siegfried, of course, prevails. ‘‘Taste then my
sword, / repulsive babbler!’’ he cries and afterwards ‘‘grabs Mime’s corpse,
drags it to the knoll at the entrance to the cave, and throws it down inside.’’ 64
Underscoring the higher principle at stake in this execution, Siegfried apos-
trophizes the now deceased Mime:
In the cavern there,
lie with the hoard!
You schemed so long
and strove for gold;
so now take your joy in that treasure! 65
Fischerle meets his end somewhat less operatically: he is dismembered with
a bread knife and then shoved under a bed. Yet the justification for murder-
ing the disfigured dwarf is essentially the same: as retaliation for betraying
his former employee for lucre. And, like Siegfried, this executioner turns (or
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Figure 8. Fritz Lang’s 1924 Siegfried powerfully reiterates the ‘‘Aryan’’ ideal
of Germanic masculinity as unattainable by hideous misshapen dwarfs like
Fischerle—despite the assimilationist aspirations ironically encoded in his first
name, Siegfried. The film’s intertitle reads: ‘‘He is wondrous fair,’’ a commentary
that hardly seems necessary in light of the stark visual contrasts in this scene.
Museum of Modern Art/Film Stills Archive.
returns) to amorous pursuits, once this venal little antagonist is thus dis-
patched.
Wagner was still a favorite in the interwar period, particularly of Vien-
nese Jews. Further, Fritz Lang’sWeimar-era filming of the Nibelung saga can
only have circulated the story to even wider audiences. Lang’s 1924 Siegfried
in fact underscores powerfully the iconic physical polarities described above.
There is therefore little doubt that Siegfriedwould have echoedmeaningfully
within the fictional chambers of Auto-da-Fé. But in considering the specific
meaning of this intertext, we should not forget that the novel’s irony—and,
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thus, the critical vantage point—resides in the fact that Fischerle is neither
Mime nor Siegfried, but both. Or, better, he is a Mime who would be Sieg-
fried, a Jew who would like to be freed of his physical markers, but, within
the strictures of corporeal racism, can only dream of such freedom. Bear-
ing the name Siegfried thus incarnates one of the novel’s bitter ironies that
reverberates with wider cultural significance.
All of this may elucidate the dilemma present in the very exposition of
one Siegfried Fischerle, an ostensibly simple character in whom a complex
unit of Weimar-era culture is encoded. If, on the one hand, Fischerle reflects
the truth of what Peter Gay calls the greatly imperiled prospects for Jewish
assimilation after the First World War, this dwarf also suggests by his very
being that the intra-Jewish debates of the era were tragically quite moot.
While no novel—let alone a modernist novel—can ever quantify the social
and cultural issues it may engage, we are nevertheless left to wonder about
the significance of those controversies between the assimilatedWestern Jews
and the Orthodox Jews of the East, or the debates between the Zionists and
the acculturated Austro-German Jews in the face of implacable racial anti-
Semitism.66 For such anti-Semites, after all, a Jew was a Jew was a Jew. The
cultural loyalties, political aspirations, or religious beliefs of the individual
Jew mattered not at all.67
Inescapably ‘‘Jewish’’
Despite Canetti’s noted aversion to concepts of dramatic development,
Auto-da-Fé does contain some narrative progression. In fact, of all the par-
allel plots that comprise the novel, Fischerle’s is perhaps the most tradition-
ally linear. In addition to the constraints of his unavoidably ‘‘Jewish body,’’
Fischerle apparently also lacks the intelligence to qualify for Kien’s spurious
Bildung program (he mistakes Plato, for example, for a wealthy mogul),68
and is therefore prevented on this count as well from aspiring to traditional
assimilation. Instead, Fischerle fosters a fantasy of escape to America, which
he plans to finance by methodically robbing Kien.
Because he has internalized the malicious physiognomic premises of the
corporeal anti-Semites, Fischerle believes that freedommeans freedom from
his ‘‘Jewish’’ body. His self-hatred takes darkly comical turns, as when he
beats himself for stealing Kien’s wallet, and expresses itself in a disarmingly
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straightforwardmanner: ‘‘He had no articles of faith, oronlyone—that ‘Jew’
is a genus of criminal which carries its punishment with it.’’ 69 Canetti offers
up this bitter satire at a time when, by all accounts, real-world Jewish self-
hatred had never before been so virulent.70 Certainly the phenomenon was
of great enough significance to warrant a controversial study by Theodor
Lessing, whose 1930 titleDer jüdische Selbsthaß (Jewish Self-Hatred) actually
coined the term.71
Characteristically, Canetti takes a complex social phenomenon and re-
duces it to its core absurdity. For Fischerle this means the pursuit of two
somewhat inconsistent, though oddly compatible, goals: removing the phy-
sical markers of Jewishness from his body, and fleeing to a country where his
Jewishness will not count so much against him. America is the place where
Fischerle sets his fantasy about striking it rich both by winning big at chess
and by marrying a blond heiress, a sort of Horatio Alger myth minus the
work ethic. But Fischerle worries, in one of the earlier installments of this
reiterated fantasy, about being treated as an outsider even in this land of out-
siders. In imagining his own American success story, he finds it necessary
to confront anti-Jewish stereotypes: ‘‘Let them say Jews are cowards. The re-
porters ask him who he is. Not a soul knows him. He doesn’t look like an
American. There are Jews everywhere. But where does this Jew come from,
who’s rolled in triumph over Capablanca?’’ 72 America nevertheless holds
out the offer of better times; it is a place, Fischerle imagines, where hotels
offer clean sheets even to Jews, and where a big, beautiful, blue-eyed Mae
West–type blond can fall for a little guy with an extraordinarily long nose:
‘‘ ‘Darling!’ said the millionairess and pinched it, she loved long noses, she
couldn’t stand short ones.’’ 73 This dream bride seems in fact to be an ideal-
ized version of the philosemitic proprietress of the pub The Baboon, who
expresses a similar weakness for Fischerle’s ‘‘special’’ nose.74
These fantasies aside, Fischerle is greatly concerned that his body will
give him away. Early on he considers surgery to repair his back, but has no
way to finance it. Georg actually first enters the narrative in this connection:
Fischerle determines thatKien’s brotherwill certainly be able to perform this
long-awaited operation and thereby alleviate him of his Jewish appearance.
He knows for certain that the removal of his hunchback, either by surgi-
cal or sartorial means, will require more money than he has, and therefore
ardently pursues his scheme to bilk Kien of his remaining net worth. This
plot segment offers Canetti the opportunity to heap every remaining anti-
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Jewish stereotype on the already hunched back of this little man. Fischerle
becomes the exploitative businessman who makes a huge profit while his
gentile employees remain impoverished. It can be no coincidence that just as
Fischerle announces the formation of the ‘‘Firma Siegfried Fischer,’’ explicit
references to the First World War and its aftermath begin to appear in the
novel: the ‘‘blind’’ beggar, we learn, spent three long years at the front, and,
as a result, cannot bear the stench of carbon to this day; Fischerle maintains
that Kien went mad in the war and still retains an army-issue revolver; and
the same employee who will later murder Fischerle turns out to have a war
injury that curiously affects his memory.75
Sandwiched between two books that play primarily within interior space,
Book 2 alone provides a more sustained opening to the social setting. It may
therefore be advisable to pay some attention to the social environment met-
onymically signified by these references. First of all, thewar and its aftermath
saw a marked increase in anti-Semitism, as JonnyMoser explains: ‘‘With the
agitation against the Jewish war refugees commenced the renewed attack
on the entire community of Austrian Jews . . . The Jews were represented
as racketeers, black marketers, war profiteers and shirkers.’’ 76 As the Jew-
ish entrepreneur, Fischerle incorporates each of these charges in some way.
His physical disfigurement obviously disqualifies him from military service
and thus has garnered him the status of shirker during the Great War even
before the action of the novel commences. As an exploiter of handicapped
war veterans and a dealer in fraudulent goods (recall that he sells the same
packet of cheap paperbacks to Kien over and over, representing them in each
case as something quite different), he incarnates the cliché of the dishonest
Jewish businessman. Of course the postwar era brought with it a plethora of
more general social ills and anxieties, many of which can be observed in the
scenewhere the great crowd gathers outside the Theresianum just after Kien
catches Pfaff and Therese in the act of pawning his great private library.
Some readers have no doubt assumed that Fischerle’s concern for his ap-
pearance may have nothing more to it than this: as a known thief, he fears
being recognized by the police on account of his trademark hunchback. But
the novel belies this innocent assumption. There is a distinct danger, it ap-
pears, in looking ‘‘too Jewish,’’ especially when a Viennese crowd, roiled
by rumors of a great crime, and already suffering the shortages of a lag-
ging, inflation-ridden postwar economy, is looking for a scapegoat. When
Fischerle first sees the crowd he is emboldened by the prospects for pick-
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pocketing, thus confirming his own image of Jews as essentially criminal:
‘‘Among such a mass of people a mass of money might be made.’’ 77 Yet in
very short order he becomes the object himself of this agitated crowd’s ire:
‘‘Fischerle heard the reproaches heaped upon him . . . A dwarf would get
twenty years. Capital punishment ought to be re-introduced. Cripples ought
to be exterminated. All criminals are cripples. No, all cripples are criminals
. . .Why can’t he earn an honest penny.Taking bread out of people’s mouths.
What’s hewant with pearls, a cripple like him, and that Jew nose ought to be
cut off.’’ 78 In unmistakable terms, the invective of what has become a wrath-
ful lynch mob culminates in corporeal anti-Semitism. The indirect speech
of the German gives perhaps a better impression of the way the novel hosts
what is at first a richly confused polyphony of voices and gradually galva-
nizes them into a homogenous anti-Semitic choir—giving rise, ultimately,
to the antithesis of Bakhtin’s progressive notion of heteroglossia.79 Fischerle
escapes their rage, when, just in the nick of time, die Fischerin (the Fishwife in
theWedgwood translation)—Fischerle’s female double—appears elsewhere
in the crowd. Owing to their uncanny physical resemblance, the Fishwife
takes the blows intended for the other little Jew: ‘‘The crowd falls upon her
. . . The Fishwife falls to the ground. She lies on her belly and keeps quite
still. They mess her up terribly . . . No doubt about the genuineness of the
hump. The crowd breaks over it . . . Then she loses consciousness.’’ 80
Reflecting on ‘‘the role which the Jews play in the cultural world of Chris-
tianity as the ultimate object of projection,’’ Sander Gilman remarks: ‘‘The
Jew, caught up in such a system of representation, has but little choice: his
essence, which incorporates the horrors projected on to him and which is
embodied (quite literarily [sic]) in his physical being, must try, on one level
or another, to become invisible.’’ 81 This is precisely what Fischerle attempts
to do. In what amounts to a caricature of the old formula for assimilation,
‘‘wealth and cultivation’’ (Besitz und Bildung), Fischerle seeks a doctoral title
to accompany his newly acquired wealth, in the conviction that this will gain
him, if not invisibility, then at least some respect in the eyes of the police. In
the following we notice how Fischerle clings to the illusion that culture—
here metonymically represented by the revered German Doktorwürde—can
mitigate his physical ‘‘Jewishness’’: ‘‘All the same, he was afraid. He couldn’t
help his shape. Now if only hewere calledDr. Fischer instead of plain Fischer
the police would respect him at once.’’ 82 Although the men of the under-
world pub try to convince Fischerle that such a Doktortitel would do little
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good for someone so misshapen as he, Fischerle vehemently disagrees, and
launches into a drunken, ludicrous tale about a tiny doctor even more dis-
figured than he. Fischerle prevails on this point, procures the passport, and
proceeds to the tailor, where he orders a suit that will render his hunch-
back invisible. ‘‘His new suit fitted him like the most splendid of combina-
tions. Whatever trace was left of his hump disappeared under the coat.’’ 83
Fischerle’s efforts to eradicate his Jewishness by sartorial subterfuge rever-
berate in the anti-Semitic caricature of the day, placing him squarely within
the tradition of the ridiculed Jewish parvenu.84
While waiting for his wonder suit—a kind of ‘‘Tarnkappe’’ for his de-
formed torso—to be properly fitted, Fischerle attempts to learn the lan-
guage of his future home, ‘‘Amerikanisch.’’ Practicing loudly in the park,
Fischerle arouses the attention of a number of passersby. Because he be-
lieves already to have dispensed with the hunchback—‘‘his hump was on its
last legs’’ 85—Fischerle hopes, but cannot really convince himself, that the
attention he receives is just innocent curiosity. These self-taught language
lessons are intended to put the final touch on a physical transformation of
which he does not himself seem fully confident. Still, his hope is to jettison
his all-too-revealing Jewish-Viennese dialect by acquiring English. When
evening comes, a group of menacing youths approaches Fischerle, and he
immediately assumes the worst:86 ‘‘A few boys herded themselves together
and waited until the last grown-up had gone. Suddenly they surrounded
Fischerle’s bench and burst into an English chorus. They yelled ‘Yes’ but
they meant ‘Jew’ [the German—Ja/Jude—is alliterative and makes the aural
confusion more plausible]. Before he decided on his journey, Fischerle had
feared boys like the plague . . . [but now] he was neither a Jew nor a cripple,
he was a fine fellow and knew all about wigwams.’’ 87 Fischerle survives the
harassment, and returns to pick up his new set of clothes. Fully decked out in
a garish outfit—a black and white checked suit, bright blue coat, and canary
yellow shoes—he becomes a walking parody of the Jewish parvenu. The tai-
lor gazes proudly down upon his own sartorial miracle, the very ‘‘image of a
well-bred dwarf,’’ 88 but attributes this transformation, ultimately, not to his
craft, but to humanist culture. It is the tailor, oddly enough, who reminds
us one last time of the emancipatory promises of German culture. In good
idealist fashion (and with an ironymeant only for the reader), he sonorously
opines that it is not the body, in the final analysis, that has the last word:
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Affecting a German accented with American intonation, Fischerle man-
ages to convince a train ticket salesman that he is indeed an American busi-
nessman. Appearing, he hopes, as ‘‘a smartly dressed person, rejuvenated
and well born,’’ 90 Fischerle delights in his great ‘‘success’’ in deceiving the
train official into believing that he is a highly desirable foreigner, rather than
one of the great unwashed, that mass of Galician Jews that flooded the Aus-
trian capital during and after the First World War: ‘‘From this Fischerle as-
sumed rightly and with pride that he was no longer recognizable.’’ 91
All of which does him precious little good, however. For when he returns
home to recover an address book in which he will carefully inscribe his new
title and place of residence (‘‘Doktor Fischer, New York’’), Fischerle’s new
set of clothes and newly acquired English fail to conceal his identity from a
vengeful former employee. His longstanding desire to have his hunchback
removed is finally granted, but certainly not in the manner he had hoped.
Fischerle becomes the ‘‘Operated Jew’’ of the late Weimar period, whose
doomed assimilationist efforts cannot even get him over the border: ‘‘A fist
shatters his skull.—The blind man hurled him to the ground and fetched
from the table in the corner of the little room a bread knife. With this he
slit his coat and suit to shreds and cut off Fischerle’s hump. He panted over
the laborious work, the knife was too blunt for him and he wouldn’t strike
a light . . . He wrapped the hump in the strips of the coat, spat on it once
or twice and left the parcel where it was. The corpse he shoved under the
bed.’’ 92 He is thus murdered as unceremoniously and as brutally as was the
Fischerin—the only figures explicitly slain within the action of the novel,
and both Jews.
Long after Fischerle makes his bloody exit from the novel, his voice re-
emerges, if only momentarily, by way of a telegram he had earlier sent
to Georg. Fischerle settles upon this plan because he thinks Georg might
be able to surgically remove his hunchback, and is therefore keen on lur-
ing him under false pretenses to Vienna. He composes a succinct cable in
Kien’s name, indicating that he urgently requires the professional assistance
of his younger brother. The words Fischerle carefully selects betray the very
Jewishness he so assiduously shuns.93 When Georg rips open the telegram
and reads aloud the words, ‘‘Bin total meschugge. Dein Bruder’’ (‘‘Am com-
pletely crackers. Your brother’’),94 the Yiddish word ‘‘meschugge’’ strikes
him—correctly, as it happens—as totally uncharacteristic of his learned phi-
lologist brother. But for us it serves as one last reminder that Fischerle, de-
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spite his recently acquired Bildung, language lessons, and new set of clothes,
remains tragically and inescapably Jewish in an environment increasingly
hostile to Jews.
It is true that Canetti felt some discomfort about Fischerle in the wake
of the Holocaust. Might he have contributed to the very anti-Semitism he
sought to document? Could the novel’s depiction of Fischerle as a repug-
nant, self-hating Jew have played into the hands of those who implemented
or sought to justify themass killings of Jews? Ormight this book have simply
entertained and titillated anti-Semites? That Nazi officials chose to ban the
novel rather than exploit it for propaganda purposes would suggest that it
did not lend itself very easily to such a use. But Canetti was of course aware
of thewide range of responses evoked by art, particularly modernist art, and
knew that his readers might draw conclusions from the novel that differed
markedly from his own intentions. He later wrote that he dreaded running
into people who had just read Auto-da-Fé, because they inevitably tended to
locate the wretchedness of the novel in the author himself. Not coinciden-
tally, I believe, Canetti puts his defense of Fischerle into the mouth of the
revered Hebraist Isaiah Sonne, who justifies this potentially offensive char-
acterization in this way: ‘‘People will bristle at Fischerle because he is a Jew,
and will reproach the author with the charge that this figure can be mis-
read as if in support of the odious sentiments of the times. Yet this figure
is true, as true as the narrow-minded, rustic housekeeper [Therese] or the
abusive building superintendent [Pfaff]. When the catastrophe is over, all
charges of this kind will fall away from the figures and they will stand re-
vealed as that which led to the catastrophe.’’ This is the important passage
that precedes Canetti’s more frequently cited line regarding his regret about
Fischerle: ‘‘I mention only this one detail because later, with the progress of
events, I often felt discomfort regarding Fischerle; and then I always sought
refuge in this early justification.’’ 95
This defense is interesting not because it comes from Sonne—that we
may never be able to corroborate—but because it contains an awareness on
the part of Canetti of the essential instability of parody. If Canetti really did
suffer pangs of conscience, however, I suspect that it was due not only to
the potential misunderstandings that his book might inspire, but because
he really does target Jews, at least in part, as complicit by way of Jewish self-
hatred. Complicit, however, in the rising tide of racial anti-Semitism of the
early 1930s—not in the organized destruction of European Jews that com-
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menced in the early 1940s. This distinction might well be lost in the post-
Holocaust era and thus give rise to the author’s quite understandable ‘‘un-
easiness’’ (Unbehagen).
Yet we should not permit this to obscure the novel’s broader frame of
reference. Kien’s betrayal of Fischerle, which he grounds in philological
humanism, commences almost from the moment they meet. It is then that
we witness Kien distorting the idealist Schillerian sentiment, ‘‘It is the spirit
which builds itself a body,’’ into a justification for Fischerle’s deformed ‘‘Jew-
ish’’ body rather than employing it as amotto of liberation from such irratio-
nal prejudice. In other words, Sonne’s contention, that Fischerle, along with
this gallery of despicable figures, indicts not the author but the times from
which he drew them, does in the end ring true. Specifically, his insightful
formulation concerning these characters as ‘‘that which led to the catastro-
phe’’ seems apropos of Fischerle. Canettimay still be right toworry that even
serious humor about grotesque attempts at assimilation will be rejected by
some readers as simply in poor taste. Yet the larger perspective, which de-
mands that we see Fischerle not only as an icon of racial anti-Semitism, but
more specifically as a product of a bankrupt, socially irrelevant humanism,
raises this handicapped Jew to a tragic sign of the times.
While Fischerle is, I think, best understood in terms of this larger prob-
lematic, he remains a locus of multivalent tension. When Nicola Riedner,
one of the few critics intimately familiar with the novel’s anti-Semitic dis-
course, argues that we should view Fischerle as punished for an overweening
assimilation drive, she founders on numerous counts, not the least of which
is her curious imposition of a rational choice model to the virtual exclu-
sion of the very complex matrix of social and political forces she herself has
documented. Yet her argument powerfully communicates the distinctly dis-
tasteful degree of excess in this figure. Though our post-Holocaust vantage
point has much to do with it—one cannot simply bracket out the historical
fact that Eastern European Jews were murdered at much higher rates than
German Jews—Canetti’s practice of grotesque caricature perhaps exceeds
his own narrative intentions. In discussing the novel’s attitude toward mi-
sogyny (chapter 2), we notedCanetti’s use of hyperbolic parody, a technique
that risks a measure of complicity as critique. The same holds true here. It
would, however, be an unfortunate mistake to permit this observation to
obscure the fact that in the end it is indeed Fischerle, and not the voluble
and self-pitying Kien, as some early critics would have it, who becomes the
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novel’s real victimofmodernity’s crisis of values.Yet it would be equallymis-
taken to overlook the way in which Siegfried Fischerle outstrips his didactic
function and continues to haunt the novel long after he is murdered.
Up to this point in this study we have seen how Canetti has left a trail—per-
haps something more like an elaborate web of trails—linking this novel to
broader social and intellectual concerns. The next chapter will be concerned
less with positive traces of intertextuality than with a palpable but curiously
obscured presence, namely that of Sigmund Freud. For readers of the 1930s,
Freud hardly needed to be evoked. Among later critics who fell under the au-
thor’s own anti-Freudian spell, Freud seems unaccountably absent. In either
case, the novel’s relationship to Freud and popularized Freudianism cries
out for elucidation.
5 ‘‘An Impudent Choir of
Croaking Frogs’’
Freud and the Freudians as the
Novel’s Secret Sharers
Freud, however, was not concerned with politics, not even sexual politics.
—Peter Gay 1
An Anxiety of Influence?
Canetti’s hostility toward psychoanalysis is legendary, yet it is a fact
usuallymentioned in the context of hismuch laterCrowds and Power (1960),
and seldom in connection with the novel of 1931. Though commentators
on the novel could scarcely have missed Canetti’s disdain for Freud, they
seem on thewhole to have assumed that the novel dismisses rather than con-
fronts Freud; few, at any rate, have paid any kind of sustained attention to
the novel’s thick web of Freudian allusions. Though Gerald Stieg proposes
that both Auto-da-Fé and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) be seen as
quite specific and contrastive responses to the 1927 riot/massacre that fol-
lowed the burning of the Viennese Palace of Justice, he is unable, in the end,
to show how the novel really ‘‘answers’’ Freud.2 Yet Freud is already present
in Auto-da-Fé, and it will be the task of this chapter to show how powerful
even—or especially—a negative influence can be. How, indeed, could a nov-
elist as intellectually ambitious as Canetti ignore one of the most influential
thinkers of his own time?
What complicates our inquiry, however—and this may explain the hesi-
tance of critics to take this path—is the fact that Canetti never set out to
refute Freud directly, for that might on the one hand imply an acquiescence
in the Freudian agenda, and on the other would be inappropriate to a lit-
erary engagement. A more direct confrontation would indeed have to wait
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thirty years for Crowds and Power. Furthermore, Canetti’s impatience with
Freudian grand theories is, at this time, inextricably bound up with his cri-
tique of Freud’s disciples, whom he held to be overzealous, to say the least.
His targets in the novel, therefore, will never be pure instances of unadul-
terated Freudian dogma. Instead the novel’s evocations of Freud will always
include an element of popularization, deviation and misprision. While this
ensures that the novel resonates more richly with the widespread cultural
reception of Freud, it will no doubt irritate Freud purists—to the extent that
such a group is to be found among Canetti afficionados in the first place.
Surprisingly, there are a few instances in which Canetti acknowledged
an intellectual debt to Freud. The most memorable of these is in a 1962
radio interview with Theodor W. Adorno, who was keen to rectify what
he perceived to be a glaring lacuna in the recently published Crowds and
Power. Canetti completed this lengthy anthropological study without once
mentioning Freud by name, who, after all, had written the most influen-
tial essay to date on the topic of crowd formation and social psychology,
namely his Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921). In response
to Adorno’s persistent query—he returns to Freud throughout the inter-
view—Canetti musters a few gracious words for the founder of psychoanaly-
sis: ‘‘As you speak of Freud—I am the first to admit that the innovative way
inwhich Freud approached things, without allowing himself to be distracted
or frightened, made a deep impression on me in my formative period. It is
certainly the case that I am now no longer convinced of some of his results
and must oppose some of his special theories. But for the way he tackled
things, I still have the deepest respect.’’ 3
This diplomatically worded homage—intended, I would wager, to pla-
cate those critics who read Canetti’s omission as an arrogant dismissal of
a worthy predecessor—may ultimately only confuse the matter. For it sug-
gests that Canetti’s opposition to Freud is both of recent vintage (e.g., ‘‘I
am no longer convinced’’) and partial (‘‘some of his results . . . [and] some
of his special theories’’).4 In fact, neither claim is true. For the earliest of
Canetti’s writings, Auto-da-Fé, already reveals a pattern not of positive in-
fluence, but of thoroughgoing dissent. Twenty odd years after the interview
with Adorno, an elderly Canetti—the esteemed Nobel laureate approach-
ing his eightieth birthday—seems to have been at greater ease in reflecting
on the place of Freud in his life. The final volume of his autobiography, Das
Augenspiel: Lebensgeschichte 1931–1937 (The Play of the Eyes), is strewn with
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observations that leave no doubt that the young author of Auto-da-Fé was
already determined to do battle with Freud.
The Dispute with Broch
The context for such reflections is frequently a reminiscence about the
author Hermann Broch, whomCanetti loved and admired despite his devo-
tion to Freud: ‘‘He had really fallen for Freud, in a religious manner I would
say; I don’t mean to say that he had become a zealot, like so many others
whom I knew at the time. Rather, he was permeated by Freud, as by a mys-
tical teaching.’’ 5 In speaking with Broch, Canetti sounds central objections
that will reverberate throughout his work. Again and again he maintains,
though not always as civilly as in this friendly debate, essentially two points:
(1) Freud is too readily cited and believed, when in reality the phenomena
he attempts to explain remain complex and puzzling; and (2) Freud’s theo-
ries tend to interiorize and personalize social reality. The following passage,
taken from an exchange between Canetti and Broch, is meant to rebuff the
latter’s claim that amodernist novel should incorporate Freudian insights by
presenting psychologically realistic characters, something Canetti in Auto-
da-Fé obviously chose not to do. To Broch he counters:
You gladly appeal to modern psychology. It seems to me that you are
proud of it because it arose, so to speak, out of your own intimate milieu,
from this special area of the Viennese world. This psychology has for you
the familiar feel of home [Heimatgefühl] . . . Whatever it declares, you
find on the spot in yourself.You don’t even need to go in search for it. Pre-
cisely this psychology strikes me as completely inadequate. It concerns
itself with the individual, and in this it has accomplished something; what
it cannot comprehend is the crowd [Masse], and that is the most impor-
tant entity, about which we need to learn. For all new power that arises
today draws its sustenance from the crowd. In practice, everybody who
is after power knows how to manipulate the crowd.6
The one concession Canetti makes here to individual psychology may be
nothing more than a polite way of differing with a respected friend; on the
other hand we should be careful not to exaggerate the dispute. As we shall
see below, Canetti will use Freud to critique Freud and what he perceived
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to be the broader Freud mania. Apart from this double-edged tribute, how-
ever, we notice the classic laments. The first, that Freud’s theories are all
too easily confirmed, indeed, that they are assumed to be correct from the
outset, should be judged as much a critique of Freud as of his uncritical fol-
lowers. The significance of the second point for the novel, which at this time
is still lying around in typescript form, could be easily overlooked because
Canetti is so clearly using the language we associate with his later work on
Crowds and Power.7 Yet we should not overlook the fact that Canetti point-
edly places these remarks in the context of a discussion of modernist novels.
Broch has just readAuto-da-Fé and criticizes Canetti for failing to avail him-
self of the latest discoveries in psychology. Canetti responds that Broch’s
brand of psychological realism leads not to critical distance, but serves in-
stead as a kind of anodyne. In a carefully worded passage, Canetti suggests
that Broch’s psychological realism brings insight, but also soothes (‘‘beru-
higt’’) readers in a manner that he finds problematic.
This exchange, however much it may have been stylized or perhaps even
invented in hindsight, is crucial in understanding Canetti’s relationship to
Freudian psychology, at least as he saw it. Broch is not an easyopponent, and
presses his point: ‘‘There is a modern psychology and it says things about
people that we simply cannot ignore. Literature must be on the intellec-
tual level of its day. If it falls behind, it becomes a kind of kitsch.’’ 8 Canetti
persists in advocating his use of schematic figures over Broch’s psychologi-
cally realistic people (‘‘Menschen’’), a point we have touched upon already
in chapter 1. What is essential to underscore at this juncture is the fact that
Canetti predicates the entire design of his novel upon a considered rejection
of Freudian psychology: ‘‘I, too, believe that the novel of today must be dif-
ferent, but not becausewe live in the era of Freud and Joyce. The substance of
the times is different, and can only be represented by way of new figures.’’ 9
Let us return to that second objection with the assurance that it has an
important place in the discussion of the novel: this is Canetti’s assessment of
psychoanalysis as essentially an individual, personal affair (‘‘befaßt sich mit
dem einzelnen’’), which is therefore constitutionally incapable of addressing
the social and political, particularly when it comes to the exercise of power.
For these are precisely the themes which had already found expression in
Auto-da-Fé, as we have had occasion to see thus far in this study. Reveal-
ing an intimate familiarity with Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis
of the Ego—the earliest sustained and perhaps the most important effort on
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Freud’s part to come to terms with the social—Canetti once tried to con-
vince Broch of the error of his, and more importantly Freud’s, ways. Other-
wise tolerant and patient with his interlocutor, Broch drew the line when it
came to assailing Freud; indeed ‘‘he seemed angrywhen I criticized Freudian
conceptions.’’ 10 For our discussion of the novel, it is significant to note that
Canetti’s critique here—he argues that crowds are ontologically different
and not sufficiently explained by individual psychology—articulates once
again his basic objection that Freud overextends the personal. Even as sym-
pathetic a biographer as Peter Gay, himself a fairly orthodox though not
uncritical Freudian, comes to a similar conclusion regarding the Group Psy-
chology essaywhen, in offering this précis, he remarks: ‘‘The crowd, as crowd,
invents nothing; it only liberates, distorts, exaggerates, the individual mem-
bers’ traits . . . In short, crowd psychology, and with it all social psychology,
is parasitic on individual psychology; that is Freud’s point of departure, to
which he persistently held.’’ 11 For Gay, this is a fairly neutral observation;
but for Canetti, this was war.
It is not surprising that the antagonist Freud was on his mind when
Canetti sought out his beloved Dr. Sonne as a sounding board for some of
his evolving ideas on social phenomena, a project Canetti had already come
to see as his ‘‘life’s task’’ (Lebensaufgabe).12 Canetti succeeds, however, only
in eliciting guidance onwhat—orwhom—to avoid.Wonderingwhat itmust
have been like for Sonne, the known Freud opponent, to suffer Broch’s en-
thusiasm for psychoanalysis, Canetti muses: ‘‘He was friends with Broch,
whom he respected and perhaps even loved. Whenever he spoke with him,
the conversation will certainly have turned to Freud, to whom Broch was
addicted [dem Broch verfallen war]. I would have loved to learn how Sonne
withstood that without interjecting a wounding protest.’’ 13 Canetti did not
need to imagine such scenarios, however, for he knew from personal experi-
ence that Sonne had no truck with Freud: ‘‘That he had crucial disagree-
ments with Freud, I experienced oncewhen I vehemently attacked the ‘death
drive’ in his presence,’’ 14 a concept, we might note in passing, which though
tentatively introduced already in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), be-
came a cornerstone of the extremely popular Civilization and Its Discontents
of 1930. Sonne, at any rate, steers his young protégé away from Freud: ‘‘He
warned me of doctrines that are everywhere present but explain nothing.
Better than any he understood how much they stand in the way of gain-
ing insight into public matters.’’ 15 All of these anecdotal remarks tell us, if
142 : freud and the freudians
nothing else, that Canetti saw himself and others as crucially engaged with
Freudian thought at the time he wrote Auto-da-Fé.
As we have seen on numerous occasions in this study already, Auto-da-
Fé is nothing if not centrally concerned to diagnose our blindness to ‘‘public
things’’—‘‘öffentliche Dinge,’’ as Canetti puts it. And thus it is not surprising
that it is within this context that the novel’s confrontation with Freud most
clearly emerges. I have selected three episodes for analysis: the notorious
chapter entitled ‘‘The Good Father’’ (‘‘The Kind Father’’ in Wedgwood), as
well as two less well known segments that have unjustly suffered neglect in
the secondary literature: the incident involving the mad village blacksmith
Jean Préval; and finally Georg’s curious ‘‘Parable of the Termites.’’ Each of
these passages takes as its target a central Freudian tenet: the Oedipal com-
plex; transference (and countertransference); and sublimation, respectively.
Though the novel undoubtedly contests these notions, it would be erroneous
to read Auto-da-Fé as an attempt to directly disprove Freud. This is an aim
surely inconsistent with imaginative literature in general, and furthermore
one that would make the author guilty of the very crime of which he ac-
cuses the Freudians: overreaching. In concluding with an analysis of Georg
as a parodic vehicle for Freudian ideas and associations, the relationship of
Crowds and Power to the novel—an affiliation which thus far has not re-
dounded to the favor of Auto-da-Fé—will emerge in a clearer light. We will
see that while both challenge fundamental Freudian notions, they do so in
quite different ways.
Father Knows Best: Unseating the ‘‘Electra Complex’’
‘‘Sadism in the evening is refreshing and bracing!’’ Max Pulver’s response,
the first on record to what is perhaps the best-known chapter of Auto-da-
Fé, ‘‘The Good Father,’’ apparently broke the silence of an agitated and be-
mused salon audience, which had gathered in Zurich to hear the young au-
thor read from his yet unpublished work.16 At a later reading of this same
piece inVienna, Canetti would be accused of ‘‘inhumanity’’ (Unmenschlich-
keit); indeed, sometimes the most positive remark Canetti’s auditors could
muster was the assurance that the author would one day outgrow this kind
of writing.17 Well before feminist critics would draw our attention to the vio-
lence perpetrated upon women in this novel—sometimes in the process ac-
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cusing the author himself of promoting the misogyny depicted here (see
above, chapter 2)—Canetti had been subjected to ‘‘a real scolding’’ (eine
wahre Schelte) by his contemporaries for this stark and unsparing portrayal
of child and spousal abuse.18
‘‘The Good Father’’ (Der gute Vater), an ironic reference, of course, to the
very bad father Benedict Pfaff, contains only the most concentrated part of
a story that in fact extends throughout the novel. It is in this chapter, how-
ever, that we are confronted with a critical mass of incriminating evidence
against an abusive father who has been trying (and will continue to attempt)
to suppress, distort, and trivialize the extent of his sexual violence. Con-
temporary readers may be tempted to attribute the attention accorded this
chapter to the rise of critical paradigms informed by second-wave (i.e., post-
1968) feminism, and to some extent this is perfectly true.Yet as we have seen,
Der gute Vater already enjoyed an unmistakable prominence—and not only
in the eyes of the author, as we shall see—even before the novel appeared in
print. Canetti, at any rate, referred to this chapter as the ‘‘indispensable’’ part
of the novel,19 and later as an ‘‘obligatory’’ component of his performance
repertoire.20
Our ‘‘good father’’ is of course Kien’s Hausbesorger—a kind of door-
man cum building superintendent—long known to us as an unambiguous
woman-hater.WhenKien first calls uponhis services, well before the chapter
in question opens, Benedikt Pfaff assumes his assignment is to beat Therese:
‘‘For years he had longed in vain for an opportunity to smash up a piece of
woman’s flesh.’’ 21 Pfaff is quick to assure us that his motto, ‘‘Women ought
to be beaten to death. The whole lot of them,’’ 22 is based on personal experi-
ence: ‘‘My old woman now, she was black and blue to the end of her days.
My poor daughter, God rest her, I was that fond of her, there was a woman
for you now, as the saying is, I started with her when she was that high.’’ 23
Pfaff ’s sexual abuse of his daughter takes on new dimensions starting on
the day of his wife’s funeral. Tellingly, Pfaff is reminded of the sexual rela-
tionship with his daughter just as he begins sleeping with Therese, a com-
parison that clearly does not favor the older woman: ‘‘If only she [Therese]
were forty years younger. His daughter, God rest her, she had a heart of gold.
She had to lie down beside himwhile hewatched out for beggars. He used to
pinch and look. Look and pinch. Those were the days! . . . Cry, she used to.
Didn’t do her no good. You can’t do anything against a father. Ah, she was a
love. All of a sudden she died . . . He simply couldn’t do without her.’’ 24 The
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Hausbesorger’s sporadic but insistently bad conscience slowly reveals a pat-
tern of father-daughter assault and molestation. Prodded by the likelihood
that the authorities will imminently appear at the Theresianum, where he
and Therese are attempting to pawn Kien’s library, Pfaff imagines himself
punished not for dealing in stolen property, that is, for his current and evi-
dent infraction, but for sexually abusing and murdering his daughter years
ago: ‘‘The caretaker stood stock still. He saw it: on every first of the month
someone would come to take away his pension instead of paying it out to
him. They’ll lock him up as well . . . Everything will come out and the plain-
tiffs will continue to violate his daughter posthumously. He isn’t afraid . . .
He is retired on a pension. He isn’t afraid. The doctor said himself, it’s her
lungs. Send her away! How would I do that, mister? He needs his pension
just to eat . . . Health insurance—the idea! Suddenly she’d return to himwith
a baby. In that tiny room. He isn’t afraid!’’ 25
With the phrase ‘‘and the plaintiffs continue to violate his daughter in the
grave’’ (und die Parteien schänden seine Tochter noch im Grab), his fear that
‘‘everything will come out’’ (even while he repeatedly denies being afraid),
not to mention his foreboding that Anna will return with a baby from a
medical exam supposedly made necessary because of her lungs, Pfaff con-
victs himself in his own idiom. For this narrated monologue clearly belongs
to his linguistic and mental repertory.When the police actually arrive, Pfaff
immediately thinks, ‘‘My daughter!’’ and during the ensuing police inquiry
he refers the murder that Kien insists having perpetrated uponTherese back
to his own guilty conscience: ‘‘The Professor was talking about a wife, but
he meant my daughter.’’ 26 Kien is lying about a murder he never committed
(though he fervently wishes he had); Pfaff dissimulates about a murder he
actually committed but cannot fully suppress. All of this leads up to the epi-
sode in question.
‘‘The Good Father’’ chapter gives a more complete picture of this un-
savory incestuous abuse, but one that has rarely been fully acknowledged
in the critical literature until recently, as Kristie Foell documents in Blind
Reflections, her Canetti monograph of 1995. This may be due to the fact that
Pfaff, whose denial of the crimes against his daughter is only occasionally
and inadvertently punctured by feelings of guilt and concomitant moments
of honesty, is largely in linguistic control of this chapter. This fact, combined
with a hesitance on the part of critics—acting, perhaps, on the same feel-
ings of disgust registered by Canetti’s early auditors—to address such issues,
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may explain why Kien has so often been portrayed as the principal victim
of Pfaff ’s aggression. At any rate, as the famous father-daughter dialogue
referred to above in chapter 2 illustrates, Pfaff ’s power over his daughter is
mediated by a kind of semiotic extortion. A central point for Canetti, here as
in the contemporaneous playHochzeit (TheWedding), is that language does
not merely represent power relations, but actively structures them. While
true, we should also acknowledge that language is simply an easier topic
for critics to handle; the venerated ‘‘crisis of language’’ (Sprachkrise) whose
pedigree reaches back at least as far as Hofmannsthal’s Lord Chandos Brief
(1902) provided a critical context for the discussion of ‘‘The Good Father’’
that often led away from the substance of this infamous exchange. One of
the central points of that one-sided dialogue is after all the father’s pointed
prohibition of other romantic interests—there shall be no other suitors be-
side him—a point that is all too easily lost in more abstract discussions of
referentiality and linguistics. The exchange commences with Pfaff talking
to himself and does not essentially change, despite the coerced inclusion of
Anna’s voice:
‘‘A father has a right to . . .’’ ‘‘. . . the love of his child.’’ Loud and toneless,
as though she were at school, she completed his sentences. [. . .]
‘‘For getting married my daughter . . .’’—he held out his arm—‘‘. . . has
no time.’’
‘‘She gets her keep from . . .’’ ‘‘. . . her good father.’’
‘‘Other men do not want . . .’’ ‘‘. . . to have her.’’ 27
With regard to the implicit Freud debate, it is of obvious import that the ex-
clusion of other erotic interests is an unambiguous function of the father’s
unseemly desire for the daughter, and not vice versa. The extent to which
Anna is reduced to a function of her father’s fantasy world is made abun-
dantly evident by the fact that she is compelled not only to speak like her
father, but to dress like him as well. Wearing his pants, doing his job, and
ultimately bearing his name—he renames her ‘‘Poli’’ (‘‘Polly’’ inWedgwood)
to remind him of the ‘‘Polizist’’ he once was—Anna’s independent existence
is effectively obliterated. And this, Pfaff opines, is the way to handle women
after all: ‘‘Since he had nominated her Polly, he was proud of her. Women
were good for something after all, men just have to understand how tomake
Pollys of them.’’ 28The ‘‘other’’ whomAnna impersonates ismerely a figment
of her father’s narcissistic imagination, a sadomasochistic stimulant to his
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sexual fantasy. Having subjugated her in this manner, Pfaff was inclined to
pleasure: ‘‘For hours he fondled her.’’ 29
Just as he has scripted his own wife’s death,30 Pfaff actively—but unsuc-
cessfully—attempts to camouflage the incest as some kind of acceptable
paternal solicitousness. Given this imbalance of narrative power, we must
sometimes piece together the actual abuse from revelatory fragments scat-
tered throughout the narrative. For example, in a passage clearly describ-
ing the father-daughter relationship subsequent to the mother’s death, we
encounter the astonishing phrase—clearly attributable to Anna’s conscious-
ness—‘‘in the long years of their marriage’’ (in den langen Jahren ihrer Ehe).31
‘‘Marriage’’ is of course themost arresting term here, whereas the descriptive
phrase ‘‘long years’’ indicates the daughter’s subjective experience of time
in this oppressive relationship. If this might quickly be passed over, then we
need only turn to Pfaff ’s blunter formulations. For he uses within the space
of three pages two separate terms for the illicit ‘‘honeymoon’’ (Wonnemond
and Honigmond) he shamelessly conducts with his daughter since his wife’s
premature demise.32
Furthermore, when Anna engages in her doomed fantasy of redemption,
she attends to a sartorial matter that might seem extraneous until we realize
her need to appear to her would-be savior, the ‘‘black knight’’ Franz, as the
virgin she no longer is: ‘‘She takes all the money with her, over her night-
gown she slips on her own coat, the one she’s never allowed to wear, not the
old cast-off of her father’s, thus she appears to be a virgin.’’ 33 The signifi-
cance of this apparent detail becomes clearer when we turn our attention
to the culmination of Anna’s fantasy: just as Franz declares his determina-
tion to marry her and her alone, Anna has him take approving notice of her
‘‘new coat.’’ 34 Again, if Anna’s subaltern language permits alternate and less
repellent interpretive possibilities, her father’s less subtle manner of speech
proves stunningly less ambiguous. Inhabiting the narrator’s voice, he relates:
‘‘While she beat the steak for his dinner, he could thump her to his heart’s
content. His eye did not know what his hand did.’’ 35 Thus we can easily sur-
mise the reason for her unmistakable fear of the marital bed, ‘‘the fear which
this piece of furniture instilled into her.’’ 36 In the end we learn that, after
being beaten almost to death, ‘‘she lived for several more years as her father’s
servant and wife,’’ 37 at which point the term ‘‘Weib’’ (wife, woman) as des-
ignation for Anna should no longer surprise us—yet it does. We are left to
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wonder only if the guilt-ridden Pfaff, in an intertextual reference to Poe,38
has walled up his daughter’s corpse in the adjoining room. Certainly the
evidence of his escalatingly guilty conscience, whose demands increasingly
intrude upon his consciousness and culminate in his confession to Georg,39
calls to mind the unforgettable ‘‘Tell-Tale Heart.’’ 40
But domestic violence was not Canetti’s only—or, perhaps, even princi-
pal—point here, and the contrast with Kien, whom Pfaff threatens with a
similar fate of domestic interment, clarifies the issue. Particular to Anna’s
story are two factors: the incest itself, and the concomitant, elaborate effort
to reconstruct her as a mere supporting actor in Pfaff ’s psychodrama. These
two elements propel the story into conflict with an influential cultural nar-
rative already firmly entrenched at the time of the novel’s writing and one
that, if we can believe Adolf Grünbaum’s pronouncement on ‘‘the present
stunningly ubiquitous cultural influence of the Freudian corpus,’’ is largely
with us still.41 In plotting this story, Canetti goes to some lengths to insure
that this narrative both conjures and collides head on with Freud’s account
of fathers and daughters. In naming his fictional daughter after Freud’s own
daughter, Anna, Canetti may indeed have earned the compliment proffered
by Friedl Benedikt: ‘‘Nobody can write as wickedly as you.’’ 42
It is this single father-daughter relationship, in fact, that can be said to
have given birth to psychoanalysis, despite the fact that Freud would already
in the Weimar period be accused of a myopic preoccupation with men—
that is, with sons and mothers—and of having founded a ‘‘masculine psy-
chology.’’ 43 In the beginning, however, Freud derived much of his theory
from the analysis of what was then known as female hysteria. Though Freud
encountered case after case of incest and sexual assault by fathers and father
figures, he interpreted these stories as defenses against a deeper truth: the
daughters’ unacknowledged sexual desire for their fathers. And in this way
hewas able to confirm that cornerstone of psychoanalysis, theOedipus com-
plex. Later, Freud would contend that any serious detractor would have to
come to terms with this central tenet: ‘‘Every human newcomer has been
set the task of mastering the Oedipus complex. Whoever cannot manage it
falls prey to neurosis. The progress of psychoanalytic work has sketched the
significance of the Oedipus complex ever more sharply; its recognition has
become the shibboleth that separates the adherents of psychoanalysis from
its opponents.’’ 44 Thus Freud, who by now had placed the Oedipus complex
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squarely at the center of his controversial account of the rise of civilization
(Totem and Taboo), drew a line in the sand. And Canetti, with his frequent
public renditions of ‘‘The Good Father,’’ meant to cross it.
Freud’s account of the girl’s passage through the Oedipus complex has
of course proven notoriously controversial. Even in his own words, Freud
seems to suggest that the girl does not so much pass through as remain
mired in her erotic attachment to the father. True, she transfers her love from
mother to father; but where does she go from here? Freud’s own pronounce-
ment does not offermuch hope: ‘‘She slips—along the line of symbolic equa-
tion, onemight say—frompenis to a baby.HerOedipus complex culminates
in a desire, which is long retained, to receive a baby from her father as a
gift—to bear him a child.’’ 45 Indeed, as Judith Lewis Herman argues, Freud’s
model posits girls who are predisposed to father-daughter incest.46 It is not
difficult to see how this side of the Oedipus complex would prove useful to
Freud in dispelling the claims of sexual trauma made by his female ‘‘hyster-
ics’’: their stories only served to conceal their own illicit desire. Though it
would be unfair to suggest that Freud actually sanctioned the sexual assault
of daughters by fathers (and father figures, like uncles and oldermale friends
of the family), or that he completely denied such abuse, his theory would
serve powerfully to disguise such molestation as the fantasy of maladjusted
women. In the Introductory Lectures, Freud recounts rather candidly why he
was moved to recant his own seduction theory, an interpretation that ac-
cepted at face value the accounts of his female ‘‘hysterics,’’ in favor of the
allegedly deeper explanatory power of the Oedipus complex: ‘‘Almost all of
my women patients told me that they had been seduced by their father. I
was driven to recognize in the end that these reports were untrue and so
came to understand that the hysterical symptoms are derived from phan-
tasies and not from real occurrences . . . It was only later that I was able to
recognize in this phantasy of being seduced by the father the expression of
the typical Oedipus complex in women.’’ 47 In a footnote appended to a sub-
sequent edition of Studies on Hysteria, Freud did admit to falsifying a case
study by suppressing the fact that a father was in fact the perpetrator of the
molestation of his daughter.48 But this was of little consequence in light of
his continued trumpeting of the female Oedipal complex, which in effect
suggests that if the daughter does not wholly imagine the abuse, then at least
she can be thought to have elicited it on account of an unresolved erotic
attachment to her father.
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What Freud had driven inward, Canetti was determined to bring into the
light of day. ‘‘The Good Father,’’ with its blunt portrayal of Pfaff ’s abuse of
Anna, challenges the Freudian internalization of this father-daughter con-
flict. Despite obvious thematic parallels that would at first invite a Freudian
reading, Anna’s predicament cannot possibly be grasped by means of the
Freudian prefabricated postulate of daughterly desire. And, as if it were not
already abundantly clear that Freud is the spectral antagonist in ‘‘The Good
Father,’’ the title itself seems designed to cement the allusion and clarify the
target. For though it is the beleaguered daughter who is forced to bestow the
epithet ‘‘the good father’’ on the villainous Pfaff, we come to see by means
of the intertextual dynamic implicit in this chapter that it is none other than
Freud who makes this appellation culturally available—and problematic.
In bequeathing this title to the patriarchal society of his day, Freud autho-
rizes—however inadvertently—a kind of blindness to social reality, one of
the principal varieties of ‘‘Blendung’’ arraigned in this novel. Viewing ‘‘The
Good Father’’ as a counternarrative to what Jung later dubbed the ‘‘Electra
Complex’’ expands our understanding of Canetti’s critique of contempo-
rary misogyny, explored above in chapter 2. In the case of Pfaff it is clearly
not a matter of an individual’s use of the feminine to shore up a dissolving
self—he, like many lower-class personages of literary modernism, does not
possess enough of a self to be taken seriously in this regard—but a larger
cultural narrative that is here put on trial. From this perspective, the sta-
bility and affirmation theViennese patriarchy derives from Freud’s Oedipus
complex—despite the surface clamor and claims of outrage—comes at the
price of repressing a reprehensible social reality.49
Apropos of overreaching theory and in particular of his reception of
Freud, Canetti once observed:
Among the most uncanny phenomena of human intellectual history is
the evasion of concrete experience [das Ausweichen vor dem Konkreten].
There exists a striking penchant to go after the most distant of things
first and to overlook everything that one continually knocks up against
in the immediate vicinity. The soaring arc of grand [interpretive] ges-
tures—the adventure and audacity of expeditions into the unknown—
masks the motivations for going there. Not infrequently, it is simply a
matter of avoiding the most immediate reality because we are not equal
to it.50
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This ‘‘evasion of the concrete’’ is, I would suggest, the rubric that best cap-
tures Canetti’s Freud critique, here and in subsequent passages considered in
this chapter. Freud’s promulgation of the Oedipus complex comes under fire
in Auto-da-Fé not because it is inherently wrong as a model for individual
psychology—that is simply not at issue here—but because it is overextended
in a manner inconsistent with observable social facts. It is quite true that
Canetti would later reject the Oedipus complex outright—replacing it in
Crowds and Power with the more positive concept of ‘‘Verwandlung’’ (trans-
formation) 51—but the novel’s disavowal of this central Freudian notion is
already conspicuous.
Canetti is fully aware that his father-daughter narrative shifts the sympa-
thy to the ‘‘tortured daughter’’ and toward the recognition of the intersub-
jective reality of power. As he approvingly remarks in noting the response
to a public reading, ‘‘The auditors were moved by the ‘Good Father,’ there
was the opportunity for sympathy with the tormented daughter.’’ 52 More-
over, Canetti is fully convinced that his version of the story resonates with
palpable Viennese reality: ‘‘The frightful ‘Good Father’ provoked horror;
theViennese were well aware of the power of their building superintendents
[Hausbesorger] and I don’t believe that anyone would have dared doubt
the truth of this figure as long as everyone in the room was in his [Pfaff ’s]
power.’’ 53Actual—not just fictionalized—child abusewas in any case a great
sensation in fin-de-siècle Vienna, as Larry Wolff has documented. ‘‘The
Viennese cases,’’ Wolff observes, ‘‘provide us with an extraordinary picture
of how child abuse was perceived and interpreted in an age that had not
yet accepted the fundamental concept of child abuse.’’ 54 Canetti’s stark re-
inscription of this issue in the Pfaff-Anna conflictmight therefore be seen not
merely as a sobering evocation of this as yet unrecognized social pathology,
but also as an inquiry into ‘‘why it had to be obliterated and forgotten.’’ 55The
social resonance of Pfaff-like violence is further corroborated by the mod-
ernist sculptor FritzWortruba, who, remarking on the same reading of ‘‘The
Good Father’’ Canetti refers to above, is said to have quipped ‘‘that nothing
was more Vienna, the real Vienna, than that which [was] selected for this
reading.’’ 56 And later Dr. Sonne will testify to the irreducible truth of the
Pfaff figure.57 It can hardly be a coincidence that when Canetti later set down
his own definition of ‘‘hysteria,’’ he would eschew all references to intrapsy-
chic disturbances, and view it instead as a woman’s frequently unsuccessful
attempt to escape male violence and domination.58
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To appreciate Canetti’s revision of the Freudian masterplot does not re-
quire that we fully endorse it. Faithful Freudians could easily exempt them-
selves from the novel’s critique by crying foul. Though Anna is clearly dis-
turbed and apparently delusional, she does not seem to exhibit classical
symptoms of ‘‘hysteria.’’ And is not Pfaff a kind of extreme, tailor-made
exemplum? While Canetti never wavered in his insistence that ‘‘The Good
Father,’’ nourished by the ‘‘darkest aspects’’ of Viennese society,59 exhibits
a quantum of social truth, devout Freudians could claim that Canetti holds
Freud to a standard that is simply incommensurate with the latter’s own
claims.60Whatever the case may be, it should be noted that Canetti sounds a
critique here (and in the instances discussed below) that will echo through-
out later Freud reception. Even—or especially—those who wish to redeem
Freud for use in social theory will have occasion to address what is seen as
psychoanalysis’s inherent propensity to privatize what properly belongs to
the social. In the end, of course, Auto-da-Fé is limited in its engagement to
the tools of fiction: it can merely provoke, satirize, and suggest; clearly, it
cannot disprove in a purely analytic sense.
If the assessment of the novel’s Freud critique must to some extent re-
main in the eye of the beholder, there can be little doubt as to the narrative’s
almost heavy-handed allusion to Freud. Anna imaginatively refashions the
sickly and slight grocery clerk into an avenging black knight, creating a fairy
tale with a thick network of Freudian motifs that would seem to rival any of
Bruno Bettelheim’s examples from Kinder brauchen Märchen (published as
The Uses of Enchantment). Franz gives Anna a treasured cigarette, which she
caresses and nuzzles as if it were a baby, stowing it on her person in a place
her father would never think to violate (just below her breasts); but of course
he does. Franz, ‘‘the noble knight’’ (der edle Ritter), declines the opportunity
to elope quietly, insisting instead on the honor of ceremoniously behead-
ing the father, which in turn triggers an additional Oedipal desire. Suddenly
Franz feels impelled to bring ‘‘the father’s red head’’ to mother (albeit to
Anna’s mother): ‘‘ ‘To mother,’ he says, ‘she should also have some happi-
ness.’ ’’ 61Uponwinning his ‘‘virgin’’ bride in thismanner, Franz comments in
a way that seems to exceed his own understanding: ‘‘Today . . . I’ll carry you
off back home.’’ 62 But just as Canetti explicitly invokes the fairy tale atmo-
sphere only to parody it, so too does he evoke the language and imagery of
psychoanalysis only to undermine it.63 For in the chapter’s parting gambit,
it becomes clear that the expectations aroused by these Freudian allusions
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are not only unfulfilled, but reversed. Pfaff ’s naked aggression fully suffices
to motivate the unmistakable masochism of Anna’s richly imagined revenge
fantasy; we have little need for Freudian notions that posit masochism in
pubescent girls and women as a product of the female Oedipus complex.64
Franz’s utility to Anna lies not in his function as father replacement, or even
as erotic love object, but purely in his role as potential patricide. When we
read ‘‘She wants to get a husband in order to get away from home,’’ 65 we
fully realize that Anna is not just any teenage girl anxious to make her way
in the adult world. Quite in contrast to the powerful black knight of her fan-
tasy, the real Franz turns out to be a common thief who is thrown in jail,
whence he is unable to perform his rescue function. Because he is impotent
to deliver her from paternal harm, Anna dismisses Franz as immaterial to
her real concern.66
If ‘‘The Good Father’’ disputes the dominant Freudian narrative on
fathers and daughters, it does so without the intent of creating sustained
sympathy for Anna, or for similarly abused girls, as an end in itself. Though
aware that his narrative revision cast the daughter in a relatively more com-
passionate light, Canetti’s aesthetics demand here as elsewhere a cool, un-
sentimental consideration of the issues at stake. By abjuring the aesthetics of
identification, that is, by eschewing a lachrymose portrayal of the brutalized
daughter, Canetti prevents us from ‘‘dissolving ourselves’’—to echo Kien’s
fears about popular novels—in empathy for an Anna, who of course to some
extent remains a comic cipher. Instead (and, like Brecht, Canetti saw this
as an either/or situation), the novel’s strikingly dispassionate depiction of
father-daughter violence invites a responsewhose energies would not be dis-
charged within the story, but directed outward to the world the novel seeks
to engage. To put it simply: Anna’s stark unreality contrasts productively
with the reality of the social problems to which she points. In confronting
Freud’s ‘‘Dora’’ with his own Anna, Canetti strikes a blow at the explana-
tory power of the Oedipus complex, the very centerpiece of Freud’s whole
theory. Pfaff ’s sexual violence is undeniably real and inescapably ‘‘out there’’:
‘‘To be sure he took his stepdaughter off the bed and beat her bloody.’’ 67 No
less than Georg’s neoempiricism and Kien’s elitist conception of scholarship
and idealist culture, psychoanalysis makes its appearance in Auto-da-Fé as
a popular but fatally flawed brand of blindness to a world that will not be
ignored.
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Georg and Countertransference: The Machiavellian Analyst
The figure of Georg, the gynecologist turned psychiatrist, might seem at
first glance the most obvious place to begin an investigation of the novel’s
engagement with Freud. But are we justified now in viewing Georg as a kind
of Freudian analyst, especially in light of our prior association of him with
the explicitly non-Freudian psychological movement known as neoempiri-
cism? Can we have it both ways? Canetti’s undogmatically and capaciously
drawn figure does indeed evince several key Freudian concepts and prac-
tices, as wewill see below; but wemust keep in mind that Georg both evokes
and exceeds this role. He is not merely a cipher, as in a roman à clef, for the
psychoanalyst; as we have seen, he is a crystallization site for a whole clus-
ter of cultural movements, including neoempiricism, primitivist ‘‘life phi-
losophy’’ (Lebensphilosophie), and, yes, Freudian analysis as well. Though
Canetti goes to some lengths to satirize the psychoanalyst as unacknowl-
edged power broker—reprising one of his favorite themes—the parody ulti-
mately functions to discredit Georg as the oracle of crowd theory. In other
words, in this case Canetti actually employs Freudian notions, though only
provisionally, in order to undermine Georg’s pseudosolution to the crisis of
modern culture.
The chapter that introduces us to Georg, ‘‘AMadHouse’’ (Ein Irrenhaus),
is laced with Freudian references, as perhaps any sustained treatment of psy-
chology by 1930 would inevitably be. Georg’s jealous assistants, for example,
link their director’s unorthodox methods and unbridled ambition to a dis-
turbed childhood and in particular to a fear of sexual impotence.68 Earlier
in the novel, too, we notice the broad influence of popularized Freudian
ideas in the comic portrayal of thewedding night—a subject towhich Georg
himself will later turn in an effort to analyze his brother. After the wedding
ceremony,Therese produces the key, whichKien cannot find despite desper-
ate fumbling in his pant pockets. She proceeds to dominate sexually, albeit
unsuccessfully, in a manner that has led one critic (Foell) to view her as a
‘‘phallic mother.’’ Kien clearly recognizes that his chief nuptial task (‘‘seine
Aufgabe’’) is now to initiate sexual intercourse, and attempts to build up his
courage to do so.69 Ultimately, he reaches the conclusion that sexual inter-
course, presumably by means of the Freudian ‘‘principle of constancy,’’ will
bring him relief from the nightmares he attributes to his abstemious life-
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style: ‘‘The bad dreams of these last days were doubtless connected with the
exaggerated austerity of his life. Everything would be different now.’’ 70Thus,
sex is for Kien a necessary evil, a kind of pressure release valve that will allow
him to carry on his service to culture more efficiently.
Evoking similar notions of popularized Freudianism, Georg, on his way
to Munich to aid his beleaguered brother, wonders what could possibly be
ailing his virtually sexless older brother. Revealing the Freudian conception
that personality disorders are rooted in the psychic management of sexual
instincts, Georg queries: ‘‘What could be oppressing him, an almost sex-
less creature?’’ 71 Peter’s apparent sexlessness only momentarily stumps the
stellar psychiatrist, who quickly modifies his diagnosis to madness brought
on by exaggerated repression (rather than absence) of sexuality: ‘‘Peter be-
longs in a lock-up facility. He has lived chastely for too long.’’ 72 These and
numerous other episodes that evoke the general atmosphere of Freudian
psychology are more than witty and wicked instances of the novel’s comic
background music. Indeed, they set the stage and direct our attention to the
question of Georg’s relationship to psychoanalysis.
On closer consideration, however, we discover there is much that sets
Georg apart from Freud, at least on the surface. Most important is Georg’s
conviction that his whole approach to psychology is fundamentally anti-
bourgeois, not to mention his deepest desire to leave the mentally ill, as
far as possible, in their state of intense and ‘‘authentic’’ (if psychotic) delir-
ium. While some critics may wish to view precisely these characteristics as
inverted references, respectively, to Freud’s own pronounced political con-
servatism and to psychoanalysis’s reputation as an essentially ‘‘bourgeois
discipline,’’ 73 it may be more correct to say that it is specifically Georg’s mis-
placed belief in his own radicalism that constitutes the parody.74 That is, just
as Freud fancied himself a bourgeois critic in certain matters of sexuality, he
actually served to undergird that class at a deeper level. This aside, there is a
more obvious point of contact with Freud: Georg’s lauded form of treatment
consists exclusively of the ‘‘talking cure.’’ Gerald Stieg, at any rate, does not
hesitate to refer to this practice as ‘‘Georg’s psychoanalytic therapy’’ and to
the practitioner himself as a ‘‘psychoanalyst.’’ 75
An example of Georg’s ‘‘Freudian’’ approach can be gleaned from his at-
tempt to cure Kien by taking him back to the origins of his misogyny in
order then to rid him of this disturbance:
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Georg noticed very well every time Peter’s voice went sharp. It was
enough that his thoughts returned to the woman upstairs. He had not
said a word about her, but already in his voice there betrayed itself a
screeching, shrill, incurable hatred . . . He must be induced to give vent
to as much of his hatred as possible. If only he would simply retrace the
events as they had appeared to him from their origins onwards in a simple
narrative! Georg knew well how to play the part of the eraser in such a
retrospect, and to wipe from the sensitive plate of memory all its traces.76
Here we see Georg intent upon helping Kien manage his irrational hatred
not with drugs or electroshock therapy or even by means of incarcera-
tion (despite an earlier temptation to do just that), but by listening to and
interpreting the stories of his patient. The very image of Georg as eraser
(Radiergummi) may already contain the novel’s caricature of this practice,
yet ‘‘erasure’’ is not all that far from the term Anna O. would famously
give to the Freudian talking cure: ‘‘chimney sweeping.’’ 77 This attempt to
have Peter ‘‘talk away’’ his problems 78 raises the question of Georg’s overall
track record with patient treatment, his own claims to unqualified success
notwithstanding.
The hallmark of Georg’s spectacular new treatment consists not merely
in talking (and then erasing), but in his active encouragement of that central
event in psychoanalytic therapy known as ‘‘transference.’’ Freud once de-
scribed transference as the therapeutic revival of ‘‘a whole series of psycho-
logical experiences . . . not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the
person of the physician at the present moment.’’ 79 This process of inappro-
priate projection onto the essentially unknown person of the psychoanalyst
provides crucial insights into the patient’s personal history and is consid-
ered to be indispensable to the psychoanalytic cure. Psychologist and Freud
expert Stephen Frosh explains that ‘‘transference has increasingly come to
be seen as the central element in the psychoanalytic situation, encouraged
by the passivity and ‘blank screen’ behaviour of the analyst.’’ 80
Georg considers himself, as we observed above, to be precisely such a
neutral recipient of his patients’ manias, his preferred self-appellation being
eine spazierende Wachstafel that passively registers only his patients’ needs:
‘‘Instead of working over things or responding to them, he received them
mechanically.’’ 81 Canetti could hardly have devised an image more likely to
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conjure Freud’s own figure for the properly objective and distant analyst.
‘‘The physician,’’ Freud writes, ‘‘should be opaque to the patient and, like a
mirror, show nothing but what is shown to him.’’ 82 Though Georg’s claim to
objectivity and neutrality is ultimately belied, as we saw above, by his own
behavior, his effort to engage his patients’ fantasies and desires does evoke
(even if it simultaneously misconstrues) the Freudian ‘‘reliance of analysts
on making an alliance with the patient’s ego.’’ 83
Notice in the following passage, part of which we have already visited in
another context, how the encouragement of the patient’s fantasy projections
is intimately linked to the therapist’s exercise of power. Here Georg, cloth-
ing himself in the narrator’s voice, is describing his most promising patients,
whom he (like Freud) would treat in his own apartment:
There he would easily win, if he did not enjoy it already, the confidence
of those who, towards anyone else, would hide behind the screen of their
insanity. Kings he addressed reverently as Your Majesty; with Gods he
would fall on his knees and fold his hands. Thus even the most sublime
eminences stooped to him and went into particulars. He became their
sole confidant, whom, from the moment they had recognized him, they
would keep informed of the changes in their own spheres and seek his
advice. He advised them with crystal cleverness, as though their wishes
were his own, cautiously keeping their arms and their beliefs before his
eyes . . . Was he not after all their chief minister, their prophet or their
apostle, occasionally even their chamberlain? 84
It hardly needs to be said that Georg, his self-image notwithstanding, hardly
fulfills the psychoanalytic contract: rather than assisting his patients to re-
solve their conflicts, he actively encourages their delusions by taking on and
playing out their fantasies. Without a doubt, Georg’s evocation of transfer-
ence simultaneously contravenes the fundamental Freudian precept barring
analysts from abandoning their neutrality: ‘‘On no account must the analyst
live up to the transference,’’ writes Frosh, paraphrasing Freud’s own warn-
ings of 1915 contained in a paper titled ‘‘Observations onTransference Love’’:
‘‘every departure from analytic distance and the pure pursuit of truth sup-
ports the patient’s resistances andmakes the analytic workmore difficult.’’ 85
The caricatured nature of this allusion to Freudian analysis may be held
by some to exonerate authentically practiced psychoanalysis. But the oppo-
site may in fact be true: For the caricature only draws out the structural
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imbalance endemic to the patient-analyst relationship. Frosh elucidates this
inherent potential for abuse, of which Georgmakes rich use: ‘‘[Psychoanaly-
sis] accentuates the power of the therapist to such a degree that it appears
to validate authoritarianism . . . The real distress engendered in the patient
by experiences which s/he has undergone are taken up into the person of
the analyst so that all reality is lost and everything is understood in terms
of the transference relationship—an astonishing piece of megalomania, if
nothing worse.’’ 86 Canetti satirizes this aspect of analytic hubris in Georg’s
purported ability to cure schizophrenia precisely by hosting, as it were, the
patient’s rival personalities in his own consciousness: ‘‘The scientific world
argued vigorously over his treatment of schizophrenia of the most varied
kinds. If a patient, for instance, imagined himself to be two people who had
nothing in common or who were in conflict with each other, Georg Kien
adopted a method which had at first seemed very dangerous even to him:
he made friends with both parties . . . Then he would proceed to the cure.
In his own consciousness he would gradually draw the separate halves of
the patient—as he embodied them—closer to each other, and thus gradu-
ally would rejoin them.’’ 87 It does not much matter that the bulk of Freud’s
patients were neurotics, not psychotics like Georg’s clientele. Nor is it ulti-
mately important that Freud specifically cast doubt on the effectiveness of
analysis for psychotics. For this caricature is clearly not drawn out of a con-
cern for scrupulous fairness to Freud, but to ridicule the tyranny of the ana-
lyst. Indeed, Freud’s own dictatorial certainty that Dora’s adamant denials of
the master’s diagnosis were actually covert affirmations of his insights may
not have been far from Canetti’s mind.88 The last sentence of the passage
quoted above indulges in comic hyperbole, to be sure, yet it also expresses
Canetti’s conviction that psychoanalysis, authorized in this instance by the
privilege of the all-powerful analyst, is complicit in the reduction of social
tomental phenomena.The patient, after all, no longer even exists for Georg,
except as a function of the analyst’s consciousness. As in the case of Pfaff ’s at-
tempt to subordinate Anna’s existence to his own, we aremeant to recognize
psychoanalysis as a dubious accomplice in this process. Despite consider-
able liberties, then, Georg’s ‘‘quite controversial’’ treatment captures rather
effectively the problematic role assigned to the Freudian therapist, namely
to ‘‘take up into the person of the analyst’’ (Frosh) all the patient’s fantasies
and desires in order then to assist in the resolution of psychic disturbances. It
should come as no surprise, then, to learn that Canetti would later describe
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the psychoanalyst’s ‘‘blank screen’’ behavior as ‘‘cold’’ and ‘‘power-hungry’’
and the analysand, conversely, as ‘‘helpless’’ and ‘‘exposed.’’ 89 From this per-
spective, Georg’s celebrated method of mending a split ego serves as a kind
of cautionary tale about the potential for ontological reductionism implicit
in the therapeutic relationship.
But Georg is not merely a walking illustration of the imbalance of power
intrinsic to the transference phenomenon. He crosses the line and commits
the cardinal psychoanalytic sin of countertransference in allowing his own
response to one of his favorite patients to influence the treatment outcome
of that patient. Jean Préval is one of the doctor’s model patients, and as such
serves well in characterizing Georg.The assistants at the psychiatric institute
marvel at and envy their leader’s ability to treat this particularly intractable
case. Georg’s phenomenal success consists of nothing more than encourag-
ing Jean’s delusion that his absent wife is indeed present, when she has in fact
disappeared long ago, having run off with a young officer. Georg’s encour-
agement is clearly the key factor in the diurnal conjuring of an imaginary
Jeanne: ‘‘ ‘But Jean, she’s in the net, don’t you see her?’ ’’ the analyst would
insist; and, lo: ‘‘He was always right. His friend opened his mouth and look,
his wife was there.’’ 90 Although the assistants try the very same trick (‘‘die
Zauberformel ’’), only the trusted Georg can fulfill this fantasy: ‘‘Every day
he helped Jean produce her.’’ 91
While thismayalready constitute psychoanalyticmalpractice, it is not yet
countertransference. This first occurs at a point in the novel celebrated by
other critics as Georg’s eloquent disquisition on the futility of individuality
and the inevitability of the crowd—a passage that, as we noted above, has
consistently been seen as an expression of Canetti’s own views on the crowd,
and therefore has endowed Georg with an ill-deserved authority. Basking in
his ability to mediate the multitudinous roles imagined for him by his psy-
chotic patients, and despairing at his assistants’ constitutional incapacity to
do so, this preeminent psychiatrist is inspired to explain what distinguishes
him from these mundane colleagues. Georg decries their overly restrictive,
unidimensional psyches (‘‘ihre flachen Seelen’’).What these overly cultivated
apprentices refuse to acknowledge, claims Georg, and here he is echoing the
Lebensphilosophie that first converted him to psychiatry, is the primal drive
toward the crowd: ‘‘Of that far deeper andmost essential motive force of his-
tory, the desire ofmen to rise into a higher type of animal, into themass, and
to lose themselves in it so completely as to forget that one man ever existed,
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they [the assistants] had no idea. For they were educated, and education is in
itself a cordon sanitaire for the individual against themass in his own soul.’’ 92
As we noted above when we first began to glimpse the fundamental simi-
larity between Georg and Kien, Georg’s espousal of the crowd is calculated
initially to evoke readerly sympathy. Not only is the bearer of this message
the novel’s first—and only—really attractive character, but themessage itself
seems correctly to diagnose Kien’s own abuse of high culture, namely as a
‘‘Festungsgürtel’’ (fortress belt) against a feared modernity envisioned by
the elitist professor precisely as the province of the masses. Kien’s fortress-
like library, the walled-up windows of which are meant to keep the world at
bay, is only the most obvious of symptoms and symbols in this regard. Add
to this Canetti’s later analysis of crowds—in pointed but unacknowledged
opposition to Freud—as fundamentally positive human groupings fulfilling
primal urges, and one can easily grasp the temptation of so much Canetti
scholarship to view Georg as the mouthpiece of the author of Crowds and
Power.
This view, actively encouraged by the novel on the one hand, is substan-
tially qualified by the very context of these remarks, thus creating a stimu-
lating narrative dynamic, a push and pull that makes us aware of our own
readerly desire inherent in the hermeneutic process. Some critics, beginning
with Barnouw, had early on begun to suspect that Georg is hardly the dispas-
sionate voice of reason, as we have noted. Yet apart from what has been said
about Georg’s questionable practices and general unreliability elsewhere in
the novel, no one has yet observed how the very passage that is supposed
to elevate Georg’s trustworthiness as bearer of crowd theory actually under-
mines his status considerably. For it is within the context of an egregious
instance of countertransference onto his star patient Jean that Georg delivers
this vaunted soliloquy on the crowd.
Madness, says Georg, is attributable to an untenable repression of the
masses within. In what sounds like an instinctual theory à la Freud—sub-
stitute ‘‘libido’’ for ‘‘crowd’’ and it would be hard to tell the difference—our
psychiatrist postulates the following: ‘‘Countless people go mad because the
crowd in them is particularly strongly developed and can get no satisfaction.
In no other way did he explain himself and his own activity. Once he had
lived for his private tastes, his ambition and women; now his one desire was
perpetually to lose himself. In this activity he came nearer to the thoughts
and wishes of the crowd, than did those other individuals who surrounded
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him.’’ 93 Whereas Georg had previously claimed to be interested also in his-
torically real crowds—‘‘die Wirksamkeit der Masse in der Geschichte’’ 94—he
ends up interiorizing this social phenomenon. Like his philologist brother,
Georg’s advocacy of grand explanatory theories turns out to serve his im-
mediate (and, as wewill presently see, changing) needs.HereGeorg is claim-
ing to have successfully circumvented the dangers of an erupting crowd by
assimilating the porous, malleable self he so valued in the gorilla man; in
other words, by his therapeutic practice of ‘‘perpetually losing himself.’’ We
might note in passing that this conception implies a humorous reversal in
which patients serve as fodder for the analyst’s own self-therapy—a prepa-
ratory step in the process of countertransference that will follow. But at this
point, which represents the grand finale of Georg’s oration about crowds,
what is essential to notice is that the crowd has become an intrapsychic phe-
nomenon. Precisely by playing out the many roles assigned him, above all
by successfully mediating the presence of the spectral Jeanne that inaugu-
rates this discourse on the crowd in the first place, Georg claims to have ap-
peased his own ‘‘inner crowd.’’ Like the psychotic patients he treats, Georg
has become the crowd, and therefore need not fear its vengeance.
All such ‘‘philosophical’’ musings on crowd theory are of course brack-
eted by the story of the unfortunate village blacksmith turned mass mur-
derer, Jean Préval, whom Georg approaches once again on evening rounds.
But Georg’s fortunes have suddenly turned: his assistants are no longer en-
amored or even jealous of their leader, and the once fawning patients have
become indifferent: ‘‘A sad day, he said softly to himself . . . He always
breathed in the stream of other people’s feelings.Today he could feel nothing
around him, only the heavy air.’’ 95 In this depressive mood, Georg encoun-
ters Jean’s relentless and now tiresome preoccupation with his long-since-
departed wife. Reminded of his own flagging marriage—Georg will soon
confess: ‘‘My wife bores me’’ 96—he mounts the countertransference. An-
noyed specifically by the connubial loyalty he observes in his patient, Georg
takes his revenge on the imaginary wife Jeanne: ‘‘ ‘Hit her over the head,’ said
Georg, he was sick and tired with this thirty-two years of faithfulness. Jean
hit her hard and performed the screams of help for her.’’ 97 Though Jean’s be-
havior is initially no different today than on any other day, his request elicits
not the blank screen analytic behavior even Georg sometimes musters, but
functions instead to trigger a crisis in the analyst’s own life. Georg’s cher-
ished self-image, the very therapeutic structure, let us recall, that permits
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him to host his inner crowd and cure his patients, is now endangered: ‘‘Be-
sides, the wax tablet was melting.’’ 98 Now not even indulging in a fantasy of
his own future fame can cheer him up, for hemust face the fact that such rev-
eries only delay what he desperately wants to avoid entirely, namely going
home to his wife: ‘‘Why don’t I go home? Because my wife’s there. She wants
love . . . The wax tablet weighed heavy.’’ 99
This instance of imaginary wife-beating probably has very little to do
with raising readers’ consciousness about actual domestic violence, particu-
larly since Jean himself supplies the screams for his imagined victim. Yet it
represents an important point of convergence for the themes we have been
thus far considering. The only Jeanne we know, and the one Jean batters, is
after all largely the product of the omnipotent analyst. As such, she under-
scores her creator’s depoliticizing tendency, already in evidence during the
interpolated monologue on crowd theory. In deploying ‘‘Jeanne,’’ Georg
clearly employs his power to enforce the internalization of a problem en-
meshed in the iconic events of economic modernity. Though trapped now
in psychotic delusions, Jean Préval’s woes originate of course in his eco-
nomic displacement. As village blacksmith, he has been ruined by the ar-
rival of automobiles. ‘‘His wife, after a few weeks of acute poverty, could no
longer endure her life with him and ran off with a sergeant.’’ 100 Though he
claims to want to find the actual wife, Georg is constitutionally ill equipped
to do so; as a psychologist he is disinclined to attend to the socioeconomic
causes of his patient’s symptoms.101 Rather than persuade Jean to learn a
new trade more promising in the late industrial period, Georg encourages
him to see himself not as socially embedded, but as an eternal type, that
is, as the wronged and vengeful husband from ancient mythology, Vulkan,
who catches his wife in the act of infidelity. Alluding to Freud’s own well-
known love of ancient mythology, and his tendency to build psychoanalysis
around archetypical situations prefigured in myth, Canetti endows Georg
with a similar passion. This is why Georg, even when he speaks of Jeanne
as a real-world woman, incites his star patient to imagine his regained wife
as Venus, trapped in Vulkan’s incriminating and punishing net.102 Though
a specific act of countertransference triggers the intertextual connection to
Freud, what is principally on trial here is Georg’s larger transference of a
fundamentally social problem—one pointedly rooted in the industrial dis-
locations of the early part of this century—to the realm of fantasy and uni-
versal myth. At issue, by extension, is Georg’s entire conversion to psychia-
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try. Recall that he then claimed to leave behind the debauchery of easy sex
and anesthetizing French literature, a kind of ‘‘schöngeistige Literatur ’’ he
felt papered over the cracks of the real world, in order honestly to confront
a more complex and diverse reality. In his treatment of Jean Préval we see
that Georg’s earlier commitment to multiplicity and difference is belied by
his method of subsuming individual cases under prefabricated mythologi-
cal constructs, a charge that precisely coincides with one of Canetti’s central
and repeated critiques of psychoanalysis as master narrative—‘‘the aridity
of a single theory that would apply to all human beings.’’ 103 In the end, then,
Georg’s apparent abandonment of gynecology in favor of psychiatry proves
to be a homecoming—itself a kind of humorous Freudian allusion. Yet as
much as Canetti may wish to loosen the grip of Freud on the popular imagi-
nation, it is noteworthy that the novel also capitalizes on this widespread
cultural narrative. For it is partly due to the unwitting help of an admit-
tedly bowdlerized Freud that we come to see Georg’s crowd theory as the
opportunistic cant it essentially is.
In the Termite Colony
Alluding to the extremely popularCivilization and Its Discontents,Canetti
has his fictional Freudian analyst concoct and apply his own, roughly paral-
lel, account of the rise of society and culture. The context of Georg’s tale of
the termite colony, which ismeant to coaxKien into revealing his own libidi-
nal drives, is at least as important as the story itself. Rather than rendering
Kien a cooperative patient, however, Georg’s efforts only incite the learned
scholar to ever greater heights of misogynist erudition. At the heart of this
sibling rivalry, inwhichKien ultimately gains the upper hand, are competing
notions of culture. Kien’s rebuttal of Georg’s termite parable illustrates the
shortcomings of the Freudian account: culture is not so much the achieved
product of sublimation, we learn, but the site and record of ongoing conflict.
Though Freud had already rehearsed his fundamental ideas on societal
ontogeny in Totem and Taboo (1912–13), these views received fresh articu-
lation and widespread circulation in 1930, the year Canetti began work on
the novel. ‘‘Freud could take comfort in his book’s astonishing popularity,’’
notes Gay; ‘‘within a year, its first edition of 12,000, exceptionally large for a
work of Freud’s, was sold out.’’ 104 Georg’s anthropomorphic tale, which en-
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visions a society founded upon the renunciation of the sexual drive, could
thus scarcely have failed to evoke Freud at this time. Reflecting his primitivist
orientation and the influence of his guru (the gorilla man), Georg displaces
his story onto the animal kingdom.The very choice of termites seems calcu-
lated, as Stieg has suggested, to evoke Freud; for at one point in Civilization
Freud muses about termites as having achieved an ideal state of stable sub-
limation that forever eludes humans.105 Though Freud distinguished human
from termite society, he simultaneously presents it as an ideal of sorts and
therefore comparable in some respects. Georg’s humorous explosion of the
Freudianmetaphoraffords us the critical perspectivewe have come to expect
in Canetti. Above all, the use of termites permits Canetti the opportunity of
targeting one of the weakest links in Freudian theory, namely a notoriously
unspecific theory of drives.106 Contrary to Stieg, who argues that Canetti’s
cultural critique actually rests upon the Freudian theory of psychic econ-
omy, we will see how the novel parodies this foundational conception of
drives.107
But first let us have the tale—or at least the first half—in Georg’s own
words:
Even some insects have it better than we do. One or a very few mothers
bring into being the entire race. The rest remain underdeveloped. Is it
possible to live at closer quarters than the termites do? What a terrifying
accumulation of sexual stimuli such a stock would produce—if the crea-
tures still possessed their sexuality! They do not possess it; and have the
related instincts only in small quantities. Even what little they have, they
fear.When they swarm, at which period thousands, nay millions, are de-
stroyed apparently without reason, I see in this a release of the amassed
sexuality of the stock. They sacrifice a part of their number, in order to
preserve the rest from the aberrations of love. The whole stock would go
aground on this question of love, were it once to be permitted.108
While broadly alluding to Freud, this is clearly a rather imperfect clone of
that master narrative. Yet it is precisely in those ways in which Georg’s tale
alters its original that it becomes interesting as critique. Repression and sub-
limation are for Freud the sine qua non of human society, whereas the in-
stincts of termites represent unalterable, genetically determined behavior
patterns. A termite’s sociability is as predetermined as a moth’s attraction to
light; there is never a question of their forgetting or remembering a sexuality
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sacrificed for the benefit of society. The pseudoscience again pokes through
as we observe Georg’s unabashed anthropomorphism: the termites, we are
told, fear even the residual sexual instinct still in their possession.
Canetti’s use of the termite parable could be dismissed as another instance
of the novel’s ‘‘hyperbolic parody,’’ a perhaps gratuitous burlesque on con-
temporary ideas. But to do so would be to fail to grasp the way in which
this perhaps illegitimate transposition nevertheless raises valid and funda-
mental questions about Freud’s theory of drives. Freud of course observed
a distinction between hardwired animal instincts (what Laplanche calls the
‘‘zoological’’ viewpoint) and those human drives (Triebe) deemed to bemal-
leable and redirectable to other ends;109 yet Freud himself remained unclear
on this crucial point. In having Georg espouse the patently absurd view that
termites can somehow manage their own instincts, Canetti raises a serious
set of questions regarding the process in humans.What is the domain of the
‘‘Instinkt’’ and what that of the ‘‘Trieb’’? Where does biological determin-
ism leave off, and where (and how) can analysis intervene in the economy of
drives? If the actual determinants of sublimation remain shrouded in uncer-
tainty, then what can be said about the civilization to which these repressed
drives have supposedly given rise? These are some unresolved and perhaps
unresolvable aporias of psychoanalysis implied in Georg’s blatantly incom-
mensurate example.
The parodyachieves sharper focus in the secondhalf of the story, inwhich
Georg’s fixation on a potential termite bacchanalia reflects his own unabated
prurient interests as much as it continues to assault the Freudian notion of
drives. Tellingly, the hard-wired Instinkt we noted above metamorphoses
into theTrieb just at the point when the termites begin to act like the humans
Georg really has in mind. The following passage, which in the novel follows
immediately upon the one quoted above, begins as pure speculation but
modulates by way of the historical present verb tense into a very immediate
scenario:
I can imagine nothingmore poignant than an orgy in a colonyof termites.
The creatures forget—a colossal recollection has seized hold of them—
what they really are, the blind cells of a fanatic whole. Each will be him-
self, it begins with a hundred or a thousand of them, themadness spreads,
their madness, a mass madness, the soldiers abandon the gates, thewhole
mound burns with unsatisfied love, they cannot find their partners, they
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have no possibility of sex, the noise, the excitement far greater than any-
thing usual, attracts a storm of ants; through the unguarded gates their
deadly enemies press in, what soldier thinks of defending himself, they
only want love; and the colony might have lived for all eternity—that
eternity for which we all long—dies, dies of love, of that drive [Trieb]
through which we, mankind, prolong our existence! A sudden reversal
of the wisest into the most foolish.110
This ‘‘sudden reversal’’ dramatizes the conflict inherent in the Freudian
explanation of culture: in so far as we are civilized at all, we are doomed
to unhappiness. Georg’s specter of the advance of the killer ants may dis-
tort the threat (since Freud did not envision the peril as coming from with-
out), but it does so in a manner that draws our attention to the fundamental
trade-off implicit in the Freudian model of repression. If the termites seek
to fulfill their deep sexual urges, this leads inevitably to social disintegration
and certain death. Frosh could be speaking about Georg’s make-believe ter-
mites, but he is of course commenting on Freud’s view of civilization when
he observes: ‘‘Before society there is only the unremitting and potentially
calamitous libertarianism of the instincts; as soon as these instincts become
bridled, society is formed . . . The theory that society is ineluctably opposed
to individuality is one of the most pessimistic strands of thought associated
with the bourgeois era. For Freud, the passions of the individual were pri-
mordial and dangerous, the work of civilisation being to control them—a
justifiable work in the interests of the perpetuation of human existence.’’ 111
It is not merely the termite story that mocks Freud’s global explication of
society and culture, it is Georg himself. He has positioned himself, as we re-
cently saw, as the novel’s bold proponent of the crowd, as the sworn enemyof
an isolationist, overindividuated cultivation that insulates us from ourdeep-
est ‘‘crowd drives.’’ In pointed contrast to his brother, Georg anoints him-
self—to borrow the title of Ernst Toller’s well-knownWeimar-era play—the
novel’s great ‘‘Masse Mensch’’ (crowd man). Here we catch him in the act of
donning yet another, ill-fitting pseudophilosophical, hat. As the ‘‘Freudian’’
teller of the termite tale, he espouses a view quite incompatible with the very
recently and earnestly espoused belief that the so-called crowd instinct is our
deepest drive.With his claim that the sexual drive is both primordial and, in
its naked quest for fulfillment, inherently opposed to social organization, he
has clearly reversed himself. Whereas the ‘‘mass drive’’ (Massentrieb) made
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its appearance just a few pages prior as itself a kind of libido, somehow both
mankind’s first cause and destiny, here the sexual drive emerges as a de-
cidedly less reliable friend of the ‘‘crowd.’’ It functions as a force for social
cohesion only as long as it is bound by sublimation. But Georg suggests that
it is only a matter of time until it emerges unshackled and destructive. It will
erupt even amidst a species as sexless as termites, and, by extension, within
his ‘‘virtually sexless’’ (beinah geschlechtslos) elder brother; and in this push
for erotic requital it operates (as Freud had argued) as a virulent solvent on
social bonds. If this turnabout has eluded some critics, it is because Georg—
no less than Pfaff—is a great manipulator of language. This individualistic
drive for sexual gratification that dissolves the group into pleasure-seeking
monads becomes within the space of a sentence a ‘‘mass hysteria’’ (Massen-
wahn), a term that may mask the otherwise blatant inconsistency with his
previous position. Georg, it turns out, really is the protean player (Schau-
spieler) Kien accuses him of being; in championing a roughly Freudian view
of culture, he is now simply following the latest fad.
All the pseudoscientific jargon notwithstanding, Georg was never really
talking about instinctual theory per se, but about women. Freud simply pre-
sented Georg the opportunity to dress up the misogyny he hoped would
please his older brother in the garb of a respectable scholarly illustration.
Georg admits as much when, just before he deploys the termite tale, he sees
as his primary mission the task of removing Therese: ‘‘Evidently [Kien] ex-
pected Georg to take her away.’’ 112 By way of introduction to the termite
parable, Georg remarks: ‘‘ ‘I believe . . . that you overestimate the importance
of women. You take them too seriously, you think they are human beings
like us. I see in women merely a passing necessary evil. Even some insects
have it better than we do.’ ’’ 113 The subsequent story—or at least the first
half, which holds out the prospect of firmly repressed sexuality—is meant
to appease if not win over his brother; for the termites have in this segment
already overcome this ‘‘necessary evil.’’ Kien refuses to take the point, how-
ever, and instead launches a tirade against the creation of woman, which he
concludes with the lamentation, ‘‘What misery for all time!’’ 114 This, in turn,
provides Georg the opportunity to clarify the point of his parable: ‘‘Why for
all time? We were just speaking a moment ago about the termites who have
overcome sex. It is therefore neither an inevitable nor an invincible evil.’’ 115
In the second half of the story, which ostensibly represents a fundamen-
tal reversal, it remains clear that ‘‘sexuality’’ (das Geschlecht) is not to be
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read as libidinal drives in general, but more specifically as ‘‘woman.’’ If the
first half of the story functions as a carrot, the second half is meant as a
stick. Even before he begins the story, Georg is evidently frustrated with his
brother’s unwillingness to submit to therapy. For Georg cannot perform his
chimney-sweeping function unless Kien cooperates in revealing the source
of his troubles with Therese. This is the passage, noted above, where Georg
offers to play the eraser, ‘‘if only Kienwould simply retrace the events . . . nar-
ratively back to their origin!’’ 116 The specter of the doomed termite orgy is
Georg’s threat of the return of the repressed, a warning he explicitly couches
as the (otherwise unmotivated) burning of Kien’s library. Submit tomy ther-
apy, Georg is saying, or suffer a similarly destructive fate. In denying the
applicability of the termite allegory (and its implicit threat), Kien under-
scores the fact that he and Georg are talking about women and not sexual
drives.117 Spare me your idle threats, Kien is saying, for I have already killed
off the woman at the root of my woes: ‘‘ ‘Of my own free will, alone, lean-
ing on no one—I had not even an accessory—I have liberated myself from
a weight, a burden, a living death, a rind of accursed granite. Where would
I be if I had waited for you?’ ’’ 118 Georg’s termite parable is thus dismissed
as superfluous. Kien has no need of grand psychosocial theories, for he has
tended to the concrete problem in his own immediate vicinity.
Have the Kien brothers, in their predisposition to see women as the seat
of sexuality and therefore as the real threat to culture, misread Freud? Not
entirely. For while Freud intoned inCivilization and Its Discontents that ‘‘it is
impossible to overlook the extent towhich civilization is built upon a renun-
ciation of instinct,’’ 119 he simultaneously succumbed to a tendency to iden-
tify instinct with women and the work of sublimation with men. ‘‘Women
represent the sexual impulse,’’ explains Frosh; ‘‘more prosaically, they are
always trying to reclaim their menfolk from the clutches of the work of
building culture (which forces men [according to Freud] to ‘carry out in-
stinctual sublimations of which women are little capable’) into their isolated
family units. Hence, civilisation opposes women by the same principle that
it opposes love.’’ 120 While the novel’s parody certainly extends to this in-
stance of slippage in Freud’s own work—about which Freudian revision-
ists have had a good deal to say—it takes primary aim at the more popular
Freudian reception. For it is within this larger orbit that popularizations,
like Georg’s termite narrative, would commingle Freudian ‘‘science’’ with
deeply ingrained cultural prejudice. Here Canetti shows how the language
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of biology and positivistic inquiry could be used to camouflage if not justify
real-world aggression toward women.
This is the cultural malaise with which Canetti confronts Freudian so-
cial psychology, and he does so through the improbable mouthpiece of Kien
himself. By this point in the novel—we are just short of the comic reso-
lution in which Georg buys the cooperation of Pfaff and Therese—it no
longer matters that the protagonist himself is discredited. For the truth of
this cultural diagnosis depends not on the benighted Kien, but on the data
he musters, which we recognize as existing independently of the fictional
novel. At the outset of this diatribe, we may be inclined to dismiss Kien’s
claim that ‘‘all really great thinkers are convinced of the worthlessness of
women’’ 121 as the bluster of a madman. But just as Georg often inadvertently
makes his case, Kienmanages to give us pause, despite himself.When at first
he cites Confucius and Buddha, we may still cling to the belief that we are in
the hands of a merely idiosyncratic Orientalist. Yet Kien soon demonstrates
that he has plenty of other illustrations at his disposal. ‘‘I will prove to you
that all women deserve hate,’’ he says to Georg. ‘‘You think I am expert only
on the Orient. The proofs he needs, he’s taken from his own area of spe-
cialty—or so you thought. I shall tear the blue down from the sky for you,
and I will tell no lies. Truths, beautiful, hard, pointed truths, truths of every
size and shape, truths of feeling and truths of understanding, even though
in your case only your feelings function, you woman.’’ 122
Indeed, as Kien is able to pluck his ‘‘proofs’’ so readily from ancient Greek
mythology and philosophy, and then quote whole passages from Homer in
support of his case, not tomention his citation of theNibelungenlied,Michel-
angelo’s Sistinemurals, Thomas Aquinas, ThomasMore, a foray into ancient
history, and so forth, it gradually becomes clear that this is no longer merely
a case of private dementia. A symptom of the very cultural malady he illus-
trates, Kien powerfully demonstrates not ‘‘that all women deserve hate,’’ but
the extent to which misogyny has been a constituent element of the cultural
canon. The picture we gain here is one of culture as a chauvinistic semiotic
battlefield, not the product of successfully sublimated libido. The violence
wewitnessed in the single case of Anna is here multiplied in the imagination
of artists and philosophers, and given high cultural standing in the process.
Kien does not cite Freud in this misogynist pantheon; he is far too past-
minded to take notice of this newcomer. But the novel does: not for pro-
moting the kind of rabid hatred that Kien spews forth, but for propagating
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a grand theory that is at once amenable to this age-old prejudice and simul-
taneously diverts our attention from it. Though Freud knew of real-world
violence—he famously sought to explain the barbarism ofWorldWar I—his
psychological model would emphasize violence as intrasubjective and prior
to the benefits of civilization. In one of the greatest, if bleakest, surveys of
world literature and culture, Auto-da-Fé seems intent upon redirecting our
attention to the fact that violence occurs within and in the name of civiliza-
tion, as well as to the fact that the object of that violence is not in the first
place some amorphously defined drives, but fellow human beings.
Rejection and Displacement: Freud as Foil
David Roberts asserted as recently as 1996 that ‘‘the rejection of psycho-
analysis, fuelled by Canetti’s encounter with and direct experience of the
crowd, is already the driving impulse of his early novel, Auto-da-Fé.’’ 123
While the foregoing has been concerned precisely to show in some detail
how this ‘‘driving impulse’’ determines the particular shape of this complex
novel, Roberts’s thesis had to wait for verification until we could move be-
yond the assumption that Canetti’s two principal works, Auto-da-Fé and
Crowds and Power, respond to this psychoanalytic impulse in the sameman-
ner. Reading Auto-da-Fé as a kind of literary encryption of Crowds and
Power has actually tended to emarginate Freud from the discussion of the
novel; for Georg can hardly be seen as the simultaneous bearer of Canetti’s
truth and of Freud’s error. This, too, was to prove a pitfall for Roberts, whose
laudable impulse to align these two works vis-à-vis Freud results in the less
than convincing proposition that Georg’s crowd theory encapsulates a kind
of alternate, group psychology that contrasts favorably with Freud’s unten-
able individual psychology.124 This simply entails too much reading back-
ward and fails to respect the novel in its own right.
Looking back at the novel’s literary engagement with Freud, we perceive
thoroughgoing negation rather than the positive ‘‘counter image’’ of society
Roberts would see in the novel. Now there can be no question of Freud
receiving a fair hearing in Auto-da-Fé. Canetti’s selection of recognizably
Freudian notions, though hardly capricious, is undoubtedly polemic in that
these ideas make their appearance only to be discarded as socially naive.
In ‘‘The Good Father’’ we were reminded of psychoanalysis’s predilection
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to psychologize real-world brutality; and in the person of Georg we noted
an associated tendency to discredit socioeconomic determinants (e.g., the
root causes of poor Jean Préval’s misfortune) in favor of intrapsychic and
mythological accounts. Similarly, the ultimate and unexpected applicability
of Georg’s termite parable to his elder brother’s deeply sexist and isolationist
practice of high culture illustrated the problematic limits of Freud’s group
psychology qua social theory. Auto-da-Fé thus echoes a standard critique
of psychoanalysis’s introverted gaze—though, given the novel’s chronologi-
cal priority, it would of course be more correct to say that these subsequent
critics echo Canetti.125 Hermann Broch perceptively observed that the novel
leaves only destruction in its wake; it does not rebuild on the site of its
ruin. Broch’s comment is no less apropos of the novel’s repudiation of Freud
than any other system of ideas or set of cultural practices treated in this
study. ‘‘There is something uncompromising about it that one has to re-
spect,’’ Broch observes. ‘‘But does thatmean that you’ve given up hope?Does
it mean that you yourself cannot find the way out, or does it mean that you
are in doubt altogether about such a way out?’’ 126
Broch did not live long enough to get the answer to his question, for the
‘‘way out’’ he sought but clearly missed in the novel would not emerge for
another thirty years, that is, until the publication of Crowds and Power in
1960. It is tempting to say that, by viewing Freud as the unacknowledged
agonmotivating bothworks, the latter study presents the answer to the ques-
tion posed by the novel. But this would simplify the way in which Crowds
and Power makes its own complex and ambitious case against Freud with
the quite different analytical tools available to a writer of nonfiction. De-
spite significant differences, it is nevertheless arresting to note how similar
both works are in their general approach to Freud. Indeed, Adorno could
be speaking of the novel when he says to Canetti: ‘‘Your critique seems to
me to be extremely fruitful and correct in many points, for the very reason
that Freud’s basic tendency to replace the theory of society by individual
psychology extended to the collectivity leads him time and again to the in-
variant fundamental quanta of the unconscious, neglecting essential histori-
cal modifications. As a result his social psychology remains somewhat ab-
stract.’’ 127 In the novel, Canetti was primarily concerned with clearing the
way for further inquiry, that is, with negation, but not because he wished to
promote a nihilistic worldview, as Peter Russell would famously accuse him.
Freud’s widespread acceptance, Canetti complained, simply led to compla-
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cency and to a dampening of intellectual curiosity. ‘‘The psychoanalytic epi-
demic had made advances,’’ Canetti laments. ‘‘The most astounding things
were occurring in the world, but it was always the same, arid background
against which they placed these events. They spoke of these things and con-
sidered them explained, and the phenomena were no longer surprising.
Where thinking should have commenced, there croaked instead an impudent
choir of frogs.’’ 128
With Crowds and Power Canetti fulfills the very agenda he set forth in the
novel. By then it was no longer enough to show the insufficiency of Freudian
ideas, confronting themwith stubborn facts of social reality. Now that he had
killed off father Freud, he would replace him. Significantly, Canetti begins
his study with the crowd (‘‘die Masse’’), viewing it as a fundamentally posi-
tive unit of social organization.The sine qua non of the crowd is an elemental
human experience Canetti labels ‘‘discharge’’ (Entladung), which engenders
a foundational sense of equality. ‘‘Before this the crowd doesn’t really exist,
it is the discharge which actually first constitutes it. This is the moment in
which all who belong to the crowd rid themselves of their differences and feel
as equals.’’ 129 All subsequent egalitarian social theories, Canetti maintains,
derive their power from the discharge phenomenon: ‘‘All demands for jus-
tice, all theories of equality draw their energy in the final analysis from this
experience of equality, which everyone knows in his/her own way from the
crowd.’’ 130 Canetti very likely chose the term Entladung specifically to chal-
lenge—or dislodge—Freud’s notion of psychic ‘‘Abfuhr’’ (discharge). For
Canetti posits a fundamental, positive value to the individual’s relationship
to social organization in implicit contrast to Freud’s notion of social group-
ings as the deeply conflicted by-product of libidinal sublimation. Society, in
other words, is not a necessary evil (as in the Freudian schema), but a central
good, albeit one eminently corruptible by the abuse of power.
Equally important was the need to dismantle and replace the central
Freudian concept, namely the Oedipus complex. At Adorno’s prodding,
Canetti admited that it was his ambition to retire the ill-defined Freudian
concept, which he refered to as ‘‘identification,’’ and replace it with his own
notion of ‘‘transformation’’ (Verwandlung), a concept that allows for growth
and development rather than the foreordained replay of the Oedipal con-
flict. Aware of the centrality of his own (and of the rival Freudian) concept,
Canetti vowed to return to this issue in a second volume of Crowds and
Power that never appeared in print during his lifetime. As his title (Masse
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und Macht) promises, Canetti lavishes a great deal of attention on the sub-
ject of power, espousing the proposition that violence and aggression are not
primarily intrapsychic, but intersubjective, phenomena. Power circulates
by way of ‘‘commands’’ (Befehle), which leave behind damaging ‘‘thorns’’
(Stachel ).131This curiouslymechanistic conception of power leaves no doubt
in the reader’s mind that violence breeds violence. Like Freud, Canetti ac-
knowledges the profound influence of childhood experience in later adult
life; but unlike Freud, Canetti is specifically worried that vulnerable chil-
dren will become the repositories of thorns, which will in turn only lead to
another cycle of violence in the next generation, when the victimized chil-
dren become perpetrating adults—this time with them as perpetrators—
later on in life. Guilt is redefined not as a function of Oedipal desires or as
a response to the primordial crime of killing the father, but as the conse-
quence of the misapplication of power. In case after case, Freud provides the
antimodel, a kind of invisible grid that explains the content and structure
of Crowds and Power.
This is not the place either to fully summarize or to critically assess the
ideas put forth in Crowds and Power.132 Yet enough may have been said to
demonstrate that this work contains a positive fund of ideas meant to dis-
place those of Freud and others. While there are clear and undeniable con-
tinuities between the novel and anthropological study at the level of fun-
damental attitude, there is much in the latter work that is not even hinted
at in the former. The novel whets our appetite for the subsequent study by
re-creating the curiosity Canetti claimed was destroyed by reverential and
derivative Freudian disciples—followers not unlike Georg’s fawning assis-
tants at the asylum. But it is simply untenable to claim that those innovative
ideas central to Crowds and Power (‘‘discharge,’’ ‘‘transformation,’’ ‘‘com-
mand,’’ ‘‘thorn,’’ and so on) are present or even vaguely discernible in Auto-
da-Fé. Having read about the brutal Pfaff and the abused Anna, we may
appreciate better Canetti’s later concern for children as particularly suscep-
tible to becoming labile thorn repositories, but that is all. Canetti did not
spend thirty years reformulating ideas that were essentially already complete
in the novel. Moreover, the fictional Georg is not only not an illustration of
the later work, he is a sometime exemplum of precisely that which Crowds
and Power will reject. In stark contrast to this study’s valorization of society,
the novel depicts a world in which society seems dangerously to inhere in
the minds of monomaniacal figures—a true ‘‘Welt im Kopf ’’ (World in the
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Head), to borrow the title from the novel’s third book. In short, Auto-da-Fé
speaks eloquently and hilariously about false approaches to the social, but is
ignorant of the social concepts Canetti will propound in Crowds and Power.
All of which suggests that the most influential branch of scholarship on
the novel has got it backward. It is not Crowds and Power that provides the
theoretical key to the novel, but the novel that illuminates the concerns of
the later study. The implications may prove mutually liberating: Crowds and
Power can be released from its narrow literary-critical function and the novel
can be further exposed to critical approaches at variance with Canetti’s own
views. This is hardly a radical proposition; for it was Goethe who long ago
suggested that we approach a writer’s work genetically, that is, by respecting
the chronology and context of its genesis. Ironically, we owe this insight on
the Canetti oeuvre to a man whose determinative influence Canetti never
fully acknowledged—namely to Sigmund Freud.
Up to this point in this study, we have drawn upon an array of Weimar-era
texts and contexts to illuminate the concerns of this ambitious novel. It may
be helpful now to see how modernist and antimodernist critical paradigms
of the post–World War II era can help us understand why Auto-da-Fé re-
mains virtually in a class of its own, despite many obvious points of contact
with literary high modernism.What is it about the novel—and the critics—
that enforced this state of literary segregation? And in what sense might we
think of this novel as an intentional boundaryor endpoint to thismovement?
6 Neither Adorno nor Lukács
Canetti’s Analytic Modernism
A Productive Error
James McFarlane concludes his investigation into ‘‘TheMind of Mod-
ernism’’ with a panegyric to that veritable bible of themovement,T. S. Eliot’s
The Waste Land, which is said to embody a ‘‘peculiarly Modernist kind of
vision.’’ In this account, which focuses almost exclusively on intellectual his-
tory, literarymodernism emerges asmuchmore than an effect, or register, of
the demise of traditional culture and the rise of the modern sciences. On the
contrary,McFarlane’smodernism is a central galvanizing agent of signal cul-
tural importance—highmodernism, in other words.Though he pays lip ser-
vice to less lofty constructions,1 McFarlane ultimately comes down squarely
on the side of modernism as bearer of cultural coherence rather than mere
barometer of fragmentation: ‘‘The defining thing in the Modernist mode is
not so much that things fall apart but that they fall together . . . In Modern-
ism, the centre is seen exerting not a centrifugal but a centripetal force; and
the consequence is not disintegration but (as it were) superintegration.’’ 2
This rather sanguine view, which ascribes an enormous synthesizing task
to the modernist poet, was bound to find verification in The Waste Land, if
only because this very reading of modernism is largely derived from Eliot
himself. Less self-evident, however, is McFarlane’s curious effort to fit Auto-
da-Fé—which he supposes to be ‘‘an unexpected commentary’’ on Eliot—
into this highmodernist schema.3Though ultimately rather forced, this con-
junction of Eliot with Canetti is fortunate in that it provides the opportunity
to consider Auto-da-Fé within postwar discussions of American and Euro-
pean modernism, adding a context to Canetti’s novel that not only has thus
far been lacking in the critical literature, but one that illuminates the novel’s
distinctive traits particularly effectively. In resurrecting the so-called pre-
theoretical literary landscape of the novel’s rediscovery in the early 1960s,
we will come to see how Auto-da-Fé rather strenuously defies the affiliation
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McFarlane so casually asserts. Sharing neither Adorno’s marked sympathy
for the epistemologically humbled modernist subject, nor meeting Lukács’s
demand for realistic depiction of an ‘‘objective totality,’’ Canetti’s novel fell
between the chairs of the regnant literary paradigms and was thus destined
to remain an outsider and a kind of curiosity until new views of modernism
(and postmodernism) came into play.
Though this study has thus far profited precisely from these newer and
more capacious orientations toward modernism, we now consciously step
backward in time, a conceit that will help us appreciate Auto-da-Fé against
the backdrop of the more familiar lights of high modernism. Since a discus-
sion of the full range of modernist novels would be impossible—or amount
to another book altogether—I will content myself instead with an ideal con-
struct such as McFarlane himself provides. In leaping from the deeply con-
servative Eliot to the leftists Adorno and Lukács (with whom I am primarily
concerned) we risk losing, one might object, high modernism’s vast apoliti-
cal middle ground. Yet, given Adorno’s propensity for cooptation by New
Criticism, this need not be the case, as I argue below. Furthermore, by focus-
ing on the modernist ‘‘epistemological shift’’ as the philosophical touch-
stone of modernism, as Randall Stevenson proposes,4 we may indeed find
ourselves in a position to capture a considerable number of high modernist
works within a single conceptual framework. Additionally, though the texts
customarily gathered under this rubric present a rich and apparently contra-
dictory cluster of stances towardmodernity,5 they are unified, as Jameson ar-
gues, by their attempt to ‘‘manage’’ modernity, a strategy that includes con-
structing alternate aesthetic worlds, and one that certainly unites thinkers
as different as Eliot and Adorno.6 Lukács’s self-imposed admonition, which
he intones at the outset of his influential essay ‘‘The Ideology of Modern-
ism,’’ applies no less to this undertaking: ‘‘Of course, dogmas of this kind are
only really viable in philosophical abstraction, and then only with a mea-
sure of sophistry.’’ 7 In moving toward a new appreciation of the relationship
of Auto-da-Fé to its modernist cousins, we will periodically cast a glance
back on the foregoing study. In the end, we will see how Auto-da-Fé mounts
a remarkable protest from within, announcing, as it were, an end to high
modernism and the exigency of its own social and analytic agenda.
Before prematurely extricatingAuto-da-Fé fromMcFarlane’s clutches, let
us first endeavor to understand his argument better. Canetti’s protagonist
seems so appealing because he appears to ratify modernism’s investment
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in a fragmented and diffuse subjectivity that is actually enhanced by the
superficial defect of blindness. Eliot (and then McFarlane) makes a virtue
of these weaknesses in claiming that the blind Tiresias actually enjoys a very
privileged kind of vision and, owing to his fluid boundaries and lack of dis-
tinct self-definition, a unique ability to unite all the disparate characters
of this poem.8 Taking his cue rather directly from Eliot, McFarlane views
Tiresias’s apparent liabilities as characteristically modernist assets: ‘‘His see-
ing blindness derives from a very Modernist logic, a logic which is then em-
bodied in the structure of the poem as a whole.’’ 9 It is crucial to note that
the model proposed here contains a foregone conclusion: epistemological
impairment—represented here above all as blindness—is from the outset to
be seen as an ultimate bonus. And this, in turn, implies a perpetuation of
the traditional model in which culture continues to assimilate the fragments
of experience into a meaningful whole. We are to read with Tiresias, Eliot
states in no uncertain terms: ‘‘What Tiresias sees, in fact, is the substance of
the poem.’’ 10
It is not at all surprising that this emphasis on ‘‘seeing blindness’’ would
call to mind Canetti’s Peter Kien. ‘‘The hero of this novel, a professor of Ori-
ental studies, also discovers for himself by chance the full visionary power
of blindness (or at least of controlled ‘defective’ vision) as a cosmic prin-
ciple.’’ 11McFarlane’s scarcely contained enthusiasm for Kien is evident in his
remark that ‘‘Canetti’s hero recognizes . . . an active principle at work: in
his kind of seeing-blindness he discovers a way of relating or linking things
that would otherwise seem not in the least to relate to each other.’’ 12 Like
Tiresias, Kien exhibits the ability—precisely by means of an apparent per-
ceptual deficiency—to unify dauntingly disparate phenomena. And, as with
Tiresias, we are clearly meant to read with Canetti’s professor. ‘‘Blindness
becomes the means wherewith to come to terms with life,’’ opines McFar-
lane, ‘‘permitting a wholly new philosophy of contingency. Canetti’s hero
decides that ‘blindness is a weapon against time and space, and our exis-
tence a uniquemonstrous blindness.’ ’’ 13Afinal ingredient to ‘‘this peculiarly
Modernist kind of vision,’’ 14 and one that will be of crucial significance in
our discussion of Adorno, below, is that of pain. The insights to be gleaned
do not come without this price; Kien’s ‘‘visionary blindness,’’ we read, ‘‘like
the blindness of eyes filled with tears or pain . . . yields much more reli-
able testimony about the real meaning of life than does the report of wit-
nesses enjoying conventional good sight.’’ 15 This in a nutshell comprises the
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high modernist recipe for ultimate recuperation of a disintegrating culture:
a handicapped protagonist whose own fluid or fractured self and visionary
blindness equips him, not without a measure of pain, to embrace (if not
unite) a host of superficially discordant and incompatible phenomena. And
it is this paradigm into which McFarlane rather forcibly inserts Kien.
Here one might object that this older view of modernism has already
been superseded; that the newer views advocated, for example, by Bathrick
and Huyssen in their Modernity and the Text already provide a more ca-
pacious framework that could easily accommodate the likes of Auto-da-Fé.
This is admittedly true, and in fact informs the methodology of all the pre-
ceding investigations of this study. Yet while the fairly recent expansion of
the term modernism, already fairly imprecise, by the way, in its more tradi-
tional usage, is undeniably more inclusive of a wider range of texts (and of
a more diverse array of stances toward modernity), a degree of clarity may
have been sacrificed in the process.
In an illuminating essay, ‘‘The Knower and the Artificer,’’ intellectual
historian David Hollinger acknowledges that modernism has of late been
stretched in so many directions that it threatens to become an almost use-
less term,16 but nevertheless concedes the appeal of maintaining it. ‘‘The ad-
vantages are manifest: one retains a claim to the most commanding, most
talismanic word in the critical study of twentieth-century intellectual life.’’ 17
Yet to do so does not mean that we reduce all constituent elements to some
common denominator. Indeed, Hollinger is most concerned to retrieve that
‘‘cognitivist’’ aspect of modernism that both rivals and completes the more
familiar figure of the ‘‘artificer’’—a term he borrows from Joyce’s iconic
Stephen Dedalus—featured in the corpus of canonical literary modernism.
As Hollinger rightly observes, ‘‘The Knower,’’ while not entirely absent, ‘‘is
less honored within the modernist literary canon.’’ It will be my argument,
below, that Auto-da-Fé presents the supreme exemplar of this minority tra-
dition within the corpus of German modernist prose.
Hollinger’s strategy of highlighting the cognitivist strain of modern-
ist thought—which captures Canetti’s undertaking extraordinarily well—
is what most interests me in this context: he argues that we can best make
sense of these divergent strands not bymingling the categories of the knower
and the artificer, but bymaintaining the traditional distinctions. Ultimately,
Hollinger will underscore the interconnection of these two categories—he
shows, for example, how both are present in certain key modernist novels.18
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But his provisional strategy of segregation is quite fruitful and worthy of
emulation here. Thus, in attending to McFarlane’s and Eliot’s confidence in
the paradoxical prowess of the modernist protagonist (i.e., Hollinger’s arti-
ficer), I do not seek to resurrect traditional conceptions for their own sake—
or only because they happen to have been applied to Canetti—but also to
reap a share of the conceptual clarity that will result from viewing Auto-da-
Fé as an example of that minority cognitivist discourse that both constituted
and rivaled canonical literary modernism.
Now, in his enthusiasm for what Lambert Zuidervaart would later dub
the ‘‘deprivileged’’ modernist subject, McFarlane fails to inform us that Kien
is not really blind, but is just pretending to be so. Furthermore, this blind-
ness is not in any sense imposed by the modern world (whatever that would
mean), but represents a scheme that issues from a quite integrated and de-
vious consciousness. Moreover, Kien’s pseudophilosophical method of ex-
punging reality is, as we have seen above, problematic not only because it
deprives ontological status to his fellow human beings (such as his nagging
wife), which is in itself questionable, but because by losing sight of people in
this manner he is actually overlooking a very real menace to his own well-
being. Furthermore, if onewere really seeking a true counterpart toTiresias,
particularly with regard to his capacity to host the most disparate of figures,
one would more likely turn to Kien’s equally problematic brother Georg—
the psychic host par excellence, as we have had occasion to observe in the
preceding chapter.
This affiliation of Kien with Tiresias, and thus of Canetti with Eliot, must
be seen as part of a larger cultural dynamic that granted legitimacy to serious
literature insofar as it participated in the developing modernist aesthetic.
Indeed, the postwar era was an important period of canon formation for
German modernism, as the additions of Franz Kafka (whose star rose dra-
matically in the 1950s) and Rainer Maria Rilke (whose only novel was first
given its modernist imprimatur in the 1960s) clearly attest. Indeed, Canetti’s
novel reemerged into public consciousness just as The Notebooks of Malte
Laurids Brigge (1910) was being ushered into the modernist pantheon.Why,
to put it simply, was Canetti left out?
Clearly, Auto-da-Fé could only be shoehorned into the Elotian concep-
tion of highmodernism with considerable effort. Both Kien and Georg con-
test the very fragmented subjectivity that high modernism enshrines; my-
thology serves in Auto-da-Fé not to counteract the chaos of history (as Eliot
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famously stated), but is itself the target of unrelenting parody; and, finally,
the novel does not depict the loss of historical and social moorings as in-
evitable characteristics of the modern age that are somehow redressed by
the ability of the precious individual to unite an increasingly disorienting
world within himself. All of this—and this is quite substantial—is at odds
with central strains of high modernism. But to demonstrate this, we need
to move somewhat beyond Eliot and McFarlane to consider at least two of
the major players in the construction of postwar modernism: Theodor W.
Adorno and his principal aesthetic adversary, Georg Lukács.
Adorno and the Modernist Love Affair
with the Fragmented Self
The influence of Adorno on definitions of modernity and modernist art
in the postwar period can hardly be overestimated, particularly in light of
his influential study (with Max Horkheimer) Dialektik der Aufklärung (Dia-
lectic of Enlightenment, 1947) and the subsequentNoten zur Literatur (Notes
to Literature, 1958–74). Indeed, in his After the Great Divide (1986), Andreas
Huyssen baptizes Adorno the ‘‘high priest of modernism,’’ ‘‘the theorist par
excellence of the Great Divide, that presumably necessary and insurmount-
able barrier separating high art from popular culture.’’ 19 Adorno’s theory
of modernism, which so powerfully maintained that divide, was motivated,
Huyssen explains, by the ‘‘political impulse . . . to save the dignity and au-
tonomy of the art work from the totalitarian pressures of fascist mass spec-
tacles, socialist realism, and an evermore degraded commercialmass culture
in theWest.’’ This exclusionary gesture in turn ‘‘found its theoretically more
limited expression in the New Criticism.’’ 20 The link to New Criticism—
dominant in America and England at this time—is significant because it
demonstrates how Adorno’s endorsement of modernism’s ‘‘strategy of ex-
clusion’’—itself a politically motivated aesthetic—could be absorbed into
a thoroughly apolitical approach to literature.21 Frederic Jameson’s assess-
ment of Adorno’s ‘‘proposal to see the classical stage of high modernism
itself as the very prototype of the most ‘genuinely’ political art’’ as an ulti-
mately ‘‘anti-political revival of the ideology of modernism’’ can help us to
grasp the unholy alliance betweenAdorno and theNewCritics regarding the
high modernist canon.22 Yet, even if Adorno may inadvertently have pro-
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vided theoretical cover to traditionalist proponents of high modernism, we
should not for our own part underestimate the distance separating Adorno’s
position, which ascribes a crucial contestatory power tomodernist art, from
Eliot’s essentially compensatory view, which imagines a protagonist some-
how capable of reconciling modernity’s contradictions. To linger over this
distinction, however, will not advance our understanding of Auto-da-Fé,
above all, perhaps, because this very point of contrast became muddled in
critical practice.23 Let us therefore bridge the abyss between Adorno and
Eliot, thereby recapitulating a New Critical practice, in order to see how
that which is common to both the traditionalist and the Marxist, namely
their sympathetic portrayal of the modernist protagonist, stands in stark
and structural contrast to Canetti’s treatment of Peter Kien.
Given his much-discussed indictment of instrumental reason in the Dia-
lectic, the effective exclusion of Auto-da-Fé from membership among those
lofty works that ‘‘enjoy what is today the only form of respectable fame’’
(Adorno’s words in praise, here, of Beckett) is virtually foreordained.24 For
Canetti’s novel is nothing if not analytic—mercilessly and unrelentingly
‘‘penetrating’’ as, for example, Erich Fried has observed.25 In his widely read
essay ‘‘Commitment’’ (‘‘Engagement,’’ 1965), Adorno argues—against Sartre
and Brecht—that truly engaged literature has little to do with thematic
political commitment and everything to do with modernist formal experi-
mentation, that ‘‘avant-garde abstraction which provokes the indignation
of philistines.’’ 26 Adorno thus opposes modernist ‘‘autonomous’’ art to the
well-meaning but often self-defeating category of ‘‘committed’’ art. His in-
fluential critique of traditional litterature engagée as moralizing, manipula-
tive, and as the purveyor of unacknowledged consolation—perhaps above
all in its capacity to aestheticize suffering—is widely known and has become
part of our critical repertoire, as Lawrence Langer’s work on Holocaust lit-
erature well attests.27 Turning the traditional notion of engaged literature on
its head, Adorno argues: ‘‘It is not the office of art to spotlight alternatives,
but to resist by its form alone the course of the world, which permanently
puts a pistol to men’s heads.’’ 28 The real virtue of those ‘‘very features de-
famed as formalism,’’ we are told, is that they do not bespeak any political
or social program—or much of anything, for that matter: ‘‘[Autonomous
works of art] are knowledge as non-conceptual objects. This is the source
of their nobility. It is not something of which they have to persuade men,
because it has been given into their hands.’’ 29 Lest this sound all too reminis-
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cent of idealist aesthetics (one is reminded, for example, of Schiller’s concept
‘‘naive poetry’’), Adorno emphatically asserts that any formal contestation
of empirical reality is dialectically related to that very empirical reality.30
Adorno’s interest in art that presents ‘‘knowledge as non-conceptual ob-
jects’’ follows directly from his (and Horkheimer’s) critique of instrumental
reason inDialectic of Enlightenment, their monumental effort to link the En-
lightenment to that apogee of modernity (as they argue): the Holocaust. Art
that holds out the promise of contesting commodification would have to do
so, therefore, in a manner that eschews any heavy-handed teleological or
manipulative component. This is why Adorno, in preparing for the discus-
sion of his favorite modernists, Kafka and Beckett, hastens to remind us that
‘‘the avant-garde abstraction which provokes the indignation of philistines
. . . has nothing in common with conceptual or logical abstraction,’’ that kind
of instrumentalizing, nature-exploiting abstraction, in other words, which
is the real culprit in the Dialectic.31 Indeed, the nobility of Adorno’s non-
conceptual objects and their simple givenness reside in their (apparent) lack
of tendentious purpose, lending them an aura of the naturalness—and thus
the Schillerian reminiscence.
Adorno’s argument usually achieves clearer contours when applied to
actual literature. It may therefore beworthwhile to turn briefly to his discus-
sion of Beckett for an illustration of what was dearest to him in modernist
prose:
Beckett’s works . . . enjoy what today is the only form of respectable fame:
everyone shudders at them, and yet no-one can persuade himself that
these eccentric plays and novels are not about what everyone knows but
no one will admit . . . They deal with a highly concrete historical reality:
the abdication of the subject. Beckett’s Ecce Homo is what human beings
have become. As though with eyes drained of tears, they stare silently out
of his sentences . . . However, the minimal promise of happiness [these
works] contain, which refuses to be traded for comfort, cannot be had
for a price less than total dislocation, to the point of worldlessness.32
Let us set aside the rather dubious claim regarding a critical consensus
on the content of Beckett’s works (‘‘what everyone knows but no one will
admit’’), and focus instead on Adorno’s discernment of the core concern of
Beckett’s oeuvre: the loss of the traditional will-dominated unified subject.
For here Adorno—in good modernist company, by the way—is asserting a
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kind of mimesis; not the rich mimetic referentiality of nineteenth-century
social realism, to be sure, but a rather definite homology betweenmodernist
protagonist and the real, extraliterary beings: ‘‘Beckett’s Ecce Homo is what
human beings have become.’’ For Adorno, evidence of what wewould today
call a decentered subject is a truth (‘‘a highly concrete historical reality’’)
that manifests itself in modernist abstraction, a reality conveyed almost ex-
clusively at the level of discourse rather than mere plot. Imbricated within
this conception ofmodernism isAdorno’s valorization of silence (‘‘they stare
silently out of his sentences’’) as well as his embrace of ‘‘dislocation’’ and
‘‘worldlessness’’ as the appropriate consequence of recognizing oneself in
the text’s ‘‘abdicated subject.’’ Later in this same essay, Adorno returns to
the topic of modernism’s eloquent silence: ‘‘Yet paradoxically in the same
[post–World War II] epoch it is to works of art that has fallen the bur-
den of wordlessly asserting what is barred to politics.’’ 33 ‘‘Wordless’’ here
is, of course, Adorno’s shorthand for a lack not of actual words but an ab-
sence of thematic social engagement. Resistance to empirical reality (what-
ever this would mean in practice) must issue forth from this ‘‘nonconcep-
tual’’ silence. Adorno’smodernist program resulted in his rather improbable
championing of the reclusive aesthete Stephan George over the century’s
most accomplished committed artist, Bertolt Brecht.
Canetti, no less than Adorno, is concerned in Auto-da-Fé to resist the
forces of cultural affirmation, as I have argued throughout this study. But
whereas for Adorno this consists of ‘‘avoid[ing] popularization and adapta-
tion to the market,’’ that is, remaining at all costs on the proper side of that
great divide, Canetti identifies and targets certain very specific trends within
interwar culture—many of which haunt us still—and mercilessly parodies
them. This literary strategy of ‘‘search and destroy’’ immediately suggests
the fundamental distinction of Canetti’s modernist prose: it is, in contrast
to Adorno’s veneration of the ‘‘nonconceptual object,’’ decidedly concep-
tual, thematic, even argumentative. In fact, it would seem to enshrine all the
hubristic evils of instrumental reason.
While this is surely somewhat of an exaggeration, it nevertheless serves
to spotlight the epistemological grid that obtains within the novel and that
operates between text and reader. Perhaps the clearest indicator of this
novel’s epistemic distinction among itsmodernists cousins is its peculiar wit,
an often wicked humor that, as I reiterate throughout this study, operates
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over the heads of the benighted figures. This readerly sovereignty, however,
is perceived toviolate themodernist contract: themagisterial rationalist per-
spective is held to be an obsolete holdover from a discredited Enlightenment
optimism; the comedic premise that social failings can be reliably isolated
and corrected merely by identifying them, a kind of embarrassing naivete.
And finally, the epic purview underwritten by a firmly interlocking episte-
mic narrative structure may appear to resurrect the quaint world of literary
realism that was so widely repudiated by the modernists.
Canetti’s analytic modernism cannot, however, be properly appraised by
rhetoric that harbors its own foregone conclusion, such as the supposition
that the presence of any analytical structure represents eo ipso a disreputable
kind of ideological regression. For this assumption can blind us to the real
innovation of Auto-da-Fé, which is to seduce readers into a state of episte-
mological security only later (with the arrival of Georg) to confront them
with its radical insufficiency. In other words, analysis itself serves to cri-
tique traditional modes of analysis. The very readers who believe themselves
superior to the erroneous constructions of characters given to relentlessly
projecting themselves onto others are structurally drawn into precisely the
same kind of error, and thus are fully implicated in the target of parody. In
fact, as we have seen above in chapter 1, Canetti questions the fundamen-
tal premise of an epistemology based on identification: our need to affiliate
ourselves with the beautiful (in the case of Auto-da-Fé, this is of course the
handsome, erotically charged Georg) is hardly a reliable basis for making
judgments about the world. In falling for Georg, as first-time readers of the
novel typically do (and as a number of early critics of the novel did), we are
knocked off our epistemological high horses.
Yet even the ability to make such confident distinctions between correct
and misguided judgments implies an epistemological crow’s nest that con-
trasts starkly with the tentative, radically contingent percipient subject of
high modernism—a subject, after all, who cannot typically distinguish con-
fidently between self and world, let alone make normative judgments about
the latter. This is an important distinction, and one that will allow Canetti
unique latitude, but it should not be exaggerated. Canetti’s appropriation
of realism’s ‘‘panoptic’’ narrative structures is, ultimately, an analytic par-
odyof realism—a burlesque, so to speak, that hardly recreates the confident,
grand societal vistas of the great realists Fontane, Zola, or of his own favor-
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ite, Balzac.34 The reader ofAuto-da-Fé is sovereign, to be sure, but often over
a Lichtenstein of literary reality. Like the protagonist Peter Kien, we know
quite a lot about precious little.
Or do we? A closer analysis, undertaken in greater detail above in chap-
ter 1, reveals that even this epistemological security is largely a chimera. Not
only does the knowledgeable narrator turn out to be a sham, little more than
an opportunity for the characters to masquerade their own bias as objective
truth. More radically—and this has yet to be fully appreciated in the criti-
cal literature on the novel—the facts we possess often remain nothing more
than uncontested (or uncontestable) claims of very biased players. How can
we ever really know if Peter Kien is in fact a world-renowned sinologist, or
if his brother Georg actually stands a chance of winning the Nobel prize for
his innovations in the treatment of psychotic patients? The ex post facto dis-
covery of ubiquitous self-interest and pervasive perspectivism parading as
omniscience should leave us feeling epistemologically impaired. What pro-
vides the temporary illusion of epistemological security, on the other hand,
is the fact that the narrative is constructed of extremely limited andmutually
exclusive units. Each of the figural worlds remains utterly distinct, without
the slightest overlap—a fact which thus far has been taken only as a symbol
of the isolation of the individual in the modern world. Perhaps Auto-da-Fé
can also be read to support this existential lament, but this highly artifi-
cial demarcation of rival belief worlds certainly serves another function as
well. For it comprises the very precondition of our vaunted epistemological
privilege. In this pared-down and schematized universe, unmasking a char-
acter’s delusions and projections of self onto others is child’s play. But is it
our world?
Auto-da-Fé offers itself as a highly stylized model, not as a readily in-
habitable simulacrum. In pointing to the world outside itself—to various
cultural attitudes, beliefs, and practices of the interwar period—it simulta-
neously raises questions about the status and applicability of the very analy-
sis it employs. The epistemological structure that underwrites the novel’s
humor becomes in the course of thismonumental narrative also the object of
the inquiry, a dialectical refinement that has not yet been fully appreciated.
In the end, then, our epistemological sovereignty is somewhat of a pyrrhic
victory. Like the infamous burrow in Kafka’s short story of the same title,
the narrative world of Auto-da-Fé begins to resemble an environment both
terribly familiar and yet virtually impossible.
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Certainly this analytic mode seemed foreign to classical high modern-
ism, which viewed its more obviously skeptical model of epistemology as
the product of numerous social upheavals—as, in other words, the child of
modernity itself. Bradbury andMcFarlane cite, for example, Strindberg’s fa-
mous remark on the figures in hisMiss Julie to demonstrate the point: ‘‘Since
they aremodern characters, living in an age of transitionmore urgently hys-
terical at any rate than the age that preceded it, I have drawn them as split
and vacillating.’’ They proceed to generalize this relationship to all of mod-
ernism: ‘‘This is much the sort of comment that might have been made by
any Modernist writer between the 1880s and the 1930s; and, in its conso-
nance between fragmentation, discontinuity, and the modern age of transi-
tion, it is itself modern.’’ 35 EvenHermann Broch, who probably came closest
to Canetti in diagnosing a cultural crisis—one thinks of the famous essay
‘‘Zerfall der Werte’’ (Disintegration of Values) that first appeared within the
fictional context of Die Schlafwandler—took pains to portray his charac-
ters as psychograms of a disintegrating communal culture. Lukács noted
this same, consonant relationship between what he called the erosion of the
‘‘outer world’’ or ‘‘reality’’ on the one hand and this new conception of ‘‘per-
sonality’’ on the other: ‘‘Attenuation of reality and dissolution of personality
are thus interdependent: the stronger the one, the stronger the other.’’ 36
In contrast to Lukács, however, one finds among the modernists an
implicit sympathy for the protagonists’ fragmented consciousness as a con-
sequence or expression of modernity itself. This is not to exclude the pos-
sibility of critique or protest encoded in such a figure, but one senses
nonetheless, particularly in the postwar critical embrace of this fractured
consciousness, a consensus on the necessity of this state of affairs—these
men (it is typically amale protagonist) have no choice in thematter; they are
products and victims of a fragmented age. Adorno’s enthusiasm for Beckett,
as we noted, certainly contains this same kind of empathetic identification:
‘‘everyone shudders . . . [for this] is what human beings have become.’’ This
shudder of recognition reaches an apogee at that moment when Adorno
reads himself into the actual position of the protagonist of Kafka’s ‘‘In der
Strafkolonie’’ (In the Penal Colony), who, it should be noted, actually loses
consciousness in the process of his nightmarish torture: ‘‘Kafka and Beckett
arouse the fear which existentialism merely talks about . . . He over whom
Kafka’s wheels have passed’’—for Adorno, a badge of honor—‘‘has lost for
ever both any peacewith theworld and any chance of consoling himself with
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the judgment that the way of the world is bad.’’ 37 Apart from any particular
attitude we may bear toward these protagonists, we are in most cases struc-
turally constrained to read with them, which is to say that in order to make
sense of the narrative we must assume their perspective. The consonance
that we are told obtains between the fragmentation of modernity and the
fragmented modernist protagonist replicates itself in this way at the level of
text and reader.
But reading with these fellows is not always an easy task. For, whether it
be Musil’s Törleß, Rilke’s Malte, or even Döblin’s Franz Biberkopf, we are
typically confronted with a protagonist who suffers from a certain dimin-
ished epistemological prowess; like Tiresias, they all are marked by compro-
mised vision of some sort. One need only recall, for example, the establish-
ing scene in Berlin Alexanderplatz, in which Biberkopf perceives the walls
of a Berlin tenement courtyard to be falling in on him, though, of course,
they are not. Perhaps these subjects have not fully abdicated, yet neither are
they the realist heroes of yesteryear. This modern, fluid self, which Ernst
Mach famously dubbed an ‘‘ideelle denkökonomische, keine reelle Einheit’’
(a thought construct, not a real unity) is simply less capable of knowing
itself (or selves), the world, and of drawing a credible line of demarcation
between the two. Indeed, this deprivileged modernist protagonist becomes
the walking proof of the obsolete, or at least artificial, nature of these very
subject-object distinctions. The typical protagonist of Expressionist drama
presents, as Peter Szondi has shown, a parallel case in which the social world
is refracted through an individual’s consciousness and thereby subjected to
notable distortion.38 The debate—if there was one—as to whether this ‘‘see-
ing blindness’’ really represents a higher wisdom or rather a dangerous sub-
jectivist misrepresentation becomes lost in the larger portrayal of this kind
of handicapped perception as natural, even quintessentially modern. Biber-
kopf may be right about the menacing quality of the German metropolis.
But in viewing himself as victim from the outset, is he not also perhaps lay-
ing the groundwork for exonerating himself of all responsibility for his own
actions? 39 These questions, which are important to Canetti, tend to recede
in the presence of these figures, because they are themselves merely the ava-
tar of (and sometime antidote to) a larger-order social fragmentation. As
Bradbury and McFarlane would have it, modernism ‘‘is the art consequent
on the dis-establishing of communal reality and conventional norms of cau-
sality . . . The assumption that the age demands a certain kind of art, and that
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Modernism is the art that it demands, has been fervently held by those who
see in the modern human condition a crisis of reality, an apocalypse of cul-
tural community.’’ 40 In short, whether the modernist psyche reveals a rich
inwardness or a tortured incoherence, whether we are to celebrate or con-
demn the world that drove the self both inward and apart, this fragmented
mental state is not a free choice, but a given—Adorno’s ‘‘highly concrete
historical reality.’’
But what if this were not the whole truth? What if the celebrated crisis of
subjectivity were, in part, hype, fad, or, worse yet, a kind of malleable per-
sona through which one could exploit others—a feint, in other words, that
served to conceal power? Furthermore, what if it were not a question of a
homogenized generic self, but a gendered self, whose efforts at maintaining
self-control, so to speak, revealed rich patterns of cultural misogyny? All
of this, as I have argued above in chapter 2, is in fact strongly suggested by
Auto-da-Fé. To modernism as it was constructed at the point of the novel’s
reemergence, and the time of Adorno’s first American publications on aes-
thetics and politics, such would have been heresy. For this modernism was,
as we have seen, largely predicated upon the sympathetic, or consonant, de-
piction of the fragmented self. Auto-da-Fé breaks modernism’s empathetic
spell over the reader and questions the political and social implications of
a fragmented protagonist by, first of all, placing the notion of a universal,
ungendered self into serious doubt.
To notice that Auto-da-Fé renders this hallmark of literary modernism in
a markedly different manner is not to suggest that it necessarily refutes the
consonant/sympathetic portrayal of consciousness in, say, Joyce’s Portrait of
the Artist as a Young Man. For this is not a matter of a simple binary, but
rather of a cluster of possible positions. Yet coming at the end of a tradition
that had tended to venerate the modernist protagonist, often rendering so-
cial reality only as refracted in this figure’s own fragmented consciousness,
Canetti was indeed intent on placing the phenomenon in a more critical
light. Specifically, Canetti challenges the (often only implicit) consensus that
the modernist protagonist is the inexorable end product of a world come
unhinged, a victim of vanishing nineteenth-century certainties. Auto-da-Fé
challenges Lukács’s formula—if we may speak anachronistically—by sug-
gesting that the loss of the communal may in part be attributable to the
‘‘inward turning’’ not only of modernist literature, but of a whole host of
cultural currents in the Weimar era.
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The strong epistemological structure of the narrative is of course hardly
conducive to a sympathetic portrayal of the crisis of subjectivity: the reader
is positioned outside and above, not with, the characters undergoing a crisis
of subjectivity. The analytic cast of the novel thus asks us to think about this
phenomenon, rather than read ourselves into it, a prospect that will yield
insight if only we will allow the novel this liberty. In other words, we do not
shudder in self-recognition (as Adorno did in the presence of Beckett and
Kafka); we laugh at what we wish to see as distinct from ourselves. After all,
overidentification, misidentification, and self-projection are the sins of the
characters we recognize because we have as readers (at least until the intro-
duction of Georg) been held at arm’s length. The novel’s analytic framework
requires us to read Kien, not to read with Kien, as McFarlane would have us
do in good high modernist fashion. Auto-da-Fé, does not, in other words,
foster the modernist ‘‘vision avec,’’ but rather a stylized ‘‘vision par derriere,’’
to borrow a pair of terms used by Hans Binder in his analysis of Kafka.41 If,
in the end, we are deprived of the pleasures of identification, we are richly
compensated with an aesthetic pleasure that is uncharacteristic of the high
modernist mind-set: humor.42
Canetti’s problematization of identification brings into focus the way in
which highmodernism had distanced itself from this commonplacemanner
of reading. In a pathbreaking essay on the television miniseries ‘‘Holocaust’’
(1978), Andreas Huyssen points to one of modernism’s signal deficiencies:
it fails to offer the opportunity for readers to identify. ‘‘What I am propos-
ing,’’ Huyssen explains, ‘‘is that certain products of the culture industry and
their popular success point to shortcomings in avantgardist or experimental
modes of representation.’’ 43 While holding fast to modernism’s ‘‘truth con-
tent,’’ Huyssen faults theseworks for failing tomeet ‘‘the socio-psychological
need for identification with the Jews as victims.’’ 44 What Huyssen identifies
in his discussion of ‘‘Holocaust’’ can indeed be generalized (as his own book
title suggests) to a much larger problematic: high art may have something
to learn from lower—or more populist—forms of entertainment. Long dis-
daining identification as an obsolete if not vulgar relationship to the text,
modernism made a virtue out of more cerebral modes of reception, though
it was not, as we have noted, fully conscious of the implications of this prac-
tice. Owing fidelity variously to Brechtian ‘‘Verfremdung’’ (alienation) or to
Adorno’s belief in the powers ofmodernist form, traditional readerly identi-
fication with individual characters was rather forcefully shunned.45 But this
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should not distract us from the way in which these works already fulfilled
an identification function, if only for a certain clientele. Clearly Adorno saw
himself (or his self ) reflected in the fractured protagonists of Kafka and
Beckett, even if many other readers never would experience this same de-
gree of self-recognition. Because high modernism was touted as the only
authentic response to modernity, and thus implicitly a natural or univer-
sal aesthetic, we may have overlooked the particular identification function
operant in these avantgardist and experimental works. Auto-da-Fé, on the
other hand, simply does not permit this kind of illicit identificatory plea-
sure, which elsewhere could of course take placewithout readers fully realiz-
ing that they are reading themselves into the respective modernist novel. In
Auto-da-Fé the topic and practice are simply too prominently foregrounded
for this to occur. Identification remains for Canetti a problem: both within
the fictional world of the novel and at the level of reader and text, identi-
fication emerges as a vehicle for approaching and utterly distorting reality.
There is no such thing here as sacred, Tiresian vision; identification as a her-
meneutic principle is both necessary, and necessarily disfiguring. The novel
in fact thrives on the insoluble tension between our ongoing need to iden-
tify on the one hand, and the inherent fallacy of this gesture, when raised
to the level of epistemological criterion, on the other. Auto-da-Fé both ap-
peases and thwarts this basic readerly urge, and in doing so flushes out into
the open a foundational modernist aporia.
Canetti clearly did not draw the same conclusion for aesthetics as so
many others did. On the contrary, he knew (as did Brecht) that analytic
prose holds forth the possibility of a truly critical stance, including one that
would take aim at the very framework that enables that analysis. Further-
more, Canetti believed that the subjectivist turn was something of a hoax,
attributable in part to a culture of self-indulgence and solipsism that should
be exposed, if not opposed.46 Motivated, as we have seen, by a deep con-
cern about the diminution of the public sphere as a consequence of in-
flated notions of subjectivity, Auto-da-Fé suggests the philosophical impos-
sibility of conceiving of a fragmented self from the perspective of an equally
fragmented consciousness. In ‘‘Self-Indulgent Philosophies of the Weimar
Period’’ (chapter 3), I develop this thesis in some detail; but the conclusion
may be restated here. Any time we imagine an inchoate self, we automati-
callydo so from a position of a relativelymore unified psyche: howelse could
we even recognize this phenomenon, let alone make meaningful compari-
190 : canetti ’s analytical modernism
sons with other notions of subjectivity? Rilke, in other words, is not Malte
(or not onlyMalte)—even if on bad days hemay have felt just like his psychi-
cally split protagonist—else he could not havewritten the novel. Similarly, if
an age of economic and cultural dislocation had produced readers precisely
and exclusively as fragmented as Malte, they could never recognize him as
such.47 Likewise, Adorno, despite his shudder of self-recognition in the face
of truemodernist art, is not exclusively to be equated with Kafka’s exotically
punished protagonist.When he is not under the wheels of Kafka’s prose, he
is (or was) an undeniably self-actuated theorist, quite capable of deploying
a formidably analytic self.
Problematic as Auto-da-Fé demonstrates it to be, the analytic self can-
not be checked at the door when one enters the realm of fiction. It is always
there, Canetti seems to be suggesting, so perhaps it is best that we acknowl-
edge it.What Canetti suggests bymeans of his unmistakably dissonant treat-
ment of fragmented subjectivity, therefore, is not the inherent invalidity of
the modernists’ consonant or sympathetic rendering, but the essential bad
faith in concealing the philosophically necessary discrepancy between the
fragmented modernist protagonist and the necessarily less fragmented con-
sciousness of author and reader. As a result of this kind of strong narrative,
we are impelled to ask whether a charge that has often been laid at the feet of
literary realism,48 namely the concealment of ideology and the implication
of its naturalness, may be just as apposite of high modernism.
Certainly Adorno himself can be faulted, as Frederic Jameson has sug-
gested, for failing to recognize the irreducible role of the ‘‘transcendental
subject’’ in his own Critical Theory.49 Given Adorno’s noted emphasis on
our ‘‘unfreedom’’ in the face of the ‘‘administered universe,’’ there seems to
be in fact little role for the analytic self in political society. Freedom, agency,
and the old Cartesian self that underlies both are simply comforting illu-
sions, Adorno maintains. One could in fact argue that Adorno simply dis-
placed reflective agency from individuals tomodernist autonomous art. The
Kantian autonomy of the individual becomes, with the requisite material-
ist alterations, the defining and redemptive characteristic of art.50 Certainly
Adorno ismore sanguine about the prospects ofmodern art than he is about
the individual’s capacity to change society.51 At the only point in the essay
when he expresses explicit concern for social justice, Adorno links its attain-
ment to modernist form rather than to traditional political activism.52 ‘‘The
Mind of Modernism,’’ to use McFarlane’s terminology, seems for Adorno
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to have mysteriously wandered into the modernist art object itself. Mindful
that this critical subjectivity does not simply vanish into thin air, Auto-da-
Fé poses the question about this mind’s whereabouts, so to speak, once it
has abdicated.53
One need not have been a leftist, politically astute Jewish intellectual in
the final Weimar years—though the young Canetti was of course all of these
things—to notice that these very same modern times had produced a whole
array of other selves that had little in common with the modernist predilec-
tion for genuine fragmentation and dissolution. This is the context within
which we must judge Georg’s fascination with the gorilla man, a laughable
figure meant to lampoon that ostensibly antibourgeois movement known as
vitalism and loosely tied toNietzsche. As I elaborate in chapter 3, Georg’s en-
thusiastic conversion to this kind of primitivism harbors deeply reactionary
and authoritarian tendencies. First, this apparently emancipatory persona is
at root antisocial: his sense of reality consists of a highly protean bubble of
consciousness that follows him around like an invalid’s oxygen tent. Under-
lying this putatively liberating mode of consciousness is, as we have seen,
the radical subordination of ontology not to epistemology per se, but to this
single percipient individual’s whim.
Georg’s appropriation of this mind-set is, however, the most memorable
critique in this context. He sits at the knees of the gorilla man in order to
learn how to acquire not only his unique language—which is ultimately no
language at all—but precisely his mode of consciousness, the radical mal-
leability of which is thought by its very nature to contest the rigidities of
bourgeois society. Georg’s career, however, tells a different story. Under-
neath the facade of a vulnerable, permeable consciousness lurks a self every
bit as hard-nosed and self-serving as his brother Peter. Georg presents the
image of an intellectual’s insidious retreat from an evermore daunting social
reality under the cover of a pseudopolitical and specious antibourgeois ide-
ology.Thirty years after Canetti wroteAuto-da-Fé, Lukács brought a similar,
devastating charge against those enamored of the ‘‘dissolution of person-
ality,’’ which he attributed to a desire to dissociate oneself from political re-
sponsibility. Lukács termed this investment in fragmented subjectivity the
‘‘doctrine of the eternal incognito’’ because it provided an alibi to those men
such as Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, and Gottfried Benn
who participated in Nazism and later wished to believe that at a deeper level
of selfhood they had in fact remained opponents. It was precisely the frag-
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mented conception of the self to which they appealed in their self-defense.54
Canetti could not of course have imagined the precise usefulness of Georg’s
infatuation to Nazi authorities, but the potential dangers are already clearly
present in the novel.
This is a distinctive contribution. More than any other novel from within
the movement, Auto-da-Fé contests the unlimited glorification of frag-
mented subjectivity, particularly when it becomes the arbiter of social real-
ity. By means of a negative dialectic, the novel suggests that there is a limit,
or endpoint, beyond which the veneration of individual consciousness—or,
more accurately, an individual’s consciousness—cannot proceed. It is not a
simple matter of upholding some positive notion of the social that must, at
all costs, be defended against the onslaughts of rampant subjectivity. Rather,
Auto-da-Fé seems concerned to remind us that modernity has not eradi-
cated the problem of power—and certainly not by means of retreat into
a figure’s rich psyche. More precisely, the novel suggests that power lurks
in the very definition and deployment of fragmented consciousness. After
reading Auto-da-Fé, one can never again take unreflective comfort in the in-
ward turning of the novel; for we must always now ask ourselves whether
the highly nuanced, layered consciousness we encountermay ultimately dis-
guise authoritarian desires, or, by virtue of its manifest vulnerability, invite
those of others. Otto Weininger sensed the widening gap between the tra-
ditional, will-dominated, ‘‘ethical’’ self and the modern, fragmented, ‘‘em-
pirical’’ self. He wondered how such weakened empirical specimens (which
he notoriously saw exemplified in women and Jews) could possibly survive
with any dignity and meaning in the modern, materialistic world. Though
infamous today for his misogyny and anti-Semitism,Weiningermaydeserve
to be remembered also, as Steven Beller argues, for articulating the civic crisis
posed by the rise of the empirical self. Certainly Canetti acknowledged the
huge influenceWeininger had on him and his entire generation.That impact
is clearly felt in the novel, which asks, as we have seen, how this verymodern
self comports with notions of communal culture and civic responsibility. In
the end, Auto-da-Fé forces us to bid farewell to the high modernist natural-
ization of the impaired self as the unexamined avatar of the modern age.
More the novel does not do. Both the use of radically reduced characters
(with the partial exception of Georg) and the deployment of characters who
construct artificially distinct and mutually exclusive worlds-units, instead
of the radically more complex and overlapping portrayal of consciousness
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typical of Joyce orWoolf, suggest rather clearly that Canetti’s critique is not
meant directly to contest the rich and sophisticated minds we encounter in
the fiction of the great masters of modernism, many of whom, as we know
from his autobiography, he seems to have respected deeply. As we saw in
chapter 5, Canetti explicitly renounced psychological realism over the pro-
tests of Broch; and one cannot help feeling that Canetti sensed the danger
of undermining social critique by providing compellingly nuanced figures
whose psychological appeal might serve to ‘‘explain’’ a set of practices we
are meant to place in question.55 Auto-da-Fé is, at any rate, simply incom-
mensurate with such novels. Yet it may well serve as a necessary corrective, a
function that is, as I hope is clear by now, directly ascribable to the author’s
choice of an epistemologically strong narrative structure.
Before concluding this topic altogether, it may be helpful to observe
that our interest in the epistemological criterion of literary modernism has
its own history. To be sure, the phenomenon of fragmented subjectivity is
readily observable in the contemporary texts, both fictional and critical. In-
deed, the Austrian critic Hermann Bahr used the term ‘‘Nervenkunst’’ (neu-
ralgic art) to promote the trend that Anglo-American readers know, thanks
to Henry James, as the ‘‘inward turning of the novel.’’ Bahr advocated the
application of the Naturalist technique, which in the work of Ibsen, Strind-
berg, andHauptmann had so impressively captured social conditions, to the
interior life of the mind. While this inward turn necessarily tended to val-
orize subjectivity, one does not notice among contemporary modernists the
same degree of skepticism that later critics would bring to the discussion of
modernism. Indeed, if one looks to the modernist practitioners themselves,
one notes not a radical doubt, but a surprising confidence in their effort to
portray the modern world. Different tools, foci, methods, conventions—all
of these would, of course, be required. But the modernists were less despair-
ing of their ability to produce a compelling literary perspective on moder-
nity than committed to breaking with obsolete realist literary conventions.
While any kind of summary statement runs the risk of oversimplification,
it may be fair to say that the modernists themselves—as we saw in Eliot,
above—viewed fragmented subjectivity as paradoxically enabling, not nec-
essarily crippling. Certainly the New Critical love of paradox would sustain
this potential to see loss as gain.
The investment in a radically decentered self became entrenched, it
seems, with the ascent not onlyof Derrida and his disciples, but also of Lacan
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and Foucault on the critical horizon during the 1970s and 1980s. Their al-
most exclusive focus on literary modernism—and one could easily expand
this list to include, for example, Kristeva’s interest inmodernist poetry as the
privileged locus of the ‘‘semiotic’’ and Barthes’s exaltation of the modernist
‘‘writerly’’ text—can in part be explained by the fact that such works offered
prooftexts for a cluster of theories that similarly conceived of the self as
essentially deprivileged,56 that is, as an overdetermined site complexly con-
structed by impersonal forces rather than an autonomous, self-legislating
subject. Modernism’s vaunted ‘‘epistemological shift’’ (Stevenson) thus re-
ceived a powerful boost by the canonization of these critical paradigms, such
that the retrospective construction ofmodernism became significantlymore
skeptical about the modernist protagonist’s epistemological prowess than
the original authors themselves may have been. Approaching Auto-da-Fé
through the prism of such theories of course made it even less likely that
the novel would be admitted to the properly modernist (read: epistemo-
logically skeptical) canon. In the case of Auto-da-Fé, this point may explain
the curious fact that early reviewers of the thirties and forties clearly and
repeatedly recognized the novel as modern, experimental, and anti-realist.
Yet later critics of the seventies and eighties, influenced perhaps unwittingly
by the centrality of subjectivity and epistemology in literary theory, were
more ambivalent: Darby, whose study situates the novel within ‘‘disinte-
grative’’ anti-realist narrative strategies characteristic of modernism, is ulti-
mately bewildered by the presence of a firm narrative structure. He delivers
his verdict—which convicts the novel of harboring precisely the epistemo-
logically strong narrative framework identified above—as if it had befallen
him to unmask a beloved imposter. Likewise, Dieter Liewerscheidt, oper-
ating on the premise that only consonant modernism is valid modernism,
acts as if he has discovered a cryptorealist novel masquerading asmodernist,
emblazoning his great discovery in the title of his article: ‘‘A Contradiction
in the Conceptualization of the Novel.’’
Lukács and the Loss of the Social
In dramatizing fragmented consciousness not as the modern condition
per se, but as something contingent and partial, Canetti approaches the
substance of one of Georg Lukács’s fundamental criticisms of modernism,
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namely that it universalizes and transcendentalizes subjective human ex-
perience.Writing of themodernist treatment of time, Lukács observes: ‘‘The
uncritical approach of modernist writers—and of some modern philoso-
phers—reveals itself in their conviction that this subjective experience con-
stitutes reality as such. That is why this treatment of time can be used by
the realistic writer to characterize certain figures in his novels, although in
a modernist work it may be used to describe reality itself . . . We arrive,
therefore, at an important distinction: the modernist writer identifies what
is necessarily a subjective experience with reality as such, thus giving a dis-
torted picture of reality as a whole (Virginia Woolf is an extreme example
of this). The realist, with his critical detachment, places what is a signifi-
cant, specifically modern experience in a wider context, giving it only the
emphasis it deserves as a part of a greater, objective whole.’’ 57
If Georg’s gorilla-fervor represents a particular instance of reactionary
modernism—as I have proposed—rather than some quintessential expres-
sion of the modern age, then Canetti’s critique does come very close to
Lukács’s protest against the uncritical exaltation of subjectivity over the
intersubjective social whole. But as the passage above demonstrates, this
similarity is itself only partial: for Lukács’s touchstone of ‘‘critical realism’’
is, as he notes repeatedly, the literary representation of that ‘‘wider context,’’
‘‘a greater, objective whole.’’ And precisely this is missing from Auto-da-Fé.
Though Canetti’s novel lacks this sine qua non of Lukácsian critical real-
ism, a common spirit of critique nevertheless inhabits the work of both.
Lukács never tired of decrying, most memorably perhaps in his signature
essay ‘‘The Ideology of Modernism,’’ ‘‘the negation of outward reality,’’ ‘‘the
rejection of narrative objectivity,’’ and the ‘‘attenuation of actuality,’’ all
lamentable characteristics he located in the work of the recognized mod-
ernists Joyce, Musil, Gide, and, of course, Kafka. Again and again, Lukács
warned about mistaking a historical symptom (such as the individual’s radi-
cal isolation) for a ‘‘natural’’ and therefore unalterable aspect of reality. In
singling out Heidegger’s concept of ‘‘thrownness-into-being’’ (Geworfenheit
ins Dasein), Lukács furthermore opposes what he sees as the ruse of em-
ploying the ‘‘dignity’’ of philosophy in order to underwrite an essentially
asocial worldview. ‘‘This implies,’’ Lukács argues, ‘‘that man is constitution-
ally unable to establish relationships with things or persons outside him-
self.’’ 58 McFarlane’s rhapsodic endorsement of Kien’s philosophy of blind-
ness would seem to be a case in point.
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Auto-da-Fé is thus solidly in line with this kind of critique, though of
course it is not Heidegger, but philosophies popular during the Weimar
period such as neoempiricism and neo-Kantianism, that form the principal
target of the novel’s parody of philosophy, as I have elaborated in chapter 3.
Still, perhaps we need to ask how the novel can share the Lukácsian con-
cern for the diminution, or outright abandonment, of the social without
providing that putatively necessary corrective of ‘‘narrative objectivity.’’ The
answer derives from the dissonant narration described above. Rather than
emanating from largely sympathetic consciousness—sympathetic in terms
of epistemological stance rather than particular content—the text of Auto-
da-Fé derives from figures from whom readers immediately feel distanced.
In short, we witness and deplore the reduction of the social as a highly sus-
pect function of their subjectivity; we watch as characters alternately illu-
minate and darken the social world according to a characteristic obsession,
and—given the highly stylized epistemological privilege we enjoy—we rec-
ognize and condemn their mistakes. Thus, in contrast to Lukács’s requisite
wider context, the critical stance of Auto-da-Fé proceeds from the virtual
absence—or at least the suspiciously ephemeral and malleable quality—of
the social order.
At this point one might object that wringing critique from dearth of de-
piction is a very convenient interpretive gambit, and, furthermore, one that
could just as easily apply to that body of consonant modernism that I have
thus far sought to keep at some distance from Auto-da-Fé. The key dif-
ference, however, is that Canetti’s novel foregrounds the figural process of
reducing, refunctioning, and excluding the social. Just as Lukács arraigns
Heidegger for lending a dubious respectability to modernism, the novel ap-
prehends Kien in the very act of devising a curiously self-serving philosophy
to authorize his exclusion of the larger world. I have already made brief ref-
erence to Georg’s similarly suspect appropriation of the then-popular philo-
sophical movement known as neoempiricism, which, despite superficial dif-
ferences, he deploys to similarly solipsistic ends. But this is just one side of
perception; in order to make the point, Canetti shows in some of the fun-
niest passages of the novel how objects of perception—real places and cul-
tural objects known to the reader independently of the text—are gradually
denied, occluded, or remade in the image of the mad perceiver.
The largest of these cultural données is Vienna itself, which is both eerily
present and absent in Auto-da-Fé. In fact, it is its occasional presence and
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unexpected reappearance that makes us feel the pervasive absence more
acutely. Regarding the modernists’ use of municipal settings, Lukács main-
tains that ‘‘Joyce uses Dublin, Kafka and Musil the Hapsburg Monarchy, as
the locus of their masterpieces. But the locus they lovingly depict is little
more than a backcloth: it is not basic to their artistic intention.’’ 59TheVienna
of Auto-da-Fé is no mere backdrop in this sense. The evocation of the Aus-
trian capital, particularly of two great institutions of the old dual monarchy,
serves not to host but to contest the subjectivist proclivities of the figures.
That architectural and cultural anchor of old Vienna, the Cathedral of St.
Stephen, fails to ground or even orient the subjectivist fantasies of Peter
Kien, who pauses at the landmark statue of Christ (the famous ‘‘Toothache
Christ’’) only to see himself in this sculpture. Therese indulges similar sub-
jectivist inclinations during her visit to the Cathedral: in the gilded painting
of the Last Supper displayed over one of the side altars she is only able to see
a ‘‘reflection’’ of her own small and venal world. This is clearly not the ‘‘see-
ing blindness’’ that McFarlane claimed for the novel; this is rank distortion.
The glimpses we get of Vienna, though admittedly few and far between, pro-
vide us that which the figures utterly lack: a point of reference by which to
gauge the partisan projections of the self-absorbed figures.The novel’s much
more extended focus on the ‘‘Theresianum,’’ a thinly veiled reference to the
real-world Viennese state-run auction house cum pawn shop known as the
‘‘Dorotheum,’’ draws ourattention not only to the particular economic crises
of the Weimar years, but also to the way in which traditional culture was
then subordinated in as yet unprecedented ways to the demands of naked
commerce. The book-eating ogre whom Fischerle conjures in order to mo-
tivate Kien to ransom books is really just the humorous literalization of the
Dorotheum’s standard practice of commodifying and consuming art of all
kinds. Though the novel’s staging of this interwar crisis of values happens to
overlap in part with Kien’s own anxieties about disappearing cultural cer-
tainties, the evocation of the Theresianum fails to fully ratify the protago-
nist’s nostalgia. In fact, both aspects of Vienna depicted in the novel—both
the cathedral and the cathedral of commerce—serve to define rather than
resolve widespread cultural anxieties characteristic of, but not limited to,
the Austrian First Republic. Though this evocation of Vienna would seem
too scant to fulfill Lukács’s prescription for social critique,60 we neverthe-
less garner precisely this critical vantage point from this modest municipal
depiction.
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Lukács memorably accused modernism not only of neglecting the wider
social context, but also of the ‘‘rejection of history,’’ citing Gottfried Benn’s
Static Poems as an exemplary realization of the subjectivist tendency that
Henri Bergson is said to have sanctioned philosophically.61 This concern for
a lack of authentic historical consciousness resonates also within Auto-da-
Fé, but with this caveat: whereas Lukács is concerned with the outright ‘‘de-
nial of history,’’ Canetti is more concerned with its perversion as a device
for avoiding the anxieties of modernity.62 As we noted earlier, this kind of
spurious ‘‘historicism’’ makes its appearance in the novel not in the form
of modern art (as Lukács held), but in theWeimar-era pulp fiction that has
somehow found a place in Kien’s august private library and is passed on to
Therese as the fare appropriate to the barely literate. Canetti employs the
then-wildly popular novel by Willibald Alexis, The Trousers of Mr. Bredow,
which as we noted was published in school editions for courses on German
history during the interwar period, to suggest the suspiciously historical ap-
peal of this literature. Despite the historical veneer, this is sheer escapism,
as we saw above in chapter 1, and is therefore rightly juxtaposed with Georg
Kien’s addiction to erotic French novels.63 As in the matter of the requisite
‘‘wider social context,’’ the critique here proceeds by way of negation—or,
more precisely, by double negation: the novel rejects the characters’ own
dubious rejection of history.
The role of myth in Auto-da-Fé should be at least briefly mentioned in
this context, for it is the integrating power of myth in high modernism that
is typically opposed to the centrifugal force of history. Modernism’s alleged
denial of history, to which Lukács draws our attention, often went hand in
hand with an embrace of myth. The classic expression of this doctrine is
found in Eliot, who famously perceived in Joyce’s Ulysses a certain ‘‘mytho-
logical method’’ credited as an effective means ‘‘of controlling, of ordering,
of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and
anarchy which is contemporary history.’’ 64 This stabilizing or reconciling
function, even if only as an aesthetic effect, has no counterpart in Auto-da-
Fé. Though myth (differently conceived) would later assume great impor-
tance for Canetti in a positive sense, in the novel it serves primarily as grist
for a stinging indictment of the ‘‘orientalist’’ construction of misogynistic
high culture. Surely Kien’s misogynist tour de force near the end of the novel,
which draws so richly upon the mythological reserves of Western culture,
reveals a cultural canon in crisis. The novel’s unrelenting analytical modern-
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ism creates in the end amass of deeplydisturbing negations without promise
of resolution. Canetti himself claims to have been left profoundly unnerved
by the cultural wreckage Auto-da-Fé left in its wake.65 Things finally do not
fall together; they fall apart. The novel concludes in a state that is a far call
from McFarlane’s notion of ‘‘superintegration.’’
Underlying Lukács’s entire critique of modernism is the assumption that
we are insidiously positioned to side with the protagonist. Deprived of any
independent perspectivewewould derive from a proper sociohistorical con-
text, we are sucked into his subjective reality—subordinated, as it were,
to his ‘‘unifying vision.’’ Even if we don’t particularly like the modernist
hero, we run the risk, Lukács warns, of mistaking his particular fate as uni-
versal, ineluctable, and therefore unalterable. Lukács, in other words, con-
curs not only that high modernism is tantamount to what we have above
termed consonant modernism, but argues that very point from additional
angles.66 Yet then, as now, Auto-da-Fé’s markedly dissonant posture com-
plicates this dichotomy, for while it clearly does not qualify as an exemplar
of Lukácsian critical realism, neither does it exhibit the ideological dangers
against which Lukács so tirelessly inveighed. Aswe have had numerous occa-
sions to observe thus far, the figures in the novel are schematically drawn,
not psychologically nuanced approximations of real people, a point Canetti
later underscored, though it is of course easily enough observed in the novel
itself. These figures, hardly the subjectivist sirens of Lukács’s antimodern-
ist imagination, are instead quite consciously stylized vehicles for a whole
array of social and cultural practices employed in doomed—and perhaps
therefore humorous—ways to copewith the experience ofmodernity.When
the novel’s reclusive protagonist seeks to wall himself off from a threatening
tide of humanity, ensconcing himself as the master researcher in a carica-
ture of positivist inquiry, we see him as the expression of particular social
and intellectual anxieties—not, as Lukács feared, as the timeless epitome of
the human condition.Therefore it is preciselywithout directly depicting ‘‘the
common life, the strife and togetherness of other human beings,’’ that we
come to see the ‘‘solitariness’’ of Kien and company as ‘‘a specific social fate,
not a universal condition humaine.’’ 67
The fact that Canetti’s novel shares so much of the spirit of Lukács’s clas-
sic critique of modernism cannot, according to the prevailing ideas of the
time, have encouraged postwar readers to consider Auto-da-Fé as authenti-
cally modernist. Given the fact that it ultimately confirms neither Adorno’s
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positive nor Lukács’s negative construction of literarymodernism, the novel
was virtually destined for emargination as long as these and similar views
held sway.Yet as helpful as this context can be in situatingAuto-da-Féwithin
what may be a more familiar literary-historical landscape, it may prove re-
freshing to note in conclusion the artificiality of this gambit. Not once in all
of his writings does Canetti refer to modernism in the sense that we have
been using it in this chapter. Canetti undoubtedly counted himself among
those modern artists, who, as Ezra Pound put it, sought to ‘‘make it new,’’
but hewas just as likely to affiliate himself with modernmusic and sculpture
as with literature. He relates feeling quite at home as a guest at Hermann
Scherchen’s symposium on modern music in Strassbourg in 1933, ‘‘because
I had written ‘Kant Catches Fire’ [the manuscript title of Auto-da-Fé] and
‘Wedding’ and was conscious of the fact that with that I, like the composers
in attendance, had done something new.’’ 68 Indeed, Canetti contemplated
writing the libretto for one of Scherchen’s modernist compositions. In re-
counting Fritz Wotruba’s approving reaction to the figures of Auto-da-Fé,
Canetti furthermore invites a comparison between his own literary figures
and the hard, uncompromising figures fashioned by this modernist sculp-
tor.69Canetti felt an intense artistic ‘‘brotherhood’’ (his term) withWotruba,
about whom he later wrote a monograph, and saw his own literary accom-
plishment reflected in the musical innovations of his friend, Alban Berg. In
other words, when Canetti conceived of modernism, his purview was hardly
limited to literature alone.
This is not to suggest that Canetti was unfamiliar with the peculiarly lit-
erary avant garde of the 1930s. On the contrary, he reports: ‘‘During the
last four or five years of independent Austria . . . one could hear a trinity
of names, which was held high by the avant garde: Musil, Joyce and Broch,
or Joyce, Musil and Broch.’’ 70 All of whom, of course, were known to him
well beyond mere hearsay. Joyce attended one of Canetti’s salon readings
(though he left at intermission because he was apparently put off by the
Viennese dialect), while both Musil and Broch were Canetti’s close friends.
Nevertheless, Canetti dwelt less on what these (and other) modernists had
in common with regard to technique, theme, or ideology, than with their
shared goal of venturing something newand aesthetically challenging. In the
end, this was Canetti’s litmus test for respectable modern art: does it pander
to conventional taste, andmerely titillate, ordoes it risk ‘‘making it difficult,’’
thereby resisting the allure of commercial success? The ‘‘odd trinity’’ (die
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absonderliche Trinität) of modernists mentioned above was bound together,
at least for Canetti, not by some explicit aesthetic program or ideological
doctrine, but merely by their desire to negate the literary status quo. ‘‘They
belonged—this I never doubted—to a very small group of people who with
literature made it difficult for themselves, who did not write for popularity
or vulgar success. At that time this may have been more important for me
than their work.’’ 71Authors like Stefan Zweig and FranzWerfel, on the other
hand, were relegated to the category of the ‘‘mundane literature of those
years’’ precisely for trimming their literary sails to market success. Canetti
applied the same standard to modern music, as when he excoriated the
Viennese public’s ‘‘obduracy’’ in rejecting the experimental compositions of
Alban Berg and AntonWebern.72
Canetti’s broad, multimedia conception of modernism, which inciden-
tally shares Adorno’s own rigorous opposition to aesthetic commodifica-
tion, provides a helpful reorientation, I think, as we conclude this discussion.
Unbeholden to any of the high priests of modernism, Canetti continued to
tread his own, sovereign path. At a time when modernism was in its heyday,
Canetti penned an essay tellingly titled ‘‘Realismus und Neue Wirklichkeit’’
(Realism and New Reality), a piece that appears intent on scrambling the
conventional wisdom. Indeed, in one of the very few places where he trains
his attention explicitly on modern literature, Canetti pointedly eschews the
language of literary modernism, advocating instead a brand of ‘‘new real-
ism’’ that must rise to the challenge of our daunting ‘‘new reality.’’ While it
is undoubtedly instructive to contrast his novel, particularly its distinctive
analytic structure, with better known high modernist schemas, we might
finally permit Auto-da-Fé its own free berth. In these final pages, then, let
us permit Canetti’s own achievement—rather than the aesthetic criteria of
others—to frame a concluding discussion of the author’s subsequent oeuvre.
The End of Modernism and a New Beginning
TheNazi book burning and ban on ‘‘degenerate art’’ could not have come
at a worse time for Canetti.Yet while these developments surely thwarted the
reception of Auto-da-Fé in the German-speaking world, they do not fully
explain the novel’s marginal relationship to the highmodernist canon in the
postwar years. After all, Auto-da-Fé had been published in both Britain and
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the United States to critical acclaim and had even garnered a major literary
award in France before the end of the 1940s. Though never as widely read as,
say, ThomasMann’sDer Zauberberg (TheMagicMountain), it was certainly
known to the cultural elite. We are forced therefore to face the conclusion
that Auto-da-Fé’s status as a literary ‘‘Sonderling’’ (Auer) has less to do with
world history, accident, or neglect than with the fact that it was effectively,
though perhaps not consciously, excluded from the highmodernist canon—
and, of course, with the fact that it is indeed a very different kind of book.
As we have seen, these differences go well beyond the mere surface va-
garies of mood, atmosphere, and style. It has been the frankly anachronis-
tic task of this final chapter to transplant ourselves into the period when
highmodernism reigned supreme in order towork out consciously theways
in which Auto-da-Fé found itself at loggerheads with central, though not
always explicit, tenets of this movement. Canetti was a modernist who loved
Kafka and Musil, but also Balzac and Heinrich Mann (more than Thomas,
by theway). If we chafe atMcFarlane’s belated and awkward attempt to bring
Canetti into the modernist fold, we do so because of a profound sense of
misalignment: Kien is simply no Tiresias. Indeed, whether we look to the
standards of a traditionalist such as Eliot or to those of theWestern Marxist
Adorno, we see thatAuto-da-Fé remains, at a fundamental level, delightfully
different. The recent efforts to rewrite modernism as a broad set of cultural
responses to the economic ruptures of modernity threaten to obscure the
fact that the old elitist canon of great modernist masters was indeed held
together by an identifiable and sometimes problematic core of qualities that
happen to enshrine much of what Auto-da-Fé avidly contests. There were,
in other words, good (or at least substantive) reasons for keeping Canetti’s
novel at arm’s length. The inclusive, democratizing gesture of the new mod-
ernist paradigm should not, whatever other salubrious results it may have
brought about, be used to conceal important conceptual differences.73 As
beneficiaries of this modernist perestroika, for example, we can now think
of both Rilke and Canetti as suitably modernist, but we would only conflate
these rather different novels at our own peril. Though today we might be
inclined to read Rilke’s Malte as a comment on the anomie of the modern
metropolis, as critics have recently urged, what we most assuredly cannot
do is read Auto-da-Fé as the celebration of the isolated, precious aesthete. In
clashing with essential criteria of high modernism, Canetti earned his place
canetti ’s analytical modernism : 203
on the sidelines. As a kind of rebel-participant, Auto-da-Fé self-consciously
set a limit to the modernism of its day.
Yet this discussion, helpful as it may be in defining distinguishing fea-
tures both of Canetti’s prose and of high modernism’s assumptions, threat-
ens to become somewhat antiquarian. Surely it is an act of academic fancy to
imagine Auto-da-Fé sitting in judgment on its modernist contemporaries—
a kind of intellectual revenge fantasy, perhaps. This would be as misguided
as it is fruitless. ThoughAuto-da-Fé can be said to articulate and foreshadow
the very arguments that would later bring down the canon of the isolated
great masters, this says nothing of the ongoing relevance of that character-
istic feature of Canetti’s prose that we have considered in some depth here,
namely its markedly analytic quality.
Certainly this is a feature that characterizes all his later work. Canetti un-
abashedly employed fiction as well as nonfiction to investigate a world he
felt to be both increasingly menacing and yet unfailingly awe-inspiring. His
three allegedly absurdist plays (Wedding, Comedy of Vanities, and The Num-
bered) contain generous quantities of hyperbole and the grotesque, yet re-
tain at bottom a recognizable social-critical agenda—and were for this very
reason held by some critics to be insufficiently absurd.74 The three-volume
autobiography, the most successful of all Canetti’s writings, was published
to critical and popular acclaim. Yet, here too, critics lamented the fact that
the narrator failed to engage in sufficient quantities of epistemological self-
flagellation. He should have indulged in ritualistic expressions of his in-
ability to narrate, they opine; or, at least, he might have foregrounded the
incommensurability of the narrating and narrated selves. But here, as in the
novel, Canetti thwarted readers’ expectations.75
Canetti’s captivating memoir of his visit to North Africa, Die Stimmen
von Marrakesch (The Voices of Marrakesh, 1968) illustrates the paradox of
this analytic prose particularly well. Canetti imparts a series of memorable
aperçus into the lives of Arabs and Jews (his visit in the spring of 1954 pre-
ceded the Algerian CivilWarof 1954–62) without renouncing his status as an
outside observer. Ignorant of the native languages—but not of the colonial
French—Canetti folds this linguistic handicap into the stories he tells; it be-
comes the self-conscious precondition of the experiences he relates and the
pictures he paints. This frank acknowledgment of his own limited subject
position stands not in the tradition of that high modernist, quasi-mystical
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‘‘Tiresian seeing-blindness,’’ but instead demonstrates in an exemplary and
timely manner the necessarily dual thrust of any multicultural undertaking:
the irrepressible quest to know the other combinedwith the humility incum-
bent upon any foreign observer. These two factors, present also in Auto-da-
Fé, produce remarkable glimpses into the lives of the native peoples. Their
voices are recorded in the ears of the European intellectual, but are never
fully translated. Canetti’s very title,The Voices of Marrakesh,draws ouratten-
tion to that which the author can never fully comprehend. Though realized
in fascinatingly different ways, Canetti’s analytic prose always contains the
two elements we have observed throughout this studyofAuto-da-Fé: a prob-
ing gesture toward discovery and an attendant reflection on the difficulty
(and sometime futility) of that very undertaking.
With the conclusion ofAuto-da-FéCanetti himself was at a dead end.The
social sphere he saw threatened by subjectivist fads and philosophies was
something representable only indirectly in fiction and by means of negation
because it existed for the author principally as unrealized potential. Canetti
spent the next thirty-plus years pursuing a positive foundation that would
justify his hope for the future of the human community in the face of the
demonstrated barbarism of the two world wars. It was not something the
young novelist factually knew, but something he fervently sought. Except for
those few plays, the best of which, Hochzeit (Wedding, 1932), was contem-
poraneous with the novel and shared its fundamental critique of a radically
diminished social sphere, Auto-da-Fé represents virtually the beginning and
end of Canetti’s fictional output.
Canetti’s second ‘‘life’s work,’’ Crowds and Power, can appropriately be
seen as an outgrowth of the novel in this larger sense. Not, of course, as
a mere extension or repetition of the concerns we have thus far discussed,
but as a response to the larger challenges posed in the novel. Indeed, the
armchair anthropologist who narrates Crowds and Power represents a veri-
table ‘‘Anti-Kien’’ in that his insatiable hunger for the myths and legends of
Asia, Africa, and the Americas exemplifies a constructive option to the euro-
centric, misogynistic, and ‘‘orientalist’’ perversions of his fictional predeces-
sor.76 This new kind of mythological method that characterizes the pages of
Crowds and Power—not Eliot’s high modernist version—seeks to avoid the
subjectivist dangers exhibited by both the Kien brothers by drawing upon
the voices of the many, including emphatically those of the non-European
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peoples, past and present. If this can be seen as Canetti’s effort to redeem rea-
son and redefine ‘‘culture,’’ it is amarkedly literaryandpoetic undertaking as
well. For this anthropological study—if we can after all call it that—not only
eschews the accustomed scholarly apparatus in favor of masterful and rivet-
ing storytelling, but invokes the sovereigntyof the poet in springing—some-
times capriciously and bemusingly—from insight to insight. As the novel is
uncharacteristically analytical, this cross-cultural and interdisciplinary in-
quiry into the nature of masses and the sources of power is imbued with
unexpected inflections of the poetic. And while Crowds and Power in a sense
rebuffs the novel’s protagonist, it also reprises him: this study’s ambition,
erudition, and, yes, bombast evoke nothing if not the ghost of Peter Kien.
Crowds and Power ventures this answer to the question posed in the
novel—an incomplete answer, to be sure (Canetti had planned a second
volume), but one that is based on a dauntingly expansive survey of world
mythology, folklore, and anthropological reports: We are by nature social,
and this is a fundamental characteristic, not an epiphenomenon of drive-
sublimation, as Freud would have it. Furthermore, we possess the primal
ability to evolve toward higher forms. In naming this most optimistic of
qualities, Canetti borrowed a term from his beloved Kafka, ‘‘Verwandlung,’’
thereby characteristically encoding a warning even at hismost sanguinemo-
ment: the potential for human metamorphosis can go either way. Canetti’s
postulation of the transformative power recorded in myth comes only after
hundreds of pages documenting patterns of atrocity and barbarism. It offers,
finally, a whiff of optimism, amodicumof hope that contrasts starkly with—
and responds to—the novel’s dark and unpromising ending. In this way,
then, Canetti’s personal departure from literary modernism set the course
for a creative new beginning.
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preface
1. Denby, ‘‘Learning to Love Canetti,’’ 107.
2. Up until 1993, the Harvard Department of Germanic Languages and Litera-
tures listedAuto-da-Fé as a postwar novel on its reading list for graduate students.
3. Kimball, ‘‘Becoming Elias Canetti,’’ 17.
introduction
1. Kimball, ‘‘Becoming Elias Canetti,’’ 23.
2. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 39.
3. Ibid., 42.
4. See Darby’s survey of the scholarly literature in Structures of Disintegration,
1–15, and Göpfert, Canetti Lesen.
5. Jay makes this point in both The Dialectical Imagination and Adorno.
6. Kimball, for example, remarks: ‘‘In tone, outlook, and texture, Auto-da-Fé
may be described as a cross between Kafka . . . and the Borges of stories like
‘The Libraryof Babel’ ’’ (‘‘Becoming Elias Canetti,’’ 23). Similarly, Denbyobserves:
‘‘The great European modernists—Yeats, Kafka, Mann, Musil—took on the bur-
den of Europe’s disintegration; Canetti, who had sorrowfully watched Austria fall
apart between the wars, also sounds the authentic note of despair, the anguish of
an impassioned humanism at bay’’ (‘‘Learning to Love Canetti,’’ 107).
7. Quoted in Rodney Livingstone, ‘‘Brecht’s Me-ti,’’ 68.
8. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 142.
9. Ibid., 176.
10. Ibid., 176–77.
11. Göpfert, ‘‘Reception History,’’ 304.
12. Ibid., 312.
13. Ibid., 302.
208 : notes to pages 1 1–19
14. Ein Dichter gegen Macht und Tod.
15. Göpfert, ‘‘Reception History,’’ 304.
16. For this story, as well as a source rich with early reception data, see ‘‘Weis-
manns Versuch.’’
17. Göpfert, ‘‘Reception History,’’ 293.
18. Quoted in Peter Russell, ‘‘The Vision of Man,’’ 30.
19. Reich-Ranicki, in Ein Dichter gegen Macht und Tod, remarks: ‘‘Es ist ein
ganz großer Entwurf über die Tragödie des Intellektuellen in unserem Jahrhun-
dert, eine Parabel von höchster Ambition.’’
20. Enzensberger, ‘‘Elias Canetti,’’ 48.
21. Examples can be found in Barnouw, Elias Canetti, 29, and Lorenz, ‘‘Bezüge
zwischen Roman und Massentheorie,’’ 89.
22. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 89.
23. SeeMurphy,Canetti and Nietzsche. Foramore in-depth assessment of Mur-
phy’s monograph see Dagmar C. G. Lorenz’s review in German Quarterly 71.2
(Spring 1998).
24. For a fuller account of German literarymodernism than I can provide here,
see Steven Dowden, Sympathy for the Abyss.
25. Dominick LaCapra and Walter Cohen, for example, take New Historicism
to task for fostering ‘‘facile associationism’’ as well as ‘‘arbitrary connectedness’’;
in Cohn, ‘‘Optics and Power in the Novel,’’ 96.
26. For example, Georg Eisler remarks, in Ein Dichter gegen Macht und Tod:
‘‘Canetti ist eminent weltanschaulich. Seine Arbeiten entstehen auf Grund einer
sehr intensiven Betrachtung, eines sehr intensiven Anschauens, derWelt. Schein-
bar steht er etwas abseits. Aber diese bohrende Art sich Fragen zu stellen, sich mit
demWahrgenommenen auseinanderzustellen, geht natürlich auch ins Politische,
ins in jeder Hinsicht Weltanschauliche.’’
chapter 1
1. Canetti, ‘‘Das erste Buch,’’ 250.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Liewerscheidt, ‘‘Ein Widerspruch,’’ 356.
5. Darby, Structures of Disintegration, 101. For a contrastive study of narration
in Canetti’s two major works, see Werlen’s Narrative Strategies.
6. Canetti, ‘‘Das erste Buch,’’ 244. Here Canetti mentions also his translations
of the American popular realist author Upton Sinclair for the leftist Malik Verlag
of Berlin, 248–49.
7. Ibid., 249.
8. Canetti, Auto-da-Fé, 38. Henceforth all references to theWedgwood transla-
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tion will be abbreviated as AF. Those instances where I have modifiedWedgwood
are indicated by ‘‘trans. rev.’’ The German text, cited in the notes according to
the edition listed in the bibliography, is abbreviated as DB, as in the following:
‘‘Sollte es zu spät sein, dachte er, wie alt mag sie sein? Lernen kann man immer.
Mit einfachen Romanen müßte sie beginnen’’ (DB, 37).
9. AF, 37; DB, 36.
10. AF, 42; ‘‘Für sie kam bloß ein Roman in Betracht. Nur wird von Romanen
kein Geist fett. Den Genuß, den sie vielleicht bieten, überzahlt man sehr: sie zer-
setzen den besten Charakter. Man lernt sich in allerlei Menschen einfühlen. Am
vielen Hin und Her gewinnt man Geschmack. Man löst sich in die Figuren auf,
die einem gefallen. Jeder Standpunkt wird begreiflich. Willig überläßt man sich
fremden Zielen und verliert für länger die eigenen aus dem Auge. Romane sind
Keile, die ein schreibender Schauspieler in die geschlossene Person seiner Leser
treibt. Je besser er Keil und Widerstand berechnet, um so gespaltener läßt er die
Person zurück. Romane müßten von Staats wegen verboten sein’’ (DB, 41–42).
11. Terry Eagleton tells the story of the rise of English literature as an academic
discipline in the British university—which occurred concurrently with thewriting
of Auto-da-Fé (1930–31)—in his ‘‘The Rise of English,’’ in Literary Theory, 17–53.
12. AF, 43; ‘‘Sie schlug das Buch auf, las laut: ‘Die Hosen . . .’, unterbrach
sich und wurde nicht rot. Ihr Gesicht bedeckte sich mit einem leichten Schweiß’’
(DB, 43).
13. ‘‘Roswitha las den Zettel durch und schnitt in der anderen Stube die letzte
Zeile fort; sie genierte sich ihret- und ihrer Frau wegen, den Zettel in seiner ur-
sprünglichen Gestalt abzugeben.’’ In Fontane, Effi Briest, 198.
14. Effi instructs Roswitha: ‘‘du mußt mir nun auch Bücher besorgen; es wird
nicht schwer halten, ich will alte, ganz alte’’ (ibid., 198). Fontane has included in
this remark a barb against Alexis, with whom he felt a rivalry (see below): He has
Effi suggest that it won’t be difficult to find this Alexis novel in the library, because
it is so dated. In this Fontane was simply wrong: Alexis’s popularity continued
unabated—even increased—during the Weimar period (see below).
15. Five times in Book 1 (DB, 42, 43, 45, 47, 121), and three times in Book 3 (DB,
379, 457, 458).
16. The nineteenth-century tendency to construct an idealized literary past—
quite in contrast to historical reality—is well documented with regard to the
‘‘Ghettogeschichte’’ by Gabrielle von Glasenapp in her monograph Aus der Juden-
gasse.
17. Thomas, ‘‘The Literary Reputation of Willibald Alexis,’’ 195.
18. Adolf Stern writes that Alexis ‘‘ward nach einer üblen Gewohnheit . . . nur
allzu oft als der deutsche Walter Scott bezeichnet’’ (in Thomas, ibid., 210 n. 3).
19. Ibid., 197.
20. Lynne Tatlock observes: ‘‘To this day he is remembered, if at all, as the Ger-
manWalter Scott. Whereas in our own time his name means nothing to the gen-
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eral public, educated Germans of an older generation tend to know the historical
novel, Die Hosen des Herrn von Bredow’’ (Willibald Alexis’ Zeitroman ‘‘Das Haus
Düsterweg’’ and the Vormärz, 3).
21. This and the following publication information culled from Reinhard
Oberschelp, ed., Gesamtverzeichnis, 418–19. Despite its title, this catalogue is not
reliably comprehensive. Furthermore, printing quantities are only haphazardly
given. Nevertheless, the global impression is that Die Hosen did a considerable
business in the 1920s.
22. Though my account of the novel’s publication history breaks off here, one
might note that Die Hosen des Herrn von Bredow continued to be issued through-
out the Nazi period.
23. Theodor Fontane, ‘‘Willibald Alexis,’’ 422.
24. Alexis,Die Hosen, 49.Though no date of publication is printed in the book,
1926 is the year given in the Gesamtverzeichnis for the Insel printing of ‘‘22. bis 26.
Tausend,’’ which is printed on the final page of this edition.
25. Ibid., 29.
26. Ibid., 8, 74.
27. Ibid., 6.
28. Der blaue Engel opened in Berlin in 1930, though, of course, Heinrich
Mann’s novel, on which the film is loosely based, had already appeared almost
twenty-fiveyears earlier. Rath’s enchantment at hearing the school girls sing ‘‘Änn-
chen von Tharau’’ gives us an idea of the text through which he saw Lola-Lola.
29. With the metamorphosis of an obedient servant into a destroying shrew,
Canetti combines gender representations often rigidly separated, namely the
‘‘real’’ subservient woman as against the ‘‘mythic’’ she-devil. On this see Maria
Tatar, ‘‘ ‘Wie süß ist es, sich zu opfern’: Gender, Violence, and Agency in Döblin’s
Berlin Alexanderplatz,’’ 514.
30. For an account and critical appraisal of this debate, see Saul Friedländer,
Probing the Limits of Representation, especially 1–21.
31. Quoted in Thomas, ‘‘The Literary Reputation of Willibald Alexis,’’ 195.
32. Ibid., 196.
33. Tatlock (‘‘Willibald Alexis and ‘Young Germany,’ ’’ 367) quotes Alexis him-
self on the collapse of the two time levels (the historical period treated and the
period in which the novel is written) in this genre: ‘‘denn ist nicht jede Novelle
=Roman [sic] eigentlich eine Zeitnovelle, wenn der Autor seine subjektive Auf-
fassung in der Behandlung des Themas, möge es noch so weit in der Zeit zurück-
liegen, aus der Zeit, in der er lebt, mit hereinbringt?’’
34. Thomas, ‘‘The Literary Reception of Willibald Alexis,’’ 202.
35. Natter, Literature at War, 208.
36. AF, 114, my emphasis; ‘‘In der Liste der gefallenen Bücher figurierte als
Nummer 39 ein dicker, alter Band über ‘Bewaffnung und Taktik der Landes-
knechte.’ Kaum war er mit schwerem Krach über die Leiter gekollert, als die
blasenden Hausbesorger sich in Landsknechte verwandelten. Eine ungeheure Be-
notes to pages 28–3 1 : 211
geisterung packte Kien. Der Hausbesorger war ein Landsknecht, was denn sonst?
. . . Da jagte ihm die Faust keinen Schrecken mehr ein. Vor ihm saß eine wohl-
vertraute historische Figur. Er wußte, was sie tun und was sie lassen würde . . .
Armer, zu spät geratener Kerl, kam da als Landsknecht im zwanzigsten Jahrhun-
dert auf die Welt . . . ausgestoßen aus dem Säkulum, für das er geschaffen war,
verschlagen in ein anderes, wo er immer fremd blieb! In der harmlosen Ferne des
beginnenden 16. Jahrhunderts schmolz der Hausbesorger zu nichts zusammen, er
mochte prahlen, soviel er wollte. Um eines Menschen Herr zu werden, genügt es,
ihn historisch einzureihen’’ (DB, 119–20, my emphasis).
37. DB, 417.
38. Canetti visits the issues of ‘‘Vergangenheit,’’ history, and historians repeat-
edly in the Die Provinz des Menschen: Aufzeichnungen 1942–1972 and he is invari-
ably negative. Canetti charges historians with preserving and propagating rela-
tionships of power, for failing to see what could have been (i.e., for encouraging
the sense of historical inevitability), and for creating a false sense of security: ‘‘Die
Geschichte gibt den Menschen ihr falsches Vertrauen zurück’’ (50). Other per-
tinent passages can be found at 13, 32–33 (where Canetti compares historians to
blind termites who consume each other’s waste), 36, 51.
39. See also Kien’s paean to the past from the chapter ‘‘Die Erstarrung’’: ‘‘An
allen Schmerzen ist die Gegenwart schuld. Er sehnt sich nach der Zukunft, weil
dannmehrVergangenheit auf derWelt sein wird. DieVergangenheit ist gut, sie tut
niemand was zuleid, zwanzig Jahre hat er sich frei in ihr bewegt, er war glücklich
. . . Er beugt sich vor dem Primat der Vergangenheit’’ (DB, 169).
40. AF, 398; ‘‘Lesen als Streicheln, eine andere Form der Liebe, für Damen und
Damenärzte, zu deren Beruf feines Verständnis für die intime Lektüre der Dame
gehörte’’ (DB, 436).
41. DB, 435; AF, 398.
42. AF, 398–99; ‘‘Die besten Romanewaren die, in denen dieMenschen am ge-
wähltesten sprachen . . . Eine solche Aufgabe bestand darin, die zackige, schmerz-
liche, beißende Vielgestalt des Lebens, das einen umgab, auf eine glatte Papiere-
bene zu bringen, über die es sich rasch und angenehm hinweglas . . . je öfter
ein Geleise befahren war, um so differenzierter die Lust, die man ihm abgewann
. . . Georges Kien hatte als Frauenarzt begonnen. Seine Jugend und Schönheit
fand ungeheuren Zulauf. In jener Periode, die nur wenige Jahre dauerte, ergab er
sich den Romanen Frankreichs; an seinem Erfolg hatten sie wesentlichen Anteil
. . . Von zahllosen Frauen, zu seinem Dienst bereit, umgeben, verwöhnt, reich,
wohlerzogen, lebte er wie Prinz Gautama, bevor er Buddah wurde. Kein besorgter
Vater und Fürst schloß ihn vomElend derWelt ab, er sahAlter,Tod und Bettler, so
viele, daß er sie nichtmehr sah. Abgeschlossenwar erdoch, aberdurch die Bücher,
die er las, die Sätze, die er sprach, die Frauen, die sich als gierige, geschlossene
Mauer um ihn stellten’’ (DB, 436).
43. Davis, Resisting Novels, 12.
44. Davis observes that ‘‘ ‘Identification,’ . . . [a] major defense, in which we
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convince ourselves that we are like certain ‘ideal’ figures, is so clearly a feature of
novel reading that further discussion is not necessary . . . Suffice it to say that a
novel can barely succeed unless we place ourselves in some special relation to the
hero or heroine’’ (ibid., 21).
45. Ibid., 127.
46. Barnouw, Elias Canetti, 28.
47. AF, 395; DB, 432.
48. AF, 396; ‘‘Er war groß, stark, feurig und sicher; in seinen Zügen lag etwas
von jener Weichheit, die Frauen benötigen, um sich bei einem Manne heimisch
zu fühlen. Wer ihn sah, nannte ihn den Adam des Michelangelo’’ (DB, 433).
49. Davis notes that ‘‘ideologically speaking, then, character gives readers faith
that personality is, first, understandable and, second, capable of rational change.
As part of the general ideology of middle-class individualism, the idea that the
subject might be formed from social forces and that change might have to come
about through social change is by and large absent from novels. Change is always
seen as effected by the individual ’’ (Resisting Novels, my emphasis, 119).
50. Göpfert, ‘‘Reception History,’’ 299.
51. Ibid., 303.
52. Georg’s self-image as insightful ‘‘Menschenkenner’’ can be found at AF,
426, and DB, 466. The critics’ love affair with Georg has continued down toWal-
ter Sokel (1974) and Russell Berman (1986), both of whomwill be discussed in the
following chapter.
53. AF, 210; ‘‘ ‘Sicher sind Sie ein guter Läufer!’ Fischerle durchschaute die Falle
und erwiderte: ‘Was soll ich lügen? Wenn Sie einen Schritt machen, mach’ ich
einen halben. In der Schule war ich immer der schlechteste Läufer.’ Er dachte sich
den Namen einer Schule aus, für den Fall, daß ihn Kien danach fragte: in Wirk-
lichkeit hatte er nie eine besucht. Aber Kien schlug sich eben mit wichtigeren
Gedanken [namely the memory of his own physical shortcomings] herum. Er
stand vor dem größten Vertrauensbeweis seines Lebens. ‘Ich glaube Ihnen!’ sagte er
schlicht. Fischerle frohlockte’’ (DB, 229, my emphasis).
54. AF, 255; ‘‘weil ihm ihre Empörung gefiel’’ (279), trans. rev.
55. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 132.
56. Davis, Resisting Novels, 102–61, especially 125.
57. Ibid., 137.
58. Ibid., 138.




63. Davis, Resisting Novels, 142.
64. AF, 16–17, my emphasis, trans. rev. Readers of English may not immedi-
ately recognize Wedgwood’s ‘‘Mut Strasse’’ as referring to a city street (Straße =
street), and may also wish to know that there is some irony in the choice of this
notes to pages 36–39 : 213
name, which, though also a proper name (i.e., a real Viennese street name), lit-
erally means ‘‘courage street,’’ indicating a quality totally lacking in the protago-
nist. ‘‘Da rief jemand laut jemand andern an: ‘Können Sie mir sagen, wo hier
die Mutstraße ist?’ Der Gefragte entgegnete nichts. Kien wunderte sich; da gab es
auf offener Straße noch außer ihm schweigsame Menschen. Ohne aufzublicken,
horchte er hin. Wie würde sich der Fragende zu dieser Stummheit verhalten? . . .
Wieder sagte er nichts. Kien belobte ihn . . . Noch immer sagte der zweite nichts
. . . Der Vorgang spielte zu seiner Rechten. Dort tobte der erste: ‘Sie haben kein
Benehmen! . . .’ Der zweite schwieg . . . Da bekam Kien einen bösen Stoß . . . Der
zweite, der Schweiger undCharakter, der seinenMund auch imZorn beherrschte,
war Kien selbst’’ (DB, 14–15, my emphasis).
65. Darby, Structures of Disintegration, 27.
66. Alexis, Die Hosen, 55, 56.
67. Ibid., 96–97.
68. Ibid., 68.
69. For the parallel story, see ibid., 87–89. Schneider Wiedeband, like Hed-
derich, is accused of selling fraudulent articles of clothing. Because of his talents
as a tailor, and because ‘‘die sächsischen Herren’’ enjoyed playing him off against
‘‘die vonBeelitz,’’Wiedebandwas able to buy himself into nobility. Butwhenhe at-
tempts revenge on his oppressors à la Michael Kohlhaas, both parties turn against
him, and he is hanged.
70. The exchange in German runs as follows: ‘‘Plagt der Teufel den alten Krip-
penreiter, daß er einem Juden auflauert, der mit seinemWagen nach Berlin fährt.’’
‘‘Einem Juden.’’ ‘‘Oder so was’’ (ibid., 2:6).
71. Ibid., 2:12; see also 2:7–8.
72. An examination of Alexis’s political affiliations can be found in Tatlock,
‘‘Willibald Alexis and ‘Young Germany.’ ’’
73. See Hal Draper, ‘‘Marx and the Economic-Jew Stereotype,’’ in Karl Marx’s
Theory of Revolution, 1:591–608.
74. Alexis, Die Hosen, 2:12.
75. On this see Michael Brenner, After the Holocaust.
76. Alexis, Die Hosen, 1:23–24.
77. Thomas’s statement on Alexis’s ‘‘love of impartiality’’ certainly does not
extend to this novel’s anti-Semitism; nor does it seem appropriate in general to
Die Hosen. See ‘‘The Literary Reception of Willibald Alexis,’’ 207.
78. See also Alexis,Die Hosen, 2:157. Any critical position onemight attempt to
read into this representation seems further disallowed by Alexis’s conception ‘‘of
the hero as the representative of the reader, just as the chorus in ancient tragedy
typifies public opinion’’ (Thomas, ‘‘The Literary Reception of Willibald Alexis,’’
210).
79. See, for example, Alexis, Die Hosen, 2:79, which marks the beginning of a
passage that moves Lindenberg into a distinctly more positive light by portraying
him as the enlightener of the youthful ruler.
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80. Ibid., 62, 64.
81. Though also sprinkled throughout the book, such gnomic utterances can
be found at 1:30 (fickle human nature), 1:92 (von Bredow as a dimwit), 1:60
(simple living is best).
82. Gilman, Difference and Pathology.
83. Some examples of Therese-focalization buried within an apparently objec-
tive narrative voice can be found at DB, 334 (the investigation), 80–81 (the furni-
ture shopping excursion), and 107 (the discovery of Kien after his accident in the
library). One example of unmarked Kien focalization is at DB, 181–82; others are
strewn throughout the novel.
84. AF, 396; ‘‘in seinen Zügen lag etwas von jener Weichheit, die Frauen be-
nötigen, um sich bei einem Manne heimisch zu fühlen’’ (DB, 433).
85. For a concise overview of these two Genettian terms (‘‘zero focalization,’’
‘‘internal focalization’’) as well as Stanzel’s parallel categories, see Dorrit Cohn,
‘‘Optics and Power in the Novel.’’ A more extensive treatment of these key narra-
tological terms can be found in Cohn’s classic Transparent Minds.
86. See Canetti’s 1965 essay ‘‘Realismus und neue Wirklichkeit.’’
87. Canetti, ‘‘Das erste Buch,’’ 249.
chapter 2
1. Sontag, ‘‘Mind as Passion,’’ 88.
2. AF, 445; ‘‘Du bist immer höflich, duWeib, du bist wie die Eva . . . Ruh dich
doch von derWeiblichkeit aus! Vielleicht wirst du wieder ein Mensch’’ (DB, 488).
The title quotation is also spoken by Peter Kien to brother Georg. The German
original has a somewhat different flavor: ‘‘Eigentlich bist du eine Frau. Du bestehst
aus Sensationen’’ (DB, 479).
3. Lawson, Understanding Elias Canetti, 8.
4. Ibid., 41.
5. Ferrara, ‘‘Grotesque and Voiceless,’’ 86, 93.
6. Foell, Blind Reflections, 186. Foell reaches a similar conclusion regarding a
sexual encounter between Therese and Pfaff: ‘‘Canetti preserves the distance to
Therese, leaving the reader disgusted at her . . . rather than sympathetic with her
as victim of sexual assault. In effect, he perpetuates the myth that ‘women want
it’ ’’ (137).Though Foell claims to offer amore differentiated view (i.e., that Canetti
both actively criticizes and passively reflects reigning gender theories of his day),
the net effect of her study is to suggest that even in those cases where she per-
ceives Canetti to have offered some revision of Weininger, that position is still
decidedly misogynistic (see, for example, 57, 100, 148, 154, 188). More recently,
Foell espouses the curious notion that Auto-da-Fé does not qualify as satire be-
cause it ‘‘cannot be a means of satire when the object of satire (here Weininger’s
‘W’) is itself an absurd exaggeration’’; see ‘‘Whores, Mothers, and Others,’’ 248–
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53. This stands in stark contrast to the more convincing position taken by Elfriede
Pöder in ‘‘Spurensicherung.’’
7. Sontag, who once supposed that the novel ‘‘is animated by an exceptionally
inventive hatred for women’’ (‘‘Mind as Passion,’’ 92), appears repeatedly as a kind
of inspiration in subsequent feminist analyses of Auto-da-Fé. What her disciples
have overlooked, however, is the more sophisticated ‘‘life and work’’ model im-
plicit in Sontag’s essay. Reflecting on language common to both the novel and the
published notebooks (Die Aufzeichnungen), Sontag notes: ‘‘And this was not lan-
guage suitable only for the mad bookman; Canetti later used it in his notebooks
to describe himself, as when he called his life nothing but a desperate attempt to
think about everything ‘so that it comes together in a head and thus becomes one
again,’ affirming the very fantasy he had pilloried in Auto-da-Fé’’ (ibid., 93). This
approach to ‘‘life and work,’’ which is at once alert to inconsistencies and thematic
parallels yet opposed to reductionist equations, seems to me the most promising
for future Canetti scholarship, particularly as we anticipate the publication of the
Nachlaß as well as a truly critical biography.
8. Felman, ‘‘Turning the Screw of Interpretation,’’ 105.
9. Ferrara simply thinks that the novel’s men are treated better by the narrator,
who, for her, is interchangeable with Canetti himself (‘‘Grotesque and Voiceless,’’
86–87, 92). Foell assumes a narrator so in charge of the story that silence itself tac-
itly endorses a character’s misogynistic views. When Fischerle insults the school
teacher by assuming she is a whore (recall that Fischerle thinks every woman is a
whore), Foell rushes to her defense, lest the hapless reader be persuaded to adopt
Fischerle’s opinion: ‘‘The joke is at the teacher’s expense . . . ,’’ we are told, ‘‘leaving
the reader with Fischerle’s viewpoint (which the narrator does not contradict)
that this is not a ‘real’ woman because she is not a whore, not concerned with her
attractiveness to men’’ (ibid., 141; see also 82).
10. On this see Foell (Blind Reflections, 125, 135, 139), who proposes that Kien
is indeed an identification figure capable of inspiring misogyny in the reader.
11. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 40.
12. Beller, ‘‘Otto Weininger as Liberal?’’
13. AF, 184; DB, 200–201.
14. Bronfen, Over Her Dead Body, 415.
15. Ibid., 418.
16. AF, 177; DB, 192. The mother-son relationship is articulated later in the
same chapter: ‘‘Sie hatte das Gefühl, daß sie ammißratenen Teil ihres Kindes mit-
schuldig sei’’ (DB, 199).
17. AF, 355; ‘‘Unters Bett wär’ er zum Abschied gern gekrochen, weil er dort in
derWiege seiner Laufbahn lag. Da . . . herrschte eine Ruhe wie in keinem Kaffee-
haus’’ (DB, 388).
18. Tatar, The Hard Facts of the Grimms’ Fairy Tales, 91.
19. Ibid., 182.
20. Ibid., 149.
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21. AF, 368; ‘‘Bald nach dieser Veränderung starb die Frau, vor Überanstren-
gung . . . Am Tage nach der Beerdigung begann sein Wonnemond. Ungestörter
als bisher verfuhr er mit der Tochter nach Belieben’’ (DB, 402).
22. Tatar, The Hard Facts of the Grimms’ Fairy Tales, 150.
23. Ibid., 152–53.
24. AF, 370; ‘‘Das Futter gibt ihr . . .’’ ‘‘der gute Vater.’’ / ‘‘Die Männer wollen
sie . . .’’ ‘‘gar nicht haben.’’ . . . / ‘‘Jetzt wird sie der Vater gleich . . .’’ ‘‘verhaften.’’ /
‘‘Auf dem Vater seinem Schoß sitzt . . .’’ ‘‘die brave Tochter.’’ / ‘‘Der Vater weiß,
warum er sie . . .’’ ‘‘schlägt.’’ / ‘‘Er tut der Tochter gar nicht . . .’’ ‘‘weh.’’ / ‘‘Dafür
lernt sie, was sich beim . . .’’ ‘‘Vater gehört’’ (DB, 404–5).
25. Concluding from Cox’s study of 345 variants of ‘‘Cinderella,’’ Tatar ob-
serves: ‘‘Cinderella and her folkloristic sisters are therefore almost as likely to flee
the household because of their father’s perverse erotic attachment to them or be-
cause of his insistence on a verbal declaration of love as they are to be banished to
the hearth and degraded to domestic servitude by an ill-tempered stepmother’’
(The Hard Facts of the Grimms’ Fairy Tales, 153). Tatar’s analysis of the potential
complementarity of the incestuous father/jealous mother plots reminds us that
these may not, therefore, represent discrete alternative plots at the level of psychic
motivation.
26. AF, 45, trans. rev.; DB, 45.
27. AF, 121; DB, 127.
28. AF, 43; ‘‘Umständlich suchte sie ein passendes [Stück Packpapier] aus und
legte es dem Buche um, wie einem Kind ein Kleid . . . Er hatte sie unterschätzt.
Sie behandelte die Bücher besser als er’’ (DB, 42).
29. Hauptmann employed this same female type elsewhere, as Karl S. Guthke
has suggested, namely in the figure of Hanne Schäl (Frau Henschel), from Fuhr-
mann Henschel (1898).
30. Downing, ‘‘Repetition and Realism.’’
31. Hauptmann, Bahnwärter Thiel, 225, my emphasis. The German gives a
slightly clearer sense of Lene’s sexuality: ‘‘Drei Dinge jedoch hatte er, ohne es
zu wissen, mit seiner Frau in Kauf genommen: eine harte, herrschsüchtige Ge-
mütsart, Zanksucht und brutale Leidenschaftlichkeit. Nach Verlauf eines halben
Jahres war es ortsbekannt, wer in demHäuschen desWärters das Regiment führte.
Man bedauerte denWärter.’’
32. For example, Werlen, Narrative Strategies, 12.
33. Hauptmann, Bahnwärter Thiel, 236.
34. Ibid., 238.
35. For more on this see Mieder, ‘‘ ‘Spuren der schwarzen Spinne.’ ’’
36. I explore this issue in greater depth in ‘‘The Kiss of the Spider Woman.’’
37. AF, 432, trans. rev.; ‘‘In der Spinne, dem grausamsten und häßlichsten aller
Tiere, sehe ich die verkörperteWeiblichkeit. Ihr Netz schillert in der Sonne giftig
und blau’’ (DB, 475).
38. Regarding pornography, Stewart wrote in the famous 1964 case of Jacobellis
notes to pages 60–63 : 217
v. Ohio: ‘‘I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I under-
stand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.’’
39. Ryan,Vanishing Subject, 6–22; a somewhat fuller treatment of this topic can
be found in her ‘‘Viennese Psychology and American Pragmatism.’’
40. Ryan, Vanishing Subject, 21.
41. For Weininger, the ‘‘Jew’’ no less than ‘‘Woman’’ represents the specter of
the disunified empirical self. On the Jew as the quintessential Machian (or empiri-
cal) self, see Beller, Vienna and the Jews, 224. The opposition between the empiri-
cal and ethical selves is of central concern in Beller’s ‘‘OttoWeininger as Liberal?’’
42. In Ein Dichter gegen Macht und Tod, poet Erich Fried insightfully refers
to Klaus Theweleit as Canetti’s ‘‘rebellious student.’’ Yet the affinity goes well be-
yondmere literary form (i.e., similar kinds of eclecticism and idiosyncratic essay-
istic form in both Masse und Macht and Männerphantasien [Male Fantasies]) to
include a shared analysis of misogyny as rooted in a male identity crisis. Thus
Theweleit’s Male Fantasies is indebted as much to Auto-da-Fé as it is to Masse und
Macht.
43. An instructive survey of Weininger’s considerable influence can be found
in Barbara Hyams and Nancy A. Harrowitz, ‘‘A Critical Introduction to the His-
tory of Weininger Reception.’’
44. Beller, ‘‘Otto Weininger as Liberal?,’’ 97.
45. Ibid., 99.
46. Beller elaborates: ‘‘Man’s mortal enemy is Woman, that is, the animal,
the material, the earthly in each individual. What woman really represents is
Weininger’s fear that Man’s higher self will be distracted from the pursuit of
knowledge and meaning by the allures of hedonistic pleasure and the irrational
realm of feelings’’ (ibid., 98).
47. AF, 239, trans. rev.; ‘‘Da der Philologe in ihm noch lebte, beschloß er, bis
ruhigere Zeiten ins Land gekehrt wären, eine von Grund auf neue, textkritische
Untersuchung der Evangelien vorzunehmen. . . . Er fühlte in sich Gelehrsamkeit
genug, um das Christentum auf seinen wahren Ursprung zurückzuführen, und
wenn er auch nicht der erste war, der die wirklichen Worte des Heilands in eine
Menschheit warf . . . so hoffte er doch mit einigem inneren Grund, daß seine
Deutung die letzte blieb’’ (DB, 261).
48. AF, 391; DB, 428.
49. AF, 385; ‘‘DieWissenschaft hat uns von Aberglauben und Glauben befreit.
Sie gebraucht immerdie gleichenNamen,mitVorliebe griechisch-lateinische, und
meint damit die wirklichen Dinge. Mißverständnisse sind unmöglich’’ (DB, 421).
50. AF, 144; ‘‘Immerwieder zwang er sich, nach den japanischenHandschriften
auf dem Tisch zu greifen. Kam er so weit, dann berührte er sie und zog die Hand,
fast angewidert, gleich zurück.Was hatten die zu bedeuten? . . . Auf das begonnene
Manuskript malte er, ganz gegen seine Gewohnheit, Zeichen, die keinen Sinn
ergaben’’ (DB, 153).
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51. AF, 130–31; ‘‘Es genügte ihm daß sie schwieg. Zwischen China und Japan
sagte er sich einmal, das sei der Erfolg seiner klugen Politik . . . Viele Konjekturen
gelangen ihm in diesen Tagen. Einen unglaublich verballhornten Satz stellte er
in drei Stunden wieder her. Die richtigen Buchstaben regneten nur so aus seiner
Feder . . . Ältere Litaneien meldeten sich in ihm zu Wort; darüber vergaß er die
ihre’’ (DB, 138).
52. Kien is here referring to the discovery of Therese’s finances, but the term—
even in this context—remains apposite of his scholarly pursuits. AF, 144; DB, 153.
53. AF, 47–48; ‘‘Sie ist das beste Mittel, um meine Bibliothek in Ordnung
zuhalten . . . Hätte ich eine Person nachmeinen Plänen konstruiert, sie wäre nicht
so zweckmäßig ausgefallen’’ (DB, 47).
54. AF, 148; ‘‘Damals sprach sie immerdasselbe; er lernte ihreWorte auswendig
und war genaugenommen Herr über sie . . . aber da begann Therese wieder zu
sprechen. Was sie sagte, war unverständlich und übte despotische Gewalt über
ihn aus. Es ließ sich nicht auswendig lernen und wer sah voraus, was jetzt kam?’’
(DB, 158).
55. AF, 311; DB, 340, emphasis in original.
56. AF, 397, trans. rev.; ‘‘Er untersuchte seinTrugbild so lange, bis er sich davon
überzeugte, was es war. Ganz anderen Gefahren, schadhaften Texten, fehlenden
Zeilen, war er schon auf den Leib gerückt. Er entsann sich nicht, je versagt zu
haben. Sämtliche Aufgaben, die er sich vorgenommen hatte, waren gelöst. Auch
den Mord betrachtete er als eine erledigte Angelegenheit. An einer Halluzination
zerbrach kein Kien . . .’’ (DB, 336). On this topic see also DB, 338, 349.
57. AF, 445; ‘‘Bücher sind stumm, sie sprechen und sind stumm, das ist das
Großartige’’ (DB, 489, emphasis in original).
58. AF, 463; ‘‘Aus der ersten Zeile löst sich ein Stab und schlägt ihm eine um die
Ohren. Blei. Das tut weh. Schlag! Schlag! Noch einer. Noch einer. Eine Fußnote
tritt ihn mit Füßen. Immer mehr. Er taumelt. Zeilen und ganze Seiten, alles fällt
über ihn her. Die schütteln und schlagen ihn, die beuteln ihn, die schleudern ihn
einander zu. Blut . . . Zu Hilfe! Zu Hilfe! Georg!’’ (DB, 508).
59. Tatar, Lustmord, 10.
60. This incident is recounted in DB, 54–55.
61. Ibid., 18, 67, 183.
62. Ibid., 126.
63. AF, 322; ‘‘Solche Sachen stehen in den Büchern’’ (DB, 352).
64. AF, 438; ‘‘Georg sah sich hier als wichtigenTeil einesMechanismus, den ein
anderer zur Erhaltung seines bedrohten Selbstgefühls in Bewegung gesetzt hatte’’
(DB, 481).
65. In the most compelling chapter of Lustmord, ‘‘The Corpse Vanishes: Gen-
der, Violence, and Agency in Alfred Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz,’’ Tatar con-
cludes: ‘‘Franz and Reinhold may be indicted by the narrator and by the law for
theirmurderous impulses and actions towardwomen, but the stories of theWhore
of Babylon and Clytemnestra lift the burden of guilt from their shoulders’’ (151).
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66. This misogynistic tour de force concludes, it should be noted, with yet
another defense of the imagined Lustmord: ‘‘Seine Rede ging in die eines Vertei-
digers über, der vor Gericht erklärt, warum sein Klient die dämonische Frau
ermorden mußte. Ihre Dämonie ersieht man aus dem unzüchtigen Leben, das sie
gern geführt hätte, aus der aufreizenden Kleidung . . . Welcher Mann hätte eine
solche Frau nicht ermordet?’’ (DB, 493).
67. AF, 448; ‘‘Das Material war größer als sein Haß’’ (DB, 491; see also DB,
478).
68. AF, 111; ‘‘Am wohlsten fühlte er sich noch, wenn er sie dort unterbrachte,
wo alles Platz fand, für das er trotz Bildung und Verstand keine Erklärung wußte.
Von der Verrückten hatte er ein grobes und einfaches Bild. Er definierte sie als
Menschen, die dasWidersprechendste tun, doch für alles dieselbenWorte haben.
Nach dieser Definition war Therese—im Gegensatz zu ihm selbst—entschieden
verrückt’’ (DB, 116; see also DB, 186).
69. Gilbert and Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic.
70. AF, 395; ‘‘Er hielt es für seine eigentliche Lebensaufgabe, das riesige Ma-
terial, über welches er verfügte, als Stütze für gangbare Bezeichnungen zu verwen-
den . . . Er hing an der Fertigkeit des Systems und haßte Zweifler. Menschen, be-
sonders Geisteskranke und Verbrecher, waren ihm gleichgültig . . . Sie lieferten
Erfahrungen, aus denen Autoritäten dieWissenschaft erbauten. Er selber war eine
Autorität’’ (DB, 432–33).
71. AF, 396; ‘‘Verrückt, sagte er mit großem Nachdruck und blickte seine Frau
durchdringend und durchschauend an, sie errötete, verrückt werden eben die
Menschen, die immer nur an sich denken. Irrsinn ist eine Strafe für Egoismus . . .
Anderes hatte er seiner Frau nicht zu sagen. Sie war um dreißig Jahre jünger als
er und verschönte seinen Lebensabend. Die erste Frau war ihm durchgebrannt,
bevor er sie, wie später die zweite, in die eigene Anstalt steckte, als unheilbar
egoistisch. Die dritte, gegen die er außer seiner Eifersucht nichts im Schilde führte,
liebte Georges Kien’’ (DB, 433).
72. AF, 404; ‘‘Er tat ihnen [den Geisteskranken] den Gefallen und führte sie
nach Ägypten zurück. DieWege, die er dafür ersann, waren gewiß so wunderbar
wie die des Herrn beim Auszug seines Volkes’’ (DB, 442).
73. AF, 405; ‘‘Seine Fachkollegen bestaunten und beneideten ihn . . . Man
beeilte sich, kleine Brocken von seinemRuhmzu erschnappen, indemman sich zu
ihm bekannte und seine Methoden in den verschiedenartigsten Fällen erprobte.
Der Nobelpreis war ihm sicher’’ (DB, 443).
74. AF, 399; ‘‘Von zahllosen Frauen, zu seinem Dienst bereit, umgeben, ver-
wöhnt, reich, wohlerzogen; [er] lebtewie PrinzGautama, bevor er Buddhawurde’’
(DB, 436).
75. TheWedgwood translation captures the religious aura that attends Georg’s
repudiation of women: ‘‘He found the way to the wilderness in his twenty-eighth
year’’ (AF, 399). The German text contains many humorous references to reli-
gious motifs in the surrounding text, but not in the sentence itself: ‘‘DenWeg in
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seine Heimatlosigkeit fand er mit 28 Jahren’’ (DB, 436). Though Georg’s conver-
sion experience is thus riddled with irony, a number of critics take this transfor-
mation quite seriously. Hans Fabian, for example, refers to it as ‘‘Dieser Prozeß
der Läuterung’’ and proceeds to identify it with ‘‘Canettis eigene Einstellung.’’ See
Fabian, ‘‘Die Sprache bei Elias Canetti,’’ 504.
76. AF, 401, trans. rev.; ‘‘Wenn der Gorilla nur wieder sprach! Vor diesem einen
Wunsch verschwanden alle Gedanken anZeitknappheit,Verpflichtungen, Frauen,
Erfolge, als hätte er von Geburt an den Menschen oder Gorilla gesucht, der seine
eigene Sprache besaß’’ (DB, 439).
77. Clover, Men, Women, and Chainsaws, 97–113.
78. Beller, ‘‘Otto Weininger as Liberal?,’’ 99.
79. AF, 401, 403; ‘‘Jeder Silbe, die er hervorstieß, entsprach eine bestimmte
Bewegung. Für Gegenstände schienen die Bezeichnungen zu wechseln. Das Bild
meinte er hundertmal und nannte es jedesmal verschieden; die Namen hingen
von der Gebärde ab, mit der er hinwies . . . Die Gegenstände hatten . . . keine
eigentlichen Namen. Je nach der Empfindung, in der sie trieben, hießen sie. Ihr
Gesicht wechselte für den Gorilla, der ein wildes, gespanntes, gewitterreiches
Leben führte. Sein Leben ging auf sie über, sie hatten aktiven Teil daran. Er
bevölkerte zwei Zimmer mit einer ganzen Welt. Er schuf, was er brauchte, und
fand sich nach seinen sechs Tagen am siebenten darin zurecht. Statt zu ruhen,
schenkte er der Schöpfung eine Sprache’’ (DB, 439, 441).
80. For a somewhat different discussion of this concept with reference to Auto-
da-Fé, see Pöder, ‘‘Spurensicherung,’’ 59–60.
81. AF, 403; DB, 441.
82. No critic has, tomy knowledge, fully appreciated the extent towhichGeorg
actually creates this woman to appease the hallucinations of his patient Jean (see
DB, 447, 448).The significance of this episode lies not primarily in Jean’s fantasy of
punishing the sexually ‘‘digressive’’ woman (a parallel to Kien’s own hallucinatory
fantasies of punishingTherese), nor in the fact that the assistants themselves make
so much of this treatment as a test case of Georg’s ‘‘therapy,’’ but rather in the
fact that it provides a frame for evaluating Georg’s musings on the crowd (DB,
449–50). For a fuller treatment of this point, see below, chapter 5.
83. DB, 479, 488.
84. AF, 397; ‘‘Könige redete er untertänigst als Eure Majestät an . . . Er wurde
ihr einziger Vertrauter . . . Er beriet sie . . . als hätte er selbst ihreWünsche, immer
ihr Ziel und ihren Glauben im Auge, vorsichtig verschiebend . . . Männern gegen-
über nie autoritär . . . schließlich sei er doch ihr Minister, Prophet und Apostel,
oder zuweilen sogar der Kammerdiener’’ (DB, 434).
85. AF, 413; DB, 452.
86. AF, 421, trans. rev.; ‘‘Georg der Bruder eines Lustmörders. Schlagzeilen
in allen Zeitungen . . . Rücktritt von der Leitung einer Irrenanstalt. Fehltritt.
Scheidung.Assistenten alsNachfolger.DieKranken . . . Sie lieben ihn, sie brauchen
ihn, er darf sie nicht verlassen, ein Rücktritt ist unmöglich . . . Peters Affäre muß
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geregelt werden . . . Erwar für chinesische Schriften da, Georg fürMenschen. Peter
gehört in eine geschlossene Anstalt . . . Seine Unzurechnungsfähigkeit läßt sich
beweisen. Auf keinen Fall tritt Georg von der Leitung seiner Anstalt zurück’’ (DB,
460–61).
87. AF, 456; ‘‘Sehnsucht nach dem Ort, wo er ein ebenso absoluter Herrscher
war, wie Peter in seiner Bibliothek’’ (DB, 500).
88. Sokel, ‘‘The Ambiguity of Madness.’’
89. Barnouw, Elias Canetti, 25–26.
90. Berman, The Rise of the Modern German Novel, especially chapter 8, ‘‘The
Charismatic Novel: Robert Musil, Hermann Hesse, and Elias Canetti,’’ 179–204.
91. Notice in the following how Georg relates ‘‘die Masse’’ first to ‘‘the ma-
ternal’’ and then to madness, a term we have already established as, in the vo-
cabulary of the novel, intrinsically ‘‘feminine’’: ‘‘ ‘Die Menschheit’ bestand schon
lange, bevor sie begrifflich erfunden und verwässert wurde, als Mass. Sie brodelt,
ein ungeheueres, wildes, saftstrotzendes und heißes Tier in uns allen, sehr tief,
viel tiefer als die Mütter . . . Zahllose Menschen werden verrückt, weil die Masse
in ihnen besonders stark ist’’ (DB, 449–50). For a discussion of the feminization
of the crowd in the novel, see Bernd Widdig, Männerbünde und Massen. Below,
in chapter 5, I develop further the point that Georg offers us virtually no insight
on crowd psychology, and that his views are only superficially similar to those
enunciated by Canetti in Crowds and Power.
92. AF, 411, trans. rev.; ‘‘Zahllose Menschen werden verrückt, weil die Masse
in ihnen besonders stark ist und keine Befriedigung findet. . . . Früher hatte er
persönlichenNeigungen, seinem Ehrgeiz und den Frauen gelebt; jetzt lag ihm nur
daran, sich unaufhörlich zu verlieren. In dieser Tätatigkeit kam erWünschen und
Sinnen der Masse näher, als die übrigen einzelnen, von denen er umgeben war’’
(DB, 450).
chapter 3
1. Denby, ‘‘Learning to Love Canetti,’’ 110.
2. My nonliteral translation aims to capture the spirit of Canetti’s remark;
compare Das Augenspiel, 131.
3. Ibid., 142.
4. Kien’s interest in ancient Chinese texts indicates his total remove from con-
temporary concerns, and thus is not unrelated to the novel’s critique in this re-
gard. Yet a careful reading of the novel reveals that Kien’s status as ‘‘sinologist’’
is more referred to than illustrated. The intellectual tradition associated prin-
cipally with Kien and more consistently at stake throughout the novel is neo-
Kantianism, as I argue below. Nevertheless, Kien’s bastardization of Confucianism
presents, as Ning Ying observes (‘‘China und Elias Canetti,’’ 155), a clear parallel
to his capricious use of the Western philosophical tradition: ‘‘Kien verhält sich
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tatsächlich nicht rigoros konfuzianisch, während er immer von den Ratschlägen
der chinesischen Gelehrten redet.’’
5. The single episode which has thus far inspired a philosophical approach
is Kien’s pointedly pseudophilosophical diatribe against Therese’s ‘‘blendende
Möbel’’ (DB, 70–73); see Darby, ‘‘Perception and Perspective in Berkeley and
Canetti.’’
6. In a rare moment of self-deprecation, Canetti remarks: ‘‘Ich hatte, wenn ich
es heute zu bemessen versuche, noch wenig gelernt und jedenfalls nichts von dem,
was sein besonderes Wissen ausmachte: die zeitgenössische Philosophie. Seine
Bibliothek war hauptsächlich eine philosophische, er scheute im Gegensatz zu
mir vor derWelt der Begriffe nicht zurück, er gab sich ihnen hin wie andere dem
Besuch von Nachtlokalen’’ (Das Augenspiel, 27). Elsewhere in the autobiography
Canetti remarks that he is simply not a ‘‘Begriffsmensch.’’
7. Regarding the professor of philosophy, Oskar Kraus, Canetti writes: ‘‘Daß er
sich bei jeder Gelegenheit noch in seinem Alter auf seinen Meister, den Philoso-
phen Brentano berief, hatte etwas Subalternes, wenigstens kam es mir so vor, da
ich mich noch kaummit Brentano befaßt und von derVielfalt seiner Austrahlung
eine unzureichende Vorstellung hatte’’ (ibid., 292; see also 291).
8. Unpublished letter of 1992 to the author. I rely in this chapter on Ryan (and
later Copleston) to sketch in the philosophical information commensurate with
Canetti’s own understanding as well as with the novel’s intention. It would be
digressive and fundamentally mistaken, I think, to turn to philosophical tractates
we knowCanetti did not read, rather than attend to the level of discourse he clearly
did imbibe at the university, Viennese coffee houses, and salons. My gratitude to
my philosopher colleague, StevenGrossman, for reading this chapter for accuracy.
9. Ryan, Vanishing Subject, 6–22.
10. Ryan further delineates a third group of ‘‘empirical’’ psychologists (ibid.,
2); but this distinction is not carried through in her own analysis and neither is it
of relevance here.
11. Ibid., 9.
12. Ibid., 10. It is important to remember that ‘‘turn of the century’’ is a notori-
ously expandable term, often extended up to the Second World War. This is the
sense in which Ryan uses it.
13. Ibid., 2.
14. See, for example, ibid., 12, where Ryan notes that ‘‘the two Austrian em-
piricists [were] on opposite sides of one of the greatest controversies of their
time: the debate between holists and elementarists (the latter also being known
as ‘atomists’).’’
15. Ibid., 21.
16. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 292.
17. This distinguishes Kafka, whose attitude toward neoempiricism Ryan
deems to be parodic, from Canetti.Whereas Kafka also held up Brentano’s notion
of intentionality to parodic critique (Ryan, Vanishing Subject, 100–112), he does
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not do so out of the same concern for the social world. An ironic treatment of
empiricism does not therefore necessarily imply an unsympathetic treatment of
the ‘‘fragmented self ’’ of high modernism. See my discussion below in chapter 6.
18. AF, 273; ‘‘Vor seiner Firma blieb sie stehen. Die Buchstaben des Firmen-
schilds rückten nah an ihre Augen. Erst las sie Groß & Mutter, dann las sie Grob
& Frau. Das hatte sie gern. Dafür gab sie ihre eilige Zeit auch her . . . Da tanzten
die Buchstaben vor Freude, und als der Tanz zu Ende war, las sie auf einmal Groß
& Frau. Das paßte ihr gar nicht’’ (DB, 299).
19. Copleston, History, 7:431, my emphasis.
20. Locke does so as well; Hume offers a pragmatist solution (not unlikeWil-
liam James’s) to the skepticism that arises from his version of empiricist philoso-
phy; see ibid., 4:26.
21. Ibid., 6:206.
22. AF, 133–34; ‘‘Sie suchte sich die größte Kirche der Stadt, denDomaus . . . Da
hing ein Bildmit demAbendmahl, in teuren Ölfarben gemalt . . . Den Beutel hätte
man greifen können, dreißig schöne Silberstücke steckten drin . . . Der Judas hielt
ihn gepackt. Der hätt’ ihn nicht hergegeben, der war ja so geizig. Der vergönnte
niemandem was. Der war wie ihr Mann . . . Ihr Mann ist mager, der Judas ist dick
und hat einen roten Bart. In der Mitte von allen sitzt der interessante Mensch.
So ein schönes Gesicht hat er, ganz blaß, und die Augen genauso wie es sich ge-
hört. Der weiß alles . . . Ihr Mann ist ein Schmutzfink. Der macht das für zwanzig
Schilling . . . Sie ist die weiße Taube. Die fliegt ihm grad über den Kopt. Die glänzt,
weil sie so unschuldig ist. Der Maler hat es so wollen . . . Sie ist die weiße Taube.
Da soll es der Judas nur versuchen. Er kriegt sie doch nicht zu fassen. Sie fliegt
ja wohin sie will. Sie fliegt zum interessanten Menschen, sie weiß, was schön ist.
Der Judas hat nichts zu sagen. Der muß sich aufhängen . . . Das Geld gehört ihr
. . . Gleich kommen die Soldaten . . . Sie wird vortreten und sagen: ‘Das ist nicht
der Heiland. Das ist der Herr Grob, einfacher Angestellter bei der Firma Groß &
Mutter. Dem dürfen Sie nichts tun. Ich bin die Frau. . .’ Der Judas soll sich schon
aufhängen. Sie ist die weiße Taube’’ (DB, 140, 141–42).
23. I develop this point further in ‘‘Elias Canetti’s Die Blendung as a ‘Viennese’
Novel.’’
24. AF, 28; ‘‘Das Bewußtsein bewahre man für wirkliche Gedanken; sie nähren
sich von ihm, sie brauchen es; ohne Bewußtsein sind sie nicht denkbar’’ (DB, 27).
25. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, 1:147.
26. Ibid., 5:233, my emphasis.
27. Ryan, Vanishing Subject, 12.
28. AF, 305, trans. rev.; ‘‘Er hatte Therese gepackt, nicht mehr zaghaft, mit aller
Kraft hielt er sich an ihremRock fest, er stieß sieweg, er zerrte sie zu sich heran, er
umspannte siemit seinen langen, hagerenArmen. Sie ließ es sich gefallen . . . Bevor
sie aufgehängt werden, bekommen Mörder eine letzte Mahlzeit . . . Er drehte sie
einmal um ihre eigene Achse und verzichtete auf die Umarmung . . . Er glotzte sie
aus zwei Zentimeter Entfernung an. Er strich mit zehn Fingern am Rock entlang.
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Er streckte die Zunge heraus und schnupperte mit der Nase. Die Tränen traten
ihm in die Augen, vor Anstrengung. ‘Ich leide an dieser Halluzination!’ bekannte
er keuchend’’ (DB, 334).
29. AF, 305; ‘‘Ich lebe für dieWahrheit. Ich weiß, dieseWahrheit lügt’’ (DB, 333,
emphasis in original).
30. AF, 305.
31. AF, 422; ‘‘Alle Morde, alle Ängste, alle Tücken der Welt waren zerstoben.
Der Hausbesorger gefiel ihm. Sein Kopf erinnerte ihn an die aufgehende Sonne
heute früh. Er war grob, aber erfrischend, ein unbändig starker Kerl, wie man sie
in Kulturstädten und -häusern selten mehr sieht. Die Treppe dröhnte. Statt sie zu
tragen, schlug Atlas die arme Erde’’ (DB, 462).
32. In the context of the interwar period it is perhaps not incidental to note
that Georg’s reinscription of Pfaff is predicated on an enthusiasm for nature and
mythology (Pfaff becomes Atlas), both of which are opposed to ‘‘Kulturstädte.’’
The nature interest and anti-urban sentiment remind us that Georg, as the great
promoter of the ‘‘Naturmensch’’ (gorilla man) over against the decadent bour-
geois citizen, can be situated among the contemporaneous ‘‘Lebensphilosophie’’
enthusiasts without compromising his neoempiricist aura.
33. AF, 376–77; ‘‘Sie ist nicht seine Tochter! . . . Irrtümlich erwähnte er ein-
mal eine gewisse Poli. Seine Muskeln machten den Fehler sofort wieder gut. Der
Name der Weibsperson, die er züchtigte, lautete auf Anna. Sie behauptete mit
einer Tochter von ihm identisch zu sein. Er schenkte ihr keinen Glauben. Die
Haare fielen ihr aus, und da sie sich wehrte, zerbrachen zwei Finger’’ (DB, 411–12).
34. Peter Russell argues, ‘‘If we are honest, we see Auto-da-Fé for what it is: a
violently limited, eccentric and sadistic view of human existence,’’ in ‘‘The Vision
of Man,’’ 32.
35. AF, 71; ‘‘Esse percipi, sein ist wahrgenommen werden. Was ich nicht wahr-
nehme, existiert nicht!’’ (DB, 73).
36. AF, 403; ‘‘Georges war Gelehrter genug, um eine Abhandlung über die
Sprache dieses Irren zu veröffentlichen. Auf die Psychologie der Laute fiel neues
Licht’’ (DB, 441).
37. AF, 405–6; ‘‘ ‘Sie sehen, meine Herren,’ sagte er ihnen etwa, wenn er allein
mit ihnen war, ‘was für armselige Einfaltspinsel, was für traurige und verstockte
Bürger wir sind, gegen diesen genialen Paranoiker gehalten. Wir sitzen, er ist
besessen; auf den Erfahrungen andrer wir, von eigenen er. Er treibt mutterseele-
nallein, wie die Erde, durch seinen Weltraum . . . Er glaubt an das, was ihm
seine Sinne vortäuschen. Wir mißtrauen unseren gesunden Sinnen . . . Und er?
Er ist Allah, Prophet und Moslim in einer Person. Bleibt einWunder darum kein
Wunder mehr, weil wir ihm die Etikette Paranoia chronica aufkleben? Wir sitzen
auf unserem dickenVerstand wie Habgeier auf ihrem Geld. DerVerstand, wie wir
ihn verstehen, ist ein Mißverständnis. Wenn es ein Leben reiner Geistigkeit gibt,
so führt es dieser Verrückte!’ ’’ (DB, 444).
38. AF, 410; ‘‘Wenn ermüdewar und von der Hochspannung, mit der ihn seine
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irren Freunde luden, ausruhen wollte, versenkte er sich in die Seele irgendeines
Assistenten. Alles was Georges tat, spielte in fremden Menschen’’ (DB, 449). Fur-
ther, Georg thinks of himself in quintessentially empiricist terms, namely, as ‘‘a
walking wax tablet,’’ an image that expresses the interpenetrability so central to
the empiricist model of consciousness. As a ‘‘tablet’’ it is an image of a consider-
ably more passive self; yet as a ‘‘wax’’ tablet, it suggets a modicum of mutual
interaction, of ‘‘entering’’ as well as receiving the stimulus. But as with so many
other self-nominated images in the novel, we will see that this does not really fit
what we know about Georg and his activities. It is a claim that, like so much of
the narration in Auto-da-Fé, will have to be revised retrospectively.
39. Copleston, History, 7:440.
40. For Foucault, the tension between ‘‘the empirical and the transcendental’’
(‘‘Man and His Doubles,’’ 320) conceptions of the human being constitutes the
dilemma par excellence of modern philosophy, as Gutting (in ‘‘Michel Foucault,’’
chapter 9 of French Philosophy in the 20th Century) remarks: ‘‘The question of
‘man’ is particularly difficult because man is supposed to be simultaneously the
source of representations (a subject) and an object of representation. Because of
this, the question of how representation is possible becomes the question of how
there can be a being that is both the ultimate subject of representation and a repre-
sented object. Developing a coherent conception of man in this sense has been
the fundamental project of philosophy within the modern episteme (i.e., philoso-
phy since Kant).’’ I cite this passage from themanuscript of Gutting’s forthcoming
study, generously provided to me by the author.
41. One needs to read the passage on Georg’s ‘‘conversion’’ carefully, for it is
focalized by him. He carries on an affair with the banker’s wife, he admits, despite
his intention to reform. To the very end, in fact, he attempts to solve problems
erotically. Attempting to get Therese to agree to his conditions, Georg says, ‘‘Wenn
ich nicht verheiratet wäre! . . . Sie haben doch, was eine Frau braucht. Nichts fehlt.
Glauben Sie mir! . . . Und die Augen! Und die Jugend! Und der kleine Mund! Wie
gesagt, wenn ich nicht verheiratet wäre—ich würde Sie zur Sünde verführen’’ (DB,
496–97).
42. Canetti, ‘‘Das erste Buch,’’ 251–52.
43. For example, Dissinger argues (rather too creatively, I think) that the name
‘‘Kant’’ is a hidden contraction for ‘‘Canetti,’’ and that both ‘‘Kant’’ and ‘‘Kien’’
are covert references (via the Latin canis and the French chien, respectively) to the
word ‘‘dog.’’ Dissinger undertakes these philological acrobatics in order to show
that the brothers Kien represent the poet, about whom Canetti once said, ‘‘Der
echte Dichter ist ‘der Hund seiner Zeit,’ ’’ (Vereinzelung und Massenwahn, 129).
44. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 44.
45. Copleston, History, 4:5.
46. AF, 18; ‘‘Wo immer eine Lehrkanzel für östliche Philologie frei wurde, trug
man sie zu allererst ihm an. Er lehnte mit verächtlicher Höflichkeit ab’’ (DB, 16).
47. Copleston, History, 6:181–83.
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48. All of this functions in the same manner as having Kien quote Berkeley
irresponsibly, in ignorance of, or indifference to, the larger system of ideas (as
Darby would have it). The reader, reasonably well informed on theWestern philo-
sophical and cultural tradition, perceives Kien’s fraudulencewithout recasting the
narrator in the image of Berkeley’s God.
49. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 44.
50. ‘‘Neukantianismus bezeichnet eine philosophische Schulrichtung . . . die
um die Jahrhundertwende zur tonangebenden Philosophie in Deutschland avan-
cierte und deren Ende gemeinhin mit dem Beginn des ZweitenWeltkriegs ange-
setzt wird’’ (Ollig, Der Neukantianismus, 1).
51. The leading figures in this disparate movement were Hermann Cohen,
Wilhelm Windelband, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Ernst Cassirer, whose influential
Philosophie der symbolischen Formen (1923–29) perhaps best epitomizes the neo-
Kantian effort to reinvigorate the humanities as a philosophically cogent enter-
prise. Canetti’s own contribution to this debate is only partially evident in Auto-
da-Fé. A new, more positive sense of culture emerges first in Crowds and Power;
see below, chapter 5.
52. AF, 123, my emphasis; ‘‘ ‘Stimmt!’ sagte er leise und nickte, wie immer wenn
eine Wirklichkeit ihrem Urbild im Druck entsprach’’ (DB, 129).
53. AF, 246; ‘‘Er nahm die Rosen aus Fischerles Hand, entsann sich ihresWohl-
geruches, den er aus persischen Liebesgedichten kannte, und näherte sie seinen
Augen, richtig, sie rochen. Das besänftigte ihn vollends’’ (DB, 269).
54. AF, 67, trans. rev.; ‘‘Die Oberfenster ließen Luft und Gedanken ein . . .
Durchs Glas der Fenster spürte man den allgemeinen Zustand des Himmels,
gedämpfter und stiller, als er inWirklichkeit war. Einmattes Blau sagte: die Sonne
scheint, aber nicht bis zu mir. Ein ebenso mattes Grau, es wird regnen, aber nicht
auf mich. Ein zartes Geräusch verriet fallende Tropfen. Ganz von ferne nahmman
sie auf, sie berührten einen nicht. Man wußte nur: die Sonne strahlt, Wolken
gehen, Regen fällt. Es war, als hätte sich jemand gegen die Erde verbarrikadiert;
gegen alles bloß materielle Beziehungswesen, gegen alles nur Planetarische eine
Kabine erbaut, eine ungeheure Kabine, so groß, daß sie für dasWenige ausreichte,
welches an der Erde mehr als Erde und mehr als Staub ist, zu dem das Leben
wieder zerfällt’’ (DB, 68–69). Kien’s conception of the scholarly life as essentially
insular—designed to keep the unknown at bay—is conveyed succinctly in the
following line that continues the passage cited above: ‘‘Auf der Fahrt durch das
Unbekannte war man wie auf keiner Fahrt’’ (DB, 69).
55. AF, 15–16; ‘‘Punkt acht begann die Arbeit, sein Dienst an derWahrheit . . .
Man näherte sich der Wahrheit, indem man sich von den Menschen abschloß.
Der Alltag war ein oberflächliches Gewirr von Lügen . . .Wer unter den schlechten
Schauspielern, aus denen die Masse bestand, hatte ein Gesicht, das ihn fesselte?
Sie veränderten es nach dem Augenblick . . . Er legte seinen Ehrgeiz in eine
Hartnäckigkeit des Wesens. Nicht bloß einen Monat, nicht ein Jahr, sein ganzes
Leben blieb er sich gleich’’ (DB, 13–14).
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56. AF, 16; ‘‘Der Charakter, wennman einen hatte, bestimmte auch die Gestalt,
schmal, streng und knochig’’ (DB, 14).
57. AF, 214; ‘‘ ‘Sie wünschen!’ / ‘Ich—ich wollte in die Bücherabteilung.’ / ‘Die
bin ich.’ . . . / ‘Was hatten Sie oben vor?’ fragte Kien drohend. ‘Ach, nur den
Schiller’ ’’ (DB, 233).
58. AF, 215; ‘‘ ‘Tun Sie das nie wieder, mein Freund! KeinMensch ist soviel wert
wie seine Bücher, glauben Sie mir!’ . . . Warum gerade Schiller? Lesen Sie doch
das Original! Lesen Sie Immanuel Kant! ’ ’’ (DB, 234, emphasis in original).
59. AF, 444; ‘‘Es ärgert ihn, daß er nur an den kategorischen Imperativ und
nicht an Gott glaubt. Sonst schöbe er diesem die Schuld zu’’ (DB, 487).
60. AF, 57, trans. rev.; ‘‘Jeder Mensch braucht eine Heimat, nicht eine, wie
primitive Faustpatrioten sie verstehen, auch keine Religion, matten Vorge-
schmack einer Heimat im Jenseits, nein, eineHeimat, die Boden, Arbeit, Freunde,
Erholung und geistigen Fassungsraum zu einem natürlichen, wohlgeordneten
Ganzen, zu einem eigenen Kosmos zusammenschließt. Die beste Definition der
Heimat ist Bibliothek. Frauen hält man am klügsten von seiner Heimat fern.
Entschließt man sich doch, eine aufzunehmen, so trachte man, sie der Heimat
erst völlig zu assimilieren, so wie er es getan hat’’ (DB, 57; compare also 418).
61. See Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, 253–449.
62. AF, 158–59; ‘‘An allen Schmerzen ist die Gegenwart schuld. Er sehnt sich
nach der Zukunft, weil dann mehrVergangenheit auf derWelt sein wird. DieVer-
gangenheit ist gut, sie tut niemand was zuleid, zwanzig Jahre hat er sich frei in ihr
bewegt, er war glücklich.Wer fühlt sich in der Gegenwart glücklich? Ja, wenn wir
keine Sinne hätten, da wäre auch eine Gegenwart erträglich . . . Er beugt sich vor
dem Primat der Vergangenheit . . . Eine Zeit wird kommen, da die Menschen ihre
Sinne zu Erinnerung und alle Zeit zu Vergangenheit umschmieden werden. Eine
Zeit wird kommen, da eine einzige Vergangenheit alle Menschen umspannt, da
nichts ist außer der Vergangenheit, da jeder glaubt: an die Vergangenheit’’ (DB,
169).
63. AF, 159; ‘‘Gott ist die Vergangenheit. Er glaubt an Gott’’ (DB, 169, emphasis
in original).
64. Nicholas Boyle explicates the birth of German idealism within a culture
of ex-theologians who transfer religious categories to philosophy and above all
to ‘‘art’’ (‘‘Kunst’’), a quite questionable phenomenon, he argues, that continues
down to our own day. See his ‘‘Learning from Germany.’’
65. Ollig remarks in this regard that neo-Kantianism ‘‘richtete sich gegen einen
naturwissenschaftlich verbrämten Objektivismus, der die Subjektkomponente im
Erkenntnisvorgang mehr oder weniger gänzlich unter den Tisch fallen lassen
wollte’’ (Der Neukantianismus, 1–2).
66. Ibid., 2.
67. ‘‘Tölpel hantieren mit Elektrizität und komplizierten Atomen . . . Diese
bedruckte Seite, so klar und gegliedert wie nur irgendeine, ist in Wirklichkeit
ein höllischer Haufe rasender Elektronen.Wäre er sich dessen immer bewußt, so
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müßten die Buchstaben vor seinen Augen tanzen . . . Am Tage brächte er eine
schwache Zeile hinter sich, mehr nicht. Es ist sein Recht, die Blindheit, die ihn
vor solchen Sinnesexzessen schützt, auf alle störenden Elemente in seinem Leben
zu übertragen’’ (DB, 73).
chapter 4
1. ‘‘Aus dem Prater ist natürlich auch die ungeheuerliche Figur—der Siegfried
Fischerle in der Blendung—hervorgegangen, nicht? Also, der schrecklich zum
Scheitern verurteilte Versuch einer Assimilation unter extremen Bedingungen’’:
Gerald Stieg in Ein Dichter gegen Macht und Tod.
2. AF, 184–85; ‘‘Von den Sitten der Lokalität verstand er [Kien] wenig, aber eins
schien ihm gewiß: hier strebte ein reiner Geist in elendem Körper seit zwanzig
Jahren danach, sich über den Schmutz seiner Umgebung zu erheben . . . Therese
[i.e., die Pensionistin] zog ihn ebenso beharrlich in den Schmutz zurück . . . Von
der Welt des Geistes hat er nun einen winzigen Zipfel gefaßt und klammert sich
daran mit der Kraft eines Ertrinkenden. Das Schachspiel ist seine Bibliothek . . .
Kien stellt sich die Kämpfe vor, die dieser vom Leben geschlagene Mensch um
seine Wohnung führt. Er bringt ein Buch mit nach Hause, um heimlich darin zu
lesen, sie zerreißt es, daß die Fetzen fliegen. Sie zwingt ihn, ihr seine Wohnung
für ihre entsetzlichen Zwecke zur Verfügung zu stellen. Vielleicht bezahlt sie eine
Bedienerin, eine Spionin, um dieWohnung bücherrein zu halten, wenn sie nicht
zu Hause ist. Bücher sind verboten, ihr Lebenswandel ist erlaubt . . . Sie reißt die
Tür auf und stößt mit ihren plumpen Füßen das Schachbrett um. Herr Fischerle
heult wie ein kleines Kind. Er befand sich gerade an der interessantesten Stelle
seines Buches. Er sammelt die herumliegenden Buchstaben und wendet das Ge-
sicht ab, damit sie sich über seine Tränen nicht freut. Er ist ein kleiner Held. Er
hat Charakter’’ (DB, 201).
3. Two studies are of particular interest here: Ringer’s The Decline of the Ger-
man Mandarins and Marchand’s Down from Olympus.
4. Marchand, Down from Olympus, 321.
5. Ibid., 312–14.
6. DB, 207, 210.
7. Marchand, Down from Olympus, 316.
8. Ibid., 322.
9. Ibid., 328. Marchand emphasizes the quietist character of this new human-
ism, a fact that strongly encourages the connectionwith Canetti’s novel: ‘‘Thus the
greatest failing of this devoutly antimodern pedagogy was its inability to confront
nationalist and racialist classical studies with a credible, embracive cultural his-
tory . . . Jäger and his followers simply allowed themselves to become strawmen—
or uncomprehending internal émigrés like Thomas Mann’s Serenus Zeitblom—
under the reign of the antihumanist advocates of Aryan supremacy’’ (ibid., 330).
notes to pages 1 1 1–14 : 229
10. AF, 192, trans. rev.; ‘‘Überhaupt fürchtete er mit dem Bildungshunger des
Kleinen in Konflikt zu geraten. Der würde ihm mit einem Anschein von Recht
vorwerfen, daß da Bücher brachlägen. Wie sollte er sich verteidigen?’’ (DB, 209).
11. AF, 194; ‘‘Durch den täglichen Umgang mit solchen Mengen von Bildung
würde der Hunger des Kleinen danach größer und größer; plötzlich würde man
ihn dabei ertappen, wie er sich an ein Buch heranmachte und es zu lesen versuchte
. . . Man müßte ihn mündlich vorbereiten’’ (DB, 211).
12. AF, 194; ‘‘Wenn es einem gelang, diesen [gleichgesinnten Naturen] ein
Stück Bildung, ein StückMenschentum zu schenken, so hatteman etwas geleistet’’
(DB, 211). When Kien discovers that books are relegated to the top floor of the
Theresianum, the least secure place in case of fire, he imagines his own behavior
in the event of such a fire. Like a loving mother—he imagines—he stands before
the dilemma of whether to abandon his ‘‘children’’ (i.e., books) to their certain
death, or riskmaiming them (or worse) by his rescue efforts. He opts for the latter:
‘‘Er bringt es [sie ins Feuer zu werfen] nicht übers Herz, unter ihnen ist er zum
Menschen geworden’’ (DB, 225, my emphasis).
13. AF, 250; ‘‘Unter dem Druck der Bücher, die er nicht einmal las, veränderte
sich der Zwerg zusehends. Kiens alte Theorie bestätigte sich glänzend’’ (DB, 273).
14. Beller, Vienna and the Jews, 211. Assimilation was also Kraus’s answer to
Herzl’s call to Zionism; see Beller, 134.
15. Ibid., 211.
16. Beller notes that Cohen ‘‘could proclaim that Kant was the philosopher of
the Jews, that Jews had become the carriers of the ‘idealistic’ mission because not
of this world’’ (ibid., 140). This broader, self-conscious Jewish investment in the
Enlightenment that acknowledged essential connections to Judaism Beller terms
‘‘the continuation of Judaism by other means beyond the Jewish identity’’ (ibid.,
143). See also Nathan Rotenstreich, ‘‘Hermann Cohen.’’
17. Beller, Vienna and the Jews, 138.
18. Ibid., 125.
19. AF, 175, trans. rev.: ‘‘mächtige Nase’’ is better rendered as ‘‘immense nose’’
rather than Wedgwood’s ‘‘majestic nose.’’ ‘‘Da tauchte ein ungeheurer Buckel
neben ihm [Kien] auf und fragte, ob es gestattet sei. Kien blickte angestrengt
hinunter.WowarderMund, aus dem es sprach?Und schon hüpfte der Besitzer des
Buckels, ein Zwerg, an einem Stuhl in die Höhe . . . Die Spitze der stark geboge-
nen Nase lag in der Tiefe des Kinns. Der Mund war so klein wie der Mann, nur—
er war nicht zu finden. Keine Stirn, keine Ohren, kein Hals, kein Rumpf—dieser
Mensch bestand aus einem Buckel, einer mächtigen Nase und zwei schwarzen,
ruhigen, traurigen Augen . . . Plötzlich hörte [Kien] eine heisere Stimme unterm
Tisch fragen: ‘Wie gehn die Geschäfte?’ ’’ (DB, 189–90).
20. Paal, Figurenkonstellation, 31.
21. AF, 175; Kien ‘‘musterte die ausschließliche Nase des Kleinen, sie flößte ihm
Verdacht ein’’ (DB, 190).
22. AF, 180; ‘‘Fischerle machte eine ganz kleine Pause, um die Wirkung des
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Wortes ‘jüdisch’ auf seinVisavis zu beobachten. Kannman wissen? DieWelt wim-
melt von Antisemiten. Ein Jude ist immer auf der Hut vor Todfeinden. Bucklige
Zwerge und gar solche, die es trotzdem zumZuhälter gebracht haben, sind scharfe
Beobachter. Das Schlucken des anderen entging ihm nicht. Er deutete es als Ver-
legenheit und hielt von diesem Augenblick an Kien, der nichts weniger war, für
einen Juden’’ (DB, 196).
23. AF, 234, trans. rev.; ‘‘Er vergaß, daß er in einer Kirche war. Vor Kirchen
hatte er sonst Respekt und Scheu, weil seine Nase sehr auffällig war’’ (DB, 256).
24. AF, 245, trans. rev.; ‘‘Fischerle war überrumpelt, in einer Kirche fühlte
er sich unsicher. Beinahe hätte er Kien wieder auf den Platz hinausgeschleift
. . . Soll die Kirche einstürzen, der Polizei läuft er nicht in die Arme! Fischerle
kannte schreckliche Geschichten von Juden, die unter den Trümmern krachender
Kirchen begraben wurden, weil sie nicht hineingehörten. Seine Frau, die Pen-
sionistin, hatte sie ihm erzählt, weil sie fromm war und ihn zu ihrem Glauben
bekehren wollte’’ (DB, 268).
25. DB, 196, 200.
26. These bestial attributes of Fischerle can be found, respectively, at DB, 190,
315, 356, and 316.
27. AF, 250, trans. rev.; ‘‘Also undankbar sind Sie auch! Sie Saujud! . . . Von
einem Saujuden hat man nichts anderes zu erwarten’’ (DB, 273).
28. AF, 352, trans. rev.: Wedgwood offers ‘‘Go boil your head!’’ for ‘‘Gehen Sie
betteln mit Ihrer Nase!’’ which fails to capture the anti-Semitic imagery of the
original: ‘‘Bei uns in Europa nennt man das Freßschach! Gehen Sie betteln mit
Ihrer Nase!’’ (DB, 384). Since the word ‘‘Judennase’’ is so often on Fischerle’s lips,
one might even go so far as to read: ‘‘Go begging [or, get lost] with that Jew nose!’’
29. Jutta Paal argues just this: ‘‘Vielmehr scheint es, daß Canetti die anti-
semitischen Tendenzen seiner Zeit kaum bemerkt hat, wenn er im Augenspiel
erwähnt, daß er ‘später, mit dem Fortgang der Ereignisse, über Fischerle oft Un-
behagen empfand’ und sich für diese Figur zu rechtfertigen suchte’’ (Figuren-
konstellation, 31 n. 104). Paal’s suggestion that the autobiography retracts this
aspect of the novel is simply mistaken; the passage she cites supports no such
assertion. It is at any rate astonishing to suggest that Canetti was oblivious to
anti-Semitism, for he records in his autobiography horror at the assassination of
Walter Rathenau; a sympathy for the situation of Austrian Galician Jews dur-
ing the time of the First World War; and this reminiscence about Alma Mahler’s
anti-Jewish bigotry: ‘‘Did you ever see Gropius?’’—Canetti recalls being asked—
‘‘A handsome, tall man. Exactly what one calls Aryan. The only man who suited
me racially. Otherwise, it was always short Jews, like Mahler, who kept falling
in love with me’’ (Das Augenspiel, 56). On the situation of the Galician Jews, see
Das Augenspiel, 129; additional remarks about Alma Mahler’s anti-Semitism and
prejudice can be found there at 58, 155.
30. We know that Canetti reflected on Jewish self-hatred at the time he wrote
this novel, because he reports in his autobiography that Otto Weininger’s Ge-
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schlecht und Character enjoyed a remarkable popularity among his peers at this
juncture. More to the point, Canetti recorded in his diaries—some of which later
became the Aufzeichnungen—just ten years after the first publication of the novel
a reflection on ‘‘self-hatred’’ (‘‘Selbsthaß’’). Yet as the following Aufzeichnungen
passage makes clear, this is not a case of confessing some shameful personal char-
acter flaw, nor is this observation necessarily limited in reference to Jews: ‘‘Es ist
nur gut, sich manchmal zu hassen, nicht zu oft, sonst braucht man wieder sehr
viel Haß gegen andere, um den Selbsthaß auszugleichen’’ (Die Provinz des Men-
schen, 89).
31. Nicola Riedner’s Canettis Fischerle helpfully catalogues the full array of
anti-Semitic stereotypes encoded in Fischerle in a more systematic manner than
it is my purpose to do here. While Riedner correctly draws our attention to the
key issue of assimilation, she ends up blaming the victim: Fischerle is presented
as a negative example of over-assimilation, that is, as someone who has aban-
doned ‘‘die Quellen der eigenen Herkunft’’ (Canettis Fischerle, 143). This reading
rests on a questionable view of Fischerle as someone who has a psyche capable of
forgetting his identity, a disputable use of Canetti’s autobiography, as well as an
unsupported importation of key ideas from Masse und Macht.
32. Gilman, The Jew’s Body, 43.
33. The depiction of Fischerle is indebted to a whole tradition of anti-Semitic
caricature. Fischerle’s most notorious cultural forebear with regard to physical
resemblance is perhaps Wilhelm Busch’s ‘‘Schmulchen Schiefelbeiner’’ (1882), in
Peter Gay’s words, the popular poet’s ‘‘most obvious and most distasteful Jew.’’
Gay notes further: ‘‘In several poems, Busch speaks of ‘the’ Jew, with his crooked
nose and devious ways, physically ugly, morally corrupt, and financially unscru-
pulous. And he illustrates rhymes like these with savage drawings’’ (Freud, Jews
and Other Germans, 207–8).We may therefore assume that Fischerle would easily
have been recognized for his anti-Semitic pedigree by contemporary readers.
34. A striking example can be found in the caricature of the Jewish art critic for
the Neue Freie Presse, which was intended to exhibit, Gilman notes, ‘‘the essen-
tial image of the Jew’s body’’ (Gilman, The Jew’s Body, 45). Further, Karl Arnold’s
caricature of the Berlin Jewish quarter, Grenadierstraße, Berlin depicts virtually
every Jew as suffering from curvature of the spine (first printed in Simplicissimus,
1921; reprinted in Ruth Gay, Jews of Germany, 239).
35. Some readers will be reminded ofWalter Benjamin’s ‘‘bucklichtMännlein,’’
which Hannah Arendt emphasizes in her introduction to the English edition of
Illuminations, 5–7. In a general way, the association may be justified: the dwarf
hunchback famous from Des Knaben Wunderhorn was an omen of bad luck and
failure, and as such played into later anti-Semitic narrative and caricature. But
Benjamin does not himself make this association. Nor is it possible that Canetti
became aware of the little hunchback via Benjamin, because Berliner Kindheit um
Neunzehnhundert, in which the reference appears, was not written until the late
thirties and published only posthumously, in 1950.
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36. AF, 186, my emphasis, trans. rev. Wedgwood softens the German and
thereby obscures the reading I suggest below. By rendering ‘‘traurig’’ as ‘‘mis-
taken,’’ she implies that Kien, who focalizes this passage, somehow regrets Fisch-
erle’s physical handicap, whereas the German suggests just the opposite, namely
that Kien justifies Fischerle’s physicalmisfortune in thismanner: ‘‘ihr zerstörendes
Treiben . . . galt dem Manne gegenüber, den die Natur durch eine traurige Ety-
mologie ohnehin schon zum Krüppel geschlagen hatte’’ (DB, 202).
37. Fischerle’s ‘‘etymology,’’ which he repeats, is this: ‘‘Passen Sie gut auf: Sti-
pendium ist ein feines Wort. Dieses Wort stammt aus dem Französischen und
heißt dasselbe wie das jüdische Kapital!’’ (196).
38. AF, 180; ‘‘An ihrer Etymologie sollt ihr sie erkennen’’ (DB, 196).
39. AF, 343, trans. rev.Wedgwood has ‘‘dainty little nose’’ for the German ‘‘put-
zige Nase,’’ a translation that excludes all valances of the word that connote ‘‘odd,
funny, curious, queer, etc.’’—which, after all, are the principal meanings of the
word. ‘‘Queer little nose’’ captures better the innkeeper’s philosemitic conde-
scension evident in the following hyperbole and use of diminutives: ‘‘Die Wirtin
[schloß] Fischerles Buckel in ihre Arme. Sie überschüttete ihnmit Koseworten; sie
hätte sich nach ihm gesehnt, nach seiner putzigen Nase, seinen krummen Bein-
chen und der lieben, lieben Schachkunst’’ (DB, 375).
40. Gilman, The Jew’s Body, 38–59.
41. Pfaff and Therese are in the process of pawning Kien’s library at theTheresi-
anum. Pfaff tosses heavy books at Therese and seems to have second thoughts:
‘‘Er war auch damit unzufrieden, kam sich wie ein Schwächling vor und sagte
manchmal, nächstens wird er noch ein Jud’ ’’ (DB, 312).
42. Gilman, The Jew’s Body, 51–60.
43. In a reflection from 1942, Canetti indicated his opposition to the artifi-
ciality and pretense of characters that are to be taken for real people. Though he
is here referring specifically to drama, we might recall that he elsewhere suggests
that all his work is essentially dramatic: ‘‘Der Hauptwiderstand, den ich gegen
die ‘Entwicklung’ von Charakteren empfand (so als wären sie wirkliche, lebende
Menchen), erinnert daran, daß auch in der Musik die Instrumente gegeben sind’’
(Die Provinz des Menschen, 15–16).
44. Riedner veers toward attributing greater psychological dimension to Fisch-
erle, claiming (improbably, I think) that he possesses more depth than Georg
(Canettis Fischerle, 94). The assumption of psychological realism of some degree
informs Riedner’s conclusion, which presumes Fischerle to possess the capacity to
choose one form of assimilation over another, as well as the ability to ‘‘transform’’
himself along the lines Canetti hinted at in Masse und Macht with his concept of
‘‘Verwandlung.’’
45. Gilman, The Jew’s Body, 43, 52; Peter Gay, Freud, Jews and Other Germans,
210.
46. In his masterful study Der Name als Stigma, Bering elucidates the cul-
tural and historical dimensions to the name ‘‘Siegfried’’: ‘‘Wie germanisch der
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Name anmutete, so gut schien er später auch für Juden dienlich, die sich mit aller
Macht ‘germanisieren’ wollten. Er wurde daher sehr bald antisemitisch markiert,
Versatzstück in jüdischenWitzen und überhaupt Beweisstück, daß die Juden die
deutschen Namen ganz verdorben hätten’’ (Der Name als Stigma, 425–26 n. 130;
see also 18, 99, 244).
47. Ruth Gay, The Jews of Germany, 184. Regarding the Nibelungenlied as meta-
phor for Jewish assimilation to German culture, Peter Gay writes: ‘‘When [Her-
mann] Levi [the Jewish self-hating conductor of Wagner’s Parsifal] lay ill, his
father came to visit him, and . . . tried to read the Nibelungenlied, and asked his
son questions. A substantial portion of German-Jewish history is summed up in
this little domestic scene’’ (Freud, Jews and Other Germans, 218 n. 53).
48. See Panizza, The Operated Jew. From his tell-tale ‘‘Jewish’’ physical at-
tributes, to his desire to unlearn his German-Jewish dialect, to his appetite for
that seal of successful assimilation, the title of ‘‘Doctor,’’ Panizza’s Itzig mirrors
the description (and fate) of Canetti’s Fischerle.
49. Zipes, Operated Jew, 88.
50. World War I was the turning point in Jewish assimilation to German cul-
ture. On this point Peter Gay writes: ‘‘The decline of German liberalism and,
even worse, the experience of war and its tempestuous aftermath went far toward
closing the avenues of Jewish approaches to host cultures. The old fear returned,
but under new conditions and hence under incomprehensible guises. The long as-
cent of Jewish integration into German culture was, if not exactly over, certainly
imperiled’’ (Freud, Jews and Other Germans, 200).
51. Ibid., 197.
52. On the popularity of Wagner in the pre–World War II era, particularly
among Jews, see Beller, Vienna and the Jews, 157–59.
53. Hanisch, ‘‘The Political Influence,’’ 196.
54. Ibid., 197.
55. In Röhl, ‘‘Wilhelm II,’’ 6.
56. Thomas Mann certainly took Wagner for granted as the cultural point of
reference for a number of his works from the first part of the century. The best
known of these, ‘‘Das Blut der Wälsungen’’ (first published 1921), features Jewish
twins named for Siegfried’s parents (Sigismund and Sieglinde), who, in the story’s
penultimate episode, attendWagner’sDie Walküre, the opera inDer Ring des Nibe-
lungen that directly precedes Siegfried. The novella makes unmistakable use of
anti-Semitic clichés, which has earned it the status of one of Mann’s ‘‘Skandal-
geschichten’’ (Vaget). Essentially this story depicts two Jewish siblings reading
themselves longingly into a German cultural classic. Ironically, both the ‘‘Aryan’’-
looking parents of Siegfried (in the opera) and Mann’s pointedly Jewish specta-
tors see themselves as ‘‘outsiders,’’ a narrative process that would seem to question
the very German-Jewish dichotomy upon which the story depends. See Vaget,
‘‘Wälsungenblut,’’ and Reed, ‘‘Der Fall Wagner.’’
57. The murderous passion is more readily evident in the original German:
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‘‘Seh’ ich dir erst / mit den Augen zu, / zu übel erkenn’ ich / was alles du thu’st: /
seh’ ich dich steh’n, / gangeln und geh’n, / knicken und nicken, / mit den Augen
zwicken: / beim Genick’ möcht’ ich / den Nicker packen, / den Garaus geben /
dem garst’gen Zwicker! / . . . / Alle Thiere sind / mir theurer als du: / Baum und
Vogel, / die Fische im Bach, / lieber mag ich sie / leiden als dich’’ (Act 1, scene 1;
179). Wagner references are to the Norton critical edition, with English and Ger-
man parallel text; accordingly, page numbers are identical for both languages.
58. ‘‘Da sah ich denn auch / mein eigen Bild; / ganz anders als du / dünkt’ ich
mir da: / so glich wohl der Kröte / ein glänzender Fisch; / doch kroch nie ein Fisch
aus der Kröte!’’ (ibid., 181).
59. Again, the German is somewhat stronger in tone: ‘‘Ganz fremd bist dumir’’
(ibid., 182).
60. ‘‘So, hieß mich die Mutter, / möcht’ ich dich heißen: / als ‘Siegfried’ würd-
est / du stark und schön’’ (ibid., 183).
61. Weiner, Richard Wagner, 170.Weiner maintains further: ‘‘Siegfried’s voice,
like Walther’s in Die Meistersinger, is the voice of the Volk, whose deeper regis-
ters connote for Wagner the German essence. Mime’s higher instrument, on the
other hand, anticipates the voice of thatmost anti-Semitic and derisive ofmusical-
dramatic constructions, Sixtus Beckmesser [also of Die Meistersinger’’ (168).
62. See Borchmeyer, ‘‘The Question of Anti-Semitism.’’ Borchmeyer is excel-
lent on the issue of anti-Semitism inWagner’s own life. His analysis of the lyrical
texts, however, is somewhat limited by textimmanent assumptions.
63. ‘‘Aus demWege dich zu räumen, / darf ich doch nicht rasten: / Wie käm’
ich sonst anders zur Beute’’ (Act 2, scene 3; 238).
64. Trans. rev. ‘‘Schmeck’ dumein Schwert, / ekliger Schwätzer!’’; in translating
the stage directions, I have followed the German Piper edition (232–33), accord-
ing to which Siegfried ‘‘packt Mime’s Leichnam auf, schleppt ihn nach der Höhle
und wirft ihn dort hinein.’’
65. ‘‘In der Höhle hier / lieg’ auf demHort! / Mit zäher List / erzieltest du ihn: /
jetzt magst du des wonnigen walten!’’ (Act 2, scene 3; 238).
66. On the conflict between assimilated Western Jews and orthodox Eastern
Jews, see Beller,Vienna and the Jews, 133; on tensions between Zionists and (other)
Austrian Jews, consult Moser, ‘‘Die Katastrophe der Juden in Österreich,’’ 77.
67. The call to rescind Jewish assimilation to German culture can be traced to
1918, whenMüller vonHausen (who became infamous as the editor of theGerman
version of the fraudulent Protocols of the Elders of Zion) published a demand for
‘‘eine deutsche Judenordnung’’ according to which, ‘‘Alle solche Personen gelten
als Juden, deren Vorfahren am 11. März 1812 (Emanzipationsedikt für Preußen)
Juden waren.’’ Schubert, ‘‘DerWeg zur Katastrophe,’’ 62. The culmination of this
effort was of course the Nazi Reichsbürgergesetz, and the Gesetz zum Schutze des
deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre, both of 1935.
68. Kien protests that he is above taking filthy lucre for things of the mind,
placing himself thus in the lofty idealist tradition of Plato (‘‘Plato habe vergeblich
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dagegen angekämpft’’); to which Fischerle responds: ‘‘Plato ist gut! . . . Plato weiß
ich. Plato ist ein reicher Mensch, du bist auch ein reicher Mensch’’ (DB, 289).
69. AF, 245; ‘‘Er glaubte an nichts, nur daran, daß ‘Jud’ zu den Verbrechern
gehört, die sich von selbst bestrafen’’ (DB, 268).
70. Peter Gay remarks, ‘‘Impossible as it is to make dependable quantitative
measurements of such matters, it seems most likely to me that Jewish cringing
at Jewish conduct, the most common and most banal expression of Jewish self-
hatred, grew markedly during theWeimar Republic, far beyond what it had been
before World War I’’ (Freud, Jews and Other Germans, 200–201).
71. An English excerpt can be found in The Weimar Republic Source Book, 268–
71.
72. AF, 197, trans. rev.; ‘‘Da soll einer sagen, die Juden sind feig. Die Reporter
fragen ihn, wer er ist. Kein Mensch kennt ihn. Wie ein Amerikaner schaut er
nicht aus. Juden gibt’s überall. Aber von wo ist dieser Jud’, der den Capablanca im
Siegeszug hingemacht hat?’’ (DB, 215). The reference here is to the Cuban chess-
master, José Raoul Capablanca (1888–1942).
73. AF, 364; ‘‘ ‘Darling!’ sagt die Millionärin und zupft ihn dran, sie liebt lange
Nasen, kurze kann sie nicht schmecken’’ (DB, 397).
74. Fischerle’s fantasy about marrying a rich gentile is an ironic reversal of yet
another anti-Semitic stereotype: the impoverished protestant aristocrat marrying
a wealthy Jewish heiress in order to save the family fortune. Intermarriage of this
sort did, of course, occur; and this is part of the complex story of Jewish assimi-
lation. But it also became the object of anti-Semitic satire, as Peter Gay notes: ‘‘A
much-exploited theme for [the journal] Simplicissimus was the effete and impov-
erished Prussian aristocrat rescuing the family fortune with a suitable marriage
to a Jewish heiress. The savagery of Bruno Paul’s cover cartoon on this subject,
published around 1900, is anything but exceptional. Entitled ‘Aristocratic World
View,’ it depicts a hideous, stunted, obviously Jewish girl accompanied by her no
less hideous, no less obvious father, marching to the altar with an impecunious
nobleman’’ (Freud, Jews and Other Germans, 205). Therefore Fischerle’s remark,
‘‘Sie heiratet meinen Namen, ich ihr Geld’’ (DB, 286), both evokes and parodies a
well-known anti-assimilationist stereotype. The ironic reversal, however, is only
partial: the Jew remains the physically disfigured person in both transactions.
75. These four references to World War I are found, respectively, in DB, 247,
253, 251, and 280. Further references can be found in DB, 218 (where standing
in line reminds Fischerle of the war), 255 (where the prevaricating ‘‘blind’’ man
claims to have learned to tell the truth in the war), and 318 (where the women in
the crowd blame the lack of available men on the casualties of the Great War).
76. Moser, ‘‘Die Katastrophe der Juden in Österreich,’’ 70.
77. AF, 326; ‘‘In einer Masse gab es eine Masse zu holen’’ (DB, 356).
78. AF, 328; ‘‘Fischerle hörte, was man ihm vorwarf . . . Für Zwerge gebe es
20 Jahre. Die Todesstrafe müßte wieder her. Krüppel gehören ausgerottet. Alle
Verbrecher seien Krüppel. Nein alle Krüppel Verbrecher . . . Er solle lieber was
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arbeiten. Er solle den Leuten nicht das Brot vom Mund wegnehmen. Was fange
er mit den Perlen an, so ein Krüppel, und die Judennase gehöre abgehackt’’ (DB,
358).
79. For a recent critical assessment of this term in the context of German
Studies, see Weninger, ‘‘Zur Dialektik des Dialektiks im deutschen Realismus.’’
80. AF, 331; ‘‘Die Menge fällt über sie her . . . Die Fischerin stürzt zu Boden.
Sie liegt auf dem Bauch und hält sich still. Sie wird furchtbar zugerichtet . . . An
der Echtheit des Buckels ist nicht zu zweifeln. Über ihn entlädt sich die Masse . . .
Dann verliert sie das Bewußtsein’’ (DB, 361).
81. Gilman, The Jew’s Body, 236.
82. AF, 342; ‘‘Angst habe er doch. Er sei eben so gebaut. Wenn er wenigstens
Dr. Fischer hieße, statt einfach Fischer, da hätte die Polizei gleich einen Respekt’’
(DB, 374).
83. AF, 359; ‘‘Der Anzug saßwie eine großartige Kombination.Was vomBuckel
noch übrigblieb, verschwand unterm Mantel’’ (DB, 392; on the topic of camou-
flaging the ‘‘Jewish physique’’ with clothes, see also DB, 382, 385).
84. The cartoon ‘‘JewishMetamorphosis’’ is reprinted in RuthGay, Jews of Ger-
many, 233.
85. AF, 357; ‘‘Der Buckel [lag] in den letzten Zügen’’ (DB, 390).
86. This passage has all the markings of figural reworking, that is, it appears
to me that Fischerle is protesting too much, and that, in the grand tradition of
this novel, he is attempting to put a good face on a threatening incident. Such a
judgment must, of course, remain somewhat speculative. However, I would point
to those phrases where the language seems put to particular stress: ‘‘die Buben
tobten und waren auf einmal erwachsen . . . ‘Meine Herren, was tut ihr!’ Noch
ein paar solche ‘Herren’ und sie blieben endgültig groß.’’ Fischerle’s desire to take
these remarks as homage does not fully erase the suggestion of harassment and
manhandling. In fact, he appears quite lucky to have escaped this gang.
87. AF, 357–58; ‘‘Einige Buben rotteten sich zusammen und warteten, bis der
letzte Erwachsene verschwand. Plötzlich umringten sie Fischerle’s Bank und
brachen in einen englischen Chor aus. Sie heulten ‘yes’ und meinten ‘Jud.’ Vor
seiner Reisefertigkeit fürchtete Fischerle Buben wie die Pest . . . er war [jedoch]
kein Jud’ [mehr] und kein Krüppel, er war ein feiner Kerl und verstand sich auf
Wigwams’’ (390–91). Fischerle’s transformation into an American is here under-
scored by his alleged familiarity with American Indians. His reference to ‘‘wig-
wams’’ alludes to the immensely popular Winnetou novels by Karl May, who is
credited with mediating images of the American ‘‘Wild West’’ to generations of
Germans (up to the present), despite the fact that May himself only knew the
United States from books. May’s pseudohistorical realism is in many respects
similar to Alexis’s, discussed above in chapter 1.
88. AF, 360; ‘‘das Bild des wohlgeratenen Zwergs’’ (DB, 393). The larger context
makes clear that the tailor takes pride in the fact that he has provided a suitable
physique for Fischerle’s beautiful spirit, the implication being that Fischerle’s re-
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cently acquired ‘‘cultivation’’ has fooled the tailor into believing that the dwarf
truly is ‘‘well-bred.’’ Thus we have a repetition (and modification) of the episode
whenKien firstmeets Fischerle, inwhich ‘‘culture’’means everything andnothing.
89. AF, 360; ‘‘Auf die Herzensbildung kommt es an’’ (DB, 393).
90. AF, 360; ‘‘ein frisch angezogener Mensch, verjüngt und hochgeboren’’ (DB,
393).
91. AF, 360; ‘‘Daraus entnahm Fischerlemit Recht und Stolz, daß er nichtmehr
zu erkennen war’’ (DB, 394).
92. AF, 365; ‘‘Eine Faust schlägt ihm den Schädel ein. Der Blinde schleudert ihn
zuBodenundholt vomTisch in der Ecke desKabinetts ein Brotmesser.Mit diesem
zerfetzt er Anzug und Mantel und schneidet Fischerle den Buckel herunter. Bei
der schwerenArbeit ächzt er, dasMesser ist ihm zu stumpf, undLichtwill er keines
machen . . . Er wickelt den Buckel in die Fetzen des Mantels, spuckt ein paarmal
drauf und läßt das Paket so liegen. Die Leiche schiebt er unters Bett’’ (DB, 398).
93. Fischerle’s unawareness of his own use of Yiddish—because of the vulnera-
bility it implies—appears much more tragic in historical hindsight and may well
constitute one of those factors about this figure that gaveCanetti pause in the post-
Holocaust years; see below. In the context of the pre-Holocaust novel, however,
there is legitimate, if undeniably dark, humor in Fischerle’s total obliviousness
to his language. His only hesitation in using the word ‘‘meschugge,’’ it turns out,
is that it might not make much of an impression on a psychiatrist, for whom,
Fischerle reasons, insanity is an everyday complaint (see DB, 368).
94. DB, 453; AF, 414.
95. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 201.
chapter 5
1. Gay, Freud, 515.
2. Stieg concedes as much when he says: ‘‘Doch scheint mir der Roman selbst
noch keine Antwort auf Freud zu enthalten, sondern eher die Drohungen der
Epoche extrem zu artikulieren, bis hin zur Selbstvernichtung der Kultur’’ (‘‘Ca-
netti und die Psychoanalyse,’’ 69).
3. In Adorno, ‘‘Canetti: Discussion with Adorno,’’ 1–2.
4. Though Freud is on Adorno’s mind throughout the conversation, the most
substantial discussion of Canetti’s dispute with Freud focuses on the disagree-
ment over what constitutes a crowd (Masse). Canetti believes that Freud exag-
gerates the importance of the leader, and contends that Freud’s whole concept
of ‘‘identification’’ (by which he means, above all, the Oedipal bond) is ‘‘insuffi-
ciently reflected, too imprecise, not really clear’’ (ibid., 13). Clearly, Canetti wishes
to substitute his cherished notion of ‘‘metamorphosis’’ (Verwandlung) for Freud’s
Oedipal complex. Adorno agrees that Canetti’s social theories—particularly his
insistence on seeing power as an external, social threat—represent an improve-
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ment over Freud’s overly abstract (and otherwise problematic) views on society.
On this, see below.
5. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 33.
6. Ibid., 42–43.
7. This, by the way, is the juncture where Broch advises Canetti to throw in the
towel in this pursuit: ‘‘Es ist schade um die Zeit, die Sie daran wenden . . . Sie kön-
nen sich nicht einer Wissenschaft widmen, die keine ist und nie eine sein wird’’





11. Gay, Freud, 405.




16. These events recounted in ibid., 167–73. Canetti often read his Komödie der
Eitelkeit in tandem with ‘‘Der gute Vater,’’ as on the evening of Max Pulver’s re-
mark quoted here (ibid., 169). Thus some of the reaction given in this paragraph
might be construed to refer also to the Komödie. Nevertheless, as the following
statement indicates, much of the negative reception was reserved explicitly for
‘‘Der gute Vater.’’ It is important to know that Canetti read this chapter after the
intermission, during the second half of the reading. ‘‘Man war noch eine ganze
Weile beisammen, ich lernte so ziemlich alle kennen, die erschienen waren und




19. The subjunctive mood in the following is apposite of the fact that the novel
was of course still unpublished. Referring to the Zurich reading of 1935 (in the
Stadelhoferstraße), Canetti relates: ‘‘Dafür hatte ich das Kapitel ‘Der gute Vater’
ausgesucht, aus dem Roman, der bald danach ‘Die Blendung’ betitelt werden
sollte. Das hatte ich in Wien schon oft vorgelesen, privat und öffentlich und ich
war seiner so sicher, als wäre es der unentbehrlicheTeil eines allgemein bekannten
und vielgelesenen Buches’’ (ibid., 169).
20. Ibid., 196.
21. AF, 88; ‘‘Jahre sehnte er sich schon danach, wieder einmal recht auf Wei-
berfleisch loszuschlagen’’ (DB, 91).
22. AF, 111; ‘‘ ‘Die Weiber gehören totgeschlagen. Alle wie sie sind’ ’’ (DB, 116).
23. AF, 111–12, trans. rev.; ‘‘ ‘Meine Frau, die ist aus den blauen Flecken nicht
herausgekommen.MeineTochter selig, die hab’ ich gern gehabt, das war einWeib,
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wie man sagt, mit der hab’ ich angefangen, wie sie noch ganz klein war’ ’’ (DB,
117).
24. AF, 286; ‘‘Wenn sie 40 Jahr’ jünger wär.’ Seine Tochter selig, ja, die war ein
seelengutes Geschöpf. Die hat sich neben ihn legen müssen, wie er auf die Bettler
gepaßt hat. Da hat er gezwickt und geschaut . . . Geweint hat sie. Es hat ihr nichts
genützt. Gegen einen Vater gibt’s nichts. Lieb war sie. Auf einmal war sie tot . . .
Er hat sie halt gebraucht’’ (DB, 313–14). The last line, it should be noted, includes
this alternate/supplemental meaning: ‘‘He simply used her.’’
25. AF, 289, trans. rev.While it is lexically possible to render ‘‘Parteien’’ as ‘‘ten-
ants,’’ that seems less appropriate in this context. Pfaff ’s anxieties are running
high: he clearly fears the authorities, being arrested and prosecuted at this junc-
ture. The ‘‘Parteien’’ he has inmind, therefore, are more likely the plaintiffs for the
state in the trial he imagines will be conducted where he will be charged with the
murder of his daughter. ‘‘Schänden’’ connotes a range of semantic possibilities—
as I am sure Canetti intended—ranging from ‘‘rape’’ to ‘‘dishonor.’’ But nowhere
in this spectrum does one find ‘‘ferret out,’’ as Wedgwood proposes. The tenants
have no reason to be looking for the daughter. This correction is of some im-
portance because this is a key passage where Pfaff convicts himself: the plaintiffs
continue to violate his daughter, because this is a practice he has begun while she
was under his care. Some ambiguity is inevitable, however, since Pfaff ’s manifest
guilt punctures—but does not thoroughly clarify—the lies he has been at pains
to put out. The German reads as follows: ‘‘Der Hausbesorger erstarrt. Er sieht,
wie jemand jeden Ersten kommt und ihm die Pension wegnimmt, statt sie ihm zu
bringen. Außerdem wird er eingesperrt . . . Alles kommt heraus, und die Parteien
schänden seineTochter noch imGrab. Er hat keine Angst . . . Er ist pensioniert. Er
hat keine Angst. Der Doktor sagt selber, es sind die Lungen. Schicken Sie’s fort! Ja
wovon, lieber Herr? Die Pension braucht er zum Essen . . . Krankenkasse—ja was!
Auf einmal kommt sie ihm mit einem Kind zurück. In das kleinwuzige Kabinett.
Er hat keine Angst!’’ (DB, 316).
26. AF, 304, trans. rev. ‘‘Der Herr Professor redete von der Frau, aber er meinte
die Tochter’’ (DB, 332; see also 321, 339).
27. AF, 370; ‘‘ ‘Der Vater hat einen Anspruch . . .’ ‘auf die Liebe seines Kindes.’
Laut und gleichmäßig wie in der Schule ratschte sie seinen Satz zu Ende . . . ‘Zum
Heiraten hat die Tochter . . .’—er streckte den Arm aus—‘keine Zeit.’ ‘Das Futter
gibt ihr . . .’ ‘der gute Vater.’ ‘Die Männer wollen sie . . .’ ‘gar nicht haben’ ’’ (DB,
404).
28. AF, 374, trans. rev.; ‘‘Seit er sie zur Poli ernannt hatte, war er stolz auf sie.
Die Weiber seien doch zu etwas gut, der Mann müsse es eben verstehen, lauter
Polis aus ihnen zu machen’’ (DB, 409).
29. AF, 371; ‘‘Stundenlang liebkoste er sie’’ (DB, 405).
30. Two factors may, as I have said, inhibit our acknowledgment of the full
extent of Pfaff ’s behavior: our own repulsion and the fact that Pfaff, though in-
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consistent in his denials, is lying about the physical abuse. A prime example of
his discordant assertions is to be found at the chapter’s outset, where within the
space of a paragraph hevariously accounts for the death of his wife. In this passage,
which serves as the exposition to Pfaff ’s affair with his own daughter, we witness
him in the process of recasting the violent death as one attributable to ‘‘natural
causes’’: ‘‘Bald nach dieser Veränderung starb die Frau, vor Überanstrengung. Sie
kam der neuen Küche nicht nach . . . Oft wartete er volle fünf Minuten aufs Es-
sen. Dann aber riß ihm die Geduld, und er prügelte sie, noch bevor er satt war.
Sie starb unter seinen Händen. Doch wäre sie in den nächsten Tagen bestimmt
und von selbst eingegangen. Ein Mörder war er nicht’’ (DB, 402). Though ren-
dered in the ostensibly ‘‘objective’’ third person, this passage evinces a Pfaff no
less in charge than in the coerced ‘‘dialogue’’ we witnessed above. The transpar-
ent efforts at self-justification (‘‘eine volle fünf Minuten’’) and palpable pleading
of his case (‘‘Doch,’’ ‘‘bestimmt’’) have left unmistakable traces of the building
superintendent’s pathetic ‘‘seelischer Haushalt.’’
31. AF, 369; DB, 404.
32. These nuptial terms can be found in DB, 402 and 405.
33. AF, 372, trans. rev. In translating the final clause as ‘‘she looks like a maiden
fair,’’ Wedgwood softens the passage unaccountably, overlooking, furthermore,
the important conjunction ‘‘da,’’ which links this clause to the preceding in the
sense of ‘‘thus, so, as such.’’ Canetti’s German reads: ‘‘Sie nimmt das ganze Geld
mit, übersNachthemdwirft sie ihren eigenenMantel, den sie nie tragen darf, nicht
den alten des Vaters, da sieht sie wie eine Jungfrau aus’’ (DB, 406).
34. ‘‘Er findet ihren Mantel schön. Sie wird ihn tragen bis zu ihrem Tod, er ist
noch neu’’ (DB, 407).
35. AF, 375; ‘‘während sie das Fleisch für sein Mittagessen weichschlug, klopfte
er zumVergnügen auf ihr herum. Sein Auge wußte nicht, was die Hand tat’’ (DB,
409).
36. AF, 369; ‘‘die Angst, die dieses Möbelstück ihr einflößte’’ (DB, 403).
37. AF, 378, trans. rev. ‘‘sie lebte noch mehrere Jahre als Dienstmädchen und
Weib ihres Vaters’’ (DB, 413).
38. Hermann Broch was the first to see the influence of Edgar Allen Poe on Die
Blendung; see Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 39.
39. At the comic conclusion of this subplot, where Georg pretends to be the
Parisian police commissioner in order to appeal to the Hausbesorger’s authori-
tarian mentality, Pfaff tenders the following unsolicited (and typically ignored)
confession: ‘‘Benedikt Pfaff, der starke, rote Lümmel, zog seine Muskeln ein,
kniete nieder, faltete die Hände und bat den Herrn Präsidenten um Vergebung.
Die Tochter sei krank gewesen, sie wäre von selbst auch gestorben, bestens re-
kommandiere er sich, ihn nicht von seinem Posten zu vertreiben’’ (DB, 498, my
emphasis).
40. This sealed-off room is itself a wonderful image of failed repression.
Though Pfaff shuns the memory of the allegedly empty room (‘‘Jede Erinnerung
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an den leeren Raum daneben mied er’’), the text of course speaks against him.
When Kien, whose position at the peep-hole (Guckloch) now parallels precisely
Anna’s former reconnaissance assignment, refuses Pfaff ’s demand for foodmoney,
the latter considers as punishment incarcerating Kien in the very same room, ‘‘wo
das Gemüt der seligen Tochter verlorengegangen ist’’ (ibid., 424). If not for the
propitious arrival of Georg, Kienmay indeed have suffered a similar fate. For Pfaff,
it is only a matter of where to begin: ‘‘Was soll er jetzt zuerst? Ihm die Beine zer-
brechen, den Schädel einschlagen, das Hirn verspritzen oder für den Anfang eine
in den Bauch?’’ (ibid.).
41. Grünbaum, ‘‘Letters,’’ 2.
42. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 226.
43. This view was forcefully argued in the 1920s by Karen Horney and Ernest
Jones; see Gay, Freud, 519–22.
44. Freud, ‘‘The Transformations of Puberty,’’ 7:226.
45. Ibid., ‘‘The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex,’’ 19:178–79.
46. ‘‘In boys,’’ Herman argues, ‘‘the suppression of incestuous wishes is re-
warded by initiation into male privilege. The girl’s renunciation of her incestuous
wishes finds no comparable reward. It is rather through the consummation of in-
cest that the girl seeks to gain those privileges which otherwise must forever be
denied to her. Thus the girl has little inducement to overcome her infantile attach-
ment to her father . . . The father’s behavior toward his daughter thus assumes
immense importance. If the father chooses to eroticize the relationship with his
daughter, he will encounter little or no resistance. Even when the girl does give
up her erotic attachment to her father, she is encouraged to persist in the fan-
tasy that some other man, like her father, will some day take possession of her’’
(Father-Daughter Incest, 57).
47. In Herman, Father-Daughter Incest, 7.
48. See Gay, Freud, 73, and Herman, Father-Daughter Incest, 9. Gay commends
Freud for being ‘‘severe with himself ’’ (73), and goes on to suggest that this falsi-
fication was an effort to disguise the patient’s identity (74). Thus Freud is seen to
be in a dilemma: torn between the demands of science (full disclosure) and the
demands of therapy (confidentiality). Herman suggests that Freud’s motivations
were less altruistic.
49. Gay argues that Freud’s self-image as bourgeois critic impelled him toward
advocating the female Oedipus complex. Commenting on the celebrated case of
‘‘Dora,’’ in which Freud insists both that his female patient felt a sexual attraction
for an older man who made an unwanted pass at her and that she was in love with
her father, Gay observes: ‘‘Such a reading follows naturally from Freud’s posture
as a psychoanalytic detective and a critic of bourgeois morality. Intent on digging
beneath polite social surfaces, and committed to the proposition that modern
sexuality was screened by an almost impenetrable blend of unconscious denial
and conscious mendacity, particularly among the respectable classes, Freud felt
virtually obliged to interpret Dora’s vehement rejection of Herr K. as a neurotic
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defense’’ (Freud, 249). A defense, that is, against her own sexual desire. Dissatisfy-
ing in Gay’s account is the fact that the exact opposite case might be made.Why,
indeed, should Freud feel ‘‘obliged’’ to set aside Herr K.’s unseemly advance and
postulate instead ‘‘a distinct feeling of sexual excitement’’ (249) on the part of his
female analysand—which feelings, by the way, his patient firmly denied? More
to the point for our purposes, perhaps, is the query, How does this move autho-
rize Freud as ‘‘a critic of bourgeois morality’’? Would he not in fact have quali-
fied as a more radical critic of bourgeois hypocrisy had he confronted the illicit
desire and violence of fathers? Herman suggests an antithetical reading, which
attributes the utility of the Oedipus complex to its function in normalizing and
internalizing an otherwise unsettling social phenomenon: ‘‘Freud concluded that
his patients’ reports of sexual abuse were fantasies, based on their own incestu-
ous wishes. To incriminate daughters rather than fathers was an immense relief
to him, even though it entailed a public admission that he had been mistaken’’
(Father-Daughter Incest, 10).
50. Canetti, ‘‘Macht und Überleben,’’ 7.
51. In the conversationmentioned above, Canetti tells Adorno: ‘‘There is above
all the question of the concept of identification. I consider this concept to be insuf-
ficiently reflected, too imprecise, not really clear. Freud says at many places in his
work when talking of identification that it is a question of an exemplary model, of
the child for example identifying with his father and wanting to be like his father.
The father is the model. Now this is certainly right. But what really happens in
this relation to the model has never been shown exactly . . . I have really made it
my task to investigate all aspects of metamorphosis completely afresh, in order to
be able to determine what a model actually is, and what really occurs between a
model and the person who follows a model. Only then perhaps will we be able to
have clearer ideas about identification. As long as this is not the case I am inclined
to avoid the whole concept of identification’’ (Adorno, ‘‘Canetti: Discussion with
Adorno,’’ 13). In Crowds and Power, Canetti effectively replaces this notion with
his own more positive concept of ‘‘Verwandlung,’’ which also contains a funda-
mental aspect of identification. Canetti had planned to return to this topic in a
second volume of Crowds and Power, but this, if written, was never published. For
a more substantive explication and critique of the term ‘‘Verwandlung,’’ see my
‘‘End of History.’’
52. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 196.
53. Ibid., 183.
54. Wolff, Child Abuse in Freud’s Vienna, 4.
55. Ibid. Wolff observes further: ‘‘Today there is heated controversy over the
development of Freud’s ideas about parents and children in the 1890s, but it has
not been appreciated that Freud’s Vienna was the scene of a great child abuse
sensation, decades and decades before the formulation of the battered-child syn-
drome’’ (6).
56. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 183.
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57. Ibid., 201.
58. ‘‘Die Betroffene fühlt sich von einer überlegenen Macht gepackt, die sie
nicht mehr losläßt. Es kann ein Mann sein, dem sie entkommen will, ein Mann,
der sie geliebt hat und besitzt oder einMann wie Peleus, der sie erst besitzen wird.
Es kann ein Priester sein, der die Kranke im Namen eines Gottes gefangen hält;
es kann ein Geist oder Gott selber sein. In jedem Fall ist es wichtig, daß das Opfer
die physische Nähe der überlegenen Macht fühlt, ihren unmittelbaren Griff auf
sich’’ (Canetti, Masse und Macht, 383). Canetti’s rather open challenge to Freud
can be read in the section title, ‘‘Hysterie, Manie und Melancholie’’ (379–86).
59. Though Canetti is speaking of the novel as a whole when he remarks, ‘‘Es
war ein erlösendes Gefühl . . . den Roman in den Händen zu halten, der von den
dunkelsten AspektenWiens genährt war’’ (DB, 196), it seems clear from the con-
text that ‘‘Der gute Vater’’ is uppermost in his mind; this is the juncture where
Canetti refers to the ‘‘obligatory’’ reading of this chapter.
60. This, essentially, is the argument Gay makes (see above), though not with
reference to Canetti. Throughout his magisterial study of Freud, Gay reminds us
that Freud, though ‘‘revolutionary’’ in a very limited sense, was largely a social
conservative. See, for example, Gay, Freud, 143, 149, 548.
61. AF, 372, trans. rev.; ‘‘ ‘Zur Mutter,’ sagte er, ‘sie soll sich auch mal freuen’ ’’
(407).
62. AF, 372, trans. rev. Wedgwood’s reading evades the oxymoron (‘‘heiment-
führen,’’ Canetti’s neologism) in the German: ‘‘Ich entführe Sie heim’’ (DB, 406).
63. By, for example, citing the formula with which most fairy tales end: ‘‘Wenn
ihre arme Mutter das erlebt hätte, sie wär’ heut noch am Leben’’ (DB, 406).
64. See Gay, Freud, 519, and Herman, Father-Daughter Incest, 58.
65. AF, 372, trans. rev.; ‘‘Einen Mann will sie schon, damit sie von zu Hause
wegkommt’’ (DB, 407).
66. This is reflected, for example, in the following: ‘‘Für sie hatte er gestohlen,
aber er stellte sich ungeschickt an. Einem Ritter gelingt alles. Seit ihre Zigarette
weg war, liebte sie ihn nicht mehr. Der Kopf des Vaters saß fester als je’’ (DB,
412).
67. AF, 377, trans. rev.; ‘‘Wohl nahm er seine Stieftochter vom Bett herunter
und prügelte sie blutig’’ (DB, 411). It should be noted that Pfaff speaks here of a
‘‘stepdaughter’’ because since Anna rebelled against his authority and rejected the
name ‘‘Poli,’’ he denies that she really is his daughter, in much the same way that
Kien denies Therese’s existence.
68. ‘‘Sein lächerlicher Wunsch ist natürlich auf ein Jugenderlebnis zurück-
zuführen. Man müßte ihn einmal untersuchen . . . Die Vorstellung eines Geistes-
kranken ist von Jugend auf mit seiner Lust verbunden. Er fürchtet die Impotenz’’
(DB, 450).
69. ‘‘Er ist ein Mann, was hat jetzt zu geschehen? . . . Sobald es geschehen ist,
wird sie ihn bewundern, weil er ein Mann ist. So sollen alle Frauen sein. Es ge-
schieht also jetzt. Abgemacht. Er gibt sich sein Ehrenwort’’ (DB, 58).
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70. AF, 57; ‘‘Aber die schweren Träume der letzten Zeit dürften mit seinem
übertrieben strengen Leben zusammenhängen. Das wird jetzt anders’’ (DB, 57).
71. AF, 415, trans. rev.; ‘‘Was bedrängte ihn, ein beinahe geschlechtsloses
Wesen?’’ (DB, 455).
72. AF, 421, trans. rev.Wedgwood skirts the issue of sexual abstinence entirely;
‘‘Peter gehört in eine geschlosseneAnstalt. Er hat zu lange enthaltsam gelebt’’ (DB,
460–61).
73. Frosch, Politics of Psychoanalysis, 10.
74. Though Freud has of course been recruited for radical politics and wide-
ranging cultural criticism, above all by the Frankfurt School, this inevitably
involves redressing and modifying fundamental aspects of Freud’s theory and
practice. Above all, this has meant focusing on the social environment—as medi-
ated by the father—in the socialization process. The Oedipus complex, in other
words, has had to be opened up to include social, political, and cultural factors
not emphasized by Freud. Stephen Frosh explicates and responds to the charge
that psychoanalysis is essentially a ‘‘bourgeois discipline’’ (Politics of Psychoanaly-
sis, 10). Indeed, his whole book should be seen as an attempt to rehabilitate Freud
for social analysis. The amenability of traditional psychoanalysis to social conser-
vatism is often cited in connection with the postwar popularity of psychoanalysis
in the United States.
75. Stieg, ‘‘Canetti und die Psychoanalyse,’’ 67 and 68, respectively.
76. AF, 431–32, trans. rev.; ‘‘Georg bemerkte sehr wohl, wann Peters Stimme
überschnappte. Es genügte, daß seine Gedanken zur Frau oben zurückkehrten. Er
sprach noch gar nicht von ihr und schon verriet sich in der Stimme ein schreien-
der, greller, unheilbarer Haß . . . Man mußte ihn zwingen, möglichst viel von
seinem Haß preiszugeben. Wenn er doch einfach die Ereignisse, so wie sie sich
ihm eingeprägt hatten, erzählend bis an ihren Ursprung zurückverfolgte! Georg
verstand es, bei solchenRückblicken denRadiergummi zu spielen, der alle Spuren
auf dem empfindlichen Blatt der Erinnerung auslöschte’’ (DB, 473).
77. Gay, Freud, 65–66.
78. The allusion is to Breuer’s phrase ‘‘wegerzählen,’’ stemming from the early
phase of psychoanalysis when Freud and Breuer were still collaborating. See ibid.,
66 and 664 n. 65.
79. Freud, ‘‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria,’’ 7:116. Freud first
came to recognize the phenomenon clearly in ‘‘Dora’’ (7–122); he would return to
the topic specifically in the papers ‘‘The Dynamics of Transference’’ (12:99–108)
and ‘‘Observations on Transference Love’’ (12:159–71).
80. Frosh, Politics of Psychoanalysis, 76. Frosh explicates the point further:
‘‘Thus, in the context of the relationship with the analyst, the patient reproduces
her/his impulses, fantasies and desires which are directed towards other current
and past objects . . . Distinctively when compared with some later theorists, Freud
argues that although transference is experienced by the patient as real and as re-
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ferring to the person of the analyst, it actually has nothing to do with current
interactions’’ (77).
81. AF, 413; ‘‘Statt zu verarbeiten und zu entgegnen, nahm er mechanisch auf ’’
(DB, 452).
82. Freud, ‘‘Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis,’’ 12:
118.
83. Frosch, Politics of Psychoanalysis, 72.
84. AF, 397; ‘‘Da erwarb er, wenn er es noch nicht hatte, spielend dasVertrauen
von Menschen, die sich jedem anderen gegenüber hinter ihre Wahngebilde ver-
steckten. Könige redete er untertänigst als Eure Majestät an; vor Göttern fiel er
auf die Knie und faltete die Hände. So ließen sich die erhabensten Herrschaften
zu ihm herab und teilten ihm Näheres mit. Er wurde ihr einziger Vertrauter, den
sie, vom Augenblick ihrer Anerkennung ab, über die Veränderung ihrer eigenen
Bereiche auf dem laufenden hielten und um Rat angingen. Er beriet sie mit heller
Klugheit, als hätte er selbst ihre Wünsche, immer ihr Ziel und ihren Glauben im
Auge . . . schließlich sei er doch ihr Minister, Prophet und Apostel, oder zuweilen
sogar der Kammerdiener’’ (DB, 434).
85. Frosh, Politics of Psychoanalysis, 77.
86. Ibid., 80.
87. AF, 397–98, trans. rev.: I have substituted ‘‘schizophrenia’’ forWedgwood’s
‘‘alternating personalities.’’ Since the Greek root of ‘‘schizophrenia’’ actually
means a splitting of the mind (Laplanche and Pontalis, Language of Psychoanaly-
sis, 408), this term would seem to capture better ‘‘Bewußtseinsspaltungen.’’ Of
course, the ensuing text does not support the strict clinical definition of schizo-
phrenia (which, however, is in its own right a disputedmatter), but neither can this
be expected of such a satirical passage. The German original reads: ‘‘Heftig um-
stritten war in der gelehrtenWelt seine Behandlung von Bewußtseinsspaltungen
der verschiedensten Art. Gebärdete sich zum Beispiel ein Kranker als zwei Men-
schen, die nichts miteinander gemein hatten oder sich bekämpften, so wandte
Georges Kien eine Methode an, die ihm anfangs selbst sehr gefährlich erschien:
er befreundete sich mit beiden Parteien . . . Dann ging er an die Heilung heran.
In seinem eigenen Bewußtsein näherte er die getrennten Teile des Kranken, wie
er sie verkörperte, und fügte sie langsam aneinander’’ (DB, 434–35).
88. Gayobserves that this aspect of the ‘‘Dora’’ case left Freud open to consider-
able criticism: ‘‘This largely implicit claim tovirtual omniscience invited criticism;
it suggested Freud’s certainty that all psychoanalytic interpretations are automati-
cally correct, whether the analysand accepts them or disdains them. ‘Yes’ means
‘Yes,’ and so does ‘No’ ’’ (Freud, 250). Freud later recanted—or, more accurately,
qualified this position, but not until 1937, that is, well after the publication ofAuto-
da-Fé in 1935.
89. This from a remark about Broch where Canetti is discussing Broch’s Freud
enthusiasm: ‘‘Es war kein kaltes oder machtgieriges Schweigen, wie es von der
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Analyse her bekannt ist, wo es darum geht, daß einMensch sich rettungslos einem
anderen ausliefert, der sich kein Gefühl für oder gegen ihn erlauben darf ’’ (Das
Augenspiel, 34).
90. AF, 409; ‘‘ ‘Aber Jean, sie liegt im Netz, siehst du sie nicht?’ Immer hatte er
recht. Der Freund öffnete den Mund, und schon war die Frau da’’ (DB, 447).
91. AF, 409, trans. rev. While Wedgwood’s rendering fails to connote that
Georg actually conjures Jeanne for his patient every day, I am perhaps guilty here
of overcorrection. The German reads: ‘‘Alle Tage verhalf er Jean zu ihr’’ (DB, 448).
92. AF, 411, trans. rev.; ‘‘Von der viel tieferen und eigentlichsten Triebkraft der
Geschichte, demDrang derMenschen, in eine höhereTiergattung, dieMasse, auf-
zugehen und sich darin so vollkommen zu verlieren, als hätte es nie einen Men-
schen gegeben, ahnten sie nichts. Denn sie waren gebildet, und Bildung ist ein
Festungsgürtel des Individuums gegen die Masse in ihm selbst’’ (DB, 449).
93. AF, 411, trans. rev. Because the English translation of Masse und Macht by
Carol Stewart uses ‘‘crowd’’ for ‘‘Masse,’’ I have done so here as well. Additionally,
I have substituted ‘‘individuals’’ for Wedgwood’s ‘‘single people’’ to avoid a mis-
understanding (such as ‘‘unmarried’’). I suspect one could go a step further here
and add an adjective such as ‘‘monadic’’ or ‘‘isolated’’ to capture the contextual
meaning of the ‘‘die übrigen einzelnen.’’ The German reads: ‘‘Zahllose Menschen
werden verrückt weil die Masse in ihnen besonders stark ist und keine Befriedi-
gung findet. Nicht anders erklärte er sich selbst und seine Tätigkeit. Früher hatte
er persönlichen Neigungen, seinem Ehrgeiz und den Frauen gelebt; jetzt lag ihm
nur daran, sich unaufhörlich zu verlieren. In dieser Tätigkeit kam er Wünschen
und Sinnen der Masse näher, als die übrigen einzelnen, von denen er umgeben
war’’ (DB, 450).
94. DB, 450.
95. AF, 412; ‘‘Ein trauriger Tag, sagte er sich leise . . . immer atmete er im Strom
fremder Empfindungen. Heute spürte er nichts um sich, nur die schwere Luft’’
(DB, 451).
96. AF, 413; ‘‘Meine Frau langweilt mich’’ (DB, 452).
97. AF, 413, trans. rev.; ‘‘ ‘Hau ihr nur eine herunter,’ sagte Georges, diese
zweiunddreißigjährige Treue hatte er satt. Jean schlug zu und schrie selbst für die
Frau um Hilfe’’ (DB, 451).
98. AF, 413; ‘‘Außerdem war die Wachstafel im Schmelzen’’ (DB, 452).
99. AF, 414; ‘‘Warum geh’ ich nicht endlich in dieWohnung?Weil die Frau dort
auf mich wartet. Sie will Liebe . . . Die Wachstafel drückte’’ (DB, 453).
100. AF, 406; ‘‘Seine Frau hielt es nach wenigenWochen äußerster Armut nicht
mehr bei ihm aus und brannte mit einem Unteroffizier durch’’ (DB, 444).
101. The very concept of transference short-circuits any effort to situate the
analysand’s projections onto the analyst within the context of economic, social, or
adult intersubjective relationships. For, as Peter Brooks reminds us, ‘‘Transference
is itself a kind of metaphor, a substitutive medium for the analysand’s infantile ex-
periences’’ (Reading for the Plot, 99). Laplanche and Pontalis elucidate further: ‘‘As
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an expansion of the second Freudian theory of the psychical apparatus, the ana-
lytic treatment may be deemed to provide the ground on which intrasubjective
conflicts—themselves the relics of the real or phantasied intersubjective relation-
ships of childhood—can once more find expression in a relationship where com-
munication is possible. As Freud noted, the analyst may for example find himself
placed in the position of the super-ego; more generally, the whole interplay of
identifications is given free rein to develop and to become ‘unbound’ ’’ (Language
of Psychoanalysis, 460).
102. ‘‘In seiner Wohnung richtete er Bett und Netz her, die Frau wäre endlich
aufgetaucht. Jean träte leise herein und zöge das Netz zu’’ (DB, 448).
103. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 135.
104. Gay, Freud, 552.
105. Stieg, ‘‘Canetti und die Psychoanalyse,’’ 66.
106. Gay explains this as in part due to the state of biological science: ‘‘These
conflicting appraisals [of the instincts] reach down to the fundamentals of psy-
chology as a science. Freud was never completely happy with his theory of the
drives, whether in its early or its late form. In ‘On Narcissism’ he lamented
the ‘complete lack of a theory of the drives’—Trieblehre—that might provide the
psychological investigator with a dependable orientation. This absence of theo-
retical clarity was in large part due to the inability of biologists and psychologists
to generate a consensus on the nature of drives or instincts’’ (Freud, 341).
107. Though he begins by suggesting that Freud’s termite metaphor offers a
fruitful point of comparison, and proceeds to argue, ‘‘daß Canetti hier auch ein
ironisches Spiel mit der Psychoanalyse treibt’’ (‘‘Canetti und die Psychoanalyse,’’
68–69), Stieg ends up postulating that Canetti actually employs Freud’s con-
cepts of repression and sublimation in order to mount a critique of high culture:
‘‘[Canetti] zeigt uns in der Blendung die Kultur in der Gestalt Peter Kiens als Aus-
druck der extremstenVereinzelung, der konsequentesten Distanz zu den anderen
Menschen, allen voran den Frauen. Er zeigt sie uns alsHochkultur in einemdurch-
aus Freudschen Licht als Exzesse derVerdrängung und Sublimation. Mit Freud zu
sprechen, wäre Peter Kiens Ende eine radikaleWiederkehr desVerdrängten’’ (69).
108. AF, 432, trans. rev.; ‘‘Manche Insekten schon haben es besser als wir.
Eine oder einige wenige Mütter bringen den ganzen Stock zur Welt. Die übrigen
Tiere sind zurückgebildet. Kann man enger beisammenleben, als die Termiten
es gewohnt sind? Welche furchtbare Summe geschlechtlicher Reizungen müßte
ein solcher Stock vorstellen . . . besäßen die Tiere noch ihr Geschlecht! Sie be-
sitzen es nicht, und die dazugehörigen Instinkte nur in geringem Maße. Selbst
dieses Wenige fürchten sie. Im Schwarm, bei dem Tausende und Abertausende
von Tieren scheinbar sinnlos zugrunde gehen, sehe ich eine Befreiung von der
gespeicherten Geschlechtlichkeit des Stockes. Sie opfern einen kleinen Teil ihrer
Masse, um den größeren von Liebeswirrungen freizuhalten. Der Stock würde an
Liebe, wäre sie einmal erlaubt, zugrunde gehen’’ (DB, 474).
109. Laplanche and Pontalis, Language of Psychoanalysis, 214–17.
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110. AF, 432–33, trans. rev.; ‘‘Ich weiß keine großartigere Vorstellung als die
einer Orgie im Termitenstock. Die Tiere vergessen—eine ungeheuerliche Erin-
nerung hat sie gepackt—was sie sind, blinde Zellen eines fanatischen Ganzen.
Jedes will für sich sein, bei hundert oder tausend von ihnen fängt es an, der
Wahn greift um sich, ihr Wahn, ein Massenwahn, die Soldaten verlassen die Ein-
gänge, der Stock brennt vor unglücklicher Liebe, sie können ja nicht paaren, sie
haben kein Geschlecht, der Lärm, die Erregung, alles Gewohnte überbietend,
lockt ein Ameisengewitter an, durch die unbewachten Tore dringen die Todfeinde
ein, welcher Krieger denkt an Verteidigung, jeder will Liebe, der Stock, der viel-
leicht Ewigkeiten gelebt hätte, die Ewigkeiten, nach denen wir uns sehnen, stirbt,
stirbt an Liebe, an dem Trieb, durch den wir, eine Menschheit, unserWeiterleben
fristen! Eine plötzliche Verkehrung des Sinnreichsten ins Sinnloseste’’ (DB, 474).
111. Frosh, Politics of Psychoanalysis, 40.
112. AF, 432; ‘‘Offenbar erwartete er von Georg ihre Entfernung’’ (DB, 473).
113. AF, 432, trans. rev.; ‘‘Ich glaube, daß du die Bedeutung der Frauen stark
überschätzt. Du nimmst sie zu ernst, du hältst sie für Menschen wie wir. Ich sehe
in den Frauen ein nur vorläufig notwendiges Übel. Manche Insekten haben es
besser als wir’’ (DB, 473–74).
114. AF, 444; ‘‘Welches Elend in alle Zukunft!’’ (DB, 487).
115. AF, 444, trans. rev.; ‘‘Warum in alle Zukunft? Wir sprachen doch vorhin
von den Termiten, die das Geschlecht überwunden haben. Es ist also weder ein
unbedingtes noch ein unausrottbares Übel’’ (DB, 487).
116. AF, 432, trans. rev.; ‘‘wenn (Kien) doch einfach die Ereignisse . . . erzählend
bis an ihren Ursprung zurückverfolgte!’’ (DB, 473; see also 478).
117. Which is not to say that Georg’s threat falls on deaf ears. Indeed, it is
clear that this image of the ‘‘Liebesaufruhr im Termitenstock’’ has burrowed itself
deeply into Kien’s consciousness, for he feels compelled to refute it throughout
this chapter (see DB, 475, 487, 489, 490).
118. AF, 437, trans. rev.; ‘‘Aus eigenem Willen allein, von niemandem unter-
stützt, nicht einmal einen Mitwisser besaß ich, habe ich mich von einem Druck,
einer Last, einem Tod, einer Rinde von verfluchtem Granit befreit. Wo wäre ich
wenn ich auf dich gewartet hätte?’’ (DB, 479).
119. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 21:97.
120. Frosh, Politics of Psychoanalysis, 45. Gay’s exegesis of Civilization and Its
Discontents corroborates Frosh’s on this point: ‘‘Women, who have increasingly
become love’s guardians, are particularly hostile to civilization that corners the
attention of their men and the service of their children’’ (Freud, 548).
121. AF, 433; ‘‘die wirklichen großen Denker sind vom Unwert der Frau über-
zeugt’’ (DB, 475).
122. AF, 437, trans. rev., though neither Wedgwood nor I has done justice to
the idiomatic phrase ‘‘das Blaue vom Himmel herunterlügen,’’ which means ‘‘to
lie shamelessly’’ and is here cleverly reversed by Kien: ‘‘Ich werde dir beweisen,
daß alle Frauen Haß verdienen; du meinst ich verstünde mich nur auf den Orient.
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Die Beweise, die er braucht, holt er sich aus seinen Spezialgebieten—das denkst
du dir. Ich werde dir das Blaue vom Himmel herunterholen, aber keine Lügen,
Wahrheiten, schöne, harte, spitze Wahrheiten, Wahrheiten jeder Größe und Art,
Wahrheiten fürs Gefühl undWahrheiten für denVerstand, obwohl bei dir nur das
Gefühl funktioniert, duWeib’’ (DB, 479).
123. Roberts, ‘‘Crowds and Power or the Natural History,’’ 47.
124. Ibid., 49–50.
125. For example, Frosh notes that for Freud ‘‘there is no necessity to conceive
of any inherent embeddedness of [the] individual in culture, a characteristic as-
sumption of most progressive philosophies. Explanation of behaviour is provided
by the vicissitudes of instinct; the environment is only relevant to the extent that
it supports or opposes satisfaction’’ (Politics of Psychoanalysis, 27).
126. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 42. Broch’s remarks refer here to both Die Blen-
dung and the contemporaneous play Hochzeit.
127. Adorno, ‘‘Canetti: Discussionwith Adorno,’’ 13; Adorno also takes approv-
ing notice of Canetti’s emphasis on the violence within society that is often con-
cealed from view (14).
128. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 142–43.
129. Canetti, Crowds and Power, 12. In the orginal, Canetti underscores the
sense of equality by italicizing the word ‘‘gleiche.’’
130. Canetti, Masse und Macht, 26.
131. Though Carol Stewart translates ‘‘Stachel’’ as ‘‘sting,’’ I continue to prefer
‘‘thorn’’ because it more accurately represents Canetti’s almost mechanistic con-
cept and also provides a sense of the ongoing substantialityof this concept. ‘‘Sting’’
may suggest a pain that dissipates over time, possibly on its own. Canetti’s curious
notion of ‘‘thorns’’ is quite different.
132. For a brief overview, see my encyclopedia entry ‘‘Crowds and Power.’’
chapter 6
1. Earlier McFarlane had rejected the characterization of modernism as either
the ‘‘reconciliation of opposites’’ or as ‘‘ambivalence,’’ claiming instead a much
more complex model: ‘‘It is then as though the Modernist purpose ought to be
defined as the resolution of Hegel with Kierkegaard; committing oneself neither
wholly to the notion of ‘both/and,’ nor wholly to the notion of ‘either/or,’ but (as
it were) to both—and to neither. Dauntingly, then, the Modernist formula be-
comes ‘both/and and/or either/or’ ’’ (‘‘Mind of Modernism,’’ 88). In championing
Eliot and Canetti, as we shall see, McFarlane appears to drop the Kierkegaardian
side of his argument.
2. Ibid., 92.
3. Ibid., 91.
4. Stevenson’s book is built around this notion, which he defines in this man-
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ner: ‘‘philosophers such as Bergson, Nietzsche and William James all suggest a
change in something as fundamental as the relation of mind and world—a kind of
epistemological shift, from relative confidence towards a sense of increased unreli-
ability and uncertainty in the means by which reality is apprehended in thought’’
(Modernist Fiction, 11). Stevenson qualifies this central idea by referring to Fou-
cault’s parallel concept of paradigm shifts, which is meant to remind us that phi-
losophy should not naively be construed as the ‘‘cause’’ of changes in art: ‘‘Though
it would obviously be misleading to rule out any possibility of philosophy influ-
encing life or literature directly, relations between the various spheres need to be
considered reciprocal rather than only hierarchical’’ (13).
5. On the rich variety of modernism, see, for example Bradbury and McFar-
lane: ‘‘In short, Modernism was in most countries an extraordinary compound of
the futuristic and the nihilistic, the revolutionary and the conservative, the natu-
ralistic and the symbolist, the romantic and the classical. It was a celebration of
a technological age and a condemnation of it; an excited acceptance of the belief
that the old regimes of culture were over, and a deep despairing in the face of that
fear; a mixture of convictions that the new forms were escapes from historicism
and the pressures of the time with convictions that they were precisely the living
expressions of these things’’ (‘‘Name and Nature of Modernism,’’ 46).
6. Arguing against Lukács’s claim thatmodernismwishes utterly to escape his-
tory and politics, Jameson argues that ‘‘the modernist project is more adequately
understood as the intent . . . to ‘manage’ historical and social, deeply political im-
pulses, that is to say, to defuse them, to prepare substitute gratifications for them’’
(in Stevenson, Modernist Fiction, 220).
7. Lukács, ‘‘Ideology of Modernism,’’ 21.
8. Tiresias’s visionary acumen, it must be stressed, derives not only from his
paradoxical ‘‘visionary blindness,’’ but from an almost mystical ontological status
that permits him to ‘‘resolve within his own androgynous person’’ the full range
of the poem’s dramatis personae (McFarlane, ‘‘Mind of Modernism,’’ 91).
9. Ibid.






16. ‘‘The conventional use of the term modernism to denote the poets, novel-
ists, and critics who reacted against the process of modernization—the advance
of industrialization, bureaucracy, science, technology, and other institutions of
modernity—has been rendered increasingly problematic by the more frequent
use of the same term, within the same discourse, to refer to the theorists who
inspired and defended this project of the mastery of nature, or who criticized it
from a perspective more sympathetic than that displayed by T. S. Eliot and other
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figures in the modernist canon’’ (‘‘Knower and Artificer,’’ 50). Hollinger goes on
to note Marshall Berman’s recent and ambitiously inclusive brief for modernism,
which Hollinger attributes in part to Berman’s struggle ‘‘against the hermeneutic
imperialism of the postmodernists’’ (50).
17. Ibid., 29.
18. ‘‘The chief significance of the Knower and Artificer is not that so many
intellectuals werewilling to choose one absolutely over the other but that somany
were willing to define the dilemmas and opportunities of modern culture so ex-
tensively in the terms of these two personae’’ (ibid., 36; see also 36–44).
19. Huyssen, After the Great Divide, ix.
20. This and the quotation directly preceding it can be found in ibid.
21. Ibid., vi.
22. Jameson, ‘‘Afterword,’’ 209. The real proof of Adorno’s error, Jameson ar-
gues, is the fact that capitalism has successfully commodified modernist art to an
amazing extent. Commenting on Adorno’s claim for the political efficacy of mod-
ernism, Jameson notes: ‘‘In retrospect, this now seems a most unexpected revival
of a Lukács-type ‘reflection theory’ of aesthetics, under the spell of a political and
historical despair that plagues both houses and finds praxis henceforth unimagin-
able.What is ultimately fatal to this new and finally itself once more anti-political
revival of the ideology of modernism is less the equivocal rhetoric of Adorno’s
attack on Lukács or the partiality of his reading of Brecht, than very precisely the
fate of modernism in consumer society itself ’’ (209).
23. It is not the fact that high modernism is inherently ambivalent about the
‘‘disintegrating’’ modern world (as many commentators continue to believe) that
collapses the opposition, but that in its very transcendent, conciliatory, unifying
mode (à la Eliot) high modernism dissolves the distinction by encompassing both
options—critique and resolution, or, better: resolution as critique—leaving the
‘‘ideology of modernism,’’ so to speak, in the eye of the beholder.
24. Adorno, ‘‘Commitment,’’ 190.
25. Fried in Ein Dichter gegen Macht und Tod.
26. Adorno, ‘‘Commitment,’’ 190.
27. See, for example, Lawrence Langer’s Admitting the Holocuaust and The
Holocaust and the Literary Imagination as well as Alvin Rosenfeld,A Double Dying
and Thinking about the Holocaust.
28. Adorno, ‘‘Commitment,’’ 180, my emphasis.
29. Ibid., 193; the phrase quoted directly above (‘‘the very features . . .’’) can be
found in ibid., 188.
30. ‘‘The uncalculating autonomy of works which avoid popularization and
adaptation to the market, involuntarily becomes an attack on them . . . Works of
art that react against empirical reality obey the forces of that reality, which reject
intellectual creations and throw them back on themselves. There is no material
content, no formal category of artistic creation, however mysteriously transmit-
ted and itself unaware of the process, which did not originate in the empirical
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reality from which it breaks free’’ (ibid., 190). Yet how this actually works remains
shrouded in mystery, and thus a vulnerable point in Adorno’s aesthetic theory.
That Schiller was in fact on his mind while writing this essay can be gleaned from
this criticism of Sartre: ‘‘The content of his art becomes philosophy as with no
other writer except Schiller’’ (ibid., 182).
31. Ibid., 190, my emphasis.
32. Ibid., 190–91.
33. Ibid., 194.
34. For a critical treatment of realism’s ‘‘panoptic’’ epistemic privilege, see
Dorrit Cohn, ‘‘Optics and Power in the Novel.’’
35. Bradbury and McFarlane, ‘‘Name and Nature of Modernism,’’ 47.
36. Lukács, ‘‘Ideology of Modernism,’’ 26.
37. Adorno, ‘‘Commitment,’’ 191.
38. Szondi’s observation, which derives from Lukács’s pathbreaking assess-
ment of Expressionism, is quoted in Schürer, ‘‘Nebeneinander:Aspekte der Kultur
der Weimarer Republik,’’ 402.
39. On other ways that the novel exonerates the protagonist, see Tatar, ‘‘Gen-
der, Violence, and Agency in Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz.’’
40. Bradbury and McFarlane, ‘‘Name and Nature of Modernism,’’ 27.
41. Binderdistinguishes ‘‘vision par derriere (Darstellung eines Erlebnisses vom
Erzähl-Ich aus’’ from ‘‘vision avec (Darstellung eines Erlebnisses vom Erlebnis-Ich
aus),’’ quoted in Jayne, Erkenntnis und Transzendenz, 18.
42. Significantly, it was not until the newermodernist paradigms displaced the
traditional high modernist model that Kafka’s humor was rediscovered. Though
Kafka was known to laugh during his own readings, the high modernist con-
struction of Kafka, which contains the most diverse and mutually exclusive of
approaches, was dominated by a serious, even lugubrious, reading.
43. Huyssen, After the Great Divide, 97.
44. Ibid., 114.
45. In discussing Brecht (in ‘‘Commitment,’’ 182), Adorno opposes modernist
abstraction to identification.
46. See Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 131 and 142.
47. An early document of German literary modernism, Hofmannsthal’s Lord
Chandos Brief, provides a clear example of the contrast between the representa-
tion of individual psychic diffusion and general cultural anomie on the one hand,
and the analysis of this situation, implicit in the very eloquent and sophisticated
formulation, on the other. Lord Chandos’s predicament cannot, in other words,
be equated with Hofmannsthal’s.
48. An example of this approach is Robert Holub’s Reflections of Realism.
49. ‘‘Adorno’s dismissal of Sartre’s literary attempt to incite individual subjects
to free and active choicewas based on the premise that late capitalism had devised
an all-inclusive ‘administered universe,’ a political order purged of contradiction
and therefore of the objective possibility of choice . . . It should be added here
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that the notion of a residual transcendental subject was structurally essential to
Adorno’s thought, furnishing the only point of leverage in a putatively totalitar-
ian social order (and founding the possibility of a thought that could indict it as
such). No assessment of his aesthetics can overlook this semi-miraculous persis-
tence of the subject in a conceptual schema that posits its complete reification.
Sartre’s belief in the efficacy of individual engagement seems much less question-
able than a theory in which the production of ‘autonomous’ works of art is little
less than magical’’ (Jameson, ‘‘Presentation IV,’’ 147).
50. On this see Zuidervaart’s Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, especially chapter 6,
‘‘Political Migration’’ (122–49).
51. See, for example, this statement: ‘‘Bydismantling appearance, [autonomous
works of art] explode from within the art which committed proclamation sub-
jugates from without, and hence only in appearance. The inescapability of their
work compels the change of attitude which committed works merely demand’’
(Adorno, ‘‘Commitment,’’ 191).
52. ‘‘Themoment of true volition, however, is mediated through nothing other
than the form of the work itself, whose crystallization becomes an analogy of that
other condition which should be. As eminently constructed and produced ob-
jects, works of art, including literary ones, point to a practice from which they
abstain: the creation of a just life’’ (ibid., 194).
53. Brecht’s was surely one of the very few voices within modernism crying
out in open support of this ‘‘analytic self ’’; indeed, his whole aesthetic program
depends upon it. But Brecht’s overtly Communist politics and his primary inter-
est in drama, as well as Adorno’s unsparing criticism of him, ensured that he
would have little effect on the construction of Anglo-American high modernism.
Though he praised Brecht’s goals, Adorno derided his output as naively didactic,
purveying ‘‘bad politics,’’ and as amenable to readings from ‘‘official humanism’’
(‘‘Commitment,’’ 188). On Brecht’s reception in the United States, see Mews, ‘‘An
Un-American Brecht?’’
54. Lukács, ‘‘Ideology of Modernism,’’ 26–27.
55. This point—that rich psychological portrayal can serve to validate a state
of affairs intended for critique—may in fact explain Broch’s own doubts about the
value of art. Still, as Roche points out, Broch’s critique retains and indeed exem-
plifies ‘‘art’s inherently proleptic function.’’ See Roche, ‘‘National Socialism and
the Disintegration of Values,’’ 375.
56. Zuidervaart uses the term ‘‘deprivileged subject’’ as a designation for the
epistemologically weakened, fragmented self: ‘‘Deep in this movement is the im-
pulse to deprive the subject of its privileged position. In philosophy, this impulse
opposes the constitutive knower first clearly articulated in Descartes’s cogito ergo
sum’’ (Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, 250); this, along with the phrase ‘‘deprivation of
the subject,’’ describes perhapsmore helpfully what is commonly referred to as the
modernist ‘‘fragmented self ’’ or what Stevenson has called the ‘‘epistemological
shift.’’
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57. Lukács, ‘‘Franz Kafka or Thomas Mann?,’’ 51.
58. Lukács, ‘‘Ideology of Modernism,’’ 20–21.
59. Ibid., 21.
60. Lukács argues: ‘‘In any protest against particular social conditions, these
conditions themselvesmust have the central place’’ (ibid., 29).YetCanettimanages
to keep wider social concerns on our mind without this sort of positive depic-
tion. On the other hand, we come to see the subjectivist fantasies as themselves
evidence of a highly problematic social practice.
61. Ibid., 35. Lukács rather directly blames philosophy, and Bergson in par-
ticular, for this subjectivist turn in literature: ‘‘Subjective Idealism had already
separated time, abstractly conceived, from historical change and particularity of
place. As if this separation were insufficient for the new age of imperialism, Berg-
son widened it further. Experienced time, subjective time, now became identical
with real time; the rift between this time and that of the objective world was com-
plete. Bergson and other philosophers who took up and varied this theme claimed
that their concept of time alone afforded insight into authentic, i.e. subjective,
reality. The same tendency soon made its appearance in literature’’ (ibid., 37).
62. It could be argued that Canetti is as close to Adorno as he is to Lukács in
this rejection of historicism (understood as a form of ‘‘false consciousness’’). But
Canetti’s method of engagement would undoubtedly have appalled Adorno, for
he opts to distance himself from this form of populist diversion by means of par-
ody rather than choosing an ‘‘unconsumable’’ modernist aesthetic; for this parody
cannot function without resurrecting and reinscribing its realist target. Though
allied in their rejection of the often disguised consolations of literature, Canetti
and Adorno were, of course, to remain worlds apart regarding aesthetic policy:
Adorno’s almost masochistic aesthetic, developed in response to Nazism and the
Holocaust (and preached, let us recall, to a specifically German audience), pro-
scribes pleasure of almost any sort. The humor of Auto-da-Fé, resting as it does on
the epistemological ‘‘superiority’’ of the reader, would undoubtedly have placed
the novel beyond the pale of Adorno’s conception of proper literary modernism.
Laughing was simply verboten.
63. Georg evinces that second aspect of escapism affiliated in the novel with
popular literature, namely ‘‘respectable’’ literature as a pleasurable, even erotic,
form of dissipation. Auto-da-Fé wryly aligns the Lebemann Georg with this ten-
dency, for he is from the very beginning introduced as someone seeking to cloak
his lechery with more respectable cultural pursuits. The unproblematic and un-
critical process of readerly identification—the slipping in and out of fictional
characters—provides a kind of anesthetizing gratification that purveys in the end
a sensual refuge from, rather than critical perspective on, the modern world.
64. This frequently quoted passage from Eliot has become a commonplace of
high modernism; cited in Stevenson, Modernist Fiction, 212; McFarlane, ‘‘Mind
of Modernism,’’ 83; and elsewhere. It originally appeared in Eliot, ‘‘Ulysses, Order
and Myth.’’
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65. Canetti remarks: ‘‘ ‘Kant fängt Feuer’, so hieß der Roman, hatte mich ver-
wüstet zurückgelassen. Die Verbrennung der Bücher war etwas, das ich nicht ver-
geben konnte. . . denn in der Bibliothek des Sinologen war alles enthalten, was für
die Welt von Bedeutung war . . . und zurück blieb eine Wüste, es gab nun nichts
mehr alsWüste und ich selbst war an ihr schuld. Denn es ist kein bloßes Spiel, was
in einem solchen Buch geschieht, es ist eineWirklichkeit, für die man einzustehen
hat’’ (Das Augenspiel, 9).
66. Lukács accuses the following intellectual trinity of aiding and abetting the
modernist cause in this way: Heidegger, Freud, Bergson. Ironically, Lukács pays
little attention in ‘‘Ideology of Modernism’’ to the wider social conditions that
contributed to the rise of the deprivileged subject.
67. Lukács, ‘‘Ideology of Modernism,’’ 20.
68. Canetti, Das Augenspiel, 61.
69. ‘‘Das scharf Umrissene der Figuren lag ihm’’ (ibid., 110).
70. Ibid., 162.
71. Ibid., 163; see also 122–23.
72. Ibid., 297; see also 83.
73. Indeed, the bulk of the foregoing study should in fact already have demon-
strated the utility of newer approaches to modernism, which Huyssen and Bath-
rick describe rather succinctly as a ‘‘move away from the isolated masters of mod-
ernism toward history and politics’’ (Modernity and the Text, 2). An overview of
this more capacious (and ever expanding) view of modernism can be found in
Heller’s review ‘‘New Life for Modernism,’’ which discusses a number of relevant
books on the topic.
74. Canetti, for example, held his play Komödie der Eitelkeit (published 1950,
but written already in 1934) to be ‘‘eine legitime Entgegnung auf die Bücherver-
brennung’’ of May 10, 1933 (Das Augenspiel, 115; see also 62), rather than an apo-
litical absurdist or existentialist drama.
75. This tendency is identified and refuted in Doppler’s ‘‘Vor- und Gegen-
bilder.’’
76. I provide amore critical assessment of thesematters, including a discussion
of the elusive matter of ‘‘Verwandlung,’’ in my ‘‘End of History.’’
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